Akitto Ledda, D.O., Appellant/Cross-Claim Defendant v. Deaconess Hospital, Inc., Deaconess Hospital Systems, Inc., Deaconess Clinic, Inc., and Deaconess Clinic at Work, Appellees/Cross-Claim Plaintiffs (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] While working as a doctor for Deaconess Clinic, Inc., Dr. Akitto Ledda improperly accessed medical records of individuals who were not his patients. Some of those individuals (“the Plaintiffs”) sued Deaconess Hospital, Inc., Deaconess Hospital Systems, Inc., Deaconess Clinic, Inc., and Deaconess Clinic at Work (collectively, “Hospital”) and Dr. Ledda, raising, as relevant here, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and a respondeat superior theory of liability. Hospital filed a cross-claim against Dr. Ledda for breach of contract and indemnification and moved for partial summary judgment on those issues. Dr. Ledda did not file a response or appear at the hearing, and the trial court entered partial summary judgment for Hospital. Dr. Ledda now appeals pro se.

[2] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Issues

[3] Dr. Ledda raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following four issues:

1. Whether Hospital is entitled to summary judgment because Dr. Ledda breached the employment contract.

2. Whether Hospital is entitled to liquidated damages and prejudgment interest thereon.

3. Whether Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on its claim for indemnity.

4. Whether Hospital is entitled to attorney's fees.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On October 17, 2018, Dr. Ledda entered into a Physician Employment Contract (“the Contract”) with Hospital. Article 4 of the Contract describes the “Duties of Physician[,]” which include § 4.2, “[a]dhering to the ‘Policies and Procedures’ ” of Hospital. App. v. 3 at 12, 13. The policies and procedures of the Hospital include the following documents, which Dr. Ledda signed and/or acknowledged receiving: “Workforce Member's Statement of Confidentiality”, id. at 35, 37, 43; Policy and Procedure No. 60-01 S, regarding “Breaches of Protected Health Information or Personal Information”, id. at 99, 104; Policy and Procedure No. 60-12 S, “Management of Protected Health Information”, id. at 107; and Policy and Procedure No. 70-31 S, “Management of Privacy/Information Security Violations”, id. at 111. Each of those policies and procedures prohibits “access[ing]” confidential information without a legitimate business reason. E.g., id. at 37.

[5] Article 8 of the Contract addresses, among other things, “Confidential Information[.]” Id. at 16. Section 8.3 of the Contract defines confidential information and states that Dr. Ledda “shall have access to certain confidential information.” Id. at 17. That section further provides, in relevant part:

During the Term of this Contract, and at any time thereafter, Physician will not use or disclose any Confidential Information, in whole or in part, to any person or entity for any reason or purpose whatsoever, other than in the course of the proper furtherance of [Hospital's] business or to the extent necessary to carry out Physician's obligations within the scope and course of Physician's employment as set forth in this Contract. Physician further agrees that Physician shall not duplicate, remove, download, disclose, or transfer any Confidential Information in any manner whatsoever and shall at all times keep such Confidential Information secure and confidential.

Id. Section 8.4.4 provides, in relevant part:

The harm resulting to [Hospital] from a violation of the restrictive covenants of Article 8 are [sic] difficult to calculate with precision in advance, but [the Parties] agree they want certainty with respect to any potential damages. Therefore, Physician and [Hospital] agree that a fair estimate of the damage resulting from a breach of Paragraph 8.2 or 8.3 is $200,000 and the Parties agree that said amount shall be the liquidated damages for which Physician shall be liable for such a breach.

Id. at 18.

[6] Section 8.5 provides, in relevant part:

Physician acknowledges that the injury to [Hospital] that would be occasioned by Physician's failure to abide by the terms of this Article 8 shall not be adequately compensated by monetary damages alone, [Hospital's] remedies at law being inadequate. In addition to all other remedies available at law or in equity, including but not limited to monetary or liquidated damages, [Hospital] shall be entitled to seek and obtain immediate and permanent injunctive and other equitable relief ․ These remedies are in addition to all other relief set forth in this Contract and available at law or in equity, along with attorneys’ fees and costs of pursuing available remedies, to enforce the terms of this Contract․.

Id. at 19.

[7] On January 26, 2022, Amanda McCarthy, Hospital's Privacy Officer, became aware of a report of suspicious activity generated by artificial intelligence auditing software employed by Hospital to monitor access of medical records by providers and employees. The alert indicated that Dr. Ledda had questionably accessed the medical records of Ashley Schimmelman. In response to this alert, McCarthy conducted an audit of Ledda's access of Schimmelman's medical record, revealing that Dr. Ledda had accessed the record multiple times dating back to June 2020. McCarthy and Bradley Scheu, Hospital's Chief Medical Officer, subsequently determined that Dr. Ledda had no legitimate business purpose for accessing Schimmelman's records, as Dr. Ledda had never treated her as a patient.

[8] In a February 9 meeting with Dr. Gurpreet Weyer, Hospital's Medical Director of Primary Care, Dr. Ledda “admitted that he knowingly viewed medical records inappropriately and for personal reasons.” Appealed Order at 6. Hospital then placed Dr. Ledda on administrative leave, and McCarthy completed her expanded audit of Dr. Ledda's past access of medical records. The expanded audit disclosed that, in 2020 and 2021, Dr. Ledda had “accessed the medical records of forty-six (46) individuals without a legitimate business reason because he never treated any of the individuals as a patient.” Id. at 7. Hospital terminated Dr. Ledda's employment “for cause” on February 14 and notified all forty-six individuals of Dr. Ledda's improper access of their records. App. v. 3 at 47.

[9] On April 19, 2022, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Dr. Ledda and Hospital, raising, as relevant here, a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and a respondeat superior theory of Hospital's liability. In August of that year, the Plaintiffs entered into a settlement with Dr. Ledda, and the trial court subsequently granted the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the claims against Dr. Ledda.

[10] On April 24, 2023, Hospital moved for summary judgment against the Plaintiffs, and the trial court granted that motion. The Plaintiffs appealed, and a different panel of this Court reversed summary judgment on the issues of intentional infliction of emotional distress and vicarious liability. Harris v. Deaconess Hosp., Inc., 235 N.E.3d 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. In Harris, we held in relevant part that the Plaintiffs’ designated evidence showed there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dr. Ledda intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to the Plaintiffs and whether Dr. Ledda acted within the scope of his employment for purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 232-34. On remand, a jury issued verdicts for Hospital as to each plaintiff's claim that Hospital was vicariously liable for Ledda's alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiffs appealed, and that appeal is pending under Case Number 26A-CT-226.

[11] On September 11, 2023, Hospital filed a cross-claim against Dr. Ledda, seeking damages for breach of contract and indemnity for its liability, “if any, to the Plaintiffs.” App. v. 2 at 65. On January 17, 2025, Hospital moved for summary judgment on all its claims against Dr. Ledda except the total amount of damages. Dr. Ledda did not file a response to Hospital's motion, nor did he appear at the September 29 hearing on the motion. In an order dated October 1, the trial court granted summary judgment to Hospital on its contract and indemnification claims. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Dr. Ledda had breached both § 4.2 and § 8.3 of the Contract; Hospital is entitled to compensatory damages for the breach of contract, the amount of which is to be determined at a later hearing; Hospital is entitled to liquidated damages in the amount of $200,000, plus prejudgment interest, for Dr. Ledda's “breach of § 8.3 of the Contract[,]” Appealed Order at 8; Dr. Ledda has a duty to indemnify Hospital if it is found vicariously liable to the Plaintiffs for Dr. Ledda's intentional infliction of emotional distress; Hospital is entitled to attorney fees it “has incurred and will incur prosecuting” its cross-claim, id. at 10; Hospital is entitled to attorney fees “that it has incurred and will incur defending itself” against the Plaintiffs’ tort claims, id.; and Dr. Ledda must pay Hospital $3,503.45 for attorney fees Hospital had incurred “pursuing this matter to date[,]” id. Dr. Ledda now appeals pro se.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[12] Dr. Ledda appeals the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment to Hospital. We review a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment under the same standard used by the trial court; that is,

[t]he moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is improper if the movant fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. In determining whether summary judgment is proper, the reviewing court considers only the evidentiary matter the parties have specifically designated to the trial court. See Ind. Trial R. 56(C), (H). We construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party's favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.

Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012) (citation modified).

[13] For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences. Hogan v. Magnolia Health Sys. 41, LLC, 161 N.E.3d 365, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)), trans. denied. “In determining whether issues of material fact exist, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility but accept as true those facts established by the designated evidence favoring the non-moving party.”¹ Mann v. Arnos, 186 N.E.3d 105, 115 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citation modified), trans. denied. On review of a grant of summary judgment, we are not bound by the trial court's findings and conclusions and “will affirm if the trial court's entry of summary judgment can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record.” Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 2025).

Issue One: Breach of Contract

[14] The trial court found that Dr. Ledda violated sections 4.2 and 8.3 of the Contract. “The interpretation and construction of contract provisions is a function for the courts.” In re Paternity of A.B., 267 N.E.3d 510, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Reviewing the terms of a contract is a pure question of law, and our standard of review is de novo. Id.

[15] When we interpret a contract, we seek “to determine the parties’ intent while making every attempt to construe the contract's language so as not to render any words, phrases, or terms ineffective or meaningless.” Thomas v. Valpo Motors, Inc., 258 N.E.3d 236, 241 (Ind. 2025) (citation modified). “If the contract's terms are unambiguous, then they are conclusive of the parties’ intent, and courts give the contract its plain meaning.” Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 616 (Ind. 2024) (citation modified). Moreover, “[a] contract is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree about the proper interpretation of its terms. Instead, for an ambiguity to exist, the contract must be subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. (citation modified).

[16] Dr. Ledda does not dispute the trial court's finding that he violated § 4.2 of the Contract, and, indeed, he could not successfully do so. Section 4.2, in plain language, lists complying with Hospital's policies and procedures as one of the “Duties of Physician.” App. v. 3 at 12. And Hospital's designated evidence establishes that its policies clearly prohibit Dr. Ledda from “access[ing]” Confidential Information ² unless it is necessary to perform his job duties as a Hospital employee.³ See Thomas, 258 N.E.3d at 241 (citation modified) (noting that when a “written contract refers to another instrument and makes the terms and conditions of such other instrument a part of it, the two will be construed together as the agreement of the parties”).

[17] However, Dr. Ledda asserts that the designated evidence does not show that he violated § 8.3 of the Contract. Specifically, he notes that § 8.3 of the Contract does not prohibit his “access” of the confidential information but prohibits only specified improper “use[s]” of that information, such as disclosure to others, duplication, distribution, or sale. App. v. 3 at 17, 18. We agree.

[18] The trial court found that Dr. Ledda violated § 8.3 “by accessing the Tort Plaintiffs’ records and information for his own personal curiosity and interest, a use of this information that is prohibited.” Appealed Order at 8. However, the court erred to the extent it conflated the terms “access” and “use” as used in § 8.3 of the Contract. While Hospital's policies contain clear, unequivocal language that prohibits both “access” and different types of “use” of confidential information for non-business reasons, see e.g., App v. 3 at 111 (emphasis added) (prohibiting “use, access, or disclosure” of confidential information for non-business reasons), § 8.3 of the Contract begins by noting that Physicians “shall have access” to confidential information but may not “use or disclose” that information for any reason unrelated to Hospital business, id. at 17. In other words, unlike the language of Hospital's policies and procedures, the plain language of Article 8 of the Contract does not explicitly prohibit “access” of confidential information for non-business reasons, and we may not read such a prohibition into the unambiguous provisions of the Contract. See, e.g., Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v. Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 756 (Ind. 2018) (“[W]e will not add tacit terms into the parties’ express, agreed-upon ones.”).

[19] It is undisputed that Dr. Ledda accessed only the confidential information; there is no designated evidence showing that he “used” the accessed information in some way. See Weyer Affidavit, App. v. 3 at 47 (“Dr. Ledda also admitted during this meeting that he accessed the medical records for personal reasons.”); McCarthy Affidavit, id. at 53 (“The investigation completed by [Hospital] did not reveal that Dr. Ledda disclosed to any third-party any information he may have obtained as a result of his access of medical records without a legitimate business need.”). The designated evidence establishes that access, alone, is not a violation of the plain language of Section 8.3 of the Contract. The trial court erred when it found that Dr. Ledda violated § 8.3 solely by accessing confidential information without a legitimate business need.

Issue Two: Liquidated Damages and Prejudgment Interest

[20] Ledda asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded Hospital liquidated damages and prejudgment interest thereon, per § 8.4.4 of the Contract. The plain terms of that provision allow an award of $200,000 in liquidated damages only for damages resulting from a breach of sections “8.2[⁴ ] or 8.3” of the Contract. App. v. 3 at 18.⁵ As the designated evidence established that Dr. Ledda did not violate § 8.3 of the Contract by merely accessing the confidential information, Hospital is not entitled to an award of liquidated damages for such a violation, nor prejudgment interest on the amount of the liquidated damages.

Issue Three: Indemnity

[21] Dr. Ledda challenges the trial court's award of summary judgment to Hospital on the issue of indemnification. Indemnity is “ ‘[t]he right of an injured party to claim reimbursement for its loss, damage or liability from a person who has such a duty.’ ” Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Libr. v. Charlier Clark & Linard, PC, 929 N.E.2d 838, 848 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 784 (8th ed. 2004)), trans. denied. “A right of indemnification may arise from an express contractual obligation or a statutory obligation or may be implied at common law.” Id. (emphasis added).

[22] Here, Hospital raises a common law right to indemnification.⁶ A party may bring such a claim “only if he is without fault. The right to indemnity may be implied at common law only in favor of one whose liability to another is solely derivative or constructive and only against one whose wrongful act has caused such liability to be imposed.” Id. (citation modified).

[23] The trial court granted summary judgment to Hospital on its indemnification claim “[b]ecause [Hospital] is without fault, [and therefore,] Dr. Ledda owes it a duty of indemnification in this matter.” Appealed Order at 9. Specifically, the court noted that Hospital's “liability, if any, to the Tort Plaintiffs for Dr. Ledda's intentional infliction of emotional distress arises from Dr. Ledda's wrongful conduct [of improperly accessing confidential information], an action for which [Hospital] is without fault.” Id. That finding was based on designated evidence showing that Hospital prohibited Dr. Ledda from accessing confidential information without a legitimate business reason and Dr. Ledda's own admission that he did so anyway. Therefore, the designated evidence supports the trial court's findings that Hospital was without fault and that its vicarious liability, if any, will be based solely upon Dr. Ledda's improper access of confidential information.⁷

[24] However, we agree with Dr. Ledda that it is premature to find that he has an obligation to indemnify Hospital, as Hospital has not yet suffered any loss or damages that could be indemnified. In an indemnification case,

the damage that occurs is the incurrence of a monetary obligation that is attributable to the actions of another party. That is why, generally, parties bringing ․ indemnification claims must wait until after the obligation to pay is incurred, for otherwise the claim would lack the essential damage element.

Pflanz v. Foster, 888 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ind. 2008) (citation modified). In other words, “an obligation to indemnify does not arise until the party seeking indemnity suffers loss or incurs damages,” and a party has not suffered a loss or damage until it “1) pays the underlying claim; 2) pays judgment on the underlying claim; or 3) tenders payment in settlement of the underlying claim.” Masters v. Masters, 99 N.E.3d 711, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citation modified), trans. denied. And this is true “even if indemnity and [the] injured party's claim are litigated contemporaneously.” State Auto. Ins. Co. v. DMY Realty Co., 977 N.E.2d 411, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation modified), trans. denied.

[25] Here, Hospital has not been ordered to pay the Plaintiffs anything on their claims. Rather, on remand following this Court's opinion in Harris, the jury returned verdicts for Hospital on all of the Plaintiffs’ claims, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The Plaintiffs’ appeal of that judgment is currently pending in Case Number 26A-CT-226. If the Plaintiffs’ appeal is unsuccessful, Hospital will not be vicariously liable to them for any payment and, therefore, will suffer no damage that could be indemnified by Dr. Ledda. If the Plaintiffs are successful on appeal and obtain a judgment against Hospital under a vicarious liability theory, Dr. Ledda will have a duty to indemnify Hospital at the time Hospital pays such judgment. See, e.g., Masters, 99 N.E.3d at 719.

[26] Because Hospital has not been ordered to pay the Plaintiffs on any of their claims, it is not presently entitled to indemnification on those claims. The trial court erred when it held that Dr. Ledda currently owes Hospital a duty to indemnify.

Issue Four: Attorney's Fees

[27] Dr. Ledda appeals the trial court's order that he must pay the attorney's fees Hospital “has incurred and will incur” defending itself against the Plaintiffs’ claims and prosecuting its own cross-claims against Dr. Ledda. Appealed Order at 10. Indiana courts follow the American Rule, under which parties “generally pay their own fees.” Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 806, 815 (Ind. 2012). However, parties to a contract may agree to pay attorney's fees, and such an agreement “is enforceable according to its terms unless the contract conflicts with law or public policy.” Derr Enters., LLC v. Union City Ind. Props., LLC, 253 N.E.3d 1129, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[28] Here, § 8.5 of the Contract discusses various remedies for injuries to Hospital caused by a physician's breach. Those remedies include “attorneys’ fees and costs of pursuing available remedies [ ] to enforce the terms of this Contract.”⁸ App. v. 3 at 19. Hospital pursued both breach of contract and indemnification claims against Dr. Ledda to enforce the terms of the Contract, specifically § 4.2. That is, Hospital's “available remedies” include the breach of contract claim, the defense against the Plaintiffs’ underlying claims, and the indemnification claim. See, e.g., Roadsafe Holdings, Inc. v. Walsh Constr. Co., 164 N.E.3d 726, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Sercon Corp., 654 N.E.2d 1163, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied)) (“ ‘[A]n indemnitee is entitled to recover attorney's fees expended defending the underlying claim and prosecuting the claim for indemnification.’ ”).⁹ Therefore, under the clear terms of the Contract, Hospital is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs incurred in pursuing its breach of contract and indemnity claims and defending against the underlying tort claims of the Plaintiffs.

Conclusion

[29] We affirm the trial court's finding that Hospital is entitled to summary judgment on its claim that Dr. Ledda breached § 4.2 of the Contract. However, we reverse the trial court's finding that Dr. Ledda breached § 8.3 of the Contract and its order granting Hospital summary judgment on that claim, as the plain terms of that provision do not apply to mere access of confidential information. We further reverse the trial court's finding that Hospital is entitled to liquidated damages and prejudgment interest on its claim that Dr. Ledda violated § 8.3 of the Contract. We also reverse the trial court's finding that Dr. Ledda currently owes Hospital a duty to indemnify, as the merits of the Plaintiffs’ tort claims are still pending on appeal. And, finally, we affirm the trial court's order granting Hospital $3,503.45 for the attorney's fees and costs it had incurred as of the date of the trial court's order. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

[30] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dr. Ledda seems to assert that the trial court failed to make its summary judgment determination based on the designated evidence but rather simply took Hospital's factual assertions as “established” because Dr. Ledda did not respond to Hospital's motion. Appellant's Br. at 19. The trial court rules provide that “[s]ummary judgment shall not be granted as of course because the opposing party fails to offer opposing affidavits or evidence, but the court shall make its determination from the evidentiary matter designated to the court.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). However, Dr. Ledda is mistaken to the extent he alleges that the trial court failed to make its summary judgment determination based on the designated evidence; in fact, the trial court's order cited to designated evidence as support for each of its factual findings.

2.   There is no dispute that the information Dr. Ledda accessed was “Confidential Information” as defined in the Contract and Hospital's policies and procedures. See, e.g., App. v. 3 at 17 (defining confidential information).

3.  See “Workforce Member's Statement of Confidentiality”, App. v. 3 at 37 (emphasis added) (Dr. Ledda acknowledging that he “will not access confidential information unless [he has] a need to know this information in order to perform [his] job”), 43 (emphasis added) (Dr. Ledda acknowledging that he “will not access․ Confidential Information ․ unless it is necessary for [him] to do so in the performance of [his Hospital] assignment”); “Policy and Procedure No. 60-01 S”, id. at 100 (emphasis added) (providing it is Hospital's policy that “employees ․ will not seek access to ․ Protected Health Information except as necessary to perform authorized activities and as permitted by [Hospital's] privacy and information security policies”); “Policy and Procedure No. 70-31 S”, id. at 111 (emphasis added) (providing “[u]se, access or disclosure [of protected health information (“PHI”) and/or personal information (“PI”)] is improper if it occurs without legitimate business need. Business need is established if there is a purpose related to the treatment, payment or operational needs of [Hospital]; the access, use or disclosure is being performed on behalf of [Hospital]; and the access is appropriate to the job functions of the person accessing, using or disclosing the information”), 112 (emphasis added) (providing “[a]ll persons granted access to the PHI and PI created or maintained by [Hospital] in order to carry out their professional, work or contractual obligations will seek access to, use, disclose, alter or destroy PHI or PI only as necessary to carry out their professional/work/contractual responsibilities” and “seeking ․ PHI without legitimate business need is prohibited”).

4.   Section 8.2 is related to a non-compete agreement and is not at issue in this case.

5.   Section 8.4.4 states, in relevant part, “Physician and [Hospital] agree that a fair estimate of the damage resulting from a breach of Paragraph 8.2 or 8.3 is $200,000 and the Parties agree that said amount shall be the liquidated damages for which Physician shall be liable for such a breach.” (Emphasis added). Thus, we note that, by its clear terms, the liquidated damages provision does not apply to the violation of § 4.2 of the Contract.

6.   Thus, Dr. Ledda is incorrect when he contends that Hospital is not entitled to indemnification because it failed to identify a provision in the Contract in which Dr. Ledda agreed to it.

7.   Dr. Ledda points to this Court's prior opinion in Harris where we denied Hospital summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability because the designated evidence raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Dr. Ledda was acting within the scope of his employment. 235 N.E.3d at 233-34. However, it is unclear how Dr. Ledda believes Harris supports his assertion that Hospital is not entitled to indemnification. Harris involved a summary judgment motion between different parties (i.e., the Plaintiffs and Hospital) and with different designated evidence. Regarding the latter, the Plaintiffs in Harris designated evidence that has not been designated in the current summary judgment motion between Dr. Ledda and Hospital—for example, the affidavit of a HIPAA security expert who opined that Hospital “could have and should have done more to monitor Dr. Ledda's record access[.]” Id. at 234. Thus, even if we found that Harris addressed a similar issue (i.e., the issue of whether Hospital shared some “fault” for the impermissible access of confidential information), that opinion is distinguishable on its facts and is not binding as the law of the case. See, e.g., Mercer Belanger Pro. Corp. v. Gaeta, 241 N.E.3d 1159, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (emphasis added) (citation modified) (“The law of the case doctrine provides that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate court in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts.”), trans. denied.

8.   Thus, unlike in § 8.4.4, which by its terms allows liquidated damages only for violations of Article 8 of the Contract, the plain language of § 8.5 establishes that attorney's fees and costs may be awarded for the violation of any “term[ ] of the Contract,” which obviously includes § 4.2. App. v. 3 at 19.

9.   Dr. Ledda purports to quote Dale Bland Trucking, Inc. v. Kiger, 598 N.E.2d 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied, as follows: “Unless an agreement specifically provides otherwise, indemnity language is not construed to require reimbursement of attorney fees incurred in establishing the right to indemnification.” Appellant's Br. at 30. However, we find no such quotation in that case. Rather, in Dale Bland, a panel of this Court reiterated the well-settled rule that, in Indiana, “each party to litigation must pay for its own attorney's fees, absent a statute or agreement authorizing such an award” and held that no agreement to pay attorney's fees was at issue in that case. 598 N.E.2d at 1105-06. Here, of course, the Contract does include a provision for attorney's fees incurred in pursuing “available remedies” to enforce the Contract, which includes a claim for indemnification. App. v. 3 at 19.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.