Nikki Nichole Dyer, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Nikki Nichole Dyer appeals her conviction for Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more, alleging the court fundamentally erred by admitting her statements into evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 27, 2023, around 4:15 a.m., Grant County Sheriff's Office (GCSO) Sergeant David Meeks responded to a disturbance. Sergeant Meeks observed two people on the scene: Dyer and a man, later identified as Raymond Ferguson. Dyer was sitting in the driver's seat of a minivan, and Ferguson approached Sergeant Meeks. Ferguson immediately offered that Dyer had driven him home. After Ferguson disobeyed Sergeant Meeks’ directions, he was handcuffed and arrested. As he was being placed in a patrol vehicle, Ferguson volunteered that Dyer was “driving drunk” and she drove him home because he “had too much.” State's Ex. 1 at 4:45-5:10.

[3] Meanwhile, GCSO Deputy Benjamin Huntington arrived and spoke with Dyer, who was still seated in the driver's seat of the van. Dyer voluntarily said, “We've both been drinking. I had two drinks. He's drank a lot. I was the sober driver. When I turned the corner up there he fell out of his seat and ․ got mad.” State's Ex. 2 at 1:15-1:35. She explained they had gone to two bars and, while she was driving home, Ferguson threw a burrito at her which left a mess on her steering wheel.

[4] Sergeant Meeks then approached Dyer, and she reiterated that she had two drinks that evening then drove home. He observed that Dyer's eyes were “red and glossy” and smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from her. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Dyer told Sergeant Meeks she and Ferguson arrived home about twenty minutes prior and confirmed she had not had any other drinks after driving home. She consented to multiple field sobriety tests, including the “horizontal gaze nystagmus,” “the walk and turn and the one leg stand” and displayed signs of intoxication during each test. Id. at 6, 7. Dyer also submitted to a field breathalyzer test, which registered at 0.097. She was then transported to the sheriff's office where she completed a certified breath test that showed her ACE was 0.098.

[5] Dyer was charged with Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more. At a bench trial on October 9, 2025, Sergeant Meeks and Deputy Huntington testified to Dyer's statements without any objection from Dyer. The State admitted body-worn camera footage from both officers, and Dyer made no objection to the admission of her statements therein.¹ The trial court found Dyer guilty as charged, sentenced her to five days in jail, and ordered her license suspended for one year. Dyer now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “We generally review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.” Perry v. State, 267 N.E.3d 20, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “However, the failure to object when evidence is admitted results in waiver of the issue for appellate review unless fundamental error occurred.” Id. Dyer concedes that she did not object to the admission of her statements contemporaneously therewith but argues their admission amounts to a fundamental error.² “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and available only when the record reveals a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, where the harm or potential for harm cannot be denied, and which violation is so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted).

[7] Dyer argues the State failed to prove the corpus delicti prior to admitting her statement that she drove the vehicle; thus, she contends the court's admission of her statement was a fundamental error. We recently reviewed the corpus delicti rule in Seal v. State, 105 N.E.3d 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, quoting our Supreme Court's most recent summarization of the rule as follows:

Proof of the corpus delicti means proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone. Thus, admission of a confession requires some independent evidence of commission of the crime charged. The independent evidence need not prove that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely provide an inference that the crime charged was committed. This inference may be created by circumstantial evidence.

․ The State is not required to prove the corpus delicti by independent evidence prior to the admission of a confession, as long as the totality of independent evidence presented at trial establishes the corpus delicti.

***

For the preliminary purpose of determining whether the confession is admissible, the State must present evidence independent of the confession establishing that the specific crime charged was committed by someone. The degree of proof required to establish the corpus delicti for admission of a confession is that amount which would justify the reasonable inference that the specific criminal activity had occurred. It is not necessary to make out a prima facie case as to each element of the offense charged, and the corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

On the other hand, in order to sustain a conviction the corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction, the confession may be considered along with the independent evidence.

Seal, 105 N.E.3d at 208-09 (quoting Shinnock v. State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843-44 (Ind. 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

[8] Dyer asserts there was “no independent evidence that she operated a motor vehicle” and the “only evidence that [she] operated a motor vehicle, was her own statements and admissions to law enforcement.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. But Dyer's argument misses the mark. The State needed to provide independent evidence that the crime was committed by someone to the extent that one could reasonably infer that the criminal activity occurred. It did not need to make a prima facie case as to the driving element alone. Here, there was ample independent and circumstantial evidence to prove the corpus delicti.

[9] When police responded to the disturbance, Dyer was seated in the driver's seat of her van, and Ferguson was the only other person present. Police observed signs of Dyer's intoxication, including her red and glossy eyes and the odor of alcohol emanating from her. Dyer also failed field sobriety tests, displayed signs of intoxication during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and registered 0.097 on a field breathalyzer test. And Ferguson told officers that Dyer was “driving drunk” because he “had too much” to drink. State's Ex. 1 at 4:45-5:10. Dyer also told officers that Ferguson had consumed numerous drinks at the bars that evening.³ This evidence establishes that Dyer and Ferguson were intoxicated and supports the reasonable inference one of them committed the specific criminal conduct of operating a vehicle while intoxicated; thus, the State provided independent evidence of the corpus delicti. Therefore, the court did not err, let alone commit fundamental error, in admitting Dyer's statements.

[10] Further, the conviction is sustainable because the State proved that the crime charged occurred beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition to the evidence described above, Dyer said she had two drinks at the bars that night and repeatedly admitted she drove the car home from the bar. She also confirmed she had not had any other drinks after driving home. Dyer later completed a certified breath test at the sheriff's office, which showed her ACE was 0.098. The totality of the evidence proved Dyer operated a vehicle with an ACE of 0.08 or more.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court admitted the body-worn camera footage over Dyer's objection that it was cumulative of the officers’ testimony.

2.   As the State notes in its brief, Dyer's trial counsel discussed the corpus delicti rule in closing argument; but Dyer made no objection to the admission of any of her statements contemporaneously therewith. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 6, 8, 14, 20. Thus, we agree she can only prevail on appeal if the admission of said statements amounts to a fundamental error.

3.   Dyer's argument makes clear that she is challenging her statement that she operated a motor vehicle, which amounted to an admission of an element of the crime charged; she does not challenge the admission of her other statements regarding Ferguson's state of intoxication.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.