R.T., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.T. appeals his delinquency adjudication for possession of a destructive device, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult.¹ R.T. raises one issue for review: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support his adjudication? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 18, 2024, sixteen-year-old R.T. pushed his grandmother and legal guardian (“Grandmother”) and drove away from their shared home on her moped without permission.² R.T. later wrecked the moped in Columbia City, about ninety minutes from home.

[3] Four days later, Grandmother confiscated R.T.’s cellphone and laptop because he refused to go to school. She hid them in her bedroom before heading to Columbia City to collect her wrecked moped. “[U]sually” when she took things away as punishment, R.T. would go through her room if she left. Tr. Vol. 2 at 79. So, Grandmother locked her bedroom door before leaving the house around 8:00 a.m. When she left, R.T. was alone in the residence. Later the same morning, R.T. called 9-1-1 and said he had broken into Grandmother's room to look for his phone and found “dynamite.” Id. at 97.

[4] Patrolman Triston Kajer of the LaPorte Police Department was one of several officers who responded to the call. R.T. told Patrolman Kajer he found something in Grandmother's bedroom that looked like what he had seen depicted on television as dynamite. R.T. said he “did not know anything about the bombs that were inside the residence” but remarked twice that “neither one of us know that it's not dynamite.” Id. at 101. Patrolman Kajer saw the device “in plain view” in the top drawer of a dresser in Grandmother's bedroom. Id. at 98. He described the device as being “four objects, two of which ․ were in black tape [and] they had gray fuses coming out of them.” Id. at 99. “[T]wo of the objects looked like fireworks and then the other two appeared to be a homemade type of like, bomb.” Id. at 102. Officers removed the device from the home and called the Porter County bomb squad to assess the device.

[5] Detective Dylan Barden arrived on the scene and saw the device after it had been removed from the house. Detective Barden described it as one device consisting of “four separate cannisters [sic] all connected together” by what appeared to be “a wick [or] [s]ome kind of ignitable fuse.” Id. at 88. Detective Barden was present when the bomb squad conducted a “burn test” that determined there were “two separate powders used. One was a flash powder, and one was a black powder.” Id. Two of the canisters were believed to be fireworks—one was wrapped in tape, which “will make an explosion a little bit bigger.” Id. at 95. A third cylinder contained the flash powder and the fourth contained the black powder. The test “used a little bit of the flash powder and black powder ․ just to show that the powder was in fact flammable or explosive.” Id.

[6] Police contacted Grandmother and told her R.T. had called 9-1-1 and they had found “explosive devices” in her dresser drawer. Id. at 80. She returned home and gave consent to a search of the residence. Police did not find any other suspicious devices, but they did collect “some items that [they] believe[d] could have been used to produce this device.” Id. at 90. Specifically, they found a roll of duct tape in the kitchen with “fresh tear marks” that appeared to be the same material used to wrap one of the canisters. Id. at 99. Grandmother also gave consent to a search of R.T.’s electronics. Detective Barden went through the search history on R.T.’s cellphone and found “sovereign citizen or First Amendment auditor-style searches. You know, how to videotape police, how to talk to the police.” Id. at 91.

[7] The State filed a petition in Cause Number 46C01-2405-JD-69 (“Cause No. 69”) alleging R.T. was a delinquent child for possession of a destructive device. In March 2025, a factfinding hearing was held.³ Grandmother testified R.T. was upset that morning because she took his electronics away. She said she had last looked in her dresser drawer at 5 a.m. and there was nothing unusual in it. She said the device was not hers, she did not put it in the drawer, and she had never seen the device before. Patrolman Kajer testified to his interaction with R.T. and said based on R.T.’s statements, he “believe[d] that [R.T.] had something to do with” the device. Id. at 101. Detective Barden testified the search history on R.T.’s phone, to him, “seemed like he was going to be expecting ․ future interactions with police, just based on those specific searches.” Id. at 91.

[8] In closing, the State emphasized evidence that R.T. was mad at Grandmother, was alone in the residence after she left, admitted to entering Grandmother's bedroom in search of his electronics, and had conducted internet searches leading Detective Barden to believe he anticipated speaking to the police. The State asserted the device would be defined as a destructive device because it “was an active device that had two types of powder in it[.]” Id. at 105. R.T. argued the State had not proved he was in possession of a destructive device because “to qualify for a destructive device, there has to be the fact that it can explode. Having flash powder in one and black powder in the other, those two items by themselves, don't explode. And the statute specifically exempts fireworks.” Id. at 106.

[9] The trial court found the device was a destructive device: “[t]here was testimony provided as such; the burn test, flash powder, and black powder together.” Id. The court adjudicated R.T. a delinquent for having possession of a destructive device. In its written findings, the trial court elaborated:

9. The homemade device was identified as a four-canister object constructed of two fireworks and two homemade bombs connected to a wick.

10. The device was tested and contained flash powder and black powder that could ignite as determined by a burn test[.]

11. The object that was found in the home is a destructive device.

Appellant's App. Vol. 4 at 186. The trial court entered a dispositional order placing R.T. under the wardship of the Indiana Department of Correction.

The State provided sufficient evidence to support adjudicating R.T. a delinquent child.

[10] R.T. asks us to reverse his delinquency adjudication for insufficient evidence. A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). We review juvenile adjudications with the same standard. See A.H. v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1147, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We respect the factfinder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). This Court will “affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[11] R.T. asserts the State presented insufficient evidence to support his adjudication because no evidence indicates the object was a “destructive device.” Under Indiana Code Section 35-47.5-5-2, “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) possesses ․ a destructive device, unless authorized by law, commits a Level 5 felony.”⁴

[12] For purposes of this case, a “destructive device” is defined as “an explosive, incendiary, or overpressure device that is configured as a ․ bomb ․ or ․ device that is substantially similar to [a bomb].” I.C. § 35-47.5-2-4(a)(1)(A), (G) (2002). An explosive is “a chemical compound or other substance or mechanical system intended to produce an explosion capable of causing injury to persons or damage to property.” I.C. § 35-47.5-2-7 (2002).

[13] Police found a four-cylinder object in the residence. The device included two firework canisters and two additional canisters, one containing black powder and one containing flash powder. R.T. correctly asserts fireworks are exempt from crimes related to destructive devices. I.C. § 35-47.5-5-1(3) (2006). But at least one of the fireworks was modified by being wrapped in duct tape, which Detective Barden testified increases its explosiveness. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 95. And even if a modified firework is still exempt, the device contained other explosive materials. Detective Barden testified the burn test showed the other two canisters contained powders that were “in fact flammable or explosive.” Id.; see I.C. § 35-47.5-3-1(19), (81) (2002) (classifying black and flash powders as regulated explosives within the meaning of Indiana Code Article 35-47.5). The State's evidence showed the object contained fireworks bound with tape and flammable powders connected by an ignitable fuse. From this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was an explosive device that was configured as a bomb or device substantially similar to a bomb, meeting the definition of a destructive device.

[14] But there are statutory exclusions to the definition of a destructive device. See I.C. § 35-47.5-2-4(b)(1)–(4). R.T. challenges his adjudication under one exclusion: the term “destructive device” does not include a “[d]evice that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon.” I.C. § 35-47.5-2-4(b)(2). R.T. argues he neither designed nor redesigned the device for use as a weapon and that “[n]o evidence was presented to show that the devices recovered were anything more than fireworks taped together with a wick.” Appellant's Br. at 13. Although the term “weapon” is not defined under Indiana Code, this Court has previously defined a weapon as “ ‘an instrument of offensive or defensive combat: something to fight with’ or ‘a means of contending against another.’ ” A.H., 794 N.E.2d at 1150 (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1335 (1985)). “In essence, a weapon is something that is used against another person.” Id. A federal statute similar to Indiana Code Section 35-47.5-2-4 defines “destructive device” and excludes from the definition “any device which is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon[.]” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f). In discussing this exclusion, the Eleventh Circuit stated:

[N]o particular design is required for a destructive device to be designed as a weapon. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the device, as designed, has any value other than as a weapon. In this inquiry, the presence of design features that eliminate any claimed entertainment or other benign value supports a finding that the device was designed as a weapon.

United States v. Hammond, 371 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2004).

[15] In A.H., the fourteen-year-old juvenile and his friends heard that if they mixed aluminum foil and toilet bowl cleaner in a plastic two-liter bottle, it would “burst with a loud ‘boom.’ ” 794 N.E.2d at 1148. They prepared the bottle, placed it in a hole in the juvenile's backyard, and moved a safe distance away. The bottle exploded and a neighbor, who heard “something which sounded louder than a shotgun,” called the police. Police found “the remnants of an acid type bomb.” Id. at 1149 (internal quotation marks omitted). No people or animals were hurt and no property other than the bottle was damaged. The juvenile was alleged to have possessed a destructive device, and the trial court entered a true finding. The juvenile argued on appeal that the evidence did not establish the bottle was a bomb or that it was designed as a weapon. A panel of this Court reversed the adjudication. The Court assumed for the sake of the decision the bottle was a bomb but determined the evidence was clear the juvenile “did not intend that the bottle be used against another person” because he took precautions so no one was hurt and nothing was damaged but the bottle itself. Id. at 1150.

[16] Contrary to the evidence in A.H. that showed a youthful prank, a reasonable factfinder could infer from the evidence in this case that R.T. designed the device for use as a weapon. Sixteen-year-old R.T. had a contentious relationship with Grandmother. He collected various explosive components, wrapped fireworks in tape to increase their explosiveness, bound the components with a wick, and called the object “dynamite.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 98. He put it in an enclosed space in his house. When Patrolman Kajer said, “we do not know that it's dynamite until it's actually confirmed,” R.T. pushed back and said, “neither one of us know that it's not dynamite.” Id. at 101. The device in this case has no value other than as something to be used against another person. The object in this case is not excluded from the definition of a destructive device.

[17] R.T. also argues the evidence fails to prove he designed the device for use as a weapon because it could have just been fireworks. Our Court has explained the difference between a bomb and a firework: “a ‘bomb’ is an explosive device designed to release destructive material or force” whereas a firework is “designed to amuse and delight by producing visible or audible effects.” Smithhart v. State, 591 N.E.2d 149, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). R.T. did not create a device “designed to amuse and delight;” he created an explosive device capable of causing damage to people or property and blamed its existence on Grandmother. See id.

[18] Finally, R.T. alludes to the possession element of the crime, namely whether there was sufficient evidence he had possession of the device. See Appellant's Br. at 11. The State addresses this argument and analyzes both actual and constructive possession. See Appellee's Br. at 10–12. But R.T. did not develop this argument in those terms or cite relevant authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning [and] citations to the authorities ․ relied on[.]”). Even if the possession argument is not waived for failure to make a cogent argument, the evidence most favorable to the judgment is sufficient to support both his actual and constructive possession of the device. Grandmother testified she had never seen the device before, it was not in her drawer the last time she looked, and she did not put it there. R.T. was alone in the home when she left and was the only person there when police arrived. It appeared items in the home had been used in making the device. R.T. had conducted internet searches in apparent anticipation of a police encounter. And when he did talk to police, he admitted to breaking into Grandmother's room to look for his phone and demonstrated knowledge of the device's nature when he called it dynamite. A reasonable factfinder could infer he had possession of the device.

Conclusion

[19] There is sufficient evidence that R.T. had possession of a destructive device.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47.5-5-2 (2014).

2.   As a result of that incident, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging R.T. committed domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and auto theft, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult in Cause Number 46C01-2405-JD-67 (“Cause No. 67”). See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 61. He was also alleged to have committed the status offense of leaving home without permission. See id. R.T. admitted to the allegations of the petition and was placed on probation.

3.   At the same time, the trial court held a factfinding hearing on a petition filed in Cause Number 46C01-2501-JD-9 (“Cause No. 9”) alleging that in January R.T. committed resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and left home without permission, a juvenile status offense. The trial court made a true finding as to that petition. The trial court also heard a petition for modification of the dispositional decree in Cause No. 67 based on Cause No. 9. The trial court found R.T. was in violation of his probation. The dispositional decree being appealed here disposes of all three cases, but R.T. appeals only his adjudication as a delinquent in Cause No. 69.

4.   The statute also criminalizes manufacturing, transporting, distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or offering to distribute a destructive device. I.C. § 35-47.5-5-2(2)–(6). The State focused on possession here.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.