Derrick Daniels, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Derrick Daniels appeals his conviction of Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.¹ Daniels claims the State presented insufficient evidence that he intended to knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm. Because the record contained evidence that would permit the jury to find him guilty, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 8:45 p.m. on November 19, 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Nicholas Mathew (“Officer Mathew”) was patrolling near 34th Street and Keystone Avenue in Indianapolis. Officer Mathew conducted a traffic stop of a red Chevrolet Tahoe (the “Tahoe”) because the Tahoe's license plate was expired. When Officer Mathew approached the Tahoe on the passenger side and looked in the front passenger window, he could see the driver, who was the only occupant of the Tahoe, had his elbow resting on the trigger guard of a firearm. Officer Mathew opened the passenger door, grabbed the firearm, placed it on the hood of the car, and collected information from the driver, who was Daniels. Officer Mathew determined Daniels had a felony conviction that prohibited him from possessing a firearm, and he placed Daniels under arrest. The firearm was loaded and, after being Mirandized, Daniels admitted that he moved the handgun closer to himself as he drove away from a nearby gas station because other people had been walking around the vehicle and looking into the windows.

[3] On November 20, 2024, the State charged Daniels with possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. A jury found Daniels guilty. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a three-year executed sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Daniels argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. When we review sufficiency of the evidence claims, we do not reweigh the evidence. Carter v. State, 273 N.E.3d 825, 832 (Ind. 2026). “We consider only ‘the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict to determine whether there is substantial evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could find the [elements] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (quoting Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1232 (Ind. 2021)). “It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011).

[5] Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon occurs when a “serious violent felon ․ knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm[.]” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). Possession of an item can be proven by actual or constructive possession. Cutshall v. State, 160 N.E.3d 247, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item.” Id. (quoting Eckrich v. State, 73 N.E.3d 744, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied). There can be no doubt in this case that Daniels had direct physical control over the gun, as he placed it on the console of the vehicle that he was driving and his elbow was resting on the trigger guard. Daniels argues instead that he “only touched the gun momentarily and lacked the intent to knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm.”² (Br. of Appellant at 8.)

[6] In support of his argument that the evidence was insufficient because his touch was only “momentary,” Daniels cites Loudermilk v. State, 523 N.E.2d 769, 770-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), in which Loudermilk's conviction of possession of marijuana was overturned for insufficient evidence. The appellate opinion described the facts therein as follows:

The only evidence presented in this case was the testimony of Officer David Hannum (Hannum) of the Indiana University Police Department. At 5:00 a.m. on July 19, 1987, Hannum, while parked in an unmarked vehicle on a street in Bloomington, Indiana, observed a group of four individuals, one of whom was Loudermilk, leaving a party. Engaged in loud conversation, the members of the group proceeded to a street corner at which time a cigarette was produced and passed around the group several times. A member of the group whom Hannum could not identify then withdrew a leather case from a vehicle parked nearby. A clear plastic bag was removed from the case and passed among the individuals in the group, including Loudermilk. Hannum testified that Loudermilk touched the bag only once, holding it for approximately seven seconds before passing it to the next individual. Hannum approached the group, placed them under arrest, and confiscated the plastic bag. The plastic bag contained a green leafy substance, and a field test performed by two other officers indicated the presence of marijuana.

Id. at 770. Our court held “the evidence introduced, and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, are insufficient to sustain a finding that Loudermilk had the intent and capability to exert dominion and control over the marijuana.” Id. at 771. In support, our court noted the State had not demonstrated that Loudermilk owned the car, owned the leather case, or removed the leather case from the car. Because the State proved only that Loudermilk held the plastic bag of marijuana for seven seconds, the State had not demonstrated “Loudermilk had the marijuana under his control or had the intent to exclude others from such control.” Id.

[7] Contrary to Daniels's assertion, the facts herein do not compel the same result as in Loudermilk. First, and probably most importantly, Daniels was alone in the vehicle, which means no one else arguably could have been in possession of the handgun. Second, Daniels was touching the handgun when Officer Mathew looked into the car – unlike Loudermilk, Daniels had actual possession of the handgun. Third, Daniels was alone with the gun for more than seven seconds, as he had driven the vehicle from home to the convenience store. We decline to reverse Daniels’ conviction based on Loudermilk.

[8] In support of his argument that “he lacked the intent to knowingly or intentionally possess a firearm[,]” (Br. of Appellant at 9), Daniels argues his “acts were not aligned [with] the intent the State had to prove.” (Id. at 13.) In support of this assertion, Daniels points to his own testimony from the record, in which he denied having any intention to possess the gun.³ (Id.) (citing Tr. Vol. II at 237-240). The jury was not required, however, to believe Daniels's testimony, see Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1194 (Ind. 1996) (“The jury is not required to believe every part of a defendant's testimony.”), reh'g denied, and we cannot accept Daniels's invitation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. See Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 176 (“appellate courts defer to a trier of fact who saw and heard the witnesses”).

[9] To convict Daniels, the State had to prove he possessed the gun “knowingly or intentionally[.]” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). Herein, Daniels placed the gun on the center console of the car and rested his elbow on the gun's trigger guard. Regardless of whether Daniels wanted to be in possession of the handgun, he had to be aware that he was in actual control of the handgun when he was holding it in place with his elbow. This evidence was sufficient to prove knowing possession of the handgun. We therefore affirm Daniels's conviction.

Conclusion

[10] The jury could infer from the evidence that Daniels knowingly possessed the firearm when he was the sole occupant of the Tahoe and he was touching the firearm when Officer Mathew approached. We accordingly affirm his conviction.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.

2.   Daniels does not challenge his status as a “serious violent felon” as defined by Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5(b).

3.   Daniels testified the Tahoe belonged to one of his car repair customers, he drove the Tahoe because his car was not running, he did not know the Tahoe's plate was expired, he noticed the gun as he was leaving the gas station, and he moved it to the console so the officer could see it as he approached the car.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.