Marysa Marie Rodriguez, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Marysa Marie Rodriguez was charged with murder. She later pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony burglary,¹ the murder charge was dismissed, and she was sentenced to ten years. Rodriguez appeals her sentence, claiming it is inappropriate in light of the nature of her offense and character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The stipulated factual basis says Rodriguez and her boyfriend, Alijah Adams, worked in concert to break into Brendan Heuer's apartment with intent to commit a felony or theft. Rodriguez wanted to fight Jayla Pillow, who was at Heuer's apartment. While Adams and Rodriguez were there, Adams and Heuer also fought. Then Heuer shot and killed Adams.

[3] The State charged Rodriguez with felony murder, and a jury trial was scheduled for July 14, 2025. On July 7—one week before trial was scheduled to begin—Rodriguez entered into an open plea agreement with the State under which she would plead guilty to an added charge of Level 4 felony burglary in exchange for the State moving to dismiss the initial charge of felony murder. The trial court took the plea under advisement and ordered a presentence investigation report (“PSI”) to be completed. The PSI indicated Rodriguez was twenty-one years old at the time of this offense. Rodriguez's criminal record consists of a completed informal adjustment for disorderly conduct as a juvenile and a Class A misdemeanor conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”). She was sentenced to sixty days in the county jail for the OWI, to be served as 180 days of probation. Conditions of her probation included completing a substance use evaluation and a victim impact panel. Rodriguez had been on probation for about a month when she committed this offense.² Rodriguez admitted using marijuana beginning at age sixteen, followed by alcohol, MDMA, Xanax, and cocaine. She uses alcohol every other day, including on the day of the offense. She has never enrolled in substance use treatment. Her risk assessment score placed her in the low category for risk of reoffending.

[4] At Rodriguez's sentencing hearing, her grandmother and father testified about her character. Rodriguez's grandmother stated Rodriguez “has a productive future ahead of her.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. She described Rodriguez as “passionate, generous, [a] hard worker, [who] loves her family and loves the Lord” and stated she was “shocked at the situation” because it “is very unlike [Rodriguez's] character.” Id. She stated she believes “society, as well as [Rodriguez], would be better served by the imposition of a period of probation along with court-ordered counseling[.]” Id. Rodriguez's father testified Rodriguez “has a very sensitive heart” and is a “very loving, loyal person” who is “not afraid to work” and put forth effort. Id. at 21. He believes “this situation has opened her eyes ․ to the seriousness of the path that she was taking” and that “she'll do what is necessary to be a productive human being in society.” Id.

[5] The State offered testimony from Adams’ relatives. Adams’ youngest sister testified to his family contributions and how his loss would “hurt for the rest of [their] lives.” Id. at 23. She did not feel Rodriguez was remorseful or understood the severity of her actions, noting prior to her arrest, Rodriguez “was on social media drinking, partying, and [having] the time of her life with her friends, when [Adams] was in the ground.” Id. at 24. Adams’ oldest sister read a letter from their mother:

There are no words that can express this pain. I received a call four weeks ago from [Rodriguez] from Lake County jail. In this call, she told me she was going to meet with the detectives to tell the truth. That it wasn't too late to tell the truth, and that she needed me to forgive her, and the least she could do is clear my son's name․ I don't know what's happened in the last four weeks, but I guess pleading guilty to burglary is better than conspiracy for murder.

Id. at 26. The mother of Adams’ son also testified:

The same person here today before you pleading for less time is the same girl that [Adams’] family had to watch and endure celebrating his death instead of grieving over it.

* * *

You have been a compulsive liar to [Adams’] family and this courtroom this whole entire year, and you still walk in with a smile․ The smile that you put on your face every time you walk past this grieving family shows the type of person that you are[.]

Id. at 30, 31–32.

[6] In allocution, Rodriguez told Adams’ family she was “deeply sorry for the loss you suffer. Because of careless decisions, a precious life was lost.” Id. at 35–36. She also apologized to her own family, stating, “I know my circumstances have caused them pain as well. The events that took place were tragic, and if I could go back and change them I would[.]” Id. at 36. She promised if she is “given another chance at life, ․ [she will] not take it for granted.” Id.

[7] Rodriguez's counsel asked the trial court to consider a Community Corrections sentence with “perhaps some probation at the end, require her to go to counseling as grandma suggested” because she has a low risk to reoffend, a very limited criminal history, and had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty. Id. at 33. “[T]his is an isolated incident; something like this will never happen again․ This was just a crazy set of circumstances, and she's here accepting responsibility for what happened that night.” Id. at 33–34. The State disagreed that this was unlikely to reoccur: “You choosing to go over to an apartment because [you're] upset with someone to get into a fight, I mean that can happen anytime.” Id. at 34. The State noted Rodriguez was on probation at the time of this offense so prior leniency had not deterred her. And the State argued a suspended sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime because “[w]e're talking about a burglary, ․ [b]ut someone ultimately did die here.” Id. at 35. The State recommended a ten-year sentence.

[8] The trial court accepted Rodriguez's plea. In a thorough statement explaining its sentencing considerations, the trial court noted, “The tragedy of it all is we're left with a situation where really everybody loses.” Id. at 38. In the trial court's assessment, Rodriguez “was the person who really pushed this series of events.” Id. at 40; see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36 (trial court stating in its sentencing order that “[b]y all accounts, [Rodriguez] was an equal aggressor with ․ Adams during the altercation with the occupants of the apartment”). The trial court noted “this is not a probation case. This is not a case where I believe Community Corrections is appropriate either.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 138.

[9] The trial court ultimately found the following aggravators: (1) Rodriguez was on probation at the time of the offense; (2) Rodriguez has a history of criminal convictions; (3) prior leniency afforded to Rodriguez “had no deterrent effect” on her criminal behavior; (4) the harm Rodriguez caused “was significant and much greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission” of the burglary offense because someone died as a result; and (5) Rodriguez's character “is manipulative.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 36–37. The trial court found the following mitigators: (1) Rodriguez pleaded guilty; and (2) Rodriguez admitted responsibility. But the trial court noted the guilty plea was “tempered by the dismissal” of the felony murder charge. Id. at 36.

[10] The trial court found the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and imposed a ten-year sentence, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Rodriguez's sentence is not inappropriate.

[11] Rodriguez asks us to revise her sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[12] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[13] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Rodriguez bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[14] When evaluating the nature of an offense, we begin with the advisory sentence as “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Rodriguez was initially charged with murder while committing or attempting to commit burglary but under the terms of a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony burglary. Felony murder carries a sentencing range between forty-five and sixty-five years and an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (2015). A Level 4 felony burglary conviction carries a sentencing range between two and twelve years and an advisory sentence of six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). The trial court imposed a ten-year sentence, a sentence above the advisory but below the maximum.

[15] Rodriguez claims her offense “is not such that it warrants a ten-year sentence.” Appellant's Br. at 9. The factual basis is sparse, and it is unclear why Rodriguez wanted to fight Pillow, but her desire to do so sparked these events. From the testimony at Rodriguez's sentencing hearing, it appears Adams followed Rodriguez's lead in going to Heuer's apartment. Once there, Adams fought with Heuer. Heuer shot Adams six times, and Adams died. There is nothing about the facts that portray Rodriguez's offense in a positive light.

[16] Examining Rodriguez's character “involves a broad analysis of [her] ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 699 (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). Rodriguez argues her limited criminal history, acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty, and remorse reflect favorably on her character.

[17] As for Rodriguez's criminal history, she had an informal adjustment agreement for disorderly conduct as a juvenile and received a 180-day probationary sentence for an OWI conviction. “Even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character[.]” Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Moreover, she had served only thirty days of probation when she committed this offense and admitted using alcohol on the day this occurred. Her criminal history is not lengthy, but she was afforded leniency she did not use to good advantage. And Rodriguez admitted to using various illegal substances from the time she was a teenager, which demonstrates a further disregard for the law.

[18] Rodriguez argues her guilty plea demonstrates she accepted responsibility for her actions. By pleading guilty, Rodriguez saved Adams’ family from the additional trauma of a trial. However, the plea agreement was filed only days before her jury trial was scheduled to begin and it reduced her maximum sentencing exposure from sixty-five years for felony murder to twelve years for Level 4 felony burglary. The trial court acknowledged Rodriguez's plea as a mitigator and did not sentence her to the maximum possible term. Under these circumstances, Rodriguez has not shown she is entitled to sentence revision, especially because the trial court was not obligated to give her plea mitigating weight. See Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting a “guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant receives substantial benefit from the plea or where evidence against the defendant is so strong that the decision to plead guilty is merely pragmatic”), trans. denied.

[19] And as for remorse, the trial court did not find Rodriguez's remorse to be a mitigator. We give deference to a trial court's evaluation of a defendant's remorse, as the trial court hears the defendant's apology and observes her demeanor firsthand, being in the best position to determine whether it is genuine. See Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Some of Rodriguez's statements at the sentencing hearing could be interpreted as deflecting, as she never claimed any personal culpability. Instead, she told Adams’ family she was sorry “for the loss you suffer” “because of careless decisions.” Id. at 35–36.

[20] Rodriguez presented character testimony from her grandmother and father that portrayed her as a “loyal and loving person” with a “good, sensitive heart.” Appellant's Br. at 7. But testimony from the victim's family referred to Rodriguez being a “compulsive liar to [Adams’] family” and to the trial court. Id. at 31. In the end, the trial court assessed her character as manipulative and saw “no alternative but to give Ms. Rodriguez a significant sentence based on her direct actions” as they led to Adams’ death. Tr. Vol. 2 at 42–43.

[21] In short, Rodriguez has not provided compelling evidence portraying her offense in a positive light or demonstrating “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” sufficient to meet her burden of showing her sentence is an outlier warranting revision. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

Conclusion

[22] Rodriguez's sentence is not inappropriate considering the nature of her offense and character.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1) (2014).

2.   Her probation in the OWI case was revoked, and she completed sixty days in the county jail.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.