Christina M. Habegger, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Christina Habegger was found guilty of murder. Habegger now appeals, raising three issues for our review: 1) whether the court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; 2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut her self-defense claim; and 3) whether Habegger's sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Habegger and Robert Higginbotham met in June 2022. A month later, Higginbotham began staying at Habegger's home and they started an intimate relationship. Their relationship soon became violent.

[3] On October 13, Habegger and Higginbotham began arguing over text. Higginbotham broke up with Habegger, telling her he was “[d]efinitely leaving” and planned to “go to Chicago” and “block” her. Ex. Vol. II pp. 29, 34-35. Habegger replied, stating “I hate u[,]” and “[t]hat's ok I'm finding u sf [sic] it's not a good way[.]” Id. at 49, 54. Habegger's last text to Higginbotham was sent at 5:50 p.m.

[4] At 5:55 p.m., Habegger parked her vehicle outside the house where Higginbotham was located. See State's Ex. 170 at 2:08-2:15.¹ She exited her vehicle, stabbed Higginbotham once in his chest, then drove away at 5:57 p.m. See id. at 2:24-2:29. Habegger did not report the incident to anyone nearby or call 9-1-1.

[5] Higginbotham died soon afterwards. An autopsy later revealed the stab wound, which was five-and-a-half inches deep, was the cause of death. Law enforcement apprehended Habegger later that evening. Fort Wayne Police Department (FWPD) Detective Benjamin Miller observed a cut on Habegger's finger that was “still actively bleeding[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 78. He found the cut significant because a person “often get[s] cut in the process” of stabbing someone because their hand “slide[s] partly onto the blade[.]” Id. at 78-79. Detective Miller did not observe any other injuries, including any marks on Habegger's neck. Habegger told law enforcement she was not involved in Higginbotham's stabbing and cut her finger while “cutting potatoes[.]” Id. at 80. FWPD officers recovered a knife from Habegger's home that tested positive for Habegger and Higginbotham's blood.

[6] The State charged Habegger with murder. A three-day jury trial began on April 8, 2025. During trial, the State introduced evidence that Habegger had threatened to stab and kill Higginbotham multiple times in the months leading up to his death. The State also introduced evidence that Habegger stabbed Higginbotham in August and September, with the latter incident resulting in Higginbotham's hospitalization. Habegger objected, citing Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). The court admitted the evidence but instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose of determining Habegger's motive and intent.

[7] Habegger testified that Higginbotham physically abused her throughout their relationship. As to the events of October 13, Habegger testified that earlier that day Higginbotham attacked her—dragging her around by her hair, strangling her until she had “red marks on all [her] neck,” and sexually assaulting her. Tr. Vol. IV p. 8. Afterward, Habegger fled, but later drove to Higginbotham's location to give him a key so he could move out. According to Habegger, when she arrived Higginbotham pulled her out of her car by her legs and strangled her for “two ․ to three ․ minutes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 241. She stated Higginbotham then brandished a knife, at which point she wrestled the knife away from him, causing the cut to her finger, and stabbed him. Habegger admitted to initially lying to the police about her involvement in Higginbotham's stabbing and how she cut her finger. Habegger also stated she had previously reported Higginbotham's abuse to the police, although the State later produced evidence that law enforcement never received any reports.

[8] The jury found Habegger guilty as charged. At sentencing, the court found no mitigating factors but found the following aggravators: 1) Habegger's prior criminal history, consisting of two felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions; 2) Habegger was on bond when she committed the instant offense; 3) her offense demonstrated an escalation of criminal conduct; and 4) the nature and circumstances of the offense. The court sentenced Habegger to sixty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Habegger now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[9] Habegger argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of her threatening and stabbing Higginbotham on prior occasions. “Our standard of reviewing claims of alleged evidentiary error is well settled: the decision to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion.” McMillen v. State, 169 N.E.3d 437, 440-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). A trial court abuses its discretion in admitting evidence when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). A trial court's evidentiary ruling is presumptively correct, and “a challenger bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the trial court erred in its exercise of discretion.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[10] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) provides “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” However, the evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2). Rule 404(b) “does not totally proscribe other-bad-acts-evidence—only its use as character evidence.” Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568. When the evidence is introduced for another purpose, the court

[f]irst ․ must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act. Second, the court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit the act. And third, the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.

D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009) (citations and quotations omitted).

[11] Here, Habegger only challenges whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The State's evidence demonstrated Habegger repeatedly instigated violence and hostilities by stabbing and threatening Higginbotham in the two months preceding his death. This evidence was highly probative in determining whether Habegger acted in self-defense when she stabbed Higginbotham on October 13. See Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (holding probative value of evidence of defendant's threats to victim two months prior to murder substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect). Habegger's prior acts were highly probative of her intent and cast doubt on her contention that Higginbotham was the initial aggressor. And while this evidence is undoubtably prejudicial, the court reduced this impact by instructing the jury that it was only to consider this evidence for the purpose of determining Habegger's motive and intent during the October stabbing. See Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. 2018) (“It is presumed that jurors follow their instructions.”) The trial court did not err in admitting evidence Habegger previously threatened and stabbed Higginbotham

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] Next, Habegger argues the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut her self-defense claim. Like any other sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

[13] “Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act.” Fuller v. State, 261 N.E.3d 821, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. The self-defense statute provides that an individual has the right to use “reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2013). A person is justified in using “deadly force” and “does not have a duty to retreat” if the person reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to herself or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. I.C. §§ 35-41-3-2(c)(1)-(2).

[14] “To prevail in presenting a self-defense claim, the defendant must show she was in a place where she had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.” Stewart, 167 N.E.3d at 376. “When the defendant raises a self-defense claim which finds support in the evidence, the State carries the burden of negating at least one of the necessary elements.” Id. Further, “[t]he State bears the burden of disproving the defendant's self-defense claim, either by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense—or by simply relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Fuller, 261 N.E.3d at 826 (quotations omitted). If a defendant is convicted despite her claim of self-defense, an appellate court will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[15] The State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate Habegger instigated the violence. In the two months preceding Higginbotham's death, Habegger threatened and stabbed him on multiple occasions. When Higginbotham ended the relationship, Habegger said “I hate u[,]” threatened to find him, and fatally stabbed Higginbotham five minutes later. Ex. Vol. II p. 49. The jurors could have concluded from this that Habegger instigated the violence on October 13. Additionally, Habegger driving away without securing medical attention or contacting law enforcement demonstrates a consciousness of guilt, further negating her self-defense claim. See Orozco v. State, 146 N.E.3d 1038, 1041-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (finding evidence defendant fled scene without securing medical assistance showed defendant did not believe he acted in self-defense), trans. denied. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude Habegger provoked, instigated, or willingly participated in the violence.

[16] Still, Habegger points to her testimony that she acted in self-defense, but the jury had ample reasons to discredit this testimony. While she claimed Higginbotham strangled her twice that day and she had “red marks all on [her] neck,” Detective Miller did not observe any such injury on her. Tr. Vol. IV p. 8. She also admitted to lying to law enforcement when she claimed she was not involved and cut her finger while “cutting potatoes[.]” Id. at 80. Finally, records indicated Habegger did not contact police regarding Higginbotham's alleged abuse during their relationship. Habegger invites us to reweigh her testimony, which we cannot do. Stewart, 167 N.E.3d at 376. The State presented sufficient evidence to disprove Habegger's self-defense claim.

III. Appropriateness of Sentence

[17] Finally, Habegger contends her sixty-year sentence is inappropriate and warrants revision in light of the nature of the offense and her character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits an appellate court to revise a sentence authorized by statute, if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We give “considerable deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision and attempt only to “leaven the outliers” rather than achieve a “perceived ‘correct’ result” in every case. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a rare avenue for appellate relief that is reserved for exceptional cases. Even with Rule 7(B), sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference. Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character). Absent such a sufficiently compelling evidentiary basis, we will not override the decision of ․ the trial court.

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted), trans. denied.

[18] We first consider the statutory range for the class of the offense. Id. The offense of murder has a sentencing range of forty-five years to sixty-five years, with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (2015). Habegger received a sixty-year sentence, five years above the advisory but less than the maximum sentence she could have received.

[19] As for the nature of her offense, Habegger acknowledges murder is “egregious” but contends “as far as murder[s] go, Habegger's actions do not warrant an aggravated sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 20. We disagree. Minutes before his death, Habegger told Higginbotham, “I hate u” and threatened to find him. Ex. Vol. II p. 49. She proceeded to locate Higginbotham and brutally stabbed him five-and-a-half inches into his chest. Habegger displayed little restraint or regard for Higginbotham's life and left without securing any medical attention for him. She does not point to any evidence, let alone “compelling evidence[,]” that portrays this offense in a positive light. Sorenson, 133 N.E.3d at 728.

[20] Turning to Habegger's character, she argues the lack of any prior convictions for violent offenses and her participation in a substance abuse program while incarcerated reflect positively on her character. While we acknowledge Habegger's assertions, her two felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions still reflect poorly on her character. See generally Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (observing that a criminal history “is a poor reflection of a defendant's character”), trans. denied. Additionally, the fact Habegger was on bond when she committed the instant offense demonstrates she has little regard for the rule of law. See Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006) (finding defendant committing underlying offense when he was on bond reflected poorly on his character). Moreover, Habegger threatening and stabbing Higginbotham on prior occasions shows an abusive and violent character that does not warrant revision of her sentence. See Reynolds v. State, 142 N.E.3d 928, 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (considering evidence of uncharged conduct as part of the Rule 7(B) character analysis), trans. denied. Habegger has not persuaded us that the nature of her offense and character warrant revision of her sentence. We affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   State's Exhibit 170 is footage from a motion-activated camera that overlooked the address where Higginbotham was stabbed. Due to the nature of the motion-activated camera, the footage starts and stops as nearby motion triggers the camera's recording function. It captured the moments Habegger arrived and left the house but did not capture any of her encounter with Higginbotham.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.