IN RE: S.D. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] J.D. (“Father”) appeals the adjudication of his child, S.D. (“Child”) as a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). He presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the evidence before the trial court supported the following findings:

1.1 Finding 45, regarding Father's consistency with visitation;

1.2 Finding 49, regarding Father's engagement during visitation;

1.3 Finding 64, regarding verification of Father's housing and employment;

1.4 Findings 82 and 83, regarding Child's developmental needs; and

1.5 Finding 93, regarding Father's ability to travel to Indiana; and

2. Whether the trial court's findings supported its conclusion that Father posed a threat to Child's safety such that the coercive intervention of the trial court was necessary.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and S.I.¹ (“Mother”) are the parents of Child, born in June 2022. Prior to the Department of Child Services’ (“DCS”) intervention, Child lived with Mother and Father in Marion County. On July 12, 2024, DCS Family Case Manager Courtney Carr (“FCM Carr”) arrived at Peyton Manning Children's Hospital (“Hospital”) to investigate a report that Child's sibling, Sa.I. (“Sibling”), who was ten months old, had experienced a serious medical emergency of unknown origin. Hospital suspected Sibling's condition was related to abuse. FCM Carr called the police and Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Daniel Hiser began investigating the incident.

[3] Mother told Detective Hiser and FCM Carr that she was caring for Child and Sibling on July 11, 2024. Mother claimed she laid down for a nap and, when she woke up an hour later, she discovered Sibling on her back in her pack and play, not breathing. Mother took Sibling to the hospital, where medical professionals revived Sibling, though there were concerns that Sibling would have permanent brain damage because she had been without oxygen for a significant amount of time. Detective Hiser executed a search warrant of Mother's residence and found “narcotics ․ on the floor[.]” (App. Vol. II at 168.) He also found “[m]ultiple bags of marijuana ․ [and] a backpack ․ which contained green bars, blue circular pills, and a white powdery substance, which law enforcement reported as being potential Xanax bars and fentanyl pills.” (Id. at 39.) Sibling subsequently died from “fentanyl intoxication.” (Id. at 169.)

[4] During the investigation, Mother told FCM Carr that Father “resides in the home with her at least some of the time” but was not at home at the time of the emergency because he “went back and forth between Indiana and Illinois for business[.]” (Id. at 169.) Mother “did not clarify what business he worked for that required the travel.” (Id.) FCM Carr later discovered that Father lived with his mother (“Paternal Grandmother”) in Illinois.

[5] FCM Carr spoke to Father at the hospital. Father was “aggressive” toward the FCM and law enforcement. (Id. at 168.) At one point Father “threatened to fight law enforcement for taking Mother's phone as part of the investigation.” (Id.) When FCM Carr attempted to speak to Father, he would not give her his contact information and “told her that he didn't have anything to say to her.” (Id. at 170.)

[6] DCS filed a petition to declare Child a CHINS on July 12, 2024, and removed Child from Mother's and Father's care due to the circumstances surrounding Sibling's death and the “narcotics found in the home[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 36.) DCS was also concerned about the inconsistency between Father's claim that he lived in Illinois and Mother's claim that Father traveled between Illinois and Indiana. Child was placed in foster care, where she has been ever since.

[7] A few days later, Father arrived at the DCS office to retrieve “court paperwork[.]” (Id. at 35.) Father's family was with Father, and they were “yelling and screaming[.]” (Id. at 36.) FCM Carr did not feel comfortable meeting with Father and his family, so another staff member provided Father with the documents. Based on that incident and an earlier incident during which one of Father's friends followed FCM Carr, she filed for a workplace protective order.²

[8] In July 2024, Father began supervised visitation with Child. Father attended two supervised visitations and then “became inconsistent” with visitation. (App. Vol. II at 170.) During some of the visitation sessions, Father was not “attentive to [Child] and [was not] emotionally engaged in the parenting time session[,]” would “mentally ‘check out’ ” during sessions and twice fell asleep during his visits with Child. (Id. at 171.) During at least two sessions, Father came to the visitation smelling like marijuana.

[9] Prior to the trial court's initial hearing on DCS's CHINS petition, DCS Family Case Manager Misty Wynn (“FCM Wynn”) referred Father for “a substance abuse assessment, a family functioning assessment, and home-based therapy.” (Tr. Vol. II at 92.) Because Father lived in Illinois, it was difficult for him to begin those services because DCS was unable to “offer services in another state.” (Id.) FCM Wynn talked to service providers in Illinois and asked Father to contact them, but he did not do so. In addition, FCM Wynn was unable to communicate with Father on a regular basis. Of the services offered, Father completed only the family functioning assessment.

[10] On October 4, 2024, the trial court held its initial hearing. Mother and Father denied the allegations in the CHINS petition. On October 17, 2024, Mother entered into an agreement by which she denied the allegations in the CHINS petition, waived her right to a fact-finding hearing, and agreed to have Child adjudicated as a CHINS. Because Father still contested the CHINS petition, the trial court held fact-finding hearings on November 8, 2024; January 8, 2025; February 24, 2025; and March 31, 2025.

[11] At the time of the fact-finding hearings, Father was on probation for a 2022 Illinois conviction of felony possession of a controlled substance. FCM Wynn testified that Father told her that his probation had ended, but Illinois prosecutor Patrick Murphy told the trial court that Father had not successfully completed his probation and had a pending petition to revoke his probation because Father “failed to obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation, he failed to attend any classes, and that he failed a drug and alcohol test, and that he tested positive for both alcohol and marijuana.” (Id. at 185.) In addition, Murphy “believe[d] [Father] has received criminal charges” in Illinois. (Id.) Murphy testified that the terms of Father's probation did not allow him to leave Illinois without permission from the probation department, and he did not know if Father had requested permission to visit Indiana. FCM Wynn testified Father had not provided information regarding his employment and she had not been able to inspect the house where Father lived in Illinois to determine if it was suitable for Child because Paternal Grandmother, with whom he lived, would not permit FCM Wynn to come into her home.

[12] On July 7, 2025, the trial court adjudicated Child as a CHINS based on the circumstances surrounding Sibling's death, Father's failure to engage in services, his inability to provide care for Child because he lived in Illinois and was on probation, and his inconsistent participation in visitation. On August 1, 2025, the trial court held its dispositional hearing and issued its dispositional order requiring Father to, among other things, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; submit random drug screens; and enroll in and successfully complete a father engagement program.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Father challenges the adjudication of Child as a CHINS. He argues the evidence does not support some of the trial court's findings and the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Child is a CHINS. “Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). DCS alleged Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

“A CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child[.]” Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106). “The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parent but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[14] When a trial court enters findings and conclusions,

[w]e may not set aside the findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous. In our review, we first consider whether the evidence supports the factual findings. Second, we consider whether the findings support the judgment. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We give due regard to the trial court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. While we defer substantially to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the judgment.

In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

1. Challenged Findings

[15] Father challenges the trial court's findings regarding his participation in visitation; verification of his employment and housing; Child's current developmental challenges; the status of his ability to travel outside of Illinois; and Child's ability to return home with Mother and Father. The trial court made several unchallenged findings:

42. Nathaniel Canalas (“Mr. Canalas”) is a supervised visit facilitator who was assigned to work with Father in July of 2024.

43. Mr. Canales was able to make contact with Father and create a parenting time schedule so that Father could see [Child] weekly.

44. In the beginning, Father attended two consecutive parenting time sessions but then became inconsistent.

* * * * *

46. Father would often cancel parenting time sessions right before they began and didn't provide a reason for his absence.

47. In total, Father had approximately four parenting time sessions while Mr. Canalas was supervising.

48. There were times during supervised parenting time that Father and Mother weren't attentive to [Child] and weren't emotionally engaged in the parenting time session.

* * * * *

50. While Father would engage and be loving with [Child] for short periods of time, he would mentally “check out” for large portions of parenting time sessions.

51. On two occasions he fell asleep during parenting time.

52. In October of 2024, Mr. Canalas closed out his referral for supervised parenting time due to Father's inconsistency attending parenting time as Mr. Canalas and his supervisor did not think it was fair to [Child].

* * * * *

56․ FCM Wynn referred several services for Father including a Substance Abuse Assessment, a Family Functional Assessment, and Home Based Therapy.

* * * * *

59. [FCM] Wynn had conversations with [Father] about these services and why they were being referred.

60. Initially, [Father] did not want to participate in the services.

61. Eventually, he decided that he wanted to participate in [the] Family Functional Assessment.

62. Father expressed that he would have difficulty participating in the services that FCM Wynn had referred.

63. FCM Wynn spoke with Father about once a month or less and he was difficult to get in contact with.

* * * * *

67. Ms. Graves[,] [Father's home based case manager,] identified goals for Father which were to obtain housing and employment.

* * * * *

69. Ms. Graves is close to discharging Father's case as unsuccessful due to [his] lack of communication and participation in Father's Engagement.

* * * * *

78. [Visitation Supervisor Ronda] Gill [ ]had to address the smell of marijuana multiple times from Mother and Father at parenting time sessions.

* * * * *

81 [Guardian ad Litem Rocky Harvey] has safety concerns for [Child] because he has not seen the home where Mother and Father reside, assessed its safety, or conducted pop-in visits.

* * * * *

88. Father was placed on probation [in Illinois] as a result of his guilty plea [to Class 4 felony possession of a controlled substance].

89. According to the terms of his probation, Father was required to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, submit to random drug screens, remain in Illinois unless he had permission to [leave Illinois], and to refrain from consuming alcohol, marijuana, and other drugs, among other things.

90. The original term of probation was forty-four (44) months, but Father failed to successfully complete his probation.

91. [Illinois Prosecuting] Attorney [Patrick] Murphy's office filed a petition to revoke the plea agreement in the fall of 2024, alleging that Father failed to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, to submit to drug testing as required, and that Father tested positive for both alcohol and marijuana during the course of his probation.

92. Attorney Murphy believes that there are additional charges pending against Father in Peoria, Illinois.

(App. Vol. II at 170-174) (errors in original).

1.1 Finding 45

[16] Father challenges Finding 45 which states, “Father would go two to three weeks without attending parenting time.” (Id. at 170.) Father contends Finding 45 is not supported by the evidence because “[a]ny decline in attendance ․ was expressly attributed to the nearly three hour commute from Illinois and the resulting financial burden.” (Father's Br. at 12.) He states that his “request for gas cards demonstrates his effort to maintain consistent contact.” (Id.)

[17] During the fact-finding hearings, Canales testified Father would not communicate with him for “two to three weeks” and then Father would contact him “on a random day after those two or three weeks ․ and ask to visit [Child] ․ within twenty-four hours of asking to visit her.” (Tr. Vol. II at 45.) Canales explained such requests were “just unrealistic” because he had to accommodate other clients. (Id.) Additionally, Canales testified that Father would contact him indicating that he could not attend a scheduled visit “within an hour [before] the visit was supposed to start[.]” (Id.) Canales indicated that Father told him “that it's three and a half to four hours one way and that was a lot of driving and that he did not have the finances for gas to, to do that every week.” (Id. at 46.) He testified that there were also “four or five visits” for which Father failed to arrive, and Father called after the visit started to apologize, but he would not explain why he was absent. (Id. at 48.) The trial court's finding is supported by the evidence, as it gives an approximation of the number of visits Father missed.

1.2 Finding 49

[18] Father asserts the evidence does not support Finding 49 regarding his engagement with Child during visitation. Finding 49 states, “Father would FaceTime other family members during parenting time or would be more focused on his phone than on [Child].” (App. Vol. II at 171.) Father contends he “occasionally allowed [Child] to communicate with family members via video chat, while remaining engaged with [Child] for most of the visit.” (Father's Br. at 13.) He also argues there was no evidence that he was “frequently inattentive, distracted, or that such conduct negatively affected [Child]. (Id.)

[19] Caneles testified that sometimes during visitation Father was “not paying attention” to Child and was “not fully there mentally.” (Tr. Vol. II at 50.) He also stated that there were times during visitation that Father “would be scrolling his phone.” (Id.) Canales told the trial court that Father “would Facetime other family members and he would be talking to other family members on the phone.” (Id.) Canales did not indicate whether Father involved Child in those calls. Further, Father does not challenge the trial court finding that Father fell asleep during two visits. Canales's testimony and Father's falling asleep support the finding that Father used Facetime and was inattentive during visits. Father's argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See, e.g., In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 836 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).

1.3 Finding 64

[20] Next, Father argues Finding 64 is not supported by the evidence. Finding 64 states, “FCM Wynn was never able to verify [Father's] employment or able to verify that [Father] had appropriate housing.” (App. Vol. II at 172.) Father points to FCM Wynn's testimony that she did not follow up on Paternal Grandmother's background check. However, during the fact-finding hearing, FCM Wynn testified she was not able to verify Father's employment because of a “lack of communication” (Tr. Vol. II at 94) and because Father “wasn't communicating with the investigator.” (Id. at 105.) Regarding her ability to assess the suitability of Father's housing, FCM Wynn indicated she could not inspect where Father lived with Paternal Grandmother because “[Paternal Grandmother] told me that she didn't want DCS to come out to her home.” (Id. at 99.) FCM Wynn's testimony regarding her difficulty in confirming Father's housing and employment supports the trial court's finding.

1.4 Findings 82 and 83

[21] Father also challenges two findings regarding Child's developmental challenges. First, Finding 82 states: “[Guardian ad Litem Rocky Harvey] [ ] testified that [Child] is slightly behind developmentally and is receiving physical therapy to address this concern.” (App. Vol. II at 173.) Father argues Child was not behind developmentally, and in support Father points to GAL Harvey's testimony that a referral to physical therapy for Child had been closed out. However, Father ignores GAL Harvey's testimony that Child was receiving services through First Steps because “she was slightly behind developmentally and so they wanted to make sure that working with her she will, I guess, close the gap per say [sic].” (Tr. Vol. II at 172.) That testimony supports the trial court finding that Child is developmentally delayed.³

[22] Relatedly, Father argues Finding 83 is not supported by the evidence. Finding 83 states, “GAL [Harvey] believes that [Child] needs ongoing services to ensure her safety.” (App. Vol. II at 173.) Father contends GAL Harvey testified that “his recommendation for adjudication was not based on observed safety concerns, but rather on a desire for continued oversight.” (Father's Br. at 13.) Father's argument ignores GAL Harvey's testimony regarding unsupervised visitation in which he said that there were safety concerns with unsupervised visitation with Father in Illinois because Indiana did not have the ability to oversee that visitation. GAL Harvey indicated an Illinois agency would need to provide oversight in that case, and Father had not contacted any Illinois providers. In addition, GAL Harvey expressed concern about Child's safety if she was in Father's care because he had not seen Father's home in Illinois and Father's inconsistency with supervised visitation made it difficult to assess the safety risks. GAL Harvey's testimony supports these findings.

1.5 Finding 93

[23] Finally,⁴ Father contends Finding 93 is not supported by the evidence. Finding 93 states: “To [Illinois prosecuting attorney Patrick Murphy's] knowledge, Father never obtained permission to travel to Indiana as required by the terms of his probation.” (App. Vol. II at 174.) Father argues “Murphy testified only that he did not know whether Father had obtained permission from his probation officer to travel. He did not testify that Father failed to obtain permission.” (Father's Br. at 14.) He asserts that Murphy's “lack of knowledge cannot be transformed into affirmative evidence of noncompliance.” (Id.) However, the finding merely restates Murphy's testimony. When asked if Father “ever request[ed] permission to come to Indiana” Murphy answered, “[n]ot to my knowledge, no.” (Tr. Vol. II at 185.) The trial court's finding does not indicate whether Father actually asked for permission to travel to Indiana. Instead, it states that Murphy did not know if he had done so, which is supported by the evidence. Father misinterprets the finding and based on Murphy's testimony, it is supported by the evidence.

2. CHINS Adjudication

[24] Father asserts the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that Child was a CHINS because there was no evidence that Child was seriously endangered or that the trial court's coercive intervention was required. “[A] CHINS adjudication may not be based solely on conditions that no longer exist.” In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The trial court should also consider the parents’ situation at the time the case is heard by the court.” Id. Additionally, “a parent's past, present, and future ability to provide sufficient care for his or her child forms the basis for a CHINS adjudication[.]” Matter of J.LV., Jr., 667 N.E.2d 186, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[25] Father contends Child was not seriously endangered because she could live with him at his mother's house in Illinois and he “interacted appropriately with [Child] during parenting time” and “[n]o witness testified that Father acted dangerously, neglected [Child], or failed to meet her needs during observed interactions.” (Father's Br. at 16.) However, his argument ignores the trial court's findings that he was inconsistent with visitation, “[o]n two occasions [ ] fell asleep during parenting time[,]” was not “emotionally engaged” during visitation, and would “mentally ‘check out’ ” during sessions. (App. Vol. II at 171.) Regarding his contention that Child would not be in danger if she resided with him at Paternal Grandmother's home in Illinois, DCS was unable to confirm Paternal Grandmother's house was appropriate for Child, in part because Paternal Grandmother would not allow DCS access to the house. The trial court also found it was unable to confirm that Father maintained sobriety during the pendency of the case.

[26] Father also contends Child is not seriously endangered because she was not “experiencing unmet developmental or medical needs.” (Father's Br. at 16.) However, the trial court's findings indicate Child needed physical therapy and continued to receive services for a developmental delay. She did not receive those services while in Mother's care, and Father's missed visits, his inattentiveness during the visits he attended, and his criminal history involving use of controlled substances support the trial court's conclusion that court intervention is necessary to ensure Child's developmental and medical needs are met. Moreover, because DCS was unable to offer services for Father in Illinois, he needed to follow up with Illinois providers suggested by DCS. He had not done so at the time of the fact-finding hearings and the trial court found that “Father expressed that he would have difficulty participating in the services that FCM Wynn had referred.” (App. Vol. II at 172.) The trial court noted in several findings that DCS had difficulty in communicating with Father. Relatedly, the trial court found that one service provider was “close to discharging Father's case as unsuccessful due to lack of communication and [lack of] participation in Father's Engagement.” (Id. at 172.) Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Child was seriously endangered by Father's action or inaction such that the coercive intervention of the trial court was required. See, e.g., Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 477 (affirming child's adjudication as a CHINS based on DCS's suspicion that parents used illegal substances, the parents’ refusal to submit to drug tests, and the parents’ lack of housing).

Conclusion

[27] The findings challenged by Father are supported by the evidence and the trial court's findings support its adjudication of Child as a CHINS. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal of Child's adjudication as a CHINS.

2.   It is not clear from the record whether FCM Carr obtained the protective order.

3.   To the extent Father argues the portion of Finding 82 indicating Child was receiving physical therapy was not supported by the evidence, it is superfluous, as there was evidence to support the remaining portion of the finding indicating Child was developmentally behind. See, e.g., Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E.2d 380, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“To the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment”).

4.   Father also challenges a finding within the trial court's conclusion that states, “[Child] would return home with both Mother and Father absent a finding that she is a [CHINS}.” (App. Vol. II at 176.) He contends this finding is not supported by the evidence because the trial court did not take into account that Mother had been charged with a Level 1 felony, which made it unlikely that Child would return to Mother's care, “or that Father would co-parent with Mother under the existing circumstances.” (Father's Br. at 14.) However, this finding is superfluous because the trial court made several findings supporting its decision to adjudicate Child as a CHINS, including Father's inconsistency in visitation, refusal to regularly communicate with DCS, and his criminal issues in Illinois. See, e.g., Lasater, 809 N.E.2d at 397 (“To the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment.”). We also note that the trial court made an unchallenged finding that “[e]ven if Mother and Father were not residing together, there is still sufficient evidence to find [Child] is a CHINS[.]” (App. Vol. II at 177.)

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.