Diamond U. Neely, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In August of 2024, Devanna Hardin obtained an ex parte order for protection (“the protective order”) against Diamond Neely. Hours after Neely had been served with the protective order, she violated it by sending Hardin a text message that referenced the protective order. Neely subsequently violated the protective order by sending Hardin another text message, tagging Hardin in an Instagram post, and, on October 14, 2024, going to Hardin's place of employment. On December 30, 2024, the State charged Neely with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Following a bench trial, Neely was found guilty as charged. Neely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction on appeal. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Neely and Josh Arenas are the parents of two children. In 2024, Hardin was in a romantic relationship with Arenas. Hardin and Arenas were both managers at Costco in Mishawaka. Neely was aware that Hardin and Arenas were co-workers. According to Neely, Arenas and Hardin had begun their relationship while Arenas was still involved with her.

[3] On August 8, 2024, Hardin obtained the protective order against Neely which prohibited Neely from threatening, harassing, or contacting her. It also ordered Neely “to stay away from [Hardin's] residence, school[,] and place of employment[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 4. Neely was served with the protective order at approximately 9:00 a.m. on September 20, 2024.

[4] Approximately two hours later, Hardin received a text message from Neely that referenced the protective order and read as follows: “Girl I don't give a f[***] about your protection order․your [(sic)] around my child[;] You think a piece of paper gone faze me [emoji] absolutely not your [(sic)] silly b[***]h[;] Tell him to drop my child off the f[***.]” Ex. Vol. p. 9 (emoji omitted, ellipsis in original). Hardin knew it was Neely because the text message had come from Neely's iCloud account, which included Neely's full name. Ex. Vol. p. 9.

[5] On September 25, 2024, Neely sent a second text message to Hardin from her iCloud account that read

[f]or yo overly grown a[**] to be sitting over there with my child that I have not seen in 4 weeks thinking ts [(sic)] okay or cute is weird af both yall a[**] weird af then you wonder why a mf don't like yo looser a[**] b[***]h you just as lame as him. I'm feeding you and some kids that ain't mine[.]

Then yall see my messages so it ain't like one of you dumb b[***]hes can't have him call. Not doing sh[**] but pissing me off[.]

Ex. Vol. p. 9.

[6] Sometime after this message, but before October 14, 2024, Neely “tagged” Hardin in an Instagram post. Tr. Vol. II p. 18. When someone is tagged, “they'll receive a direct message to their account with [the] post attached.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. Hardin knew it was Neely who had tagged her because the poster's Instagram name was “diamond.maria444” and Neely's picture was in the upper corner. Ex. Vol. p. 10. The message read “[m]fs think I won't pop up at that job bout my kids I'll do real time [2 emojis] I'm very much a crash out when it come to them two [emoji.]” Ex. Vol. p. 10 (emojis omitted). Because Neely had referenced Hardin's workplace, Hardin told co-workers at Costco about the protective order and alerted them that Neely might appear there.

[7] On October 14, 2024, Hardin, who usually worked the shift from 11:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. at Costco, went home around 3:00 p.m. because she did not feel well. Around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m., Neely went to the Costco where Hardin worked, even though she did not have a Costco membership. Arenas, who also still worked at that same Costco, was not working because he worked an earlier shift, which he had worked for several months.

[8] Neely, who was frustrated and crying, spoke with Costco employee Robert Acosta about her frustration with “having difficulty seeing her children,” claiming “that she basically was not able to have visitation at the time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Acosta told Neely that coming to Costco “was probably not the best idea” and suggested that going “to the courthouse would have been a better idea to try to work that out.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Although Hardin was not in the store at the time Neely was there, her co-workers notified her that Neely was in the store because Hardin had earlier made them aware of the protective order. Hardin went back to Costco that evening and then filed a report with law enforcement.

[9] On December 30, 2024, the State charged Neely with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The trial court conducted a bench trial on October 21, 2025, at the conclusion of which it found Neely guilty. The trial court sentenced Neely “to 180 days. They're all going to be suspended. You're going to have one year of reporting probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 52.

Discussion and Decision

[10] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[11] The State alleged that “[o]n or about October 14, 2024[,] in St. Joseph County, State of Indiana, [Neely], did knowingly [ ]violate an ex parte protective order issued under I.C. 34-26-5 by the St Joseph County Circuit under cause number 71C01-2408-PO-000941, to protect [Hardin].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 15. “A person who knowingly or intentionally violates ․ an ex parte protective order issued under IC 34-26-5․ commits invasion of privacy, a Class A misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(2). Thus, in order to prove that Neely had committed Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State was required to prove that she knowingly or intentionally violated an ex parte protective order that had been issued for the protection of Hardin.

[12] The evidence proves that the protective order had been issued on August 8, 2024, and was in effect through August 8, 2026. The protective order “enjoined [Neely] from threatening to commit or committing acts of stalking against” Hardin. Ex. Vol. p. 4. Specifically, it prohibited Neely “from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” Hardin and “ordered [Neely] to stay away from [Hardin's] residence, school[,] and placement of employment[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 4. Service of the protective order was perfected on September 20, 2024. Shortly after being served with the protective order, Neely sent a text message to Hardin, which referenced the protective order. Neely also sent a subsequent text message, tagged Hardin in an Instagram post, and went to Hardin's placement of employment. This evidence is sufficient to prove that Neely committed Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy by knowingly or intentionally violating the protective order.

[13] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Neely points to her testimony indicating that she had not (1) known that Hardin was employed by Costco, (2) knowingly violated the protective order, or (3) sent Hardin the text and social media messages. The trial court, however, acting as the trier-of-fact, was free to disbelieve Neely's testimony and apparently did so. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“As a general rule, factfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”); Wolf v. State, 76 N.E.3d 911, 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Scott v. State, 867 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied) (“ ‘The trier of fact is entitled to determine which version of the incident to credit.’ ”). Neely's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence amounts to nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.