IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Kal.L. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kal.L. (“Child”) is the biological child of R.L. (“Father”) and Kay.L. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”). Child was removed from Parents’ care due to their substance abuse, and she was later adjudicated a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Father failed to meaningfully engage in services, so a petition to terminate his parental rights to Child was filed. The trial court granted that petition. Father now challenges the termination ¹ and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights to Child is clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2022, when Child was three years old,² the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report of neglect alleging that Child and Parents were staying in a hotel in Vanderburgh County, Indiana, and Child was “running down the hallway unattended” and “was observed to appear dirty and with a very soiled diaper.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 59–60. Child “was with hotel staff for a long period of time before the mother finally answered the door of the room.” Id. at 60. Upon investigating the report, DCS requested Parents submit to drug screens. Parents agreed, and both of their screens were positive for fentanyl. Parents then admitted to DCS that they use fentanyl and other illegal substances. Child was removed from Parents’ care and adjudicated a CHINS.

[4] In the ensuing dispositional order, Father was ordered in relevant part to participate in “a dual mental health/substance abuse evaluation” and “comply with all treatment recommendations,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 63; not consume illegal controlled substances and alcohol; and take prescription medications “only in the doses and frequencies specified in the prescription,” id. at 65. Father “was not honest ․ about his use of fentanyl” during the mental health/substance abuse evaluation, id. at 63, and he continued to test positive for fentanyl and other substances throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. Father also refused to participate in “random pill counts” for his prescribed narcotics, which “he ha[d] not been taking regularly.” Id. at 68. Father's visits with Child were suspended because he “ha[d] been inconsistent with drug screens, medication, and the visitation services,” and he had an “outstanding writ of attachment” for failing to appear at a permanency hearing in the CHINS proceeding. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 67.

[5] In April 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Child. After a factfinding hearing, the trial court granted the petition and terminated Father's parental rights, concluding in relevant part that terminating the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court's Decision to Terminate Father's Parental Rights to Child Is Not Clearly Erroneous

[6] Father challenges the trial court's termination of his parental rights over Child, particularly its conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[7] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's termination decision is clearly erroneous if the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the court's decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Father does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[8] To terminate Father's parental rights under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c) (effective Mar. 11, 2024, to June 30, 2025), DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, termination of the parent-child relationship is in Child's best interests, id. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, a trial court looks at the totality of the evidence and subordinates the interests of the parents to those of the child. In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), reh'g denied (Jan. 25, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. A.B. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 209 N.E.3d 1168 (Ind. 2023). A central consideration in this determination is the child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). The trial court also considers whether a child's emotional and physical development is threatened by the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Permanent impairment of physical, mental, or social development is not necessary before a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[9] Father does not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings, so we take them as true. See R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). To the extent Father's arguments can be read as challenging particular findings, those arguments are merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Specifically, Father argues that termination is not in Child's best interests because he “was persistent in attempting to maintain a bond with” Child, Appellant's Br. at 9, and his “engagement with services demonstrated his sincere desire to continue to maintain a relationship with” Child, id. at 10. According to Father, “[b]ut for the suspension of his visitation, [he] would have been able to strengthen his bond with” Child. Id. at 10. In November 2023, the trial court suspended Father's visits with Child and “ordered Father to comply with a pill count and another substance abuse assessment prior to receiving visits.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 68. Father did not comply with this order—the trial court found that he “failed to meaningfully participate in court[-]ordered services,” including pill counts; he “continued to use substances” throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings; and he was “not honest about his [substance] use.” Id. at 69. As found by the trial court, Father did not do what was required of him to maintain and strengthen his bond with Child.

[10] Additionally, “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” P.B., 199 N.E.3d at 799 (citing L.S. v. Ind. Dep't Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied). Here, both the case manager and child advocate recommended terminating Father's parental rights to Child.

[11] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's decision, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that termination is in Child's best interests. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous, and we affirm that decision.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights to Child were terminated in a separate order, and she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Child was born on August 23, 2019.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur