Ryan Patrick Rucker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2012, Ryan Rucker pled guilty to Class A child molesting and agreed to a fully executed twenty-five-year sentence. In 2023, he sought and received federal habeas corpus relief on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. He was retried, found guilty, and sentenced to thirty-five years executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) and five years suspended to probation. He appealed his sentence after retrial, arguing it violated Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(10). Agreeing with Rucker, a panel of this Court remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

[2] On remand, the trial court included a statement identifying the conduct it found Rucker had engaged in since he was sentenced in 2012 that supported a greater sentence. It then sentenced him again to thirty-five years executed in the DOC and five years suspended to probation. Rucker now appeals and, again, challenges his sentence. He presents two arguments: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by considering improper aggravating factors, and (2) his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2011, Rucker and his then-girlfriend spent a few nights at their friends’ home. Their friends had two children, C.B., who was eight years old at the time, and L.B., who was four years old. On the second night, Rucker went into C.B.’s room after she had gone to bed, got in her bed with her, took off her underwear, and licked her vagina. C.B. asked him to stop. He did but continued to lay with C.B. in her bed “for a little while.” Prior Transcript Vol. 4 at 52. When Rucker finally left C.B.’s room, she went into L.B.’s room next door for comfort.

[4] Rucker was ultimately arrested and charged with Class A felony child molesting.¹ In May 2012, he pled guilty to that charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years executed in the DOC. Rucker's conviction also classified him as a sexually violent predator under Indiana law, which subjected him to lifetime mandatory parole. Rucker sought post-conviction relief but was unsuccessful. See Rucker v. State, No. 35A02-1610-PC-2461 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2018) (mem.), trans. denied. However, he later filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to advise him that he would be subject to lifetime mandatory parole if he pled guilty. Rucker v. Warden, No. 3:19-CV-201 DRL, 2023 WL 2599519, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 21, 2023). The federal court agreed with Rucker and conditionally granted his petition, ordering the State to either: (1) release Rucker and vacate his conviction, or (2) initiate new proceedings against him. Id. at *11. The State initiated new proceedings, and Rucker was released on bond in October 2023. During that time, he obtained employment, a driver's license, housing, and had no new criminal charges filed against him.

[5] On retrial in 2024, a jury found Rucker guilty of the same offense. At sentencing, the trial court found Rucker's criminal history and the fact that C.B. was less than twelve years old at the time of the offense were aggravating factors. It found no mitigating factors. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty years, with thirty-five years to be executed in the DOC and five years suspended to probation. Rucker appealed his sentence, asserting the trial court improperly imposed a more severe sentence than that which he'd received in 2012. Rucker v. State, No. 24A-CR-2226, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. June 24, 2025) (mem.). He argued this was improper under Post-Conviction Rule 1(10) because the trial court failed to identify any conduct Rucker had engaged in since he was sentenced in 2012 that justified a more severe sentence. Id. at *2, *3; see Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(10)(b) (prohibiting “a more severe penalty than that originally imposed unless․ the court's reasons ․ include[ ] reliance upon identifiable conduct on the part of the petitioner that occurred after the imposition of the original sentence”) (emphasis added). Agreeing with Rucker, this Court reversed his sentence and remanded the case back to the trial court for resentencing. Rucker, No. 24A-CR-2226, at *3.

[6] At resentencing, the State presented evidence that Rucker committed numerous conduct violations while he was incarcerated in the DOC. His violations included engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct, stealing or otherwise possessing property he was not allowed to have, failing to follow orders, entering unauthorized areas, possessing intoxicating and controlled substances, and interfering with staff. The most recent incident was in August 2025, when Rucker continuously spit on DOC staff, refused to follow their orders, and had to be restrained. The DOC disciplinary process for that incident was still pending at the time of sentencing. The State also introduced evidence of phone conversations between Rucker and his recent girlfriend that occurred while he was incarcerated in 2024. In those phone calls, Rucker's girlfriend accused him of getting drunk and becoming violent with her. Additionally, Rucker had sent his girlfriend text messages in which he used threatening language in reference to her ex-boyfriend. The State also introduced evidence that on one occasion, Rucker had inappropriate contact with his girlfriend's daughter. Rucker told the court that he had changed in the many years since he'd been incarcerated and committed the underlying crime, and he noted that he'd had a job, a driver's license, a car, housing, and no new offenses while out on bond.

[7] The State asked the trial court to recognize several aggravating factors, including Rucker's criminal history, that the victim was under twelve years old at the time of the offense, that the offense took place in the presence or within hearing distance of another child (C.B.’s younger brother, L.B.), and that Rucker had previously violated the terms of his probation. The State also asked the court to consider specific aggravating circumstances that occurred after his original sentence was imposed in 2012, including Rucker's poor behavior in the DOC, his drinking and violent behavior toward his girlfriend, his threatening language in reference to the ex-boyfriend, his inappropriate physical contact with another minor, and his failure to show remorse for his actions. Rucker conceded that his criminal history and the fact that the victim was less than twelve years old at the time of the offense were both appropriate aggravating factors. He asked the court to consider his law-abiding behavior while out on bond as a mitigating circumstance.

[8] Ultimately, the court found the following were aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim's “tender age [of] less than twelve years old[;]” (2) that the offense was a crime of violence committed in the presence or within hearing of a child other than the victim; (3) Rucker's criminal history; (4) Rucker's DOC conduct violations; (5) the physical violence against his girlfriend; and (6) his excessive drinking. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 63. The last three factors also served as the identifiable conduct Rucker had engaged in to warrant a more severe sentence than he received in 2012. Id. As mitigators, the court recognized that Rucker had obtained employment while out on bond, he had appeared at all of his required hearings, and he had not been charged with any new criminal offenses. Finding that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, the court sentenced him to thirty-five years executed in the DOC and five years suspended to probation for an aggregate sentence of forty years. Rucker now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Rucker appeals his sentence and presents two arguments: (1) the trial court abused its sentencing discretion by considering improper aggravating factors; and (2) his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We address each issue in turn.

1. Aggravating Factors

[10] Rucker contends the trial court abused its discretion by considering the victim's age, his excessive drinking, and his physical violence against his girlfriend as aggravating factors. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We will find a trial court has abused its discretion if its decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gober v. State, 163 N.E.3d 347, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion can occur if the court: (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) enters a sentencing statement but considers aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) enters a sentencing statement but fails to consider facts supported by the record; or (4) considers factors that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). However, even if we find the trial court abused its discretion, we will affirm if we are confident “the trial court would have imposed the same sentence.” Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[11] Turning first to the victim's age, Rucker asserts this was an improper aggravator because it “was a material element of [his] offense” and there was nothing “unique about the circumstances that would justify deviating from the advisory sentence ․” Appellant's Brief at 11 (quoting Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 852-53 (Ind. 2014)). However, Rucker explicitly conceded at resentencing that the victim being less than twelve years old at the time of the offense was an appropriate aggravating factor. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 50 (“We would ․ concede that the victim was less than [twelve] years of age in this matter and that that is also an appropriate aggravating circumstance.”). We agree with the State that, to the extent the court erred in considering this fact, Rucker invited such error. See Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (“When the failure to object accompanies the party's affirmative requests of the court, ‘it becomes a question of invited error.’ ” (quoting Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied, cert. denied)). “Under [the invited error] doctrine, ‘a party may not take advantage of an error that [he] commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of [his] own neglect or misconduct.’ ” Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128, 133 (Ind. 2005)). Rucker told the court the victim's young age was an appropriate aggravating factor, and he cannot now reverse course and complain that the court erred by considering that fact. Thus, his argument regarding the victim's age is waived for appellate review. Gamble v. State, 831 N.E.2d 178, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (invited errors are not subject to appellate review), trans. denied.

[12] He also asserts there was insufficient evidence that he was physically violent with his girlfriend and drank excessively while he was out on bond and thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the court to consider those facts as aggravators. However, even if we were to agree that these aggravating circumstances were improper, the trial court properly found that the victim was less than twelve years old at the time of the offense, and Rucker does not challenge the three remaining, valid aggravating circumstances noted by the trial court. “A single aggravator is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); see also Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that a single aggravator may justify an enhanced sentence). Furthermore, we are confident “the trial court would have imposed the same sentence without regard to the challenged aggravators.” McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007). Rucker has therefore failed to prove the court abused its discretion in its identification of aggravating circumstances or the sentence it imposed.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[13] Rucker also contends his forty-year sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his offense and his character. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a defendant's sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and [his] character ․” In our review, we grant considerable deference to the trial court's sentencing determination. Wilson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 667, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). And that deference will “prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Id. (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). It is the defendant's burden to prove his sentence is inappropriate. Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[14] We begin by looking at the advisory sentence for the relevant offense. Id. If a defendant's sentence deviates from the advisory, “we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Id. (quoting Madden, 162 N.E.3d at 564). Rucker was convicted of Class A felony child molesting, which encompasses a sentencing range between twenty and fifty years and an advisory sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). His sentence, in the aggregate, is forty years, which is ten years above the advisory.

[15] Turning then to the nature of Rucker's offense, typically we would “look to the details and circumstances of the crime and [his] participation therein.” Littlefield, 215 N.E.3d at 1089. However, Rucker presents no argument regarding the nature of his offense. Instead, he concedes “[t]he gravity of [his] offense is not in dispute[,]” and “[t]he legislature's decision to classify [ ]his conduct as a Class A felony reflects a considered judgment that the offense is amongst the most serious a person can commit.” Appellant's Brief at 15. He then proceeds to an argument about his character. Therefore, we will do the same. We note first that “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Parker v. State, 273 N.E.3d 500, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024)).

[16] Our analysis of Rucker's character requires us to engage in “a broad consideration of [his] qualities, including: [his] age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Wilson, 221 N.E.3d at 680. Rucker claims his post-habeas relief behavior—specifically, obtaining employment, housing, a driver's license, and transportation and having no new criminal charges—reveals good character and warrants revision of his sentence. We are unpersuaded.

[17] While this evidence reveals Rucker's ability to be a functioning member of society for a short time, it does not evince “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Id. at 679 (quoting Stephenson, 221 N.E.3d at 122). This is especially true in light of Rucker's significant adult criminal history dating back to 2002, including a conviction for Class D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child, eight misdemeanor convictions, and eight probation violations. See Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”); see also Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting defendant did “not possess a stellar character” in light of her criminal history and multiple probation violations). Rucker also committed fifteen conduct violations while incarcerated under the present offense, including an incident in August 2025 where he was accused of spitting on multiple DOC officers. Ex. Vol. 3 at 77; see George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (concluding the defendant's sentence was not inappropriate “[i]n light of [his] serious and violent criminal history[ ] and his conduct violations while in prison”), trans. denied. Ten months of minimally acceptable behavior while out on bond does not overshadow a clear history of disregard for authority and the law. Rucker has not shown his forty-year sentence was inappropriate in light of either the nature of his offense or his character.

Conclusion

[18] Rucker has failed to show his sentence was in error. Therefore, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2012).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.