Daniel R. Adams, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Daniel Ray Adams (“Adams”) appeals, following a jury trial, his conviction and sentence for Level 5 felony possession of child pornography.¹ Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) admitted evidence; and (2) sentenced him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced Adams.

Facts

[3] Adams lived in a mobile home with A.P.B. (“A.P.B.”), A.P.B.’s sister, and A.P.B.’s mother (“A.P.B.’s mother”). Adams is the step-grandfather of A.P.B. A.P.B.’s mother was often not home and gone for several days at a time. L.M. (“L.M.”) was a friend of A.P.B. and spent time with A.P.B. at the mobile home. Sometime in 2023, seventy-year-old Adams took photographs of then six or seven-year-old A.P.B. In the photos, A.P.B. displayed her vagina. Additionally, Adams took photographs of then nine or ten-year-old L.M. In the photos, L.M. was naked or partially clothed.

[4] In September 2024, after receiving a tip that Adams had inappropriate images of children on his cellphone, Vincennes Police Department Detective Cody Waggoner (“Detective Waggoner”) applied for and executed a search warrant for Adams’ cellphone. Detective Waggoner took the cellphone to the Knox County High Tech Crime Unit, where an inspector performed a cellphone extraction ² on the device. On Adams’ cellphone, the data extraction revealed that Adams had eleven images of L.M. and A.P.B. Specifically, Adams’ cellphone contained five nude images of L.M. and six nude images of A.P.B. Additionally, the data extraction revealed multiple images of Adams wearing lingerie and exposing his penis, images of homosexual pornography featuring young men, and nude images of women. All of the images were recovered from the same area of Adams’ cellphone.

[5] Detective Waggoner conducted an interview with Adams that was video-recorded (“the video interview”). During the interview, Adams admitted to taking the pictures of A.P.B. and L.M. Adams told Detective Waggoner that he had taken the photos of A.P.B.’s vagina because she had had a rash that Adams wanted to show to A.P.B.’s mother. Adams also admitted that A.P.B. and her sister were present when he had taken the photos of L.M. When Detective Waggoner asked Adams if he liked to look at L.M. naked, Adams responded, “Well, yeah[.]” (State's Ex. 25 at 28:44-28:47).

[6] In September 2024, the State charged Adams with Level 5 felony possession of child pornography for possessing images depicting a child less than twelve years old.³ Before trial, Adams filed multiple motions in limine. In his motions, Adams argued that all references to homosexual pornography, homosexuality, and images of Adams wearing lingerie and exposing his penis should be excluded under Evidence Rule 404(b) and 403.

[7] In May 2025, the trial court held a jury trial. Before voir dire, the parties discussed Adams’ multiple motions in limine. The State explained that it did not plan to use the images of Adams wearing lingerie unless Adams opened the door to them. Further, the State explained that it would not use the images of homosexual pornography unless Adams placed his intent at issue either during jury selection or his opening argument. In response, Adams noted that he was “intend[ing] to put intent at issue” because Adams planned on telling the jury that he was “not aroused by these photographs.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 6). The trial court took Adams’ motion in limine under advisement. Adams also requested that the trial court instruct the jury not to consider the fact that Adams viewed homosexual pornography, thought about pursuing relationships with men, or homosexuality as propensity evidence. The parties agreed to this instruction.

[8] In his opening argument, Adams’ counsel told the jury that Adams only took the picture of A.P.B.’s vagina to show A.P.B.’s mother and a doctor. Adams’ counsel also told the jury that, once he had shown the picture of A.P.B. to her mother, he had deleted the pictures. Additionally, Adams’ counsel explained that Adams had a “limited understanding” of cellphone technology and that he had believed that the images had been permanently removed from his cellphone after he had deleted them. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 173).

[9] During Detective Waggoner's testimony, the State moved to admit, and the trial court admitted, State's Exhibits 1-11. State's Exhibit 1-11 were the images of L.M. and A.P.B. extracted from Adams’ cellphone. Detective Waggoner testified that State's Exhibits 1-5 were sexual images of L.M. and that State's Exhibits 6-11 were sexual images of A.P.B.

[10] At the end of the first day of trial, the parties again discussed, outside the presence of the jury, the motions in limine. The State argued that the images of Adams wearing lingerie and the images of homosexual pornography had become relevant and admissible because Adams had offered a contrary intent regarding the images of A.P.B. Specifically, the State asserted that Adams had claimed that there had been “no sexual intent concerning the photos that he” had taken and that the images of homosexual pornography featuring young men recovered from Adams’ cellphone did show a sexual intent. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 222). The State also noted that the images of Adams wearing lingerie and the homosexual pornography were “interspersed” with the images of A.P.B. and L.M. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 226). Further, the State argued that Adams had portrayed himself as an individual “who ha[d] no idea ․ how to use a phone.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 220). The State argued that the images of Adams wearing lingerie and the images of homosexual pornography showed that Adams knew how to take and download photos.

[11] Adams responded by arguing generally that admitting the images of Adams wearing lingerie and the images of homosexual pornography would violate Evidence Rule 404(b). Adams argued that there was a “big difference between looking at gay men and young girls” and that admitting the images would be propensity evidence. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 223).

[12] The trial court disagreed with Adams’ interpretation and noted that the State was arguing that “it was sex-related when [Adams] said it wasn't sex-related.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 223). The trial court denied Adams’ motion in limine.

[13] The next morning, the State continued the testimony of Detective Waggoner. The State moved to admit State's Exhibits 13-16, which were the images of Adams wearing lingerie. Adams objected to the admission of this evidence under Evidence Rule 403 and 404(b). The trial court admitted these images over Adams’ objection. The trial court noted that the probative value of the images outweighed any potential prejudice and also noted that the images were admissible under the contrary intent exception of Evidence Rule 404(b).

[14] Additionally, the State moved to admit State's Exhibits 17-24, which were the images of homosexual pornography and nude adult women found on Adams’ cellphone. Adams objected under Evidence Rule 404(b) and 403. The trial court admitted the images over Adams’ objection. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence was “not being offered for the purpose of you to assume that because the Defendant did one thing, that he did something else.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 15).

[15] Detective Waggoner testified that Adams had told him that he had taken the photos of L.M. and A.P.B. During Detective Waggoner's testimony, the State moved to admit the video interview as State's Exhibit 25, and the trial court admitted the video interview over Adams’ objection. The trial court gave a propensity limiting instruction, and the State played the video interview for the jury. Additionally, A.P.B.’s mother testified that Adams had never shown her the photos of A.P.B.’s alleged rash and that, in 2023, A.P.B. would have been six or seven years old. L.M.’s mother testified that, in 2023, L.M. would have been nine or ten years old.

[16] Adams testified in his own defense. Adams testified that he had taken the photos of A.P.B. but that he had not taken the photos of L.M. Additionally, Adams testified that he had only taken the photos of A.P.B. because she had “complained about hurting down in her [vagina] and she was all red.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 67). Adams testified that he had taken a photo of A.P.B.’s vagina to show A.P.B.’s mother. However, according to Adams, the following morning, A.P.B. was no longer in pain. Adams testified that he had shown the photos to A.P.B.’s mother and then deleted the photos. Further, Adams testified that he had “no sexual dealings” with A.P.B. or her sister and that he “view[ed] them as [his] kids.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 80). Adams also testified that he had deleted the photos of L.M. and testified that someone else at the mobile home must have taken the photos of L.M.

[17] The trial court again gave a limiting instruction regarding the video interview in its final instructions to the jury. Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury that they were “not to consider evidence that [Adams] viewed gay pornography, thought about pursuing relations with men, or homosexuality in any way, shape, or manner as proof that he possesse[d] character traits that predispose[d] him to commit the charged offense. You are not to consider it for that purpose.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 135). At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Adams guilty of Level 5 felony possession of child pornography.

[18] In July 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The State argued that the trial court should impose a five-year sentence executed at the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). In support of this argument, the State specifically noted “the significant aggravating circumstance” of Adams violating a “position of trust ․ with two different young girls[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 185). The trial court found as aggravating circumstances: (1) the victim's age; (2) the victim's disability; and (3) Adams having care, custody, or control of the victim. The trial court found as a mitigating circumstance that Adams’ imprisonment would result in undue hardship to Adams or his dependents. Additionally, the trial court noted Adams’ “health as a slightly mitigating factor.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 188). At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Adams to five (5) years at the DOC for his Level 5 felony possession of child pornography conviction.

[19] Adams now appeals.

Decision

[20] Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it: (1) admitted evidence; and (2) sentenced him. We address each argument in turn.

1. Admission of Evidence

[21] Adams first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence. We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Hardiman v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1049, 1055 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Thus, “we reverse only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied.

[22] Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admitted, however, “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).

[23] “Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) serves to safeguard the presumption of innocence in favor of criminal defendants.” Fairbanks, 119 N.E.3d at 568 (cleaned up). The rule's restrictions “prevent[ ] the jury from indulging in the forbidden inference that a criminal defendant's prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Id. (cleaned up). When determining whether to admit evidence of specific acts under Evidence Rule 404(b), the trial court is required to: (1) determine whether the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).

[24] Adams specifically argues that the admission of images of homosexual pornography and “and other photographs” were inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). (Adams’ Br. 11). The State, on the other hand, argues that the challenged evidence was properly admitted under the contrary intent exception of Evidence Rule 404(b).

[25] However, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence because we find any alleged error to be harmless. Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that when conducting a harmless error review under Appellate Rule 66(A), our Court is to “consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied. “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Id.

[26] Here, the jury heard Detective Waggoner's testimony that Adams had told him that he had taken the photos of A.P.B. and L.M. Further, the State played the video interview for the jury, and, during that video interview, Adams admitted to taking the photos. Additionally, the trial court admitted, and the State published to the jury, the eleven photos of A.P.B. and L.M., which were found on Adams’ cellphone. This properly admitted evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Adams had formed the requisite intent to commit the offense charged by the State. Notwithstanding this fact, the trial court gave limiting instructions to the jury that directed them not to consider the challenged evidence for an improper purpose, and, by doing so, the trial court recognized the potential for prejudice and tempered it. See Hernandez v. State, 785 N.E.2d 294, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“When limiting instructions are given that certain evidence be considered for only a particular purpose, the law will presume that the jury will follow the court's admonitions.”), trans. denied. As a result, the probable impact of any possible error in admitting the challenged evidence, in light of all the evidence in this case, is sufficiently minor so as not to undermine our confidence in the outcome of this case. Accordingly, we conclude that the alleged improper admission of evidence constituted harmless error. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492 (explaining that a non-constitutional error in the admission of evidence is harmless when its probable impact in light of all the evidence is so sufficiently minor that it does not impact the substantial rights of the parties). See also Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 569 (Ind. 2000) (holding that the erroneous admission of Rule 404(b) evidence was harmless error), reh'g denied.

2. Sentencing

[27] Adams also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. Specifically, Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion when determining aggravating circumstances.

[28] Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court may abuse its discretion in several ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[29] “This Court presumes that a court that conducts a sentencing hearing renders its decision solely on the basis of relevant and probative evidence.” Schuler v. State, 132 N.E.3d 903, 905 (Ind. 2019). Even when an abuse of discretion occurs, “[w]e will not remand for resentencing if we can say with confidence the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators.” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied. “A single aggravating circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.” Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 487 n. 1.

[30] Adams argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found the victim's age as an aggravating circumstance. “Generally, where the age of the victim is a material element of the crime, the age of the victim may not be used as an aggravating circumstance.” Hudson v. State, 135 N.E.3d 973, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The trial court, however, “may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the material elements of the crime” to be an aggravating factor. Id. A trial court, thus, “may properly consider as aggravating the age of the victim when the trial court considers that the victim was of a tender age.” Id. (cleaned up).

[31] The offense of possession of child pornography is elevated to a Level 5 felony where the child depicted in the material is less than twelve years of age. See I.C. § 35-42-4-4(e)(1)(F). Here, Adams took nude and sexual photos of A.P.B., who was either six or seven years old. Further, Adams took nude or sexual photos of L.M., who was nine or ten years old. However, the trial court did not explain or make a finding of a particularized circumstance for why it considered the victim's age, which was less than twelve years old, to be an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the trial court erred by not stating the particularized circumstances necessary to find this aggravating circumstance. See Johnson v. State, 845 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a trial court erred when it found a victim's age as an aggravating circumstance because “the trial court did not explain why it considered the victim's age – less than twelve years old – to be an aggravating circumstance”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[32] Adams also challenges the trial court's finding of the aggravating circumstance of the victim's disability. The State agrees, as do we, that this aggravating circumstance lacks support in the record. However, we need not remand because we can say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the purportedly erroneous aggravators. Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 269. Specifically, the trial court found as an aggravating circumstance that Adams had care, custody, or control of the victim. Adams makes no argument challenging this aggravating circumstance on appeal, and the aggravating circumstance is supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code § 35-42-4-4.

2.   A cellphone extraction “pull[s] every piece of data” on the device, including all images and deleted images. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 189).

3.   The State also charged Adams with Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. Ultimately, the State dismissed this charge, and it is not relevant to this appeal.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.