Mark A. Goodwin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Mark A. Goodwin guilty of intimidation, as a Level 6 felony, and the trial court sentenced him to two and one-half years. On appeal, Goodwin argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 18, 2025, Goodwin went to the apartment of his mother, Marilyn, “to get some of his stuff he had there.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 189. Marilyn did not want Goodwin to enter the apartment “[b]ecause sometimes he gets upset with [her].” Id. at 190. She told Goodwin that “he could wait outside” and she would give the items to him. Id. at 189. Goodwin got upset and “loud[,]” so Marilyn “shut the door in his face[, and] he started banging on the door hard and stuff.” Id. at 191. Marilyn told Goodwin “to quit or [she] was going to call the cops on him again.” Id. Goodwin did not quit, so Marilyn called 911.

[3] The 911 dispatcher reported that Marilyn had “a breathing problem[,]” so two paramedics responded to the call. Id. at 145. Goodwin had left the premises by that time. A “shaken” and “nervous” Marilyn told the paramedics that Goodwin “had been banging on her door trying to break in” and had threatened to “kill her, take her money, kidnap her, and then kill himself as well.” Id. at 145, 146. The paramedics called the police.

[4] Before the officers arrived, Goodwin called Marilyn, who activated the speaker on her phone. The paramedics heard an “irate” Goodwin tell Marilyn that “he was going to come get her, take her to the bank, take all of her money, put her in a truck[,]” and then “kill her and kill himself.” Id. at 148. One of the paramedics recorded Goodwin's tirade on his cell phone and played the recording for one of the responding officers. After the officers arrived, Goodwin called Marilyn again, and she activated the speaker on her phone. Marilyn told Goodwin that “the cops were [here] for him[.]” Id. at 238. Goodwin “started yelling and screaming[,]” stating that he was going to put Marilyn in a box truck “and drive across state lines[,]” that “he wanted money from her[,]” that he would tear down her building, and that “she would [be] evicted[.]” Id. at 239, 240. While Goodwin “was still talking,” Marilyn hung up the phone and “said that she was done listening to him.” Id. at 240.

[5] The State charged Goodwin with intimidation, as a Level 6 felony. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14 (alleging that Goodwin “did communicate a threat, to wit: to unlawfully injure Marilyn Goodwin, with the intent that Marilyn Goodwin be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out, and the threat was to commit a forcible felony, to wit: Murder”). Goodwin insisted on representing himself at trial, despite the trial court's advisements of the perils of self-representation, and the jury found him guilty as charged.

[6] Goodwin also represented himself at the sentencing hearing. The trial court asked Goodwin if he wished to make any “amendments” to the pre-sentence investigation report, and he responded, “No, it's pretty accurate.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 81. After giving the parties an opportunity to present evidence (Goodwin had none) and argument, the court pronounced sentence as follows:

Court finds mitigating factors to be all of the Defendant's statements made to the Court, Defendant's addictions issues, and Defendant's mental health issues. Court finds ․ aggravating factors to be Defendant's prior criminal history consisting of 10 felony convictions and four misdemeanor convictions. Additionally, Defendant has violated probation 11 times, community corrections six times, failed to appear three times, and had two parole violations. All of this shows the Court that the Defendant has a disregard for the law and society.

Also, as an aggravating factor, the Defendant has numerous conduct violations while incarcerated. Also, as an aggravating factor, is the Defendant's use of illegal drugs[, i.e., marijuana, synthetic marijuana, Klonopin, methamphetamine, and opiates]. The Court notes as [an] additional aggravating factor that the victim in the intimidation case was the Defendant's mother.

Court finds as a supplemental factor the Defendant[’s] IRAS [Indiana Risk Assessment System] score is high-risk to reoffend. As an additional aggravator, the Court finds that other forms of sanctions have proved to be unsuccessful in keeping the Defendant from engaging in criminal activity. Finally, as an aggravating factor, the Defendant has not taken advantage of programing, alternative sanctions offered him in the past, [including, among others, teen court, suspended sentences, reporting probation, community service, addictions assessment and follow-up treatment, community corrections, work release, and home detention].

The Court finds the aggravators taken individually or as a whole outweigh any mitigating factors and an enhanced sentence is appropriate.

Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court imposed a two-and-one-half-year executed sentence. Goodwin now appeals his sentence.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Goodwin challenges his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that this “Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our “role under Rule 7(B) is to ‘leaven the outliers,’ and we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 613 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)).

[8] Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor a sentence appropriate to the circumstances presented, and “the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). It is Goodwin's burden to establish that his sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review. Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1092 (Ind. 2025).

[9] In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Goodwin asserts that his offense was not “particularly egregious, except for the fact that the evidence showed he threatened to kill his mother.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Threatening to murder one's mother is “egregious” under any reasonable definition of the term, especially when done so repeatedly in a blinding rage.

[10] Regarding his character, Goodwin acknowledges his extensive criminal history, illegal drug use, multiple violations of custodial rules, inability to respond positively to less restrictive forms of punishment, and victimization of his mother. He points to no substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character. Instead, he complains that the trial court “should have given at least some weight to [his] mental illness, particularly when imposing a maximum sentence.” Appellant's Br. at 14, 15. By specifically finding Goodwin's mental illness to be a mitigating factor, the trial court obviously gave it at least some weight. Moreover, a claim that the trial court should have given more weight to a mitigating factor is not subject to appellate review. Nash v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.¹ Finally, we observe that any nexus between Goodwin's mental illness and the instant offense is speculative at best.

[11] In sum, Goodwin has failed to establish that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Therefore, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Such claims are typically, albeit unsuccessfully, raised under the abuse-of-discretion standard of sentencing review. We reiterate that “a claim on appeal that a defendant's sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense and the defendant's character is separate and distinct from a claim the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing, and the two issues should be analyzed separately.” Richardson v. State, 189 N.E.3d 629, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.