Kimberly D. Tempel, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kimberly D. Tempel (“Tempel”) was convicted after a bench trial of false information in a marriage license application,¹ a Level 6 felony, and attempted bigamy,² a Level 6 felony, and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 182 days suspended to probation. Tempel appeals her convictions, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support both of the convictions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In Indiana, marriage-license applicants must complete a standardized state form, which they may begin online but must finalize in person at the clerk's office. The clerk's office staff verify each applicant's identity, typically by reviewing a driver's license. The application requires applicants to disclose personal information, the number of any prior marriages and when the last marriage ended, and whether the applicants are closely related to each other. Ex. Vol. I pp. 4–5. It also contains a sworn affirmation that all information provided is “true and correct” and advises that “knowingly furnish[ing] false information” to the clerk constitutes a felony offense. Id. at 5. When the application is completed and submitted, the clerk's office issues a marriage license. An officiant must then solemnize the marriage, after which the completed license is returned to the clerk's office to complete the process

[3] On February 28, 2019, Tempel married Mark Tempel (“Mark”). Prior to 2024, Tempel and Mark had filed six petitions for dissolution of marriage. Two of those cases resulted in final decrees of dissolution. On May 17, 2024, Tempel filed a verified petition for dissolution of marriage from Mark in the Perry Circuit Court under cause number 62C01-2405-DN-249. On May 31, 2024, the Perry Circuit Court scheduled the final dissolution hearing for July 30, 2024. Provisional orders, including property distribution, were entered on May 29, 2024.

[4] On July 26, 2024, while the Perry County dissolution action was still pending, Tempel and Bradley McCollom (“McCollom”) went to the Vanderburgh County Clerk's Office and completed an application for a marriage license. In the section of the application concerning previous marriages, Tempel listed July 31, 2018, as the date her last marriage ended, which was the date she had filed a prior petition for dissolution of marriage, not the date any decree was entered. Id. at 4, 19. Tempel signed the marriage license application, swearing that the information contained within the application was “true and correct.” Id. at 5. On that same day, July 26, 2024, Tempel and McCollom were married in a ceremony in Warrick County.

[5] On July 30, 2024, four days after the marriage application was filed by Tempel, the Perry Circuit Court entered the final decree of dissolution of marriage between Tempel and Mark. Shortly after the marriage application was submitted, the Vanderburgh County Clerk reviewed Indiana's online court records and discovered that Tempel's divorce from Mark had not been finalized as of July 26, 2024. The Clerk contacted law enforcement and referred the matter to them, providing the marriage license application and related materials to the Evansville Police Department (“EPD”).

[6] An EPD investigator reviewed the case and confirmed that Tempel's dissolution of marriage from Mark was still pending on July 26, 2024. Law enforcement made contact with Tempel on the telephone and through email. Tempel told the investigator that she did not understand “the requirements of the marriage license” and that she “was rushed through” the marriage license process “without fully understanding what was required.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 22.

[7] On February 21, 2025, the State charged Tempel with Level 6 felony false information in a marriage license application and Level 6 felony attempted bigamy. The trial court held a bench trial on August 12, 2025. At trial, the State's Exhibit 1, a copy of the marriage application, was admitted into evidence. The State also presented testimony regarding an alleged familial relationship between Tempel and McCollom, which was investigated through DNA testing. Id. at 21. During cross-examination of the EPD investigator, defense counsel introduced Defendant's Exhibit D—the EPD's incident investigation reports—to impeach the witness regarding the DNA evidence and the timeline of when certain DNA results were received. Defense counsel moved to admit Exhibit D, and the trial court admitted it without objection and without any request for it to be admitted for a limited purpose. Exhibit D contained information reflecting that Tempel was still married to Mark on July 26, 2024, as well as information that Tempel and McCollom had been married by the Warrick County clerk on July 26, 2024, including a marriage license number that matched the one from the license acquired by Tempel in Vanderburgh County. Ex. Vol. I pp. 50–65.

[8] At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found Tempel guilty of both counts. As to the attempted bigamy count, the trial court stated it placed significant weight on State's Exhibit 1 and “even more significant weight” on Defendant's Exhibit D, explaining that Defendant's Exhibit D established that Tempel “went beyond just a substantial step towards attempted bigamy and actually solemnized a ceremony” under the marriage license number matching the one on the application completed on July 26, 2024. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 74–75. The trial court sentenced her to 182 days for each conviction and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with the aggregate sentence suspended to probation. Tempel now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Tempel argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her convictions for both Level 6 felony false information in a marriage license application and Level 6 felony attempted bigamy. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

I. Attempted Bigamy

[10] Tempel first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for attempted bigamy. She contends that there was insufficient evidence that she took a substantial step toward the commission of bigamy. Specifically, Tempel argues that merely completing the marriage license application, which was valid for sixty days after completion, was not sufficient and that there was no evidence that she “intended to be married to two men until death parted them both, which is what the statute intends to criminalize.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. She further maintains that, because the trial court's reliance on Defendant's Exhibit D was erroneous, “there [wa]s no other definitive evidence that Tempel and her co-applicant wed prior to end of Tempel's marriage” to Mark. Id. at 12.

[11] To convict Tempel of Level 6 felony attempted bigamy, the State was required to prove that, being married and knowing that her spouse was alive, she engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward marrying again. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-2(a); I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a). However, “[i]t is a defense that the accused person reasonably believed that the person was eligible to remarry.” I.C. § 35-46-1-2(b). An act constituting a substantial step toward committing a crime must go “beyond mere preparation” but can be minimal and is “often defined as any ‘overt act’ in furtherance of the crime.” B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 327 (Ind. 2018) (citations omitted). “Whether a substantial step has occurred is a question of fact, to be decided by the [factfinder], based on the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. Factors to be considered in making this determination include: “(1) whether the defendant's acts strongly corroborate his criminal intent; (2) the severity of the charged crime; (3) proximity to the underlying crime; (4) the examples listed in Model Penal Code section 5.01(2); and (5) whether the defendant's multiple acts, viewed together, indicate he attempted a crime.” Id. at 328.

[12] Here, the evidence presented established that, while still legally married and knowing her spouse was alive, Tempel applied for and obtained a marriage license, signed the sworn application falsely representing her eligibility to marry, and got married in a marriage ceremony solemnized under that license the same day. This evidence demonstrated that Tempel took several steps required to marry again, and the only remaining step was to be completed by the officiant, and not Tempel, which was to return the completed license to the clerk's office. This was sufficient evidence that Tempel engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward marrying again while she was still married to her prior spouse. Tempel's actions also strongly corroborated her intent to commit the crime. Her actions were done affirmatively and voluntarily, carried out despite knowing her dissolution to Mark was not final, and accomplished by misrepresenting her marital status to obtain the license and facilitate the marriage ceremony. Such evidence demonstrated Tempel's intent to enter into a second marriage while still legally married to Mark.

[13] We do not find Tempel's reliance on the fact that the marriage license was valid for sixty days to be persuasive. Although the license was valid for sixty days, Tempel did not just complete the application and hold it for future use. Instead, the evidence revealed that she and McCollom were married the same day they applied for the license in a ceremony performed by the clerk in Warrick County and solemnized under the same license number.

[14] Further, as to Tempel's assertion that the trial court erroneously relied on Defendant's Exhibit D, we find no error.³ Defendant's Exhibit D contained the EPD investigation reports showing that Tempel participated in a marriage ceremony on July 26, 2024, and included the marriage license number that matched the one from the license acquired by Tempel in Vanderburgh County. Courts may admit evidence for a limited purpose. See Ind. Evidence Rule 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). Here, when Defendant's Exhibit D was admitted into evidence at trial, it was not done so for a limited purpose. Tempel tendered the exhibit, and it was admitted into evidence by the trial court, without any restriction or limitation. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 38–39. Tempel did not request that the exhibit be admitted for a limited purpose, and therefore, has waived any challenge to its admission. See Lawrence v. State, 959 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (failure to object or request proper admonishment as to limited admissibility of evidence results in waiver of error on appeal), trans. denied. Once the exhibit was admitted, the trial court could rely on Defendant's Exhibit D in its determination that Tempel engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward marrying again. Sufficient evidence was presented to support Tempel's conviction for Level 6 felony attempted bigamy.⁴

II. False Information in a Marriage License Application

[15] Tempel also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support her conviction for false information in a marriage license application. She contends that the State did not prove that she knowingly provided the false information on the application, only that the information she provided was legally inaccurate. Tempel asserts that the information that she provided on the application regarding the date her last marriage ended—which was the date she filed a petition for dissolution—is a date upon which a person could reasonably believe a marriage had ended.

[16] To convict Tempel of Level 6 felony false information in a marriage license application, the State was required to prove that she knowingly furnished false information to a clerk of the circuit court when she applied for a marriage license. I.C. § 31-11-11-1. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Intent “can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020).

[17] Here, the evidence established that, on July 26, 2024, when Tempel filled out the application, she was still married. On that date, she completed the application and signed a sworn statement averring that the information she had provided in the application was true and correct. In the application, she furnished information that her last marriage ended by divorce on July 31, 2018. However, this date was the date that she filed a previous petition for dissolution of her last marriage, and at the time she filled out the marriage license application, she was still married with the final dissolution decree not being issued until July 30, 2024. This was sufficient evidence to prove that the information Tempel furnished in the application was false.

[18] The trial court could reasonably infer that Tempel knowingly furnished the false information from the surrounding circumstances. Prior to the date Tempel completed the application, she had been notified on May 31, 3024, by the trial court in her dissolution case that the final dissolution hearing would not occur until July 30, 2024. Further, Tempel had prior experience with marriage and dissolution proceedings as she and Mark had filed six petitions for dissolution of marriage with two of those cases resulting in final decrees of dissolution. From this prior experience with marriage and dissolution proceedings, the trial court could infer that Tempel was aware that a marriage does not legally end upon the filing of a petition for dissolution. This evidence, combined with the date Tempel provided in the application, and her sworn affirmation that the information was true supported her conviction. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Tempel knowingly provided false information to the Vanderburgh County clerk on her marriage application.

Conclusion

[19] We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Tempel's convictions for Level 6 felony false information in a marriage license application and Level 6 felony attempted bigamy.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 31-11-11-1.

2.   I.C. §§ 35-46-1-2(a), 35-41-5-1(a).

3.   Although Tempel argues that the trial court erred in relying on Defendant's Exhibit D, she makes no argument that the trial court somehow abused its discretion or erred in admitting the exhibit at trial. Instead, she only contends that the trial court erroneously relied on the exhibit in its finding of guilt.

4.   Tempel also asserts that her attempted bigamy conviction should not stand because she reasonably believed she was eligible to marry, which is a defense to the offense of bigamy. See Ind. Code § 35-35-46-1-2(b). Because we also conclude today that sufficient evidence supported that Tempel knowingly furnished false information to a clerk of the circuit court when she applied for a marriage license, we decline to reach her argument.

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.