Howard L. Hall, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Howard L. Hall (“Hall”) was convicted of Level 5 felony escape ¹ and two counts of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief,² for which he received an aggregate sentence of four years executed. Hall appeals his sentence, claiming the trial court erred in its use of aggravators. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on March 12, 2025, Fort Wayne Police Department Officers Jared Gernhardt (“Officer Gernhardt”) and Terry Garland (“Officer Garland”) were dispatched to a Speedway gas station on North Coliseum Boulevard, where the gas station attendant reported that a person was requesting police, fire, or EMS response. When the officers arrived, they encountered Hall, who said he wanted to go to jail. Hall pointed across the street and said he broke windows at a place called “Gerber.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 108. Officer Gernhardt asked if Hall meant Caliber Collision, and Hall said yes.

[3] Officer Gernhardt left to check the nearby Caliber Collision but found no broken windows. He radioed Officer Garland and returned to the Speedway. Around this time, the gas station attendant told the officers that he wanted Hall to leave the property. As the officers walked outside with Hall, he said he was going to “try something else” and would “go break more windows.” Id. at 125. Hall started walking toward the Dollar General next to the gas station. Shortly thereafter, Officer Garland drove past a nearby business called Graber Roofing, where he observed multiple broken windows at the front of the building. He contacted Officer Gernhardt, and both officers proceeded to the Dollar General, where they found a shattered window in the sliding door at the front of the building. Hall was standing in the parking lot. Before the officers said anything to Hall, he turned around and placed his hands behind his back. Hall also volunteered that he had broken the window at the Dollar General.

[4] The officers arrested Hall, who was transported to the Allen County Jail. At the jail, he reported difficulty breathing, and staff could not accept him without medical clearance. Officer Gernhardt then transported Hall—still under arrest and handcuffed behind his back—to Parkview Hospital Randallia. As Officer Gernhardt entered a door code at the emergency room entrance, Hall ran around the side of the building. He was apprehended after tripping over a bush.

[5] The State charged Hall with one count of Level 5 felony escape and two counts of Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. A jury trial was held on July 29, 2025, and the jury found Hall guilty of all three counts. The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) and held a sentencing hearing on August 29, 2025. The PSI reflected that Hall had eight prior misdemeanor convictions out of Ohio between 2002 and 2023, as well as one prior felony conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle, also out of Ohio. Hall also had two recent misdemeanor convictions in Allen County, having been convicted of disorderly conduct in one case and criminal trespass in a separate case. The PSI revealed that Hall “was serving suspended sentences” in those criminal cases “when he committed the present offense[s]”; there was no indication that Hall had been on supervised probation at the time. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 87. The PSI further reflected that Hall had struggled with his mental health.

[6] At sentencing, defense counsel asked the trial court to find that Hall's mental health history was a mitigating circumstance, and Hall personally asked for leniency, noting that he had no prior violent convictions. The trial court orally pronounced the sentence and entered a written order in which it identified three aggravating circumstances. It gave “significant weight” to Hall's pattern of committing misdemeanor offenses in Ohio. Id. at 100. It gave “some weight” to his prior felony conviction, which “continued the pattern of criminal activity.” Id. at 101. And it gave “great weight” to Hall's two recent convictions in Allen County, noting that Hall “was on supervised probation in these cases when he committed these offenses” and he “did not take advantage” of opportunities in those cases. Id. at 100. The trial court identified a single mitigating circumstance—Hall's mental illness—to which it gave “some weight.” Id. at 101. Under the circumstances, the court decided to impose an aggravated sentence. The court imposed four years on the Level 5 felony, with two years executed and two years suspended to supervised probation. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (providing a sentencing range of one to six years for a Level 5 felony with a three-year advisory sentence). The court also imposed concurrent 180-day executed terms on the remaining counts. Hall now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Hall claims the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an aggravated sentence because it found as an aggravator that he was on supervised probation when he committed the instant offenses. Hall points out that he was instead serving two fully suspended sentences with no formal probation attached. Hall argues “remand for resentencing is appropriate because it is impossible to tell if the trial court would have imposed the same [aggravated] sentence if it had considered the proper aggravating circumstances.” Appellant's Br. p. 6.

[8] When imposing a felony sentence, the trial court must enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation” of its reasons for the sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). If that recitation includes a finding of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, “the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1(a) provides a non-exhaustive list of potential aggravating circumstances, including that “[t]he person has recently violated the conditions of any probation, parole, pardon, community corrections placement, or pretrial release granted to the person.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(6). Another potential aggravating circumstance is that “[t]he person has a history of criminal or delinquent behavior.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2). The statute also enumerates potential mitigating circumstances, I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b), and authorizes the trial court to impose any sentence within the statutory range “regardless of the presence or absence of” aggravators or mitigators, I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(d).

[9] We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion, which occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. A trial court abuses its sentencing discretion by, among other things, entering a sentencing statement that relies on aggravating factors not supported by the record or relying on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490–91. If the trial court relied on an improper aggravating factor, we remand for resentencing only if “we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491.

[10] Here, the trial court misstated that Hall was on supervised probation when he committed the instant offenses. The State concedes the court was imprecise but argues that the court's underlying finding was sound: Hall committed new offenses while two criminal sentences remained suspended,³ and that fact is a legitimate aggravating consideration regardless of the label applied to his status. We agree with the State. The substance of the trial court's finding was that Hall chose to commit new criminal offenses while serving two prior sentences. The mislabeling of his supervision status was a technical error that does not undermine the rationale for the aggravator. Under the circumstances, we are confident that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it accurately described Hall's prior sentences. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-1-2(a).

3.   These sentences were suspended without formal probation conditions attached. This type of suspended sentence is distinct from a sentence that is suspended to formal (supervised) probation; what distinguishes formal probation from a pure suspended sentence is the imposition of conditions where the defendant is monitored for compliance with the conditions. E.g., Buck v. State, 580 N.E.2d 730, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.