Daniel James Larkin, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Daniel James Larkin appeals his conviction for domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor and claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] K.A. lived with Larkin in a house in Lebanon, Indiana. Larkin was “a hoarder” and “had a path through the whole house.” Transcript Volume II at 5. “Most of [K.A. and Larkin's] arguments were about the house, dishes, [and K.A.] moving [Larkin's] stuff around. He would get mad. [K.A. would] try to clean up the front room and he'd just bring it right back in.” Id. at 7. On July 15, 2024, K.A. and Larkin “argued like always.” Id. K.A. “was cussin” Larkin. Id. Larkin grabbed K.A. by the arms, yelled at her, and struck her in the back. K.A. fell to the floor. Larkin “put his foot” on K.A.’s back. Id. at 14. K.A. sustained “a big bruise.” Id. at 10. After Larkin went to work, K.A. called her brother, D.A. D.A.’s wife, J.A., went to K.A.’s house, took photographs of K.A.’s injuries, and brought K.A. to her home. D.A. called the police. Lebanon Police Sergeant James Koontz and another officer arrived at J.A. and D.A.’s home and spoke with K.A. Police subsequently arrested Larkin.

[3] The State charged Larkin with domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor and domestic battery as a level 6 felony. The court later dismissed the level 6 felony charge at the State's request. The court held a bench trial at which the State presented the testimony of K.A., J.A., D.A., and Sergeant Koontz, Larkin testified on his own behalf, and the court admitted photographs of K.A.’s injuries. K.A. testified that she thought that Larkin's fist was closed when he struck her but that she was not sure. She indicated she “could have fell on something,” she was not sure, and “there was so much stuff in the house.” Id. at 9. She indicated that she “probably had six, eight beers.” Id. at 12. When asked if Larkin was drinking, she replied “[h]e drank every day too” and “[h]e would drink before he would go to work.” Id.

[4] On cross-examination, when asked, “you've admitted you drank at least six to eight beers,” K.A. replied “[y]eah, it could have been more.” Id. at 16. Larkin's counsel asked, “[w]ould you ever fall over in the house based on your level of intoxication or impairment,” K.A. replied “I have” and “[y]eah, before,” counsel asked, “[s]o it is possible that you've fallen over on items,” and K.A. stated “I mean we have four big dogs in the house.” Id. at 16-17. When asked, “[h]ave you ever fallen on items such as a fan,” she replied affirmatively, and when asked “would those ever cause bruises,” she answered, “yeah, I'm small.” Id. at 17. When asked, “what time did this incident occur ․ do you recall,” K.A. responded, “[n]o. It's been over a year.” Id. Defense counsel asked, “[w]as this in the evening, was this in the middle of the night,” and K.A. answered “[i]t would be like the middle of the day ․ [b]efore he went to work.” Id. When asked, “[d]o you recall telling the officers this happened at approximately two in the morning,” K.A. answered, “[t]hat was probably another fight ․ we'd stay up ‘til three, four o'clock ․ in the morning.” Id. at 18.

[5] On re-direct examination, the prosecutor asked, “the way I understood your testimony ․ is that he hit you that day and you fell ․ [a]nd you could have fallen on something ․ but it's because he hit you,” K.A. replied “Yes,” the prosecutor asked, “[n]ot because you were just drunk,” and she replied “no.” Id. at 18-19. J.A. testified she went to K.A.’s house and, when she arrived, K.A. “was upset. She had been crying and she just kept repeating herself saying I want to go, I want to go. Let's just go.” Id. at 22.

[6] Larkin testified that, on July 14, 2024, he arrived home from work and “I told her [ ] I'd had enough ‘cause she'd stole my pills to get beer. If she wasn't going to get a job she needed to get out and I gave her a week to have a job or she was gone.” Id. at 39. He testified, “[t]here was no physical about it,” “[s]he was trashed as usual,” and “I have never put my hands on that woman in any kind of angry way.” Id. at 40. He testified that he went to work the next day “and within a couple hours I had police coming to get me.” Id. He indicated that he had seen K.A. fall down in the home. He testified, “I can tell you where those bruises came from,” “[m]y friends ․ had given us a fan a few days before because our air conditioner had gone out,” and “[s]he come home two days before this incident drunk from over across the street ․, closed the door, fell back onto that fan. Got up, took two steps towards her chair and fell back on the fan again.” Id. at 41.

[7] The trial court stated:

[T]his boils down to an issue of credibility and in determining credibility the Court always looks at the demeanor of the persons testifying and the other corroborating evidence. The first thing I obviously need to consider is the photograph ․ It looks like a relatively fresh injury. It looks like it could have happened that day․ That does not look like an injury that happened two days ago․ The Defense did give an alternative explanation for the injuries but I don't find that to be a reasonable alternative, not when I'm looking at these․

Id. at 47-48. The court found Larkin guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days suspended to probation except for time served.

Discussion

[8] Larkin cites the incredible dubiosity rule and argues K.A. testified that the incident occurred during the day but later acknowledged she told police it occurred during the night, testified that she consumed six to eight beers but later indicated she may have consumed more than that amount, admitted that she had fallen before because of her intoxication, and admitted that she had fallen on a fan before and it had caused bruises. He argues that “[h]er testimony was equivocal and uncertain, and her credibility was suspect due to her admitted intoxication.” Appellant's Brief at 11-12.

[9] When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence, and we consider the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[10] Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3 provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, even if the witness is the victim. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (Ind. 1991). The incredible dubiosity rule applies only in very narrow circumstances. See Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). The rule is expressed as follows:

If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant's conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate only where the court has confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.

Id. (citations omitted).

[11] Larkin fails to show that K.A.’s testimony was inherently contradictory or so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. K.A. was thoroughly examined and cross-examined. Larkin's defense counsel questioned K.A. regarding the timing of the battery and the extent of K.A.’s alcohol consumption and intoxication. The State also presented the testimony of J.A., D.A., and Sergeant Koontz and photographs of K.A.’s injuries. The trial court as the trier of fact was free to believe K.A.’s testimony and disbelieve Larkin's testimony. The court stated that it did not find Larkin's explanation for the injuries to be reasonable. Larkin has not shown K.A.’s testimony to be incredibly dubious. Based upon our review of the evidence as set forth above and in the record, we conclude that the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which the trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Larkin committed domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor.

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Larkin's conviction.

[13] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.