Robert Moore, Appellant-Respondent v. Haleigh Moore, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Robert Andrew Moore (“Father”) appeals the trial court's modification order following a hearing held to address nine pro se motions filed by him, as well as one motion filed by Haleigh Moore (“Mother”), regarding post-dissolution custody issues relating to the parties’ two minor children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Mother dissolved their marriage in 2023. The parties share two children, six-year-old Ha.M. and three-year-old He.M. On July 9, 2025, Father filed a Petition to Modify Parenting Time.¹ On July 18, 2025, Father filed a Verified Information for Contempt and a Subpoena Duces Tecum to Mother. On July 28, 2025, Father filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On July 29, 2025, Mother filed a Response to Father's Petition to Modify and Motion for Preliminary Injunction as well as a Verified Emergency Petition for Immediate Legal and Physical Custody and a Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem. On August 3, 2025, the trial court entered an order appointing Kelly Ferguson as Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL Ferguson”). On August 5, 2025, Father filed a Motion for Reimbursement of Fees, and on August 15, 2025, Father filed responses to Mother's motions. GAL Ferguson filed her report on August 28, 2025, and on August 29, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Strike or Deny Guardian Ad Litem's Recommendations and Memorandum of Law in Support as well as a Motion to Dismiss Mother's Verified Petition for Immediate Legal and Physical Custody. On September 3, 2025, Father filed a Motion to Address Guardian Ad Litem's Bias, Potential Gender Bias, and Retaliation. In her report, GAL Ferguson recommended that legal custody remain unchanged and that Mother maintain primary physical custody. She further recommended that Father have parenting time in accordance with the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, that he work with Ha.M.’s therapist regarding his interactions with Ha.M. “moving forward,” and that he “no longer utilize such strong, rigid language” when implementing discipline. Exhibits Volume I at 89-90.

[3] On September 8, 2025, the court held a hearing to address the pending motions. Father appeared pro se, and Mother appeared with counsel. Prior to the presentation of evidence, Mother's counsel withdrew her petition for emergency custody “in light of the GAL's report,” but noted that although “technically ․ it's just [F]ather's motions and petitions that are on ․ there's a couple things that ․ we will request orally that may, at least we would suggest may help the parties moving forward, some tweaks to the current order[.]” Transcript Volume II at 137. Thereafter, Father provided extensive testimony on his own behalf regarding his petition to modify and he offered a “proposed parenting plan.” Id. at 138. Among other things, Father referenced his exercise of the “[o]pportunity for additional parenting time,” and asked that “when [M]other is in the office ․ I can get [the children] that day.” Id. at 141.

[4] Mother's counsel presented the testimony of GAL Ferguson and Mother. As Mother's counsel had previously indicated, she orally requested certain changes to the parties’ parenting time exchanges including the location, Father's exercise and manner of providing notice as to opportunities for additional parenting time with those opportunities not being permitted during Mother's work hours, and the parties’ communication practices related to parenting time exchanges. Mother testified that there was a protective order currently in place regarding Father's communication practices because they had risen “to the level of harassment.” Id. at 220. Mother's counsel further elicited testimony from Mother regarding Father brandishing a firearm during a parenting time exchange and requested that Father not be permitted to do so in the future. Mother's counsel further requested that the court “implement a provision outlining who pays for what as far as [the children's] extracurricular activities go,” suggesting the parties split the costs “[h]alf and half.” Transcript Volume III at 9.

[5] Father cross-examined both witnesses. When asked by Father about “the opportunity for additional parenting time” and why “it should not be applied” during Mother's “work hours,” Mother stated, “So the first right of refusal portion that's in our last major Court order has been a conflict point between you and I.” Id. at 25-26. During Father's cross-examination of Mother, Mother's counsel made several objections, which the trial court sustained, due to Father himself testifying, being “argumentative,” and not permitting Mother to fully answer questions. Id. at 24, 31.

[6] After Father had already engaged in extensive cross-examination of Mother, at one point the court noted the late time of day and instructed Father “to wrap up, please,” and that, “If you want more time, I can schedule another day.” Id. at 39-40. Rather than request a continuance, Father determined that he would continue his current questioning within the allotted “ten minutes,” apparently deciding that such time was sufficient. Id. at 40. However, after continuing the same line of questioning, which Mother's counsel described as “beat[ing] ․ a dead horse,” Father stated, “I believe I am going to ask for a continuance.” Id. at 45. Mother's counsel objected noting that Father had “not proven anything that he filed before the Court today. He has had his opportunity to put his proof on. We complied ․ we are now getting to the point of again, additional harassment and racking up [Mother's] attorney's fees unnecessarily.” Id. at 46-47. The court agreed and addressed Father by stating, “Sir, I have – we have even gone past the time that I said I was going to allow. I will allow you ten more minutes[.]” Id. at 47. Father responded, “Okay. Understood, Your Honor.” Id. Father then stated that he had “no further questions” for Mother. Id. Mother's counsel asked a few rebuttal questions, and Father engaged in rebuttal cross-examination before the hearing came to a close.²

[7] On September 23, 2025, the trial court issued its order finding:

1. All exchanges are to take place at Casey's in Newburgh, IN.

* * * * *

4. Firearms are not to be on display during exchanges.

5. It has become apparent from the testimony that the “Opportunity for Additional Parenting Time” provision has caused major conflict between the parties. The three (3) hours that was previously ordered has allowed [Father] to harass and stalk [Mother]. The Court now modifies the Opportunity for Additional Parenting time to six (6) hours. At all times, the parties shall follow the “Opportunity for Additional Parenting Time” provision (formerly known as the Right of First Refusal) for any time either party needs child care for six (6) or more hours.

6. Mother and Father are to work with [Ha.M.’s] therapist. Each parent is to follow the therapist's recommendations as to what is best for [Ha.M.] moving forward.

* * * * *

9. Mother and Father are to split any expense incurred for the children's extracurricular activities 50/50.

10. The GAL, after speaking to both Mother and Father, shall choose a time frame that is scheduled at the same time every day for the opposite parent to call and speak/Facetime with the children when they are not exercising their parenting time.

11. All of Father's other Motions are denied.

12. The Court extends the Protective Order issued under cause number 87D01-2507-PO-1323. This Protective Order will now expire August 8, 2027, which is two years after the initial date it was granted.

13. All prior non-conflicting Orders shall remain in full force and effect.

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16-17. On September 26, 2025, Father filed a Motion for Clarification/Correction to Its Order Dated 9/23/2025 and for Additional Orders. On October 24, 2025, the trial court denied Father's motion.

Discussion

[8] Father, pro se, asserts that the trial court erred in imposing “sweeping restrictions and financial obligations on [him] after [Mother] dismissed her only pending motion.” Appellant's Brief at 8. He asserts that “[t]he resulting order was entered without notice, without required findings, and through procedures that denied [Father] a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id.

[9] We begin by observing that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-984. “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal.” Id. at 984. “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

[10] Father's brief on appeal does not comply in several respects with the Indiana Appellate Rules. The purpose of our appellate rules—especially Ind. Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) provides that a party's arguments must be supported by cogent reasoning and citations to legal authority. Here, Father's assertions are unsupported by cogent reasoning and, more significantly, our review of the legal authority cited by Father to support his bald assertions of error reveals that such authority simply does not stand for the legal propositions for which they are cited.³ We will not become an advocate for Father and find legal support for his allegations of error. To the extent Father fails to cite relevant authority or present cogent argument with respect to the issues he attempts to raise on appeal, those arguments are waived. See Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (argument waived for failure to cite authority or provide cogent argument), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[11] Waiver notwithstanding, Father's overarching claim is that he was denied due process. In general, due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to confront witnesses. Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008). Whether a party was afforded an opportunity to be heard is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Id. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court heard extensive testimony on Father's pending motions and his due process rights were not affected by Mother's withdrawal of her emergency motion at the hearing, or by the court ending the hearing after giving Father ample time to cross-examine Mother and GAL Ferguson, and also initially giving Father the opportunity to continue the hearing to another day. Father was further afforded an opportunity to be heard, to confront witnesses, and to present objections as to any issue for which relief was requested by Mother orally during the hearing. We cannot say that Father was denied due process.

[12] Regarding Mother's request for appellate attorney fees, this Court is authorized to assess damages if an appeal “is frivolous or in bad faith,” and such damages “shall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys’ fees.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E). A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious. Bessolo v. Rosario, 966 N.E.2d 725, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To prevail on her request, Mother must show that Father's arguments on appeal are “utterly devoid of all plausibility.” See id. While we do not disturb the trial court's order, we cannot say that an award of appellate attorney fees is warranted.

[13] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order and deny Mother's request for appellate attorney fees.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We observe that copies of this motion and Father's numerous subsequent motions were not included in the record on appeal.

2.   Father's cross-examination and rebuttal cross-examination of Mother spans thirty-one pages of the trial record.

3.   For example, Father cites Ausburger v. Hudson, 802 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), for the proposition that “a trial court errs when it grants relief that was neither requested nor tried by consent, particularly when acting sua sponte.” Appellant's Brief at 11. This proposition does not appear in Ausburger. Similarly, he cites In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. 2012), for the proposition that “[c]ross examination is a core component of due process.” Id. at 12. Again, this proposition does not appear in K.D. Father further cites Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied, Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2013), and MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938 (Ind. 2005), each for various propositions that do not appear in those cases.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.