LLC v. AFC CAL LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary 1

[1] In January of 2024, AFC CAL, LLC (“AFC”), initiated a lawsuit against Orion Fleet Northern America LLC and Medhat Selim (collectively, “the Dealership Parties”), alleging fraud and conversion. AFC moved for partial summary judgment, after which the Dealership Parties made multiple requests for additional time to respond and/or continuances. The trial court granted the first request and awarded the Dealership Parties an additional ninety days to respond to AFC's motion. The trial court denied each of the Dealership Parties’ subsequent requests. The Dealership Parties never filed a response to AFC's motion. On May 1, 2025, the trial court enter partial summary judgment for AFC, awarding AFC $135,043.92 plus certain costs. Selim's subsequent motion to correct error was denied, leading to this appeal.

[2] Selim appeals,² but his appellate brief largely fails to comply with our Appellate Rules, hindering our review. We restate Selim's discernable arguments as (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a second ninety-day extension of its deadline to respond to AFC's motion for partial summary judgment and (2) whether the designated evidence supports the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of AFC. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Selim's request for a second extension of time to respond to AFC's motion and that the designated evidence supports the trial court's award of partial summary judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] According to a Promissory Note (“the Note”), Guaranty, and related contracts, AFC provided floorplan financing to Orion, which is owned by Selim, for use in its automobile sales business. On January 22, 2024, following Orion's payment default, AFC filed its complaint against the Dealership Parties, alleging fraud and conversion. AFC moved for partial summary judgment on November 25, 2024. On December 5, 2024, the trial court issued an order setting the deadline for the Dealership Parties to respond to AFC's motion as January 6, 2025.

[4] On December 23, 2024, the Dealership Parties’ then-counsel requested an extension of time to respond. On January 2, 2025, the Dealership Parties’ then-counsel moved to withdraw his appearance, citing a previously-unknown conflict of interest. On January 3, 2025, the trial court granted the motion to withdraw and the Dealership Parties’ request for a continuance, granting them “ninety (90) days from the issuance of this order to hire counsel and properly respond to” AFC's motion. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 98.

[5] Citing “attorney abandonment[,]” on March 26, 2025, Selim, on behalf of the Dealership Parties, filed an “urgent motion for [an] extension of time” to respond to AFC's motion, claiming that he had been unaware of the upcoming deadline to respond and indicating that he needed more time to find representation for himself and Orion. Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 100–03 (formatting altered). AFC objected to Selim's request for an additional extension of time, claiming that the chronological case summary indicated that Selim had been notified of both counsel's withdrawal and the trial court's January 3rd order granting the Dealership Parties a ninety-day extension of time to respond. Selim responded to AFC's objection, requesting a second ninety-day extension. On March 27, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Selim's request for a second ninety-day extension to reply to AFC's motion.³ Selim, on behalf of himself and Orion, subsequently filed numerous motions and requests for additional continuances, all of which were denied by the trial court.

[6] Neither Selim nor Orion ever responded to AFC's motion for partial summary judgment. On May 1, 2025, the trial court entered partial summary judgment for AFC. The trial court awarded AFC “the sum of $135,043.92, together with the costs of this action, plus [the] costs of collection[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 16. Selim thereafter filed a motion to correct error, which was denied by the trial court on June 27, 2025.

Discussion and Decision

[7] As an initial matter, we note that Selim proceeds pro se.

A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Rather, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal brackets, citation, and quotation omitted). “These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal [․] where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues[.]” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[8] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that an appellant's argument “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on[.]”

It is well settled that we will not consider an appellant's assertion on appeal when he has not presented cogent argument supported by authority and references to the record as required by the rules. Pitman v. Pitman, 717 N.E.2d 627, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Additionally, ‘ “[w]e will not become an advocate for a party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” [Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)] (quoting Terpstra v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 483 N.E.2d 749, 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied).

Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Stated plainly, “[f]ailure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.” Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[9] Selim raises twenty-five arguments in support of his contention that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of AFC. Our review of Selim's arguments is impeded, however, because Selim's appellate brief is largely lacking cogent argument. In addition, many of the citations to Indiana authority relied on by Selim are either fabricated or irrelevant as the cases cited do not exist, include the language attributed to them, or stand for the propositions cited by Selim. To the extent that Selim has failed to develop his arguments with cogent reasoning and accurate citations to relevant case law, Selim has waived appellate review of his arguments.

[10] We are able to discern the following two issues well enough to address them, which we restate as follows: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Selim's request for a second ninety-day extension of its deadline to respond to AFC's motion for partial summary judgment and (2) whether the designated evidence supports the entry of partial summary judgment in favor of AFC.

I. Denial of Extension

[11] “For cause found, the Court may alter any time limit set forth in this rule upon motion made within the applicable time limit.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(I). The decision of whether to order a continuance or to alter any time limit for filing a response to a motion for summary judgment is within the trial court's discretion. GEICO Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 705 N.E.2d 476, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” McGuire v. Century Sur. Co., 861 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

[12] Again, the deadline for Appellants to respond to AFC's motion for partial summary judgment was initially set for January 6, 2025. On December 23, 2024, the Dealership Parties requested an extension of time to respond. On January 3, 2025, the trial court granted the Dealership Parties’ request, granting them “ninety (90) days from the issuance of this order[,]” giving them until April 3, 2025, to respond to AFC's motion. Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 98.

[13] On March 26, 2025, Selim, on behalf of himself and Orion, requested an additional ninety days to respond to AFC's motion, claiming that he had not been aware of the trial court's order allowing their counsel to withdraw. The record indicates, however, that Selim had been served with the trial court's order, which had been issued by the trial court on January 3, 2025. Beyond blaming his prior counsel, Selim's request contained vague statements as to why he had not been able to retain counsel for himself or Orion and why he had been unable to timely respond to AFC's motion. Selim also referred to outstanding discovery, but the record does not indicate that there was any outstanding discovery in the underlying matter. In denying Selim's request, the trial court found that it was “not well-taken[.]” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 115. The trial court was in the best position to judge whether there was good cause for granting a second ninety-day extension of time to respond or whether Selim's request was a delay tactic. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that a second extension of time for Selim to respond to AFC's motion for partial summary judgment was not warranted.⁴

II. Summary Judgment

[14] We review a trial court's summary judgment decision de novo, using the same standard as the trial court. Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 812–13 (Ind. 2021).[⁵ ] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

“The moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ․” Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904 N.E.2d 1267, 1270 (Ind. 2009). If the movant satisfies that burden, “the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate and produce evidence of facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth ․” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009). “We must construe all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue must be resolved against the moving party.” Hale v. SS Liquors, Inc., 956 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

The Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). As a result, while the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of showing the Court that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure the nonmovant was not improperly denied a trial. Brown by Brown v. Southside Animal Shelter, Inc., 158 N.E.3d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), adhered to on reh'g, 162 N.E.3d 1121 (2021), trans. denied.

Force v. New China Hy Buffet LLC, 217 N.E.3d 1275, 1277–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “[M]ere speculation cannot create questions of fact.” Beatty v. LaFountaine, 896 N.E.2d 16, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. Moreover, “[o]pinions expressing a mere possibility with regard to a hypothetical situation are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.

[15] AFC's designated evidence, as set forth in affidavits executed by AFC's risk manager Tim Board, established the following: (a) Orion's and Selim's execution of the Note and Guaranty; (b) AFC extended financing to the Dealership Parties for vehicle Stock Numbers 104 and 105; (c) the Dealership Parties sold Stock Number 104 to a third party but the Dealership Parties’ ACH payment to AFC was returned unpaid due to non-sufficient funds and never replaced with good funds; (d) the Dealership Parties sold Stock Number 105 out of trust and never paid AFC for the financing provided for the vehicle; and (e) the unpaid balance due under the Note. (Appellee's App. Vol. II pp. 80–83, 87–91) This designated evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's award of partial summary judgment to AFC.

[16] Selim argues on appeal that his “emergency extension motion put the trial court on notice that substantive disputes remained” and that “[t]he very act of requesting additional time shows [that a] legitimate factual dispute” existed. Appellant's Br. p. 14. “[S]ummary judgment cannot be ‘reversed on the ground that there is a genuine issue of material fact unless the material fact and the evidence relevant thereto shall have been specifically designated to the trial court.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 412 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(H)). Stated differently, “an objection to designated evidence must be included in a timely response and is subject to the same time limitations as any other response to designated evidence under Trial Rule 56.” State ex rel. Hill v. Jones-Elliott, 141 N.E.3d 1264, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added). Neither Selim nor Orion filed a timely response to AFC's designated evidence. Selim's motion for an extension of time to retain counsel and respond to AFC's motion was not sufficient to create a material issue of fact, as it was not a response to AFC's motion and contained nothing beyond Selim's self-serving statements explaining why the Dealership Parties were allegedly unable to comply with the timeline set by the trial court.

[17] While Selim disputes Board's credibility on appeal, he failed to timely designate any evidence challenging Board's credibility before the trial court. Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court refused to consider documents filed by Selim after the deadline had passed, the Indiana Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the brightline rule that untimely submissions cannot be considered by a trial court when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See Liu, 250 N.E.3d at 412; Mitchell v. 10th and The Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 972–73 (Ind. 2014); HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98–99 (Ind. 2008); Borsuk v. Town of St. John, 820 N.E.2d 118, 123 n.5 (Ind. 2005). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting AFC's motion for partial summary judgment.

[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Selim indicated in his notice of appeal that he was proceeding pro se and that Orion had not retained legal counsel for appeal or appeared on appeal.

3.   After the trial court denied Selim's request that the trial court reconsider its denial of their request for a second ninety-day extension, Selim filed a motion to recuse the trial judge, which motion was denied on April 9, 2025.

4.   To the extent that Selim's argument also includes his other requests for more time to respond, which essentially restated the same vague assertions, we reach the same conclusion.

5.   Abrogated on other grounds by Isgrig v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238 (Ind. 2025).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.