Eve B. Sparks, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Marion County Sheriff's Office, et al., Appellees-Defendants (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Eve Sparks appeals the dismissal of her complaint for wrongful eviction. Finding she has failed to present a cogent argument on appeal, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] After Sparks’ landlord initiated eviction proceedings against her, both parties appeared for a hearing on June 2, 2025. Two days later, the court entered an “Agreed Order for Possession” memorializing the parties’ agreement that an order of possession would issue in favor of the landlord unless Sparks paid her outstanding balance in full by June 30, 2025.¹ The order further stated that if Sparks failed to timely pay her debt, she “and Any and All Occupants are notified that they shall, before 1:00 P.M. on September 8, 2025, return possession of the Leased Premises ․” Appellees’ Appendix Vol. 2 at 16 (underlining omitted). In such case, the court ordered “any law enforcement officer, including but not limited to the Sheriff of Marion County,” to seize the premises, restore the landlord's possession, and supervise the removal of Sparks’ personal property. Id.

[3] On June 23, the trial court issued a “Corrected Agreed Order for Possession” clarifying that Sparks had no right to possess the property after June 30 if she failed to pay her balance in full by that date. The corrected order authorized the Marion County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) to seize the premises after the June 30 deadline.

[4] On June 30, Sparks filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider its corrected order. The court denied that motion, noting the parties had “agreed in open court on the record that [Sparks] would either pay the balance due or vacate the property by June 30, 2025[,]” and the corrected order “properly reflect[ed] the parties[’] agreement.” Id. at 19.

[5] According to Sparks, the MCSO restored possession in the landlord (i.e., evicted her) on July 22 based on the outdated agreed order indicating possession could not be restored before September 8. Based on this discrepancy and other allegations primarily directed at her landlord, Sparks filed suit “for a Wrongful/Illegal Eviction” against the MCSO and various individual officers or staff members (collectively, Appellees). Id. at 2. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6). After Sparks responded, the court granted the motion and dismissed Sparks’ complaint with prejudice.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Sparks filed her lawsuit pro se and proceeds in the same capacity on appeal.

A litigant is not given special consideration by virtue of his pro se status. Rather, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.

Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation marks omitted).

These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. While we prefer to decide issues on the merits, where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.

Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), reh'g denied.

[7] In this case, the deficiencies in Sparks’ brief prevent us from conducting a meaningful review of her arguments on appeal.² Her brief does not comply with Appellate Rule 46(A) which requires it to contain specific sections under separate headings. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(1)-(12) (“The appellant's brief shall contain the following sections under separate headings and in the following order ․”). And it has no sections that can, as a matter of substance, be considered a table of authorities or a statement of case. Furthermore, because Sparks did not file an appendix in violation of Rule 50(A)(1), her statement of facts does not contain any citations to the appendix or the record on appeal as required by Rule 46(A)(6)(a). See App. R. 50(A)(1) (noting the purpose of an appendix is to provide the appellate court all parts of the record “necessary for the Court to decide the issues presented”).³ However, Appellees undertook the burden of providing an adequate record. See App. R. 50(A)(3) (stating the appellee must provide an appendix to the extent “necessary for completeness or context”). They filed an appendix which included Sparks’ complaint, all materials related to their motion to dismiss, and the court's order of dismissal.

[8] But even if we look past Sparks’ failure to provide any adequate record because Appellees did so, Sparks’ argument lacks any cogency. Although she argues the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint, her basis for that contention is unclear. An appellant's argument must be “supported by cogent reasoning” and citations to applicable authorities. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Sparks only cites authorities from the State of Oregon which have no bearing on her eviction from her apartment in Indiana.⁴ See Page v. State, 582 N.E.2d 438, 440 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting litigants cannot cite-out-of-jurisdiction case law to avoid binding precedent). Moreover, she quotes general propositions of Oregon negligence law rather than standards pertaining to wrongful eviction claims. See Appellant's Brief at 6 (quoting Fazzolari ex rel. Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1336 (Or. 1987) and Buchler v. State ex rel. Oregon Corrs. Div., 853 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Or. 1993)). Sparks also fails to address Appellees’ arguments (raised below and on appeal) that her claim was barred on various grounds, and Appellees were entitled to immunity. See Appellees’ Br. at 10-20 (discussing theories of immunity and Sparks’ failure to file a notice of tort claim).

[9] Finally, Sparks fails to argue that if dismissal was warranted it should have been “without prejudice.” Generally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff may amend the complaint “once as of right ․ within ten ․ days ․” Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). But because Sparks has not provided “specific information as to how [she] would have amended [her] complaint” to state a valid claim, she has not shown she was prejudiced by the dismissal with prejudice. Baker v. Town of Middlebury, 753 N.E.2d 67, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Accordingly, any error in the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was harmless. Id. (dismissal with prejudice was harmless error because the plaintiff did “not show[ ] on appeal how he would have amended his complaint to avoid T.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal”).

[10] Based on the deficiencies in Sparks’ brief and her failure to provide a cogent argument, we are unable to review the merits of her claims. She has therefore waived appellate review of the alleged errors. See Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984-85.

Conclusion

[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We have accessed the underlying eviction case, 49D33-2504-EV-19160, using our Odyssey Case Management system. Pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5), we take judicial notice that the landlord filed a ledger with its notice of claim indicating Sparks had an outstanding balance of $2,371.63, which included court costs related to the eviction proceedings.

2.   While we reference Sparks’ principal brief, her reply brief is similarly defective, though it contains one citation to an Indiana statute and another to an Indiana appellate case (without applying those authorities to the facts at hand).

3.   She also failed to file a transcript of any relevant hearings, but a transcript is only required when “necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Ind. Appellate Rule 9(F)(5).

4.   This also applies to her standard of review section. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b) provides “[t]he argument must include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review ․” Sparks’ reliance on Oregon case law does not meet this requirement.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.