IN RE: the Estate of Robert Lee Dodd (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Magnolia Health Management XII, LLC, commonly known as Willowbend Living Center (“Willowbend”), asserted a claim against the estate of Robert Lee Dodd (“Robert”) for expenses incurred in caring for Robert prior to his death. The trial court denied the claim as untimely. Willowbend appeals and argues that its claim was timely. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand.

Issue

[2] Willowbend presents one issue, which we restate as whether its claim against the estate was timely.

Facts

[3] Robert was a resident of Willowbend Living Center, a nursing home. Robert passed away on January 3, 2025. Willowbend claims that, at the time of his death, Robert owed it $14,160 for the care he received. Neither Robert's widow, Karen, nor anyone else opened an estate after Robert's death. Instead, Willowbend spent several months attempting to collect the debt from Karen. In June 2025, Willowbend's attorney sent a demand letter to Karen claiming that she was liable for Robert's expenses under the doctrine of necessaries. Karen disputed the debt and informed Willowbend to direct all future communications to her attorney. Accordingly, Karen did not respond to any further emails sent by Willowbend's attorney.

[4] On September 8, 2025, twenty-five days prior to the nine-month anniversary of Robert's death,¹ Willowbend filed a creditor's petition for probate administration. Attached to the petition was a claim against the estate for $14,160. The petition did not identify a proposed personal representative and instead requested the trial court to appoint a personal representative in its discretion.

[5] The trial court held a hearing on the petition on October 8, 2025, five days after the nine-month anniversary of Robert's death. At the hearing, Willowbend argued that its petition and claim were timely filed within nine months of the decedent's death and that the trial court should assume jurisdiction over the estate; Willowbend claimed that opening an estate was necessary to pursue a claim against Karen under the doctrine of necessaries.² Karen appeared and claimed that no estate had been opened and no personal representative had been appointed prior to the nine-month anniversary of Robert's death. Accordingly, Karen argued that no claim against the estate had been properly filed and that Willowbend's claim was time barred.

[6] On October 9, 2025, the trial court entered an order denying Willowbend's petition, in which the court found in relevant part:

(a) Robert Lee Dodd died on January 3, 2025[;] (b) an Estate was not opened nor was a Personal Representative appointed prior to October 3, 2025[;] (c) October 3, 2025 marks nine (9) months after the date of death of the Decedent[;] (d) I.C. 29-1-14-1 bars the filing of any Claims after the passage of nine (9) months from the death of the Decedent[;] (e) the purpose of the Creditor's Petition cannot be achieved because Willowbend Living Center failed to file a Claim prior to October 3, 2025[;] and (f) Willowbend Living Center cannot pursue Karen Dodd for payment of the debts of Robert Lee Dodd under the doctrine of necessaries because a timely Claim was not filed as required by statute in the Estate of Robert Lee Dodd.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 4. Willowbend now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

A. Standard of Review

[7] We first note that Karen has not filed an appellee's brief. When this occurs:

the appellate court need not develop an argument for the appellees but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Prima facie error in this context means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. This less stringent standard of review relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee. We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.

Omije v. Whilby-Omije, 256 N.E.3d 539, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied. We review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo, as we do a trial court's interpretation of statutes. Gittings v. Deal, 109 N.E.3d 963, 970 (Ind. 2018).

B. Willowbend timely filed its claim against the estate.

[8] Willowbend claims that it timely filed its claim against the estate by filing a creditor's petition for estate administration on September 8, 2025, twenty-five days before the nine-month non-claim deadline. Willowbend's claim against the estate was filed with the petition.

[9] We first note that, as a creditor, Willowbend could request that an estate be opened in order to bring a claim against the estate. Indiana Code Section 29-1-7-4(a) provides that “[a]ny interested person ․ may petition the court having jurisdiction of the administration of the decedent's estate: ․ (4) for the appointment of an administrator for the estate of any person dying intestate.” And “[i]nterested persons” is defined to include “creditors” and “any others having a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent being administered.” Ind. Code § 29-1-1-3(18); see also Hickory Creek, 992 N.E.2d at 214 (holding that a creditor long-term care facility should have opened an estate for the decedent, which it was permitted to do as an interested person).

[10] There are, however, strict time limits for filing claims against an estate. As explained by our Supreme Court in Markey v. Estate of Markey:

[A]lthough claims may be brought against an estate, they must be brought rather swiftly. Indeed, one of the basic tenets underlying the procedural provisions in our Probate Code is the uniform and expeditious distribution of property of a decedent.

For this reason, [Indiana Code Section 29-1-14-1(a)] provides that, in general, claims must be filed within three months of publication about the estate's administration:

* * * * *

But, no matter the notice date, all claims are barred nine months after the decedent's death. [Ind. Code § 29-1-7-7(g)].

38 N.E.3d 1003, 1007 (Ind. 2015) (case citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also I.C. § 29-1-14-1(d) (“All claims barrable under subsection (a) shall be barred if not filed within nine (9) months after the death of the decedent.”); 13 Ind. Law Encyc. Executors and Administrators § 116 (Jan. 2026 update) (“All claims which may be barred under this rule are also barred if not filed within nine months after the decedent's death.”).

[11] We have also explained that Indiana Code Section 29-1-14-1 is not a statute of limitations; instead, “ ‘[i]t is a nonclaim statute and, as such, it imposes a condition precedent to the enforcement of a right of action ․ and precludes recovery when this condition is not met. The time element in the statute is a part of the action itself.’ ” Mayer v. Davis, 991 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting McEwen v. McEwen, 529 N.E.2d 355, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)). Thus, in Mayer, we held that the plaintiff was barred from recovering any funds from the estate because he failed to either request that the trial court open an estate for the decedent or file a claim against the estate within the nine-month timeframe set forth in Indiana Code Section 29-1-14-1(d). Mayer, 991 N.E.2d at 121-22.

[12] Here, the trial court concluded that Willowbend's claims were barred because “Willowbend [ ] failed to file a Claim prior to October 3, 2025,” which was nine months after Robert's death. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 4. This is incorrect. Willowbend filed a creditor's petition for probate administration on September 8, 2025—twenty-five days prior to the nine-month anniversary of Robert's death. Attached to this petition was a claim against the estate for $14,160. The trial court seemed to be of the mistaken opinion that, because an estate had not been opened before the nine months expired, the timely filed claim against the estate could not proceed. But this is precisely what Willowbend's September 8 petition sought to do—open an estate so that Willowbend could make a claim against the estate.

[13] The trial court chose to hold a hearing on the petition after the nine-month deadline had passed. But that was not the fault of Willowbend, who had timely filed its petition to open an estate and its claim against the estate twenty-five days prior to the expiration of the deadline. The filing date is dispositive, not the hearing date. Willowbend has, therefore, established prima facie error on the part of the trial court in denying Willowbend's petition to open an estate for Robert.

Conclusion

[14] Willowbend has established prima facie error on the part of the trial court because Willowbend timely filed a petition to open an estate and a claim against that estate twenty-five days prior to the expiration of the nine-month statutory deadline for filing such claims. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As explained in more detail below, claims against an estate must be filed within nine months of the death of the decedent. Markey v. Estate of Markey, 38 N.E.3d 1003, 1007 (Ind. 2015).

2.   Willowbend had to file a claim against Robert's estate before it could seek recovery from Karen under the doctrine of necessaries. See Hickory Creek v. Estate of Combs, 992 N.E.2d 209, 212-13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that before seeking satisfaction of a debt from a surviving spouse under the doctrine of necessaries, a creditor must first seek satisfaction from the estate of the debtor spouse).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.