Deshawn Lee Moore, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In a fit of road rage after being cut off in traffic, Deshawn Moore chased down a family's car and struck its passenger side with his vehicle. He then continued to chase the car at high speeds until law enforcement arrived. For this, Moore was convicted of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness and Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. He was later sentenced to 730 days home detention with 185 days suspended to probation.

[2] On appeal, Moore takes issue with one of the jury instructions on criminal recklessness, but we find no error. He also challenges his sentence, but because he has finished serving it, his claim is moot. Finally, we sua sponte remand to correct the trial court's purported merger of his misdemeanor conviction into his felony.

Facts

[3] In August 2023, Kasi Conners was driving her Jeep down a two-lane road in Franklin. Her two young children were in the back seat, and her boyfriend was in the passenger seat. Conners encountered a stopped car partially blocking her lane of the road, so she drove around it using the lane of oncoming traffic, as the car in front of her had just done. But she did not see an oncoming vehicle, a black Kia Soul, which had to stop and swerve away from the Jeep, narrowly avoiding a collision.

[4] The driver of the Kia, later identified as Moore, made a U-turn and sped up towards Conners's vehicle, which was still traveling on the same road. Moore passed the car in front of him so that he could position himself directly behind Conners. Even as Conners accelerated to get away, Moore stayed on her bumper. He pulled alongside the right side of the Jeep, driving in the lane reserved for parking, then “rammed” or “sideswiped” the passenger side of the Jeep, hitting the car twice in quick succession. Tr. Vol. II, p. 57, 47. Conners made various turns to get away from Moore, driving fast, but Moore continued to follow her. During this chase, Conners called 911 and continued to drive. The chase ended only when law enforcement responded and stopped the cars.

[5] Moore immediately jumped out of his car and was “upset” and “amped up.” Id. at 80. He told a responding officer that the Jeep had hit his Kia when navigating around the stopped car. He explained that he wanted to report the incident but could not call 911, so he decided to follow the Jeep.

[6] Moore was later charged with Level 6 felony criminal recklessness and Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. The charging information for criminal recklessness alleged that Moore:

recklessly, knowingly, and/or intentionally with a deadly weapon, to wit: Kia Soul, perform[ed] an act, to wit: aggressively driving and/or tailgating and/or ramming the car, that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to [Conners] and/or [her boyfriend].

App. Vol. II, p. 27.

[7] At Moore's jury trial, the State presented testimony from Conners and an unrelated eyewitness—a woman who was driving behind Conners during the incident. That eyewitness recalled that Moore “rammed” the Jeep, or in other words, “purposefully swerved into it.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 69. The 911 calls of both Conners and the eyewitness were admitted into evidence, as well as photographs of the damage to the Jeep and the Kia. A responding police officer testified that he observed the Kia “tailgating the Jeep ․ very aggressively” by riding “on the bumper.” Id. at 78.

[8] Moore argued that the location of the damage on the vehicles did not align with Conners's version of events but was more consistent with an incident in which Conners hit Moore. Moore's mother then testified, explaining that she was on the phone with him just before the incident. Moore's mother testified that Moore stated, “This lady just hit me,” then stopped responding. Id. at 104.

[9] Moore also requested jury instructions that defined “aggressively driving,” as stated in the charging information. He proposed to use the definition from the misdemeanor offense of “aggressive driving” under Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b). The State objected, claiming he was not charged under that statute, so the instruction would confuse the jury. The trial court agreed, in part, and gave a modified instruction using some, but not all, of the language from the misdemeanor aggressive driving statute.

[10] The jury found Moore guilty on both counts, and the trial court convicted him accordingly. At sentencing, the court found that the misdemeanor reckless driving conviction “merge[d]” into the felony criminal recklessness conviction, but the court did not vacate the lesser offense. Id. at 147. Moore was then sentenced to 730 days, with 545 of those days to be served in community corrections on home detention and the remainder suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Moore raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court's jury instruction on “aggressive driving” was erroneous. Second, he contends his sentence is inappropriate. We also sua sponte address the trial court's purported “merger” of Moore's misdemeanor conviction at sentencing.

I. Jury Instruction

[12] Trial courts possess “broad discretion as to how to instruct the jury, and we generally review that discretion only for abuse.” Kane v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. 2012). “[A]n abuse of that discretion occurs when instructions, taken as a whole, mislead the jury as to the applicable law.” Reese v. State, 939 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). But where an instruction is alleged to incorrectly state the law, “we review the trial court's interpretation of that law de novo.” Kane, 976 N.E.2d at 1231. We look to the jury instructions “as a whole and in reference to each other.” Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 917 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1284-85 (Ind. 2014)).

[13] Moore challenges the instruction defining “aggressively driving,” one of the acts described in the charging information for criminal recklessness. At trial, Moore argued that “aggressive driving” is defined in Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b), which outlines the misdemeanor offense of “aggressive driving.” He argued that this definition is referenced in another subsection of the criminal recklessness statute, Indiana Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(B), which elevates the offense to a Level 6 felony if the defendant committed “ ‘aggressive driving’ (as defined in IC 9-21-8-55) that results in serious bodily injury[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(B).

[14] In response, the State emphasized that Moore was charged with criminal recklessness under Indiana Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(A), not with aggressive driving under Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b) nor with aggressive-driving-based criminal recklessness under Indiana Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(B). The State also argued that the charging information used the “common sense” meaning of the term “aggressively driving” to describe the conduct underlying the charged criminal recklessness. Tr. Vol. II, p. 99. Therefore, a jury instruction using the full misdemeanor offense definition would confuse the jury, according to the State.

[15] The trial court agreed that Moore's proposed instruction could confuse the jury because Moore was not charged specifically with aggressive driving. However, it found that “includ[ing] what the law considers aggressive driving” would be “helpful.” Id. at 101. Therefore, the court adopted instructions that read:

The term “aggressively driving” means:

(1) Following a vehicle too closely,

(2) Unsafe operation of a vehicle,

(3) Overtaking another vehicle on the right by driving off the roadway,

(4) Unsafe stopping or slowing a vehicle,

(5) Unnecessary sounding of the horn,

(6) Failure to yield,

(7) Failure to obey a traffic control device,

(8) Driving at an unsafe speed,

(9) Repeatedly flashing the vehicle's headlights.

App. Vol. II, p. 66. This instruction incorporated the list of enumerated acts that can constitute misdemeanor aggressive driving under Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b) but omitted the statute's introductory phrase: “For purposes of this section, a person engages in aggressive driving if, during one (1) episode of continuous driving of a vehicle, the person does or commits at least three (3) of the following[.]” Ind. Code § 9-21-8-55(b).¹

[16] On appeal, Moore argues that the jury should have been instructed on the full statutory definition of aggressive driving under Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b), specifically the requirement that a person commit at least three of the enumerated actions. Without that, Moore contends, the instructions incorrectly state the legal definition of aggressive driving and “lessens the State's burden” of proof. Appellant's Br., p. 11. We are not persuaded.

[17] Moore was charged with criminal recklessness under Indiana Code § 35-42-2-2(b)(1)(A), which required the State to prove that Moore knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly “[p]erformed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person” while armed with a deadly weapon. App. Vol. II, p. 60 (final jury instructions). The charging information listed three alternative actions as supporting the “act” element: “aggressively driving and/or tailgating and/or ramming the car.” Id. at 27. The jury heard testimony from various witnesses—Conners, the eyewitness driver, and the responding officers—who observed Moore driving closely behind Conners, intentionally hitting her car with his, overtaking her on the right using a lane reserved for parked cars, and speeding.

[18] The operative question was whether Moore committed some act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury to another—not whether his conduct constituted aggressive driving. Aggressive driving itself was not an element of the offense, and Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b) was not implicated. Thus, that statute's complete definition of aggressive driving was not the “applicable law.” Reese, 939 N.E.2d at 701. The purportedly incomplete definition included in the jury instructions did not incorrectly state the law of this case. See id.

[19] Relatedly, the instructions did not reduce the State's burden of proof because the State bore no burden to prove the crime of aggressive driving. In fact, Moore's proposed instructions increased the State's burden by adding elements of an offense not alleged. Had the full definition of misdemeanor aggressive driving under Indiana Code § 9-21-8-55(b) been included in the instruction, it could have created confusion about which criminal offense was at issue. See Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001) (“An instruction that tends to confuse the jury is properly rejected.”). Given the foregoing, and viewing the instructions as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.

II. Sentence

[20] Moore disputes the validity of his 730-day sentence, in which 545 days were ordered to be served on home detention through community corrections and the remaining 180 days were suspended to probation. The State responds that Moore's sentencing claim is moot because he has fully served his sentence. Per its calculations of his sentence and credit for time served, the State argues that Moore's sentence was completed in October 2025. Calculations aside, the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) in this case confirms that, by mid-January 2026, Moore had completed both parts of his sentence: community corrections and probation.

[21] According to notices filed by the probation department as to Moore's outstanding program fees, Moore had “completed the Johnson County Community Corrections program as ordered” as of July 8, 2025, and had “completed [his] supervision term at Johnson County Adult Probation as ordered” as of January 14, 2026. Notice Outstanding Fees (filed Jul. 8, 2025); Notice Outstanding Fees (filed Jan. 14, 2026).² Thus, Moore finished serving his entire sentence before the appellate briefing period ended on January 20, 2026, and before the case was deemed fully briefed on February 12, 2026.

[22] Indiana courts have repeatedly held that, once a “sentence has been served, the issue of the validity of the sentence is rendered moot.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Irwin v. State, 744 N.E.2d 565, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). This is because “a case is deemed moot when no effective relief can be rendered to the parties before the court.” Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ind. 2009).

[23] Moore did not file a reply brief to counter the State's argument that his sentencing claim is moot. He therefore provides no argument as to why we should consider the claim's merits despite its mootness. See id. (noting that moot claims are dismissed, but exceptions exist for issues that are likely to recur or of great public importance). Accordingly, we do not address Moore's sentencing claim.

III. Merger

[24] Lastly, we sua sponte address the trial court's purported merger of Moore's two convictions and remand for correction.

[25] After Moore was found guilty of felony criminal recklessness and misdemeanor reckless driving, the trial court entered judgment of conviction on both offenses. Then, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court “merge[d] that [misdemeanor] with the felony” based on double jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. II, p. 147. The sentencing documents reflect the same: the sentencing order states that the reckless driving count “is merged into” the criminal recklessness count, and the abstract of judgment lists “Conviction Merged” as the disposition for reckless driving. App. Vol. II, p. 106; Abstract of J. (issued May 6, 2025).

[26] As this Court has previously explained, “[a] trial court's act of merging, without also vacating the conviction, is not sufficient to cure a double jeopardy violation.” Gregory v. State, 885 N.E.2d 697, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). When two convictions cannot stand under double jeopardy principles, the proper remedy is to vacate one conviction, not merge convictions. See id. We therefore remand for correction of the trial court's sentencing documentation to reflect that the conviction for reckless driving is vacated, rather than merged.

Conclusion

[27] Finding no error in the challenged jury instruction, we affirm Moore's conviction for criminal recklessness. And because he has finished serving his sentence, his challenge to the validity of that sentence is moot and we do not address it. However, we sua sponte remand for correction of Moore's sentencing documents to reflect that his reckless driving conviction was vacated, not merged.

[28] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The misdemeanor offense of aggressive driving also requires proof that the defendant engaged in aggressive driving “with the intent to harass or intimidate a person in another vehicle.” Ind. Code § 9-21-8-55(c).

2.   Moore paid these outstanding fees, as reflected by subsequent motions to dismiss approved by the trial court. See Mot. Dismiss Outstanding Fees (filed Sept. 11, 2025); Mot. Dismiss Outstanding Fees (filed Feb. 5, 2026). The Clerk's record (which includes the CCS) and all proceedings before the trial court are part of the record on appeal, whether or not transmitted to this Court. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.