Michael C. McAllister, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, Michael McAllister was convicted of: Count I, resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; Count II, criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count III, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. McAllister appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for resisting law enforcement and criminal mischief.¹ We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] McAllister presents one issue: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support McAllister's convictions for resisting law enforcement and criminal mischief.

Facts

[3] In the early morning hours of July 7, 2024, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”) Officer Taylor Jones was informed that a man had been involved in a disturbance and had broken a sign in front of Insomnia Cookies, a nearby business. Officer Jones followed the man, later identified as McAllister. As Officer Jones approached, he smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from McAllister and observed him smoking from approximately ten to fifteen feet away. Officer Jones stopped McAllister and attempted to place him in handcuffs.

[4] Officer Jones did not verbally identify himself as a police officer initially, but he was wearing a full police uniform. McAllister “began to pull himself away.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Officer Jones secured a handcuff on McAllister's left wrist, but McAllister “continued to pull away and dug into his pocket and retrieved a cell phone.” Id. McAllister's phone was ringing, and he answered the incoming call. Officer Jones testified that McAllister “kept turning his body away and keeping his wrist away from” him and that Officer Jones was unable to secure the right handcuff despite telling McAllister “multiple times to put his hands behind his back.” Id. at 5-6. Officer Jones eventually allowed the phone call to continue while holding McAllister's left wrist. McAllister, however, “was using force to prevent himself from being placed in handcuffs” and was “fighting against” Officer Jones. Id. at 14.

[5] Once McAllister ended the phone call, Officer Jones secured both handcuffs. After both handcuffs were secured, McAllister complained that the handcuffs were too tight and compared his situation to “George Floyd.” Id. at 15. Officer Jones described McAllister's behavior as “thrusting himself around” and “pulling away,” “like when someone throws a tantrum.” Id. at 15-16. Officer Jones radioed for backup, and when another officer arrived, the officer conducted a pat-down search and recovered marijuana from McAllister's person. The recovered substance from McAllister was subsequently tested and determined to be 4.24 grams of marijuana.

[6] Steve Wentland, who witnessed McAllister's initial conduct, described McAllister as “very agitated” and McAllister was yelling and screaming. Id. at 18. Wentland observed McAllister kick an A-frame chalkboard sign in front of Insomnia Cookies, which “shattered into multiple pieces.” Id. Wentland described the sign as “[d]estroyed.” Id. Employees of Insomnia Cookies came running outside to see what had happened. Wentland pointed Officer Jones in the direction McAllister had gone. Although Wentland was not the owner of Insomnia Cookies, he had seen Insomnia Cookies employees place the sign outside “[e]very day for years.” Id. at 21.

[7] On July 7, 2024, the State charged McAllister with Count I, resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor; Count II, criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor; and Count III, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. On September 10, 2025, the trial court held a bench trial. The State presented Officer Jones’ body camera footage as evidence. The trial court found McAllister guilty of all three counts. The trial court enhanced the marijuana conviction from a Class B to a Class A misdemeanor based on McAllister's prior marijuana conviction. McAllister was sentenced to twenty-four days on each count, to be served concurrently, with credit for twelve days served. McAllister now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[8] McAllister argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions for resisting law enforcement and criminal mischief. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [fact-finder].” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the fact-finder's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

A. The State presented sufficient evidence to support McAllister's conviction for resisting law enforcement.

[9] Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-3-1(a) provides, “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.” (emphasis added). In K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013), our Supreme Court acknowledged that “forcibly” is a separate element of resisting law enforcement and held that “one ‘forcibly resists’ [ ] when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Id. (quoting Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 723 (Ind. 1993)). “The level of force certainly ‘need not rise to the level of mayhem.’ ” Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009)). “Yet the statute does not demand complete passivity, either. Merely walking away from a law-enforcement encounter, leaning away from an officer's grasp, or “twisting and turning ‘a little bit’ against an officer's actions do not establish ‘forcible’ resistance.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

[10] Our Court has also recognized that actual physical contact between the defendant and the officer is not required to sustain a conviction for resisting law enforcement. Tyson v. State, 140 N.E.3d 374, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 727 (Ind. 2013)). The “forcible” element may also be satisfied by an active threat of such strength, power, or violence when that threat impedes the officer's ability to lawfully execute his or her duties. Id.

[11] Here, McAllister argues that his actions did not meet the statutory requirement of forcibly resisting a law enforcement officer. Specifically, McAllister argues that Officer Jones did not identify himself before grabbing McAllister; that McAllister's phone was ringing and he was simply answering an incoming call, not attempting to flee; and that McAllister did not threaten Officer Jones and voluntarily submitted his right hand after the call. We are not persuaded by this argument and, accordingly, disagree.

[12] Although Officer Jones did not verbally identify himself as a police officer at the outset of the encounter, Officer Jones was wearing a full police uniform when he arrested McAllister. The lack of verbal identification may explain McAllister's initial pulling away, but it does not explain his continued resisting behavior. McAllister also characterizes his conduct as merely answering a phone call. This argument is unpersuasive because, even after the call ended, McAllister continued acting “agitated,” “thrusting himself around,” “like when someone throws a tantrum,” and “pulling away,” while comparing himself to “George Floyd.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 15-16. Contrary to McAllister's claim that he “voluntarily” submitted his right hand to be cuffed, Officer Jones testified that the submission was not voluntary. Id. at 15.

[13] McAllister's argument merely invites us to reweigh the evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that McAllister forcibly resisted and interfered with Officer Jones's execution of his duties.

B. The State presented sufficient evidence to support McAllister's conviction for criminal mischief.

[14] Indiana Code Section 35-43-1-2 provides, “[a] person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally damages or defaces property of another person without the other person's consent commits criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor.” Our Court has held that “circumstantial evidence [is] sufficient to prove” that the property taken or damaged was the property of another to support a conviction for criminal mischief. Wallace v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[15] Here, McAllister argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for criminal mischief because no representative of Insomnia Cookies testified at trial regarding ownership of the sign or lack of consent to its destruction. Wentland, however, testified that he personally observed McAllister kick the Insomnia Cookies sign, which “shattered into multiple pieces.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. Wentland further testified he had witnessed Insomnia Cookies employees place that sign outside “[e]very day for years.” Id. at 21. When McAllister kicked the sign, Insomnia Cookies employees ran outside to see what had happened. Id. at 18.

[16] From this testimony, the trial court could reasonably infer that the sign was the property of Insomnia Cookies and consent was not given to destroy the sign. Staton v. State, 853 N.E.2d 470, 475-76 (Ind. 2006) (stating that the fact-finder can “apply common sense to the evidence”). McAllister's contrary arguments merely request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

Conclusion

[17] The State presented sufficient evidence to support McAllister's convictions for resisting law enforcement and criminal mischief. Accordingly, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   McAllister does not challenge his conviction for Count III, possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.