WILLETTE III v. NEWREZ LLC LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] William R. Willette, III brings this pro se appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of NewRez LLC, d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“NewRez”). Willette raises five issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether he has met his burden on appeal of demonstrating reversible error. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2006, Willette executed a note payable to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) in the principal amount of $126,000, which note was secured by a mortgage on certain real property in Crown Point. The mortgage was duly recorded. In 2021, Wells Fargo assigned both the note and the mortgage to NewRez. Wells Fargo's assignment of the note is shown on an allonge attached to the note. See Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 9. And Wells Fargo's assignment of the mortgage is shown on a document titled “Corporate Assignment of Mortgage,” which was duly recorded with the Lake County Recorder against the real property secured by the mortgage. Id. at 31 (all capitals removed).

[3] In July 2023, Willette defaulted on the note. In May 2024, NewRez filed its complaint on the note and request to foreclose on the mortgage. In his ensuing answer, Willette admitted that he was in default on the note but denied that NewRez was the proper holder of the note and the mortgage.

[4] On January 6, 2025, NewRez moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion for summary judgment, NewRez designated the original note with the attached allonge and the original mortgage documents along with the ensuing assignment. NewRez further designated the affidavit of Bailee Berrien, NewRez's document verification specialist. In that affidavit, Berrien detailed the process by which NewRez came to be the holder of the note and the mortgage, affirmed that NewRez was the holder of those documents, and stated that NewRez was entitled to enforce its rights under the note and the mortgage against Willette.

[5] Willette timely filed a motion to strike Berrien's affidavit and separately, also timely filed his response to NewRez's motion for summary judgment. In support of his response to NewRez's motion for summary judgment, Willette designated “all of the [p]art[ies’] ․ discovery and responses.” Appellee's App. Vol. 3, p. 4. And Willette again conceded that he was in default on his note but disputed that NewRez was the proper holder of the note and the mortgage.

[6] In particular, Willette argued that NewRez “did not have the right to enforce the Note” under Indiana's Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) statutes. Id. at 6. That is, Willette asserted that NewRez had failed to follow the U.C.C. requirements to prove to him that NewRez was the proper holder of the note and the mortgage. He also asserted that NewRez was unable to demonstrate the full chain of holders of the note and the mortgage from his execution of the documents to the time of NewRez's complaint.

[7] NewRez timely filed a consolidated response to Willette's motion to strike and reply to Willette's response to the motion for summary judgment. In that document, NewRez asserted that Willette “has not, nor can he, produce any documents that would show that [NewRez] does not hold the Note and Mortgage or that [NewRez] is not ․ entitled to enforce the Note and Mortgage.” Appellee's App. Vol. 9, p. 35. On February 28, Willette attempted to file a “barrage of last minute [documents] pertaining to the summary judgment” motion, and NewRez objected on the ground that Willette's filings were untimely. Id. at 165.

[8] At an ensuing hearing on NewRez's motion for summary judgment, the court heard the parties’ arguments on the admissibility of the designated evidence and other filings as well as the parties’ arguments on summary judgment. Thereafter, the court granted NewRez's motion to strike Willette's February 28 filings; concluded that Berrien's affidavit was admissible; and entered summary judgment for NewRez. Willette filed a consolidated Trial Rule 59 and Trial Rule 60 motion to have the court revisit its judgment, which the court denied.

[9] This appeal ensued.

Standards of Review

[10] On appeal, we initially reiterate Indiana's long-standing recognition that pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as a trained attorney.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear:

[pro se litigants are] “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, a party proceeding pro se must “be prepared to accept the consequences of his or her action.” McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017) (quotation omitted). While trial courts may facilitate a fair hearing for pro se litigants by explaining “legal concepts in everyday language” and informing litigants “what is expected of them,” they must enforce the law. Ind. Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2 & cmt. 5.

Id. at 410-11.

[11] As for our review of the trial court's entry of summary judgment, our Supreme Court has made clear:

[w]e review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ․ the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to “demonstrate [ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,” at which point the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence” showing an issue for the trier of fact. Id. at 761-62 (internal quotation marks and substitution omitted). And “[a]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.” McSwane v. Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 909-10 (Ind. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis added; omission and some alterations original to Hughley).

[12] And much of Willette's briefing on appeal challenges the trial court's evidentiary decisions. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ordinarily reversed only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

Willette cannot show reversible error in the trial court's evidentiary decisions.

[13] We first consider Willette's evidentiary challenges on appeal. We begin with his articulated Arguments Two and Three. In his Argument Two, Willette contends that the trial court incorrectly understood his timely objection to Berrien's affidavit and ensuing timely response to NewRez's motion for summary judgment. Similarly, in his Argument Three, Willette asserts that the trial court “ignored” his designated evidence in support of his response to NewRez's motion for summary judgment. Appellant's Br. at 43.¹ And, throughout these two arguments in particular but also in other parts of his brief, Willette states that the trial court improperly applied our summary judgment burden-shifting framework or failed to properly consider his designated evidence.

[14] We need not decide those various arguments separately. Our standard of review on summary judgment is de novo, that is, without any deference to the trial court's decision or the manner in which the trial court went about making its decision. Further, we owe no deference to the trial court's understanding of documents or designated evidence. Thus, any mistakes the trial court made in these respects are of no moment to our de novo review.

[15] In his Argument One, Willette asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by “blocking his UCC-centric discovery.” Id. at 15. This appears to be a reference to Willette's February 28 filings and requests, which were made well after the close of the summary judgment timelines provided for in Trial Rule 56(C). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in striking those requests. See, e.g., Mitchell v. 10th and the Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 971-73 (Ind. 2014).

[16] In his Argument Four, Willette contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his motion to strike Berrien's affidavit. In his motion to strike, Willette alleged that Berrien's affidavit was inadmissible for the following four reasons: it contained inadmissible legal conclusions; it contained assertions that were beyond Berrien's personal knowledge; it contained assertions that were based in speculation; and it amounted to inadmissible hearsay. But, for the reasons explained below, we conclude that the admissibility of Berrien's affidavit is irrelevant to the merits of the trial court's entry of summary judgment for NewRez. We therefore need not consider this question further.

The trial court properly entered summary judgment for NewRez.

[17] We thus turn to the merits of the trial court's summary judgment order. Here, in his Arguments One and Five, Willette contends that NewRez's complaint on the note and request to foreclose on the mortgage should have been controlled by Indiana's U.C.C. provisions and not by Indiana's statutes on foreclosures. Had the trial court properly applied Indiana's U.C.C. provisions and the designated evidence, Willette continues, it would have concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether NewRez was the proper holder of the note and the mortgage.

[18] Willette is incorrect. Indiana's U.C.C. statutes are not relevant to NewRez's complaint on the note and request for foreclosure on the mortgage, which action was expressly and specifically authorized by Indiana Code sections 32-30-10-3 to -5. Once NewRez filed that complaint and foreclosure request, the proceedings were thereafter governed by the Indiana Trial Rules and the Indiana Code on foreclosures, not U.C.C. provisions regarding general rights and obligations between debtors and creditors.

[19] As for NewRez's designated evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, it designated the original note and the attached allonge. The allonge demonstrated that Wells Fargo assigned the note to NewRez. NewRez also designated the original mortgage along with its ensuing and recorded assignment from Wells Fargo to NewRez. Those documents established that NewRez was the holder of the note and the mortgage. The burden on summary judgment thus shifted to Willette to designate evidence that would establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether NewRez was the holder of those documents, which Willette did not do. The trial court therefore properly entered summary judgment for NewRez.

Conclusion

[20] For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The page numbers at the bottom of the pages of Willette's initial brief on appeal are inconsistent with the .pdf page numbers. We use the .pdf page numbers in our citations to his initial brief.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.