Monica Wirth, Appellant-Plaintiff v. LLC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Monica Wirth appeals the Marion County Small Claims Court's judgment in favor of Brinkley's Auction & Estate Sales, LLC (“Brinkley's”) on her complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. Wirth presents several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment for Brinkley's.

[2] Brinkley's cross-appeals and asks for appellate attorney's fees.

[3] We affirm the trial court's judgment and deny Brinkley's appellate attorney's fee request.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] On January 19, 2025, Brinkley's conducted an online auction. Wirth bid on thirty lots, mostly consisting of silver and silverplated flatware. Wirth had the highest bid on each lot by the conclusion of the auction. However, the auction was held “with reserve,” which meant that Brinkley's could withdraw the items at any time until it announced the “completion of the sale.” Ind. Code § 26-1-2-328. And because Wirth's bids on the lots did not meet the minimum prices sought for those items, Brinkley's canceled the sale of the thirty lots to Wirth.

[5] On January 20, Brinkley's emailed Wirth to notify her that “the bids did not meet the consignor[’]s reserve.” Ex. Vol. 3, p. 20. The consignor later clarified that the items were withdrawn from the auction because the bids “did not approach [the seller's] expectations based on market value or even on scrap value.” Id. at 21.

[6] On January 28, Wirth filed a complaint against Brinkley's alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. In particular, Wirth asked the small claims court to bar Brinkley's from putting the items up for sale in another auction. And Wirth sought unspecified damages “suffered as the direct and proximate result” of the alleged breach of contract. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 6. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment for Brinkley's. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Wirth appeals the small claims court's judgment for Brinkley's. Small claims actions involve informal trials with the sole objective of dispensing speedy justice between the parties according to the rules of substantive law. Harvey v. Keyed in Prop. Mgmt., LLC, 165 N.E.3d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Accordingly, judgments from small claims actions are provided a deferential standard of review. Id. We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Pfledderer v. Pratt, 142 N.E.3d 492, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). However, this deferential standard relates only to procedural and evidentiary issues; it does not apply to substantive rules of law, which we review de novo. Id.

[8] Brinkley's argues that Wirth has waived the issues on appeal by her noncompliance with the Indiana Appellate Rules. As she did below, Wirth has chosen to proceed pro se. It is well-settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Id. at 983-84. These consequences include waiver for failure to present cogent argument on appeal. Id. at 984. Where the appellant's noncompliance with appellate rules is so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived. Id. We will not become “ ‘an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Id. (quoting Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 106 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[9] In her brief on appeal, Wirth has failed to: (1) provide a statement of the issues “concisely and particularly” describing each issue for our review under Appellate Rule 46(A)(4); (2) provide a “concise statement of the applicable standard of review” as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(b); or (3) provide cogent argument supported by citations to relevant or persuasive legal authority as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Wirth's Statement of the Issues purports to set out fourteen issues and thirty-seven sub-issues for our review, but almost none of the issues or sub-issues are concise or helpful to understand the bases for her appeal. To the extent Wirth attempts to persuade us that the court clearly erred, Wirth makes no discernable legal argument and relies exclusively on blogs and case law from foreign jurisdictions as far away as Australia.

[10] Still, we address the issues that, to the best of our ability, we can glean from her brief on appeal. At issue is whether the small claims court clearly erred when it found that: (1) the online auction was held with a reserve; (2) Wirth's winning bids were merely offers to purchase goods; and (3) Brinkley's was entitled to cancel the sale when the bids did not meet the consignor's reserve prices.

[11] While Wirth claims that the auction was not held with a reserve, the applicable statute and evidence presented at trial show otherwise. Indiana Code section 26-1-2-328(3) provides that a sale by auction “is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms put up without reserve.” The parties agree that an item up for auction “with reserve” means that the item has a “minimum acceptable bid[.]” Tr. p. 17. Brinkley's presented evidence that, not only did they not list the items as “without reserve,” but its terms and conditions expressly stated that the items were being sold with a reserve. To the extent Wirth argues otherwise, she relies on her self-serving testimony and asks that we reweigh the evidence.

[12] Indiana Code section 26-1-2-328(3) provides that, “[i]n an auction with reserve the auctioneer may withdraw the goods at any time until he announces completion of the sale.” Thus, it is not a winning bid that completes the sale, but the announcement of the completion of the sale. Wirth's contention that her winning bid was anything more than an offer to purchase the lots is without merit.

[13] Finally, Brinkley's presented evidence that Wirth's bids did not meet the reserve that had been set by the consignor. Accordingly, Brinkley's was entitled to decline Wirth's offers to buy the lots.

[14] Wirth's appellate brief is, at best, merely an attempt to relitigate the facts underlying her claim against Brinkley's. Given our deferential standard of review, we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Wirth has not shown that the small claims court clearly erred when it entered judgment for Brinkley's on Wirth's complaint.¹

Cross-appeal

[15] Brinkley's requests appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), which provides that our Court has discretion to award appellate attorney's fees if an appeal “is frivolous or in bad faith.” Brinkley's emphasizes the lack of cogent argument in Wirth's appellant's brief and argues that “Wirth's appeal is both substantively and procedurally in bad faith.”² Appellee's Br. at 9. We do not agree.

[16] As this Court recently explained,

[w]e limit application of Appellate Rule 66(E) to “instances when an appeal is permeated with meritlessness, bad faith, frivolity, harassment, vexatiousness, or purpose of delay.” Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 404 (Ind. Ct. App.[ 2022]) (quoting Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 29 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)), trans. denied, 194 N.E.3d 599 (Ind. 2022). “We must use extreme restraint when exercising this power because of the potential chilling effect upon the exercise of the right to appeal.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Wagler, 29 N.E.3d at 174). Thus, we do not impose sanctions to punish mere lack of merit; rather, we do so when faced with something more egregious. Bousum v. Bousum, 173 N.E.3d 289, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Troyer v. Troyer, 987 N.E.2d 1130, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied).

There are two categories of claims for appellate attorneys’ fees: (1) substantive bad faith and (2) procedural bad faith. Duncan v. Yocum, 179 N.E.3d 988, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Boczar v. Meridian Street Found., 749 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).

To prevail on a substantive bad faith claim, the party must show that the appellant's contentions are utterly devoid of all plausibility. Procedural bad faith, on the other hand, occurs when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court. Even if the appellant's conduct falls short of that which is deliberate or by design, procedural bad faith can still be found.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Benziger v. Radabaugh, 267 N.E.3d 1149, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

[17] Here, Wirth presented evidence at trial that Brinkley's had not indicated that the lots she had bid on had reserves until well after the close of bidding. While Brinkley's terms and conditions stated that the lots were subject to reserves, Brinkley's could have made the reserves more obvious to Wirth and other bidders. In light of the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that Wirth's contentions on appeal are utterly devoid of all plausibility. See id.

[18] And while Wirth disregarded several appellate rules, as noted above, those errors can be chalked up to her pro se status rather than procedural bad faith. Because Wirth's appeal is neither frivolous nor brought in bad faith, we deny Brinkley's request for appellate attorney's fees.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Again, we review issues of law de novo. Pfledderer, 142 N.E.3d at 494. However, nowhere in her brief does Wirth ask us to review an issue of law.

2.   We note that Brinkley's did not list this issue on cross-appeal in its Statement of the Issues.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.