Kelvin Dewayne Easley Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kelvin Easley fled when law enforcement officers ordered him to stop, and he locked his arms to prevent the officers from cuffing him after they effectuated the stop. Following a bench trial, Easley was convicted of two counts of resisting law enforcement. Easley now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Easley's convictions.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Just before midnight on Friday, December 29, 2023, law enforcement officers with the Vanderburgh County Sheriff's Department responded to a call about a “family dispute or possible domestic violence” incident. Tr. Vol. II at 13. The call location was a mobile home (the “Residence”) on Wyoming Avenue—a residential street off Saint Joseph Avenue (“Saint Joe”). When Deputy Daniel Sander neared the Residence, he observed Easley, a black male, running east across Saint Joe to Hobart Road.

[4] After the 911 call but before officers arrived, the male suspect left the Residence on foot by traveling east on Wyoming Avenue toward Saint Joe. When law enforcement officers arrived at the Residence, the female caller appeared “visibly upset,” Tr. Vol. II at 13, and there was a “strong odor of marijuana coming from within the residence,” id. at 14. The female caller told law enforcement officers “that there had been some sort of dispute, [and] that she [had] wanted [the male suspect] to leave.” Id. at 14. The female caller described the male suspect as a “Black male.” Id.

[5] Deputy Sander left the Residence and drove to Hobart Road, where he had previously seen Easley running, and he located Easley walking south on 12th Avenue. Deputy Sander stopped his patrol car, exited, and ordered Easley to stop. Easley refused to stop and “took off jogging south on 12th.” Tr. Vol. II at 8. Deputy Sander followed Easley on foot toward Allens Lane. Deputy Brandon Rolley met Deputy Sander there, and together they “tried to place [Easley] into custody for refusing to stop.” Id. at 9. However, Easley “tried to pull away, tried to get away” from the deputies, so Deputies Rolley and Sander “ended up having to take [Easley] down to the ground to get him in custody.” Id. at 9. After the officers took Easley “to the ground,” Easley kept his hands “pinned underneath him” and “locked.” Id. at 15. Easley did not unlock his arms and allow the officers to cuff him until after Deputy Rolley “delivered a couple knee strikes” and threatened to tase him. Id.

[6] The State charged Easley with two counts of resisting law enforcement as Class A misdemeanors—one count for fleeing (“Resisting by Fleeing”)¹ and one for using force (“Resisting by Force”)² .³ The trial court found Easley guilty of both resisting counts and sentenced him to 180 days of incarceration with 150 of those days suspended. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Easley's Convictions for Resisting Law Enforcement

[7] Easley argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions for resisting law enforcement. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[8] Easley challenges his convictions for both (a) Resisting by Fleeing and (b) Resisting by Force. We address each in turn.

a. Resisting by Fleeing

[9] Easley argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for Resisting by Fleeing. In order to convict Easley of Resisting by Fleeing, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Easley “knowingly or intentionally ․ fle[d] from a law enforcement officer after the officer ha[d], by visible or audible means ․ identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024). Additionally, the State had to prove that the “order to stop rest[ed] on probable cause or reasonable suspicion, that is, specific, articulable facts that would lead the officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot.” Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014). Reasonable suspicion may arise when a defendant engages in “furtive and evasive activity” when law enforcement officers appear and “matche[s] the description of [a] suspect.” Murdock v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1265, 1268 (Ind. 2014).

[10] Easley contends that “the deputies had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot” so the officers’ order to stop was not a lawful order. Appellant's Br. at 9. More particularly, Easley argues that because Deputy Sander did not speak with the female caller or know the specifics of the allegation, he did not “kn[o]w whether a crime had occurred.” Id. Easley cites to Gaddie v. State 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014) for support. In Gaddie, a law enforcement officer arrived at a home after receiving a report of a “disturbance.” 10 N.E.3d at 1252. The officer observed several people standing in front of the house screaming and a second group of people, including the defendant, walking along the side yard toward the backyard. Id. The officer told the people in the second group to return to the front, but the defendant continued walking away, despite the officer ordering him to stop. Id. The defendant was charged with and convicted of resisting law enforcement by fleeing. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for resisting because “the mere existence of a disturbance, standing alone, does not identify specific, articulable facts that lead an officer to reasonably suspect that criminal activity is afoot, as is required for a valid investigatory stop.” Id. at 1256.

[11] Easley's reliance on Gaddie is misplaced to the extent he claims law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Deputy Sander was responding to a “domestic battery -- or domestic incident,” Tr. Vol. II at 5, not a mere “disturbance,” Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1252. Moreover, there was a “strong odor of marijuana coming from within the [R]esidence,” which was apparent to the reporting officers, Tr. Vol. II at 14, and could indicate criminal activity was afoot. When Deputy Rolley arrived at the Residence, he observed that the female caller was visibly upset, and he learned that a “Black male” had left the Residence on Wyoming Avenue heading toward Saint Joe just before officers arrived, which is near where the officers found Easley. Tr. Vol. II at 17. Easley thus engaged in evasive behavior by running away from the Residence to which officers were dispatched and continuing to run after Deputy Sander ordered him to stop, and he matched the description of the suspect in a “domestic battery -- or domestic incident” provided by the female caller, Tr. Vol. II at 5. Based upon the nature of the call, the odor of marijuana, Easley's conduct, and the suspect's description, which included direction of travel, it was not unreasonable for the factfinder to believe law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to stop Easley. See Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1268.

b. Resisting by Force

[12] Easley also challenges his conviction for Resisting by Force. In order to convict Easley of Resisting by Force, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Easley “knowingly or intentionally ․ forcibly resist[ed] a law enforcement officer ․ while the officer was lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer's duties.” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024). A person forcibly resists a law enforcement officer when “strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law enforcement official's rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Couch v. State, 224 N.E.3d 317, 319 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726-27 (Ind. 2013)). While simply refusing to present one's arms for cuffing does not constitute the use of force, the “ ‘stiffening’ of one's arms when an officer grabs hold to position them for cuffing” does constitute force. Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ind. 2009).

[13] Easley specifically argues that his resistance was “passive”—not forcible—and that he merely refused to present his arms for cuffing.⁴ Appellant's Br. at 11 (collecting cases). This is simply a request for us to reweigh evidence already considered by the factfinder, which we cannot do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Easley fled from law enforcement officers, and when the officers succeeded in stopping Easley by “t[aking] him to the ground,” he kept “his hands pinned underneath him, and they were locked” to prevent the officers from cuffing him. Locking or stiffening of one's arms in such a case constitutes force sufficient to prove resisting law enforcement. See Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 966. It was therefore not unreasonable for the factfinder to conclude that Easley forcibly resisted law enforcement.

[14] Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Easley's convictions for resisting law enforcement. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (effective July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2024).

3.   The State also charged Easley with possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor, but that charge was dismissed sometime before trial.

4.   Easley also argues insufficient evidence supports this conviction because the stop was unlawful. As previously explained, it was not. See supra ¶¶ 9–11.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.