Brandon Lee Cunningham, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brandon Cunningham appeals his conviction for burglary, as a Level 1 felony, and his sentence. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Cunningham raises four issues, which we consolidate and restate as the following three issues:

I. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for burglary, as a Level 1 felony.

II. Whether the trial court erred when it granted his defense counsel's request to rescind his initial motion for a speedy trial pursuant to Rule 4(B) of the Criminal Rules of Procedure.

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing when it did not consider his alleged lesser participation in the crimes to be mitigating factor.

In addition, we raise the following issue sua sponte:

IV. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence for robbery, as a Level 2 felony.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Isabella Teague came to Indiana at the age of eighteen and was subsequently trafficked as a sex worker. In the fall of 2023, she became Cunningham's girlfriend. She was not working regularly as a sex worker at that time, but she resumed sex work whenever Cunningham was out of town. She gave all of her profits from her sex work to Cunningham.

[4] Teague met Guranmol Saini (“G”) in November of that same year, through her work as a sex worker, when he found her on an escort website. Tr. v. 2 at 236. The two met three times between November and December, at both G's parents’ home and his own house. During those visits, Cunningham would wait outside in his white Ford Explorer while Teague met with G. Teague learned from G that he was in possession of money, guns, and a “new house,” and Teague told Cunningham about G's property. Id. at 238.

[5] Late in the evening and early morning of December 12-13, G contacted Teague and arranged for them to meet again at his new house. Cunningham drove Teague to the encounter, and on his way, he stopped to pick up a friend named Mook. Cunningham drove the three of them to G's house and parked his Explorer outside G's home. They arrived at around 1:00 a.m. G opened the door, and Teague hugged him. Cunningham and Mook were hiding on either side of the front door, armed with guns. While G and Teague were greeting one another, someone pushed Teague out of the way, and both men pushed the door back, causing G to retreat inside, fall backwards, and almost trip. Both men then grabbed G's shirt and placed their guns up to each side of his head.

[6] Mook and Cunningham were wearing ski masks, but G could see their noses, eyes, and mouths, as the masks kept falling. The men ordered G to tell them where his money was located, or else they would shoot him. Mook struck G with his gun. G put his hands up and told the men to take whatever they wanted, just not to kill him, and they searched him and took his phone. G led Mook and Cunningham to his office where the safe was located, while each man continued to hold a gun to G's head, and G opened the safe. The two men then grabbed, pushed, and hit G while dragging him back into the living room. Cunningham then went back into the office and emptied the safe of cash, firearms, and jewelry, while Mook remained in the living room with G, holding a gun to his head. G estimated the safe contained approximately $6,000 to $7,000 in cash, in addition to jewelry which was worth approximately $10,000, and guns. The safe also contained two assault rifles, a rifle, a shotgun, and a pistol. G kept one other firearm in his bedroom.

[7] The men then told G to get down on the floor so they could tie him up. Believing that the two men would kill him, G told them that he remembered he had more money in his bedroom. That was a lie that G told to “buy [himself] some time” to get to his bedroom, whose door he could lock from the inside. Id. at 105. G led the two men to his bedroom, unlocked the door, and said, “Oh, s--t, I'm sorry, I don't have the money here, I probably left it at the shop.” Id. at 106. Mook and Cunningham became angrier and started beating G repeatedly in the head, mouth, neck, and face. Cunningham then walked toward the kitchen, leaving G alone with Mook. G grabbed Mook's arm, twisted it as hard as he could, and caused Mook to lower his gun. G then ran into the bedroom, and on his way in, he heard two shots fired.

[8] G made it inside his bedroom, locked the door, and saw that he was spitting out blood. He retrieved his weapon and, while he was loading it, he heard someone rattling the doorknob on the door to his room. G “cocked [his] gun back[,]” which made a noise. Id. at 109. G then heard the two men “murmur[ing],” heard one of them say, “Oh, s--t,” and then heard them running away. Id. G opened his bedroom door “slightly” and fired two shots. Id. at 110.

[9] Mook and Cunningham fled the scene. Mook handed Teague the bag containing G's property that had been taken from the safe, as well as G's phone, and told her to put all of it in Cunningham's Ford Explorer. Cunningham then drove all three of them to a hotel, where they emptied out the bag of money onto a bed, counted it, and split it between Cunningham and Mook. Teague received nothing, and Mook took the guns.

[10] Back at his home, G walked through the house, armed, making sure Mook and Cunningham had left. He found an old phone and called 911. When the police arrived, G gave them a statement and was taken to the hospital. G's injuries included a gunshot wound to the back which exited through his shoulder, punctured his lung, and shattered one of his ribs. G also sustained injuries to his head, nose, and mouth from being beaten by Cunningham and Mook. Those injuries required surgery and visits to an ear, nose, and throat specialist.

[11] The subsequent police investigation led to the location of Cunningham's vehicle. Police were able to track the path taken by G's phone and obtain video surveillance located along the course of that route. The video showed Cunningham's Ford Explorer as he fled from the crime scene. The officers were able to obtain the license plate for the Ford Explorer from the video and confirmed that it was owned by Cunningham.

[12] On September 20, 2024, the State charged Cunningham with one count of Level 1 felony burglary and one count of Level 2 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury. On November 15, Cunningham requested a speedy trial pursuant to Rule 4(B). The trial court set the jury trial for January 21, 2025. At a pretrial conference on January 9, Cunningham's counsel, Myron Rahn III (“Rahn”), requested a continuance of the trial. He informed the trial court that he wished to rescind Cunningham's request for a fast and speedy trial, that he could not represent his client's best interests by the date set for jury trial, and that he would be making another speedy trial request under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), with the goal of obtaining a trial date sometime in March. Rahn stated that he had already informed Cunningham that he was unable to present the best defense by January 21, that he would be rescinding the first speedy trial request, and that he would be making another one. Nevertheless, at the pretrial conference, Cunningham personally stated his objection to the continuance of the January 21 trial date. The trial court granted the continuance requested by Rahn and set the new jury trial date for March 18, which was within seventy days of the request for a speedy trial filed by Rahn on January 10.

[13] Following the March 18-19 jury trial, the jury found Cunningham guilty as charged. At his April 10 sentencing hearing, Cunningham argued that his role was that of an accomplice, that he played a lesser role in the crimes, and that these should be mitigating facts. However, the trial court considered Cunningham's remorse to be the only mitigating factor and noted the aggravating fact that his criminal record was “not a very good record.” Tr. v. 3 at 51-52. On April 11, the trial court sentenced Cunningham to forty years for Level 1 felony burglary and four years for Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Sufficiency of the Evidence

[14] Cunningham challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for burglary. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal conviction,

we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We only consider the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such evidence. A conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the job of the fact-finder to determine whether the evidence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the [fact-finder's] ruling.

Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066-67 (Ind. 2015) (citation modified).

[15] To support Cunningham's conviction of burglary as a Level 1 felony, the State was required to prove that (1) Cunningham, as an accomplice or principal, (2) broke (3) and entered (4) the dwelling of another person (5) with intent to commit a felony or theft in it (6) resulting in serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(4). “A ‘breaking’ is proved by showing that even the slightest force was used to gain unauthorized entry.” Wilburn v. State, 177 N.E.3d 805, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting State v. Hancock, 65 N.E.3d 585, 591 (Ind. 2016)). Thus, even opening an unlocked door or pushing a door that is slightly ajar constitutes a “breaking” if the entry was unauthorized. Id.

[16] Here, Cunningham does not deny that there was sufficient evidence of intent to commit theft and serious bodily injury to G; rather, he alleges only that there was insufficient evidence that he “broke” into G's home. We disagree. G testified that, after he opened his front door for Teague, Cunningham and Mook stepped out of their hiding places beside the door, pushed the front door even further ajar, and entered while grabbing G's shirt and holding their guns to either side of G's head. That was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Cunningham broke and entered G's home by force. Wilburn, 177 N.E.3d at 814. Cunningham's contentions to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do. Willis, 27 N.E.3d at 1066-67 . The burglary conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

Speedy Trial Request

[17] Cunningham maintains that the trial court erred when it granted his attorney's request to rescind his initial motion for a “speedy trial” pursuant to Rule 4(B) of the Criminal Rules of Procedure and continue the trial. Appellant's Br. at 14. Rule 4(B) provides that, if a defendant held in jail on a pending charge moves for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy calendar days from the date of his motion. Ind. Crim. R. 4(B). However, a defendant is not entitled to such discharge or dismissal if the delay is caused by him. Id. Moreover, once a defendant is represented by counsel, he speaks to the court through that counsel. Anderson v. State, 160 N.E.3d 1102 (Ind. 2021) (citing Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000)). “This means that when a defendant has counsel, any objection to a trial setting based on a Criminal Rule 4 deadline must be made through that counsel.” Keener v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1137, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “To require the trial court to respond to both [the d]efendant and counsel would effectively create a hybrid representation to which [a d]efendant is not entitled.” Underwood, 722 N.E.2d at 832.

[18] Cunningham moved for a speedy trial under Rule 4(B) on November 15, 2024, and the court set his trial for January 21, 2025, which was within the seventy-day deadline. However, on January 9, Cunningham's counsel moved for a continuance of the trial date on the ground that he would not have time to prepare the best defense for Cunningham by January 21. Cunningham spoke through his attorney at that point, even though he personally stated that he objected to a continuance. See Anderson, 160 N.E.3d at 1102. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting the continuance. See Underwood, 722 N.E.2d at 832-33 (finding no error under similar circumstances, when the trial court granted defense counsel's motion for a continuance despite the defendant's personal objection).¹

Sentencing

[19] Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any[ ]—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[20] So long as a sentence is within the statutory range, the trial court may impose it without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. If the trial court does find the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it must give a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at 490. However, the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion, Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869, and a trial court is under no obligation to explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court found it to be insignificant, Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[21] Cunningham asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find his alleged lesser participation in the crimes to be a mitigating factor. However, his alleged lesser participation is not supported by the record. The record discloses only that Teague told Cunningham about G's money, jewelry, and other property, not that she told anyone else, such as Mook, about it. After Teague informed Cunningham of G's property, Cunningham drove to pick up Mook and take him to G's house where both men broke into G's home and beat him. The record also discloses that Cunningham was the person who took G's property out of the safe and put it in a bag and that Cunningham was the person who drove the car to flee the scene of the crimes. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to consider Cunningham's alleged lesser participation as a mitigator because the record does not support the existence of that mitigator. See Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869.

Illegal Sentence

[22] However, a sentence is illegal if it is not within the prescribed statutory sentencing range. Anderson v. State, 269 N.E.3d 817, 822 (Ind. 2025). “It is the duty of appellate courts to bring illegal sentences into compliance.” Hill v. State, 28 N.E.3d 348, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, even though the State does not raise this issue, we address it sua sponte. E.g., Young v. State, 901 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[23] The trial court sentenced Cunningham to forty years executed to the Department of Correction for Level 1 felony burglary, which is the maximum sentence for a Level 1 felony but still within the sentencing range. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). However, the trial court sentenced Cunningham to only four years executed for the Level 2 felony robbery conviction, which is outside the Level 2 felony sentencing range of ten to thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5.

[24] When we find on appeal that the trial court has imposed an illegal sentence, it is appropriate to remand the case for resentencing within the proper statutory range. See Bailey v. State, 202 N.E.3d 485, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Therefore, we vacate Cunningham's sentence and remand for resentencing.²

Conclusion

[25] The State provided sufficient evidence to support Cunningham's conviction for burglary, as a Level 1 felony. And the trial court did not err when it granted defense counsel's request to rescind Cunningham's initial motion for a speedy trial and continue the trial. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing when it did not consider Cunningham's alleged lesser participation to be a mitigating factor. However, the trial court imposed an illegal sentence for Cunningham's Level 2 felony conviction when it sentenced him to a term below the statutory range of ten to thirty years. Therefore, we vacate Cunningham's sentence and remand for resentencing.

[26] Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608 (Ind. 2020), does not support Cunningham's claims, as he asserts. In Watson the Court held that the defendant's personal letters to the court provided notice that he requested a speedy trial, even though he was represented by counsel. However, Watson's counsel had not taken any “action to contradict [Watson's] desire” for a speedy trial, as was the case here and in Underwood. Id. at 619. Therefore, it is Underwood, not Watson, that controls our analysis.

2.   Because we remand for resentencing, we do not address Cunningham's Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) claim that his sentence is inappropriate.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.