Shawn L. Booker, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Shawn L. Booker appeals the trial court's revocation of his placement on probation. Booker raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the court committed fundamental error when it revoked his probation. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 3, 2022, Booker pleaded guilty to one count of leaving the scene of an accident, as a Level 6 felony (Count 1), and one count of criminal recklessness, as a Level 6 felony (Count 2). Pursuant to the plea agreement, Booker and the State agreed that Booker would serve one year and 183 days on Count 1 and one year and 182 days on Count 2, to run consecutively, but that the sentences would be suspended and Booker would be placed on probation for three years.

[3] The trial court accepted Booker's plea and, in its probation order, required Booker to “behave well[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39 (capitalization removed). In addition, the order provided the following advisements:

I have been advised that my probation can be revoked after the probation term expires if: A) I violate a condition of probation during the probation period and B) a petition to revoke my probation is filed before the earlier of the following dates: 1) one year after my probation term expires or 2) forty-five (45) days from the date the State receives the notice of my violation.

I have read or had ․ the contents of this document read to me, have received a copy of same, and acknowledge that I understand these rules as conditions of my probation. I understand that a failure to obey any condition of probation means that I can be sent to prison.

Id. (capitalization removed). Booker signed the probation order.

[4] On September 2, 2025, the State filed charges against Booker in a new cause number and alleged that he had committed domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor, and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor, on August 31. The same day, the State filed a petition to revoke Booker's placement on probation and alleged that Booker had failed to “maintain good behavior” by having allegedly committed the new offenses. Id. at 44. Booker subsequently pleaded guilty to the new offenses.

[5] During a fact-finding hearing on the State's petition, Booker's probation officer testified that she had advised Booker of the rules of probation and that “a violation of these rules would mean a potential revocation.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 13. Following the hearing, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker had violated the terms of his probation as contained in the petition. The court also found that Booker had already served his period of probation for Count 1 but that he “is still serving his period of probation” in Count 2. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 59. As such, the court revoked Booker's placement on probation for Count 2 and ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Booker contends that the court violated his due process rights when it revoked his probation. Generally, whether a party was denied due process is a question of law that we review de novo. See Moore v. State, 102 N.E.3d 304, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). However, Booker acknowledges that he did not raise this issue to the trial court. Thus, to prevail on appeal, Booker must demonstrate fundamental error. “The fundamental error exception applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Hastings v. State, 58 N.E.3d 919, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[7] When it comes to probation revocations, this Court has stated that

[t]he minimum requirements of due process include: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.

Cox v. State, 850 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[8] As outlined above, Booker's probation order provided the following advisement:

I have been advised that my probation can be revoked after the probation term expires if: A) I violate a condition of probation during the probation period and B) a petition to revoke my probation is filed before the earlier of the following dates: 1) one year after my probation term expires or 2) forty-five (45) days from the date the State receives the notice of my violation.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39. (capitalization removed).

[9] On appeal, Booker asserts that the trial court committed fundamental error when it revoked his probation because the plain terms of the probation order provided that “the State could only petition to revoke probation ‘AFTER THE PROBATION TERM EXPIRES.’ ” Appellant's Br. at 7. Booker also argues that “the State agreed to forego petitioning to revoke probation for any violations of probation conditions that it became aware of more than forty-four (44) days before the expiration of the probation term.” Id. And Booker maintains that the “revocation petition was filed more than a month before the expiration of the probationary term[.]” Id. at 9.

[10] Stated differently, Booker appears to argue that the State could petition to revoke his placement on probation only after his term on probation had ended and based only on conduct that had occurred less than forty-five days before his term ended and not more than one year after his term had ended. We cannot agree.

[11] First, we do not agree with Booker's overly restrictive reading of the probation order. Under his interpretation, the State would have to wait until his probation term was finished to seek to revoke Booker's placement, and there would be no consequences for Booker if he violated the terms of his probation for all but forty-five days, leaving Booker free to commit any violations for the vast majority of the time he was on probation. And that runs contrary to a court's statutory authority to revoke a person's probation if he “has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period[.]” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1).

[12] In any event, even if we assume for the sake of argument that Booker's reading of the probation order is correct and that the agreement itself did not advise him that his probation could be revoked, Booker has not shown that the court committed fundamental error when it revoked his probation. Booker's probation officer testified that she had advised Booker of the rules of probation and “that a violation of these rules would mean a potential revocation.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 13. In addition, Booker's probation order separately provides: “I understand that a failure to obey any condition of probation means that I can be sent to prison.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 39 (capitalization removed). Thus, Booker was advised that his probation could be revoked if he violated the terms.

[13] And, other than his bald assertion that “the State's untimely petition was erroneous and offends [his] fundamental right to due process,” Booker does not explain how the court's revocation violated his due process rights. Id. at 12. In fact, Booker makes no argument that he failed to receive written notice of the claimed violations, that he failed to receive a disclosure of the evidence against him, that he was denied an opportunity to be heard, that he was denied an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses, that he was denied a neutral hearing body, or that he was denied a written statement by the fact-finder with the reasons relied upon for revoking his probation. See Cox, 850 N.E.2d at 488.

[14] There is no dispute that Booker violated the terms of his probation when he committed the new offenses to which he pleaded guilty. And Booker had been advised that violating the terms of his probation could result in his placement being revoked. Because Booker was advised of the risk, received the minimum requirements of due process related to probation revocations, and was found to have violated the terms of his placement, the trial court did not commit fundamental error when it revoked Booker's probation. We therefore affirm the trial court.

[15] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.