IN RE: M.S. and B.D. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] C.W. (“Custodian”) appeals the Shelby Superior Court's adjudication of his girlfriend's children B.D. and M.S. as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Custodian presents two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it found that B.D. and M.S. are CHINS.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to submit to random drug screens for at least sixty days and when it entered a no-contact order prohibiting him from visiting with B.D.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Initially, we note that C.W. qualifies as a “custodian” over B.D. and M.S., who are not his biological children, under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. That status is both the basis for the CHINS adjudication as it pertains to him and the source of his standing to bring this appeal. Custodian is the father of W.W., who is a half-sibling of B.D. and M.S. but who is not part of this appeal.

[4] In late January 2025, four-year-old M.S. told a teacher that her “peepee” hurt and that “Daddy [C] touches her when he comes home from work.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 202. “Daddy [C]” is M.S.’s name for Custodian, who was then living with his girlfriend T.D. (“Mother”) and Mother's children B.D., M.S., and W.W. The teacher took M.S. to see the school nurse, and M.S. repeated the allegations to the nurse. Later, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) arranged for M.S. to undergo a forensic interview at a child advocacy center. M.S. told the interviewer that Custodian had touched her “private part and her butt.” Id. at 229. DCS made “a plan” with Mother that Custodian would move out of the house, and B.D., M.S., and W.W. (“the Children”) would remain with Mother. Id. at 9.

[5] The next day, however, DCS received information that M.S. was reporting that a total of three men had touched her inappropriately, namely, Custodian, J.S. (M.S.’s father), and “Paps” (M.S.’s step-grandfather). Id. at 10. Jennifer Bastion, an intake officer with DCS, spoke with Mother, who stated that she had “100% no belief that [Custodian] had touched [M.S.] at all” and that M.S. was “lying about everything.” Id. at 10. As a result of the new report and Mother's opinions, DCS removed the Children from Mother's home and placed them with a family member. During an emergency detention hearing, however, the trial court ordered the Children returned to Mother's care as long as none of the alleged perpetrators had any contact with the Children. Mother agreed.

[6] On January 29, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were CHINS. The trial court began a fact-finding hearing on March 24, but it continued the remainder of the hearing until Dr. Linda McIntire could complete a psychological evaluation of M.S.

[7] In the meantime, on March 25, Christi Reed, a social worker at B.D.’s school, saw B.D. crying as he got out of Mother's car. Mother told Reed that B.D. was “really out of control th[at] morning and that he had hit her” and that “he was just having a really bad morning.” Id. at 190. Reed followed up with B.D., who told her that Mother had hit him that morning “and pulled on his sweatshirt and strangled him.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 134. Reed took B.D. to be examined by the school nurse, who observed red marks on B.D.’s neck. B.D. also told the nurse that Mother had “broke[n] a paddle over his bottom and hit him in the shoulder” the prior week. Id. B.D. told the nurse not to tell DCS because Mother would “ ‘beat [him] to a pulp.’ ” Id.

[8] As a result of B.D.’s reports, the State ultimately charged Mother with domestic battery against B.D. DCS removed the Children and placed them with relatives. However, at the conclusion of the detention hearing on March 31, the trial court ordered M.S. and W.W. to be returned to Mother's care. The court ordered B.D. to remain in relative care or be placed in foster care.

[9] In the meantime, Mother was supposed to take M.S. to be evaluated by Dr. McIntire, but she missed the first two scheduled appointments, and they showed up forty minutes late to the third appointment on April 8. During that evaluation, M.S. told Dr. McIntire that Custodian was the only person who had molested her. M.S. admitted that Mother had told her to report the false allegations against J.S. and her step-grandfather. Dr. McIntire found that M.S. is a “traumatized child.” Tr. Vol. 1, p. 113.

[10] On April 16, Dr. McIntire evaluated B.D. and concluded in relevant part that

the turbulence of his childhood has undermined his ability to gain the skills he need[s] to regulate his affect, which is already compromised by ADHD. In his mother's perspective, [B.D.] is the identified problem at home and is to blame for their difficulties. Yet, while the true events of their altercations can't be known to any of the professionals in this case, it's clear that for the last few years his behavior is without tantrums and outbursts except with his mother; though he clearly struggles with lability, he manages it effectively in other contexts. The home situation will likely became [sic] increasingly volatile without change, placing his adolescent adjustment at risk of negative academic, behavioral, legal, and psychological outcomes.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 120. Dr. McIntire concluded that neither M.S. nor B.D. should testify at a fact-finding hearing.

[11] Following the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing on May 15, the trial court adjudicated B.D. and M.S. to be CHINS, but the court denied the CHINS petition as to W.W. The Court found in relevant part that Custodian had sexually abused M.S. and “remains in a relationship with [Mother].” Id. at 132. The court also found that Mother did not believe M.S. and had “likely” told M.S. to lie and say that two other relatives had molested her. Id. The court concluded that M.S. needs “trauma[-]based therapy services” that she is not likely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. Id. The court found that B.D. was “not receiving the appropriate care, treatment and medication [he needs] while in Mother's care.” Id. at 135. And the court concluded that the “coercive intervention of this court is necessary[ ] or therapy will not be provided for the child.” Id.

[12] During a dispositional hearing on June 16, a DCS family case manager explained that drug screens were requested for Custodian because an investigation had revealed “that there might have been cocaine use, might have been some substance dealing” by Custodian. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 33. Custodian had already told the trial court that he would “do whatever it takes” to get B.D. and M.S. returned to Mother's care. Id. at 30. Still, Custodian, through his counsel, asked the court to clarify the requirement in the pre-dispositional report that Custodian submit to random drug screens. This colloquy ensued:

[Custodian's counsel]: Well, at least with regard to my client, Judge, I don't, yeah, that's, that's new to us that there's any kind of question about my client's drug usage or possible usage. It sounds like kind of a he said/she said kind of thing, or maybe we heard from somebody else that there might be using. Um, my client's never taken a screen. Again, there's no allegations that he is, um, using in any way so I, we would, other, other than other recommendations, I don't think there's a need for random drug screens for my client․

THE COURT: Here would be my thought on that, on that at this point. Without rehashing the underlying allegations and findings of the Court in its ․ order on fact-finding hearing, the Court[ ] has made some pretty extensive orders regarding counseling and mental health and assessments for each of the parties in this case, it's been my experience in the past that frequently, uh, drug usage, illicit drug usage can often mask itself as a mental health issue, um, erratic behavior or uh, you know, what's perceived as anger or poor judgement leading to bad results, so it would be very difficult to do an accurate assessment of someone's mental health without doing some kind of a drug screen to know if truly we're seeing somebody’[s] true mental health condition or what we're seeing is the effect of a drug. So, with that said, let me ask you, [Custodian's counsel]; the Court is inclined to order some drug screening here but I'm also open to how far I'm going to go with that. Would [Custodian] be willing, again, I'll order what I'm going to order here, but ․

[Custodian's Counsel]: You're the one calling balls and strikes․

THE COURT: would he, would he be․

[Custodian's Counsel]: as they say.

THE COURT: I guess, it's a test. Would he be willing to submit to, uh, an instant drug screen here today?

[Custodian]: Yeah, let's do it right now.

* * *

(DISCUSSION AT COUNSEL TABLE)

[Custodian's Counsel]: (Indiscernible) with an instant, an instant drug screen today, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. So, on that issue I'm going to order him to submit [to] an instant drug screen today. Again, I've already order[ed] mental health counseling and assessment. I will order that, that he submit to any drug screening requested as part of that treatment provider's assessment. Um, order that he randomly drug test for the next 60 days. Uh, and if there is no positive test on any of those, the Court will not order any further random drug test.

[Custodian's Counsel]: Okay.

THE COURT: Again, unless he tests positive․

[Custodian's Counsel]: Okay.

Id. at 35-37. Custodian now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: CHINS Adjudication

[13] Custodian contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Children ¹ are CHINS. Our standard of review is well settled:

When reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). “Instead, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and [the] reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 1287 (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). When a trial court supplements a CHINS judgment with findings of fact and conclusions [of] law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. We consider, first, “whether the evidence supports the findings” and, second, “whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if it was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or “if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) (citation omitted).

Gr. J. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re D.J.), 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017) (alterations in original).

[14] In J.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (In re S.D.), 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287-88 (Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court explained the three elements required to prove that a child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, as alleged in this case:

Not every endangered child is a child in need of services, permitting the State's parens patriae intrusion into the ordinarily private sphere of the family. See generally In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1255. Rather, a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 (often called a “CHINS 1,” in reference to the section number) requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.

In full, the statute provides:

[A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.]

I.C. § 31-34-1-1 (20[25]). That final element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families “where parents lack the ability to provide for their children,” not merely where they “encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

(Emphasis removed.)

[15] The CHINS statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parents, but to protect the child. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[16] Custodian's sole argument on this issue is that DCS did not prove that the coercive intervention of the court is necessary to provide the Children with the care they need. In support, Custodian relies on evidence that, “[a]t the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother was seeing a therapist once a week and meeting with a home-based caseworker.” Appellant's Br. at 15. And B.D. and M.S. were receiving counseling services. But Custodian ignores the evidence that Mother continues to disbelieve M.S.’s allegations against Custodian as well as the evidence that Mother blames B.D. for the strife between them.

[17] Custodian's argument on appeal amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence. Dr. McIntire testified that Mother had no insight into B.D.’s emotional needs and that, as a result, B.D. had been misdiagnosed and was not receiving appropriate treatment while he was in Mother's care. As for M.S., Mother continues to be in a romantic relationship with Custodian despite M.S.’s allegations that he molested her. And Dr. McIntire testified that M.S. needs trauma-based therapy services that she was not receiving before DCS became involved.

[18] For all these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court erred when it found that the Children need care, treatment, or rehabilitation that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. We affirm the adjudication of the Children as CHINS.

Issue Two: Dispositional Order

[19] After a child is adjudicated a CHINS, the trial court holds a dispositional hearing to consider “placement of the child ․ [and t]he necessity, nature, and extent of the participation by a parent ․ or a custodian in the program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.” I.C. § 31-34-19-1. Custodian argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to submit to random drug screens for at least sixty days and when it entered a no-contact order forbidding him to have contact with B.D. We address each argument in turn.

[20] As this Court recently explained,

[a] trial court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.” In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (citing A.C. v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Child Servs., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). Thus, we review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion. See In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180-81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is “against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 750-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[21] With respect to the drug screens, we note that, at the dispositional hearing, Custodian stated that he would do “whatever” it takes to get the Children back in his care. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 30. And he agreed to submit to a drug screen the same day.² DCS explained that it had reason to believe that Custodian may have used cocaine or been dealing in an illegal substance. And when the court explained its reasons for ordering the drug screens, Custodian did not dispute those reasons but expressed agreement by stating “Okay.” Id. at 37. The court limited the screens to sixty days if Custodian proved his sobriety. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it ordered Custodian to submit to drug screens.

[22] With respect to the no-contact order prohibiting Custodian from visiting with B.D., Custodian maintains that there is no evidence that Custodian has ever harmed B.D. and that the evidence shows that B.D. likes Custodian. But M.S.’s allegations of molestation by Custodian remain unresolved. The trial court ordered Custodian to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and to follow all recommendations as a result of that evaluation. And the court stated that it would “reassess” the no-contact orders after Custodian had undergone that evaluation and progressed with therapy. Id. at 30. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered the no-contact order.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For ease of discussion, while “the Children” refers to all three of Mother's children in the first section of this decision, from here on “the Children” will refer to B.D. and M.S., only. Again, the trial court did not adjudicate W.W. to be a CHINS.

2.   However, there is no indication that Custodian submitted to a screen that day despite the court's order and his agreement. The result of that screen would have been relevant to Custodian's argument that he does not have a substance abuse problem.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.