IN RE: G.S. and E.S. (Minor Children) S.G. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] E.S. and G.S. (collectively Children), who are 6 and 7, respectively, returned from a visit with their father, P.S. (Father), with significant bruising on their lower legs consistent with inflicted injuries. After learning of this situation, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) petitioned to find Children to be children in need of services (CHINS). Children were placed with their mother, S.G. (Mother), who lived separately from Father.

[2] Before the CHINS factfinding hearing, Mother—with her counsel assisting her—took a series of deliberate steps that ensured a CHINS adjudication. She withdrew her initial denial of the allegations, declined to enter any answer, did not contest that Children were in need of services under Indiana Code § 31-34-1, waived her right to contest the matter at a factfinding hearing, and asked the court to vacate that hearing and proceed directly to disposition.

[3] Given these actions by Mother and Father's admission that Children were CHINS, the court proceeded to enter an order finding Children to be CHINS without a factfinding hearing. At the dispositional hearing that followed, the trial court ordered Mother to submit to a single drug screen, with a substance abuse assessment to follow only if the result were positive. Mother appeals both the CHINS adjudication and the dispositional order, claiming they were unjustified because she could safely care for Children without coercive court intervention. We affirm.

Facts

[4] Mother and Father live in separate homes in Anderson, Indiana. Under their pre-CHINS custody arrangement, Children spent approximately four days with Father and three days with Mother each week.

[5] In summer 2025, Children returned from a visit with Father with lower leg bruising suggestive of inflicted injuries. After an investigation, DCS determined Father had used a belt to discipline them and employed excessive force. Additionally, DCS records reflected that Father had left bruises on G.S. previously when G.S. was an infant. That prior incident had resulted in an informal adjustment that closed successfully after both parents complied with all services. Shortly after Children's latest injuries were reported, DCS filed the CHINS petition, which alleged physical abuse by Father of Children and cited Father's history of self-harm. The petition alleged no wrongdoing by Mother.

[6] At an initial hearing days later, the court found probable cause that Children were CHINS and entered a detention order restricting Father's access to them. DCS placed Children with Mother, as it then had no safety concerns about her home. The court appointed counsel for Mother.

[7] About two weeks later, Mother appeared with her counsel for an initial hearing on an amended CHINS petition. She entered a denial. The case was set for mediation the following month, with a factfinding hearing to follow if mediation did not resolve the matter.

[8] DCS soon received a report that Mother's home smelled of marijuana. Mother admitted to a DCS investigator that she and her live-in boyfriend smoked marijuana and kept the drug in the home. At DCS's request, Mother submitted to a drug screen, which was negative.

[9] At mediation the following month, Mother—while represented by counsel—took five affirmative steps to ensure the CHINS adjudication. She signed a Mediated Agreed Entry that: (1) withdrew her denial to the CHINS petition; (2) stated she was “not entering an answer” to the petition; (3) acknowledged that Father had admitted Children were CHINS; (4) stated she “does not contest that [Children] are [CHINS] pursuant to Indiana Law, as defined in IC-31-34-1,” and expressly waived her right to a factfinding hearing; and (5) requested that the court vacate the previously scheduled factfinding hearing and set the case for disposition. App. Vol. II, pp. 9-10. The agreement, which was signed by Mother, her counsel, DCS, and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), stated it was “the entirety of the parties’ agreement” and was in Children's best interests. Id. at 10.

[10] About three weeks before the scheduled dispositional hearing, DCS filed its Predispositional Report. The report noted that when Children were first placed with Mother, she lacked beds, adequate clothing, shoes, and a car seat for both children. She also had no functional telephone. DCS recommended that Mother participate in homebased casework, individual therapy, a substance abuse assessment, and random drug screens.

[11] At the dispositional hearing, Mother appeared with counsel and contested the substance abuse and drug screening requirements. However, while questioning Mother in preparation for the objection, Mother's counsel told her on the record that the mediated agreement “kind of locks all the issues down.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 27. Counsel then objected to the substance abuse services, arguing they were untethered to the petition's allegations and that “the petition allegations are ․ what locks down what the services have to be about.” Id. at 27–28. DCS responded that it had learned of Mother's marijuana use after the filing of the CHINS petition and wanted to ensure her sobriety, given that Children were placed in her home.

[12] The trial court acknowledged Mother as a non-offending parent, found her counsel's points “well taken,” and relieved her of the services DCS had recommended, including full homebased casework. Id. at 34–35. However, the court ordered Mother to submit to one drug screen and stated that a substance abuse assessment and continued random screens would be necessary thereafter only if the result were positive. The court soon issued a written dispositional order, from which Mother appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Mother raises two issues. First, she contends the CHINS finding was improper because DCS failed to prove, as required by statute, that coercive court intervention was necessary. Second, Mother asserts that the dispositional order violated her procedural due process rights by imposing substance-abuse-related services based on conduct never alleged in the CHINS petition. We address each claim in turn.

I. CHINS Adjudication

[14] We review a CHINS adjudication to determine whether it is clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or ‘if [the court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). Without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's decision. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. Where, as here, the challenge turns on the legal effect of a mediated agreement, we also apply contract interpretation principles, including giving the language in the agreement its plain and usual meaning. Elrod v. Bauman, 136 N.E.3d 232, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); Dempsey v. Carter, 797 N.E.2d 268, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[15] To sustain a CHINS adjudication under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or endangered as a result of a parent's inability, refusal, or neglect to supply necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the court. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014); In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1)-(2). This “coercive intervention” element guards against unwarranted state interference in the family. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. Because CHINS adjudications focus on the condition of the child rather than the culpability of a particular parent, however, “the acts or omissions of one parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). A separate analysis as to each parent is therefore generally not required. Id. at 106.

[16] Mother has waived her right to challenge the CHINS determination by affirmatively agreeing to it. Through counsel, she took five affirmative steps that together left no element of the adjudication contested:

• She withdrew her denial.

• She declined to enter any answer to the petition.

• She acknowledged Father's admission that Children were CHINS.

• She stated on the record that she “does not contest that [Children] are Children in Need of Services pursuant to Indiana Law, as defined in IC-31-34-1.” App. Vol. II, p. 10.

• Finally, Mother asked the court to vacate the fact-finding hearing and proceed directly to disposition.

[17] Each of these steps was deliberate and taken by Mother with counsel assisting her. In addition, each of these steps was memorialized in a written agreement signed by Mother, her counsel, DCS, and the CASA before it was submitted to the court for approval. Because Mother did not contest that Children were CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1, she necessarily did not contest that the coercive intervention of the court was required, given that is an element of the statute under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1(2). She cannot now argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove what she earlier agreed she was not contesting. See Matter of T.F., 272 N.E.3d 1025, 1032-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (concluding that a mother could not challenge a CHINS adjudication after she affirmatively waived a factfinding hearing and admitted her children were CHINS).

[18] Even if Mother had preserved some challenge to the adjudication, the invited error doctrine would bar relief. That doctrine forbids a party from taking advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or that is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct. Matter of J.C., 142 N.E.3d 427, 432 (Ind. 2020). Mother did not merely fail to object; she affirmatively moved the CHINS adjudication forward. After withdrawing her denial, she specifically requested that the trial court vacate the factfinding hearing and enter the CHINS finding. Having driven the adjudication she now challenges, she cannot claim it as error. We affirm the trial court's finding that Children are CHINS.

II. Dispositional Order

[19] Mother next argues that the trial court violated her right to due process by ordering her to submit to a drug screen—and conditionally to a substance abuse assessment with possible random drug screens to follow—when substance abuse was never alleged in the CHINS petition.

[20] We generally review a dispositional order for an abuse of discretion. In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258). Id. A court abuses its discretion only when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. To the extent a dispositional order implicates constitutional due process, however, our review is de novo. Matter of M.P., 162 N.E.3d 585, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “A trial court has ‘broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate’ following a CHINS determination, but ‘the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.’ ” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 751 (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258) (alteration in original).

[21] A dispositional order need not be confined to the exact conditions alleged in the CHINS petition; it may address any behavior or circumstance “revealed by the evidence.” See Matter of R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (affirming dispositional order that required parents to participate in a variety of services, including some addressing home conditions, budgeting, and communications, because they were aimed at addressing physical abuse after their newborn was found with unexplained injuries). Indiana recognizes that drug use within a home where children are present creates an environment with inadequate supervision and therefore neglect. In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d at 563.

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in entering the dispositional order. The record established that after Children were placed with Mother, DCS received a report of a marijuana smell at Mother's home. Mother thereafter admitted to a DCS investigator that she and her live-in boyfriend used marijuana and kept it in the home. Possession of marijuana remains illegal in Indiana. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11. Because Children were placed with Mother, the court had a direct and substantial interest in ensuring that illegal drug use was not occurring in Mother's home.

[23] The court's order was carefully tailored to that concern. The court acknowledged Mother as a non-offending parent, found her counsel's due process arguments “well taken,” and relieved her of all other DCSrecommended services, including full homebased casework. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 34–35. What remained was a single drug screen. If it were negative—as Mother's recent drug screen had been—no assessment or random drug screens would follow. The written order reflects exactly what the court ordered at the hearing.

[24] Mother's due process argument fares no better. Dispositional proceedings are not confined to discussion of only the facts underlying the adjudication. The purpose of a CHINS proceeding is to protect children, not to punish parents. Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d at 475. Accordingly, dispositional proceedings are not confined only to discussion of facts underlying the adjudication but can include other pertinent information bearing on child safety. The evidence of Mother's marijuana use emerged after the petition was filed and was introduced at the dispositional hearing—a proceeding at which Mother appeared with counsel and had a full opportunity to be heard. She exercised that opportunity, as her counsel objected and argued at length—persuasively, as it turns out, given the trial court's decision not to impose some of the obligations on Mother that DCS had recommended. “ ‘[T]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” See In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). Mother received both.

[25] Relying on In re K.B., 793 N.E.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), Mother contends that a parent cannot be sanctioned based on conduct not alleged in the CHINS petition. But K.B. addressed whether a child could be found to be a CHINS based on conduct not alleged in the original CHINS petition—a distinct question from whether at a dispositional hearing the court may address newly revealed threats to child safety. Mother has failed to show any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

[26] Finally, we note one inconsistency in the record, although it does not affect the substance of our analysis. Paragraph 1(n) of the written dispositional order directs Mother to “[s]ubmit to random drug screens” as a standalone requirement. App. Vol. II, p. 22. That seemingly conflicts with the court's oral ruling at the hearing that limited her to one drug screen and provided for further screens only if that single drug screen were positive. But the final paragraph of the written order expressly conditions the assessment and continued screens on a positive initial drug screen and therefore is consistent with the trial court's verbal order. Accordingly, paragraph 1(n) logically requires Mother to submit to the initial drug screen but then to submit to additional drug screens on a random basis only if her initial drug screen is positive.

Conclusion

[27] Through counsel, Mother took affirmative steps to secure the CHINS adjudication, including a request that the court vacate the factfinding hearing and proceed to disposition. Having agreed in the trial court not to contest the CHINS finding, she cannot do so now on appeal. The trial court's dispositional order—requiring a single drug screen and conditioning a substance abuse assessment solely on a positive result—was supported by evidence presented at the dispositional hearing and was narrowly tailored to a legitimate child safety concern.

[28] We affirm the trial court's judgment.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.

Weissmann, Judge.