Charles J. Davis Sr., Appellant-Respondent v. Nakisha N. Brantley, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] While incarcerated, Charles J. Davis Sr. (Father) filed multiple motions in the trial court regarding his parenting time with his two minor children (Children). He twice sought to hold Children's mother in contempt for interfering with the existing parenting-time order for twice-weekly phone calls with Children. He also requested in-person visitation. The trial court denied these motions in August 2025. Father then moved the court to compel Children's mother to comply with the telephone parenting-time order, and the court denied the motion in September 2025.

[2] Father appeals both orders, but his appeal is untimely. Because he does not offer any compelling reasons to consider his untimely challenge, we dismiss it.

Facts

[3] Father and Nakisha Brantley (Mother) are the parents of Children, twin daughters born in 2012. The specifics of Children's custody are not entirely clear from the record,¹ but in September 2023, Father petitioned for parenting time. After a hearing, the court granted his request in part. It ordered that Mother “shall try to facilitate” telephone calls between Father and Children every Tuesday and Thursday at 8:00 p.m. App. Vol. II, p. 3. But the court denied Father's request for in-person visitation at the correctional facility where he was incarcerated.

[4] The following month, Father filed a motion to hold Mother in contempt for failing to answer the phone during the arranged time for telephone visitation. But a week later, Father moved to withdraw the motion, alleging that Mother told him she had been unable to afford minutes for the phone and that Father had arranged to send her money to cover the phone calls. Telephone visitation then appeared to continue without incident.

[5] In September 2024, Mother began to voluntarily allow Children to visit Father at his correctional facility. These visits proceeded roughly weekly over the following months. Then in mid-April 2025, Father could not reach Children by phone for their telephone visitation. When Children visited Father in person a few days later, Father asked them about his inability to reach them on the phone. Children told him that Mother had not cashed the check that Father had sent to cover the phone minutes. Father then instructed Children to tell Mother that if she did not reactivate the phone, he would file a complaint alleging she violated a court order. Mother felt threatened by this message and thereafter stopped allowing Children to visit Father in person. Mother loaded minutes onto the phone later in April, but another week-long interruption in phone access occurred the following month.

[6] In May and June 2025, Father filed several motions regarding his parenting time. First, he sought a modification of the parenting time order to add weekly in-person visits with Children at his correctional facility, essentially making the previously voluntary visits court-ordered. He also filed two motions for contempt, both alleging that Mother had interfered with his telephone parenting time because the phone was not answered when he called, which he claimed was due to Mother failing to load minutes onto it. Finally, he moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Mother waived any objection to the motions by failing to respond to his filings.

[7] The trial court conducted a hearing on Father's pending motions on June 27, 2025. A Senior Judge, serving as a temporary substitute for the judge assigned to the matter, presided over the hearing. Father and Mother each appeared pro se, with Father attending remotely from his correctional facility. Father first asked the court to order in-person visits with Children, claiming their voluntary visits from September 2024 to April 2025 went well. Father then testified that Mother had willfully withheld Children's access to a phone, claiming that in the past month, he had spoken with Children only twice. But Father later admitted that he had stopped sending Mother money for the phone because he believed she was using the phone and its minutes for her own calls. Father also requested that the court order Mother to instruct Children not to call her husband “dad,” claiming it was a “violation of [his] right” as a biological parent. Tr., p. 13.

[8] Mother testified that Father was “delusional” and that Children did not want to have contact with him. Id. at 10. She stated that, since telephone contact with Father began, Children had been kicked out of school, one child had begun self-harming, and both Children were attending therapy three times per week. According to Mother, Children told their therapist that they “want nothing to do [with Father].” Id. at 11. Mother testified that Father had not been regularly involved in raising Children and that Children “[h]aving contact with [Father] is not in their best interest at all.” Id. The court took the matter under advisement.

[9] On August 4, 2025, the Senior Judge denied all pending motions—for visitation, contempt, and judgment on the pleadings. The order concluded that Father “failed to show by sufficient evidence” that Mother had “willfully failed to comply” with the court's prior order. App. Vol. II, p. 28.

[10] Over the next month, Father filed several motions in the trial court, taking issue with the order denying his prior motions. Father also filed a motion to compel Mother to comply with the telephone parenting-time order and to maintain a working phone number. The presiding judge denied the motion to compel on the same day it was filed—September 5, 2025. The court found that this motion was repetitive, as the issues raised in it had already been addressed at the June 27 hearing and were resolved by the August 4 order. Father filed a Notice of Appeal on September 9, 2025, and this appeal proceeded.

Discussion and Decision

[11] In family law matters, we generally afford the trial court considerable “latitude and deference.” T.J. v. J.J., 270 N.E.3d 979, 986 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), (quoting Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016)), reh'g denied. “Because trial courts regularly observe witness demeanor and assess credibility firsthand, they are best positioned to gauge the significance of the testimony and evidence before them.” Norris v. Norris, No. 25S-DR-225, 2026 WL 694727, at *1 (Ind. Mar. 12, 2026). Accordingly, we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility. Id. “Nor do we require trial courts to accept a witness's self-serving testimony even when it's uncontradicted.” Id.

[12] We also note that Father represents himself on appeal, and pro se litigants are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys. See T.J., 270 N.E.3d at 986 (citing Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). And because Mother has not filed an appellee's brief, Father need only demonstrate prima facie error—that is, error apparent on the face of the record—to warrant reversal. See id. (citing Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020)).

[13] On appeal, Father challenges two orders: (1) the August 4 order denying his motions for visitation and for contempt; and (2) the September 5 order denying his motion to compel. Father filed his notice of appeal on September 9, 2025.²

[14] A party wishing to appeal a final judgment must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the final judgment is entered in the trial court's chronological case summary (CCS). Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(1). Therefore, the deadline to appeal the August 4 order was September 3, 2025. Father's notice of appeal was filed 6 days after that deadline and is therefore untimely.

[15] The September 5 order did not extend the timeline for Father's appeal because the motion to compel denied therein was determined to be merely repetitive of Father's previous motions. “No hearing shall be required upon a repetitive motion or upon motions to reconsider orders or rulings upon a motion.” Ind. Trial Rule 53.4. “Such a motion ․ shall not delay the trial or any proceedings in the case, or extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings under these rules.” Id. Unlike a motion to correct error, repetitive motions or motions to reconsider “cannot extend the time limit within which a party must file a notice of appeal.” Johnson v. Est. of Brazill, 917 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[16] Father does not challenge the trial court's findings that the issues presented in the motion to compel “were addressed in the June 27, 2025, hearing” and that the August 4 order “remains in full force and effect.” App. Vol. II, p. 41. He does not argue that the motion to compel raised new issues, that it presented different evidence, or that the trial court erred in treating it as repetitive.

[17] Father's motion to compel alleged that, starting in April 2025, Father was at times unable to reach Children for his scheduled calls, presumably because Mother either failed to answer the phone or failed to load it with minutes. These allegations were addressed at the June 27 hearing and in the August 4 order. Father also claimed in his motion to compel that he had not spoken to Children since June 22, 2025; but this claim is based on the same allegations of Mother's interference that had already been rejected. In other words, the issues raised in Father's motion to compel presented no materially different evidence. Cf. Gibson v. Evansville Vanderburgh Bldg. Comm'n, 725 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding motions were not repetitive because “although [they were] based on the same theories, [they] required the trial court to examine different evidence”).

[18] In summary, the September 5 order, which was based on a repetitive motion, did not change the 30-day deadline for the notice of appeal. The final judgment that triggered the 30-day countdown was the August 4 order, and the notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after that order was entered into the CCS. Accordingly, Father's appeal of the August 4 order and the September 5 order is untimely.

[19] “If a notice of appeal is not timely filed, the right to appeal is forfeited.” Clemons, 260 N.E.3d at 1014. There are limited exceptions for criminal defendants not applicable here. See id. “However, we may nonetheless restore a forfeited appeal and reach the merits of a case when there are ‘extraordinarily compelling reasons’ to do so.” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014)).

[20] Father does not acknowledge that his appeal is untimely. He therefore makes no argument as to the extraordinarily compelling reasons to consider it despite this defect, and we decline to do so on his behalf. See Sevion v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (declining to restore forfeited appeal where defendant “never asserted O.R.’s standard of extraordinarily compelling reasons”). Moreover, this case—a dispute about telephone parenting time—does not involve the kinds of interests that typically warrant consideration after procedural default, such as termination of parental rights. See, e.g., O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972 (restoring forfeited right to appeal where parent sought appellate counsel before deadline and the termination proceeding implicated constitutional rights).³ Finding Father forfeited his appeal, we dismiss it.

[21] The majority sua sponte dismisses Davis's appeal due to his untimely notice of appeal. I, however, would allow Davis's appeal to go forward and address his arguments.

[22] Davis filed his notice of appeal on September 9, 2025. Since that time, this Court has repeatedly addressed Davis's motions and allowed Davis to correct defects in his filings without mentioning the untimely notice of appeal. This case is now fully briefed, and Davis's untimely notice of appeal was not raised by the parties. “[A]n untimely notice of appeal does not go to this Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and, notwithstanding an untimely notice of appeal, we may in our discretion hear an appeal on the merits.” Smith v. McPheron, 120 N.E.3d 226, 229 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Under these circumstances, I conclude that it is unfair and inequitable to sua sponte dismiss Davis's appeal. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It appears that Father did not have custody of Children or court-ordered parenting time with them prior to September 2023. The trial court's chronological case summary (CCS) for this proceeding, which began as a paternity action, shows that Children were the subject of a Children in Need of Services (CHINS) case shortly after their birth. Children were placed in relative care during the CHINS case, and when Father subsequently requested parenting time in this case, the trial court instructed Father to file such motions in the CHINS matter. The CCS in this case reflects no further activity regarding parenting time until September 2023, when Father requested visitation. In that request, Father stated that there was no existing order for visitation or parenting time.

2.   There is no indication that Father attempted to file the notice of appeal from his correctional facility any earlier than September 9, 2025, as that is the date Father himself dated the notice. Cf. Clemons v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (incarcerated defendant attempted to initiate appeal before the deadline, though the filing of the notice of appeal was not timely).Father's notice of appeal lists the date of the appealed order as September 5, 2025. Attached to the notice of appeal are both the September 5 order and the August 4 order. To the extent Father attempted to challenge other orders, he has failed to designate them as appealed orders in his notice of appeal. See generally Ind. Appellate Rule 9(F)(8) (requiring notice of appeal attach copy of appealed order).

3.   Though Father claims, in another context, that the court effectively terminated his parental rights by denying his motions, this characterization does not bring his case within the ambit of O.R. The kinds of parental interests that have previously supported the restoration of a forfeited appeal are those involving permanent severance of the parent-child relationship, like an adoption or an actual termination of parental rights. See O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972. Rejecting a claim of interference with telephone parenting-time does not effect a termination of parental rights; Father retains his parental status and remains entitled to seek enforcement.

Weissmann, Judge.

Foley, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., dissents with a separate opinion.