N.C. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] N.C. (“Father”) and K.C. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to P.C. (“Child”). Father presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied; and

2. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests.

Similarly, Mother presents two issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from her care would not be remedied; and

2. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents are the parents of Child, born September 2020. Prior to the Department of Child Services’ (“DCS”) involvement, Child lived with Parents. On June 1, 2023, DCS received a report of unsanitary conditions at the family home. Family Case Manager Hayden Donaho (“FCM Donaho”) attempted to visit the home five times, each time leaving her card with a note indicating she needed to see the home. Parents did not respond and DCS subsequently filed a motion to compel Parents to allow access to their home. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on June 12, 2023, which Parents attended. The trial court ordered Parents to allow DCS immediate access to the home.

[3] FCM Donaho arrived at the family home approximately two hours after the hearing. She observed that the “home was in very bad condition.” (Father's Tr. Vol. I at 110.) She noted “[m]ost of the rooms had random trash, clothes, toys, items piled anywhere from waist to chest high ․ there was [sic] lots of just open containers of food and there was an issue with bugs, most like[ly] gnats or flies.” (Id.) Additionally, the “upstairs of the home ․ was so cluttered [they] couldn't get the doors open and it smelled like urine up there.” (Id. at 110-111.)

[4] FCM Donaho was concerned the condition of the house was the product of Parents’ possible substance abuse. She asked them to submit to drug screens. Mother consented to a drug screen, though she attempted to tamper with the first screen. Mother's second drug screen came back positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, oxycodone, and buprenorphine. Mother did not have a prescription for oxycodone or buprenorphine. Father refused to provide a drug screen. FCM Donaho told Parents she would return in two days and expected to see improvement in the home's condition.

[5] When FCM Donaho visited the family home on June 14, 2023, she saw “minor improvements” such as “walking paths in parts of the homes [sic]” but the house “just looked like things were moved from one place to the other” and “[t]he home still needed a lot of work.” (Id. at 111.) Father consented to a drug screen at that visit, and tested negative for illegal substances.

[6] On June 15, 2023, DCS received a report that Mother had been arrested after one of her other children was found “walking around downtown Lawrenceburg” while Mother was asleep in a parked car. (Id. at 112.) Mother told police she had experienced a medical emergency and fell asleep in the car. The State subsequently charged Mother with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent.¹ Father tested negative for illegal substances and Child was released to his care.

[7] On June 27, 2023, DCS filed its petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on Mother's substance abuse and the unsanitary condition of the family home. The trial court held a hearing on the CHINS petition on July 27, 2023, during which Parents admitted Child was a CHINS and the trial court adjudicated Child accordingly. Child was removed from Parents’ care and placed with relatives, where she has remained since.

[8] On August 2, 2023, Mother pled guilty to Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent and the trial court suspended her sentence to probation. On August 16, 2023, FCM Donaho reinspected the family home. She observed “areas of very high extreme clutter, old food, [and] lots of trash throughout.” (Id. at 115.) Although she noted the house was a “little better” than her earlier visits, it was “still just very unclean and unsanitary.” (Id.) After that visit, Parents were inconsistent with their communication with DCS. FCM Diana Huddleston (“FCM Huddleston”) would “attempt[ ] to locate [them]” but Parents “would forget the appointments or be no-showed[.]” (Id. at 49.) Eventually, DCS was able to meet with Parents and stress the importance of participating in services and communicating with their FCM. Thereafter, Father's participation in services improved.

[9] On November 9, 2023, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. It entered its dispositional order the same day, ordering Parents to both maintain communication with DCS; obey the law; refrain from using illegal substances and alcohol; submit to random drug screens; complete parenting and substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations; complete programs recommended by DCS; allow DCS to make unannounced visits to their home; and attend supervised visitation with Child.

[10] On November 22, 2023, DCS filed a motion for rule to show cause asking the trial court to find Parents in contempt for violating the trial court's dispositional order. Specifically, DCS alleged that Parents had not communicated with their FCM, missed drug screens, and failed to attend appointments with the homebased service provider. In addition, DCS stated that Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, cocaine, THC, and Fentanyl and Father did not submit his work schedule as requested. On December 7, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on DCS's motion for rule to show cause. The trial court found Parents in contempt and ordered them to comply with all DCS's requests to purge the contempt.

[11] Father purged himself of contempt by complying with the trial court's order. Mother did not submit to random drug screens or maintain contact with DCS and on December 21, 2023, the trial court found her in contempt and sentenced her to 180 days incarcerated. Sometime prior to January 29, 2024, Mother was released from incarceration and entered a substance abuse treatment facility. Mother gave birth to Child's younger sibling in February 2024.² At some point thereafter, Mother completed inpatient treatment at the treatment facility and transferred to a sober living facility. Mother was discharged from the sober living facility for violating the rules. The facility allowed her to reenter the program and at the time of the May 2024 permanency hearing, Mother was following all requirements of the program. However, she ultimately did not complete the program.

[12] In August 2024, Father tested positive for cocaine and Mother tested positive for THC. On August 21, 2024, the trial court found Parents in contempt again and sentenced them to 180 days incarcerated. Approximately one month later, the trial court released Parents from incarceration because both Parents agreed to enter substance abuse treatment. Parents participated in substance abuse treatment but there were still concerns about their ability to parent Child because “recovery ․ is a very long process” and Parents could not properly discipline or redirect Child during their supervised visits. (Id. at 151.) In November 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child based on their noncompliance with services. In June 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights.

[13] FCM Steven Cruse (“FCM Cruse”) reported Father completed substance abuse treatment in February 2025. Multiple FCMs assigned to the case testified Father was mostly compliant with services and had obtained housing and employment at the time of the fact-finding hearing. However, FCM Ronda Smith (“FCM Smith”) told the trial court that when she visited Father's apartment in April 2025, the carpet was “very soiled[,]” the bedrooms had “bolt locks” on them, and one of the rooms had clutter that “was up to [her] chest with things and stuff.” (Id. at 166-167.) She told Father that “he had to take the locks off the door and that he had to declutter that room and have [a bed] for [Child].” (Id. at 167.) FCM Smith stated that when she visited Father's apartment in May 2025, he had made improvements to the cleanliness of the apartment but did not have a bed frame or mattress for Child. Two days prior to the trial court's fact-finding hearing, FCM Smith visited Father's apartment and observed it was “a little more” cluttered than it had been during the May visit and that, while Father had a bed frame for Child, he did not have a mattress. (Id. at 171.) At the time of the fact-finding hearing Father was employed and had maintained his sobriety for several months.

[14] Regarding Mother's participation in services, FCM Smith testified that from October 2024 to March 2025, Mother missed eighteen drug screens. She reported Mother tested positive for alcohol in January 2025. She noted Mother did not complete a “Substance Use Disorder Assessment” but acknowledged that Mother successfully completed substance use treatment prior to her stay at the sober living facility. (Id. at 184.) FCM Smith told the trial court that she visited Mother's apartment prior to the fact-finding hearing. Mother lived in a studio apartment with a roommate, whom she met in substance abuse treatment. The only bedding in the apartment consisted of two futons that were pushed together. FCM Smith expressed concern about Child living with Mother because “she is sharing the apartment with a recovering addict ․ [and] it's a very small place.” (Id. at 174.) FCM Smith reported Mother had been employed at her current job for one month and had worked for four different employers since October 2024.

[15] Several FCMs and service providers testified regarding Parents’ participation in supervised visitation. Parents were mostly consistent with visitation when not incarcerated or in inpatient substance abuse treatment. FCM Cruse reported Father was “semi compliant” with visitation but “there was [sic] issues where there was [sic] a couple visits that he canceled due to a toothache.” (Id. at 147.) During some visits, Father would not pay attention to Child because “he wanted to smoke during visits.” (Id. at 148.) Mother visited Child alone until Father completed substance abuse treatment in February 2025, and they participated in family visits. The visitation supervisor, Jessica Sinclair, testified that during these visits, Child “gravitated towards [Mother]” when Parents visited Child together but became more comfortable with Father after time and would play with him when Mother was outside the room. (Id. at 29.)

[16] In April 2025, Father began attending solo visits with Child. Sinclair reported that approximately one week after Child began solo visits without Father, Child began experiencing stomach aches when she saw Father. After ruling out several physical reasons for the pain, Child's therapist, Stacey Cornett, determined Child had anxiety when visiting with Father. Cornett testified Child told her that visits with Father “ha[d] been stressful to her and she's verbalized that” and that Child “worrie[d] about seeing [Father] in particular.” (Id. at 12.) At some point thereafter, Father's visitation with Child took place in a therapeutic setting and Father did not progress back to supervised visits. The FCMs and Sinclair did not indicate any serious concerns about Mother's interaction with Child during her visitation.

[17] FCM Smith indicated that Parents loved Child and had made “significant progress” but that the progress could not “offset the trauma that [Child] [had] endured by being involved in the child welfare system[.]” (Id. at 182-183.) Based thereon, she told the trial court that it was in Child's best interests for Parents’ parental rights to be terminated. The Court Appointed Special Advocate, Sulynda Munoz (“CASA Munoz”) testified she also felt that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests because “she really needs stability at this point.” (Id. at 196.) On August 7, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child based on Parents’ substance abuse throughout the case, their individual inadequate housing situations, Mother's lack of steady employment, and Parents’ failure to progress beyond supervised visitation with Child.³

Discussion and Decision

[18] Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. “If ‘parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,’ termination of parental rights is appropriate.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[19] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Such circumstances include:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

* * * * *

(7) That the parent:

(A) failed to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree for a period of at least twelve (12) months following the child's:

* * * * *

(ii) adjudication as a child in need of services;

․ unless the parent's failure to substantially comply with the child's dispositional decree was due to the failure of the department to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5[.][4]

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024) (footnote added). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the child's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the child's care following termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024).

[20] DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” In re K.E., 162 N.E.3d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2019)), trans. denied. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their child, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[21] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When “the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions of law, we apply a two-tiered standard of review: ‘we must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the judgment.’ ” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of T.W., 859 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them.” In re Paternity of Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Father's Arguments

1. Conditions Would Not be Remedied

[22] Father contends the trial court's findings of fact did not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied. When considering whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which a child is removed from a parent's care would not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-3 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the reasons for the child's removal and then we determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. When hearing the evidence at a termination of rights hearing, the trial court must judge the parent's ability to parent the children at the time of the termination hearing and consider any evidence of changed conditions, including the “parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment” as well as a parent's “failure to respond to services.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d at 1138-9. The trial court may also evaluate “habitual patterns of conduct ․ to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. at 1139. “The trial court need not wait until the children are irreversibly influenced by their deficient lifestyle such that their physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.

[23] Father argues the trial court's finding regarding the suitability of his housing does not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied because his “home met the minimum requirements for habitability.” (Father's Br. at 21.) That finding states:

Father is currently residing in a two-bedroom apartment, where he used to live with his adult sister and parents. FCM Smith went to the home on three (3) separates [sic] occasions: April 24, 2025, May 23, 2025, and June 17, 2025. On FCM Smith's first visit, she noted that the bedrooms were completely filled with trash bags and clutter, with no safe way to get into or out of the rooms, similar to the living conditions that prompted the removal of [Child]. The bedrooms also had padlocks on the outside of them, and there was no appropriate bedding for [Father or Child], after 24 months (2 years) of services being provided to [Father] by DCS. During FCM Smith's second visit, the rooms had gotten slightly better, but would still cause safety concerns for FCM Smith. There was no appropriate bedding for [Father or Child]. On FCM Smith's final visit, [Father] had just acquired a bed frame for [Child's] bed, but did not have any additional bedding. As of June 19, 2025, [Father] has no appropriate bedding for [Child].

(Father's App. Vol. 2 at 87.)

[24] Father acknowledges that during FCM Smith's April 2025 inspection of his apartment, the rooms had piles of personal items stacked “to chest height in areas[,]” had stained carpet, and had locks for an unspecified reasons on the bedroom doors. (Father's Br. at 21.) However, he asserts the apartment's condition improved over time. In May 2025, FCM Smith visited the apartment and Father had removed the locks on one of the doors and had addressed some of the clutter. Father still did not have a bed for Child. In June 2025, “Father's apartment was observed to be in much the same state, perhaps a little more cluttered.” (Id.) While Father had a bed frame at the time of FCM Smith's final visit, he did not have a mattress or bedding.

[25] Child was initially removed from Father's care based on the state of the family home, specifically clutter and unsanitary conditions; Mother's substance use; and Mother's criminal issues. At the beginning of the CHINS investigation, the family home was “unsanitary [and] completely filled with trash and clothing[.]” (Father's App. Vol. 2 at 84.) Even after Parents had been offered services to address these issues as part of the trial court's dispositional order, rooms in the family home “could not be accessed due to the amount of trash” and Parents had made “no significant progress” with making the home suitable for Child. (Id.) As the trial court's finding states, Father's apartment at the time of the fact-finding hearing was cluttered in a similar manner to the family home at the beginning of the CHINS case, indicating that even after two years of services to address appropriate upkeep of the home, Father had not been able to achieve that goal.

[26] Additionally, while Father participated in some services, he did not make progress in other areas of concern for which he was offered services towards reunification. Father completed substance abuse treatment and was sober at the time of the fact-finding hearing. However, he did not progress beyond therapeutic supervised visits with Child because Child became anxious when visiting with Father. The visitation supervisor, Sinclair, attributed that behavior to the trauma from Child's time as a ward of DCS and

indicated that visits remain fully supervised because of [Parents’] inability to reach a level of parenting which would allow for their time with [Child] being unsupervised. [Parents] have not yet mastered parenting education.

(Id. at 88.) Despite being offered several services to address his housing situation and his relationship with Child, Father progressed only slightly closer, at best, to addressing the underlying issues for the reasons for removal. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied.⁵ See, e.g., Matter of A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (father's failure to obtain appropriate housing or progress past supervised visits supported the trial court's conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from his care would not be remedied).

2. Child's Best Interests

[27] Father also argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that termination of his parental rights was in Child's best interests. Our standard of review regarding whether the termination of a parent's parental rights is in a Child's best interests is well-settled:

[I]n determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Moreover, the testimony of service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

Z.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[28] Father contends that termination of his parental rights is not in Child's best interests because he and Child are bonded and he complied with some services. He acknowledges that Child is doing well in placement and the progress she made there but asserts “termination of parental rights served only to leave the Child in the same position she would have been in during the CHINS, only now without the love and affection of her Father.” (Father's Br. at 20.)

[29] Father's request that Child stay in placement until he can be ready to take care of her requires Child to “ ‘languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency[.]’ ” Matter of E.S., 253 N.E.3d 1153, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Baker v. Marion Co., Ofc. of Family & Children, 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 n.4 (Ind. 2004)). Father has had over two years to complete the services needed to reunify with Child. While he completed some services, Father had not remedied some of the conditions under which Child was removed from his care such as obtaining suitable housing and had not progressed past supervised visits with Child. In addition, the trial court found that CASA Munoz believed termination was in Child's best interests. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the termination of Father's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests. See, e.g., J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child]”) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied.

Mother's Arguments

1. Conditions Would Not be Remedied

[30] Mother also argues the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from her care would not be remedied. Regarding Mother's progress towards remedying the conditions under which Child was removed from her care, the trial court made several findings about Mother's participation in services to address her substance abuse issues. Regarding her progress at the time of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found:

y. Mother has continued to be non-compliant with calling in for drug screening purposes or submitting to random drug screens. FCM Smith testified that since September 2020, [Mother] has missed over a dozen drug screens, including three (3) drug screens in March 2025. Mother also tested positive for alcohol in January 2025. FCM Smith also testified that [Mother] never completed her Substance Use Disorder Assessment, which was ordered by the Court, at the beginning of the case, in July of 2023.

z․ Mother is currently residing with another female, whom [Mother] met while they were both residing at Oxford House. The apartment is considered a studio apartment, with two (2) futons acting as couches and beds for the two women. There is no bedding for [Child] after 24 months (2 years) of services being provided to [Mother] by DCS.

* * * * *

bb. FCM Smith testified that within the last six (6) months, [Mother] has held approximately four (4) different jobs of varying lengths. She has been employed at her current job for approximately one (1) month.

cc. Neither [FCM Batton], [FCM Cruse], or [FCM Smith] have seen [Parents] make any significant progress toward reunification despite the Court ordered services over the past two years.

* * * * *

ii․ [Visitation Supervisor Cornett] believes that all of [Child's] visits with [Parents] have been stressful. Ms. Cornett stated that [Child's] behaviors increased prior to her beginning solo visits with [Parents]. Ms. Cornett has witnessed [Child] showing an increase in her anxiety, and her play therapy became disorganized․

jj. Unfortunately, Ms. Cornett is unable to provide a time frame for [Child] to be comfortable with visits with either of her parents. Ms. Cornett testified that it takes approximately four (4) years before a child develops new and trusting feelings towards a parent. Additionally, Ms. Cornett is concerned about [Child's] time in the system and explained that the longer [Child] remains without permanency, her trauma will increase.

(Father's App. Vol. II at 87-89.)

[31] Mother contends that the trial court's findings were “based only on speculation” and that she “had made substantial progress on the case-plan and had the potential to continue to make progress.” (Mother's Br. at 21.) However, she admitted that her “substantial compliance with the case plan ․ may have taken more prodding and longer but nonetheless substantial progress and improvement was [sic] made.” (Id. at 20.) DCS removed Child from Mother's care in 2023. For two years Mother received services to address her substance abuse and housing issues. Throughout the case, Mother had periods of sobriety but missed several drug tests, as recent as a few months before the termination fact-finding hearing. Mother had housing but did not have ample bedding for Child and had not progressed beyond supervised visits with Child. Mother was employed at the time of the fact-finding hearing but had several short-term jobs during the pendency of the case.

[32] Like Father, Mother's argument is essentially a request to allow her to continue services while allowing Child to remain in relative care. In the two years Mother has been offered reunification services, the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother's care have, at best, only slightly improved. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother's care would not be remedied.⁶ See, e.g., In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from mother's care would not be remedied based on mother's continued drug use and noncompliance with services).

2. Child's Best Interests

[33] Mother asserts the termination of her parental rights to Child was not in Child's best interests because “[t]here was no dispute that the Child loved Mother” and “that Mother could continue to improve toward reunification.” (Mother Br. at 18.) Like Father, Mother contends, “termination of parental rights served only to leave the Child in the same position she would have been in during the CHINS, only now without the love and affection of her Mother.” (Id. at 19); (see also Father's Br. at 20) (using identical language). As in her earlier argument, Mother is asking us to allow her time beyond the two years she has already had to complete services towards reunification with Child. Mother was inconsistent with substance abuse treatment services, did not have stable employment, did not have appropriate housing, and had not progressed past supervised visits with Child. The trial court found that CASA Munoz stated termination of Mother's parental rights to Child was in Child's best interests.

[34] Child cannot be made to “languish, forgotten, in custodial limbo for long periods of time without permanency[,]” Baker, 810 N.E.2d at 1041 n.4, while Mother attempts to rectify conditions that she has had ample time to address. Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. See, e.g., Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child]”).

Conclusion

[35] The trial court's findings supported its conclusions that the conditions under which Child was removed from Father's care would not be remedied and that the termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. In addition, the trial court's findings supported its conclusions that the conditions under which Child was removed from Mother's care would not be remedied and that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a).

2.   This child was removed from Mother's care sometime prior to September 2024.

3.   Mother and Father separately appealed the termination of their respective parental rights. On January 14, 2026, the State filed a motion to consolidate the cases. We granted that motion on January 20, 2026.

4.   Parents do not argue DCS did not use “reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify” their family.

5.   Father also argues that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being and that Father did not substantially comply with Child's case plan. However, as DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), we need not address Father's argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

6.   Mother also argues that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Mother-Child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being and that Father did not substantially comply with Child's case plan. However, as DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), we need not address Mother's argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur