Ashley Brooks Applegate, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ashley Brooks Applegate challenges the trial court's order revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the entirety of her previously suspended sentence in the Franklin County Security Center (“FCSC”). Applegate raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by terminating Applegate's probation and ordering her to execute her previously suspended sentence?

2. Did the trial court violate Applegate's right to allocution at the probation violation hearing?

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 10, 2025, Applegate pleaded guilty to Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass ¹ and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.² The trial court sentenced Applegate to 365 days in the FCSC with 263 days suspended to probation. Among the conditions of her probation, Applegate was prohibited from violating any law and consuming illegal drugs.

[4] In late July, Applegate tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana. Probation instructed her to seek inpatient treatment. But the following month Applegate tested positive for methamphetamine again. And despite receiving a list of inpatient providers, she did not participate in treatment. The State subsequently filed a petition alleging Applegate violated her probation by twice testing positive for illegal drugs and failing to undergo inpatient treatment. The petition also alleged Applegate had committed a new offense of possession of paraphernalia.

[5] The trial court held a probation violation hearing on October 7. At the hearing, Applegate waived her right to legal representation and admitted to violating the terms of her probation as the State alleged. Once the State made its sentencing recommendation, the following exchange between the trial court and Applegate occurred:

THE COURT: Ms. Applegate, do you wish to be heard?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm not exactly sure even what to say now. The reason really -- I know I did what [the State] said. The only reason I pled guilty is because I have two full-time jobs. I finally signed a mortgage on a house. Now I'm going to lose it all․ [T]he last time I seen my probation officer I hadn't done anything but smoke marijuana since then. I'm like literally--I'm going to lose my whole home and everything. I'm never even going to be able to buy another house again. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Applegate?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 11–12.

[6] After noting her failure to undergo inpatient treatment and her lengthy criminal history, the trial court concluded Applegate was “not a good candidate for probation.” Id. at 12. The court ordered her to serve the previously suspended sentence of 263 days in the FCSC.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Applegate's probation.

[7] Applegate first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation and ordered her to serve the suspended sentence in the FCSC. She claims the “trial court's sanction of revocation of [her] entire suspended sentence was an abuse of discretion.” Appellant's Br. at 8.

[8] Probation is a matter of grace, not a right to which a defendant is entitled. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). We review appeals from probation decisions and sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the trial court misinterprets the law.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted).

[9] Probation revocation is a two-step process: first, the trial court must make a factual determination that a probation violation occurred; second, if a violation is found, the court must determine the appropriate sanction. Id. When a probationer admits to the violations, however, “the court can proceed to the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants revocation.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008).

[10] Under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h), if the trial court finds a person has violated the terms of their probation, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifyin or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[11] In this case, Applegate admitted violating the terms of her probation. The trial court had sufficient reason to revoke her probation, starting with the fact she tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana within just two months of being sentenced. See Utley v. State, 167 N.E.3d 777, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (no abuse of discretion in probation revocation where defendant committed violations “within two months” of placement), trans. denied. Applegate was instructed to seek inpatient treatment but never did. The trial court found her refusal to undergo treatment especially troubling because during her initial sentencing, “one of the biggest things [she] said to [the court] was that [she] wanted to get into treatment.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. Proof of one violation is enough to revoke probation. Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Yet Applegate tested positive for methamphetamine a second time and faced an additional charge of possession of paraphernalia. When we consider these facts, coupled with Applegate's multiple felony and misdemeanor convictions, see Tr. Vol. 2 at 11, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking her probation and ordering execution of the previously suspended sentence, see Sieg v. State, 271 N.E.3d 620, 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (observing trial court appropriately considered defendant's extensive criminal history when terminating probation).³

The trial court did not violate Applegate's right to allocution.

[12] Applegate next argues the trial court failed to inform her of the right of allocution prior to sentencing. Appellant's Br. at 10. By not doing so, Applegate continues, the court “did not consider facts and circumstances relevant” to her sentencing. Id. at 11.

[13] “In Indiana, the purpose of the right of allocution is to give the trial court the opportunity to consider the facts and circumstances relevant to the sentencing of the defendant in the case before it.” Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 343 (Ind. 1996); see also I.C. § 35-38-1-5 (2013) (codifying right to allocution “[w]hen the defendant appears for sentencing”). That said, if a trial court is not pronouncing a sentence—which is the case in a probation revocation hearing—the court is not required to ask the defendant whether she wishes to make a statement. See Knight v. State, 155 N.E.3d 1242, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); see also Vicory v. State, 802 N.E.2d 426, 429 (Ind. 2004), disapproved on other grounds by Strack v. State, 186 N.E.3d 99, 103 n.1 (Ind. 2022). That is because, at a revocation hearing, the sentence “has already been imposed” on the defendant but was suspended. Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429. When the “defendant specifically requests the court to make a statement,” however, the court should grant the request. Id. A defendant who claims she was denied her right to allocution bears a strong burden in establishing her claim. Owens v. State, 69 N.E.3d 531, 534 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted).

[14] Here, the trial court was not required to ask Applegate whether she wished to make a statement, see Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 429, nor did she specifically request to do so. Even so, the trial court asked Applegate if she wished to be heard. At that point, Applegate explained she pleaded guilty to the probation violations because she had two jobs and had “signed a mortgage on a house.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. She acknowledged using marijuana but fretted she was “never ․ going to be able to buy another house again.” Id. The trial court inquired whether she had “[a]nything further” to say—she did not. Id. Based on this exchange, Applegate was “given the opportunity to explain [her] view of the facts and circumstances” of the case and the purpose of the right of allocution was accomplished. Vicory, 802 N.E.2d at 430.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Applegate's probation and her right to allocution was not violated.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(2) (2024).

2.   I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1) (2015).

3.   Applegate further claims the trial court failed to properly account for mitigating and aggravating factors when terminating her probation. See Appellant's Br. at 8–9. But the trial court was under no obligation to engage in this inquiry. See Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“[I]n determining the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances”), trans. denied. To the extent Applegate argues revocation of probation must advance a rehabilitative purpose, see Appellant's Br. at 9, the record shows Applegate had ample opportunity to seek inpatient treatment but declined to do so, see Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 53. Indeed, the trial court noted Applegate had claimed she “wanted to get into treatment” during her initial sentencing—yet she failed to take advantage of that very opportunity while on probation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.