Janice Bennett, Appellant-Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff v. KAG (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Janice Bennett, a pro se litigant, failed to comply with discovery despite many opportunities, the trial court imposed strict sanctions against her and in favor of KAG Management as managing agent for Village Circle Apartments (KAG). These sanctions included dismissal with prejudice of her counterclaim, entry of default against her on KAG's claim, and certain requests for admissions being deemed admitted by Bennett. Thereafter, following an evidentiary hearing on damages and sanctions, the trial court ordered her to pay KAG $2779 in damages and $1500 in attorney fees. Bennett filed a motion to correct error, which was summarily denied.

[2] Bennett appeals, pro se, asserting, as best we can tell, that the trial court violated her due process rights by the discovery sanctions it imposed. However, Bennett ignores the bulk of appellate briefing requirements set out in Ind. Appellate Rule 46 and fails to provide any cogent reasoning, citations to the record, or supporting legal authority. Due to her procedural bad faith, we find Bennett's appellate claims waived and order her to pay KAG's appellate attorney fees.

[3] We affirm and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine KAG's appellate attorney's fees.

Facts & Procedural History

[4] In February 2023, KAG filed a small claims action against Bennett for eviction and damages related to an apartment lease. Bennett responded with a counterclaim against KAG for defamation, reimbursement for plumbing repairs, and “oppression.” Appellee's Appendix Vol. II at 18. The case was transferred to the plenary docket of the Marion County Superior Court in May 2023, by which time Bennett had moved out of the apartment. Bennett amended her counterclaim several times and requested a jury trial.

[5] In March 2024, the trial court approved the parties’ agreed case management plan. As relevant here, the plan provided for a jury trial to be held on September 9, 2025, and required discovery to be completed “no later than” sixty days prior to trial. Id. at 34.

[6] On July 5, 2024, KAG served its first set of interrogatories, request for admissions, and request for production, but Bennett objected to the discovery requests. In her objection filed with the trial court on July 8, Bennett argued that “[KAG] is well aware of the answers and the information requested has already been forwarded to [KAG's attorney and] will be given to the [attorney] during discovery that is already outlined in the case management plan[.]” Id. at 54. On July 12, the trial court overruled Bennett's objection and noted that Bennett had “failed to set forth any efforts to conform to the requirements of Trial Rule 26(F)[.]” Id. at 53.

[7] On August 2, 2024, Bennett filed responses to the discovery requests by simply repeating an objection that the requests were improper because they sought information prior to the discovery deadline set forth in the case management plan. KAG's attorney reached out to Bennett over email on August 6 and attempted to explain that the discovery process was ongoing and that the date specified in the case management plan did not set a start date for discovery but rather a deadline for completion of the process. When Bennett did not respond, the attorney reached out again on August 12. Bennett then responded, “Discovery isn't supposed to be submitted until next year according to the Case Management Plan.” Id. at 154. In three additional emails on August 12 and 13, the attorney went to great lengths to explain the discovery process to Bennett and the need to be actively engaged in discovery well before the deadline. Bennett responded in part: “YOU WILL NOT BULLY ME, OKAY. I KNOW EXACTLY WHAT IS GOING ON.” Id. at 150. Along with many accusations, Bennett made clear that she would not be responding to the discovery requests anytime soon. And Bennett did not accept the attorney's offer to give her more time to fully respond to the discovery requests, which were already past due.

[8] On August 19, 2024, KAG filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions. On August 21, the trial court ordered Bennett to “fully and without evasion respond to all outstanding discovery” within fifteen days. Id. at 115. Bennett responded that same day with a “Motion Requesting Court Hearing to Clarify Discovery Exchange of Parties.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 28.

[9] On September 5, Bennett once again filed an objection to each of KAG's discovery requests claiming that discovery was not due until the date set forth in the case management plan. That same day, the trial court overruled Bennett's objections and ordered her to “fully answer all outstanding discovery within the next twenty-one (21) days.” Appellee's Appendix Vol. II at 195. Bennett did not comply with this new deadline.

[10] On October 8, 2024, KAG filed a motion for sanctions due to Bennett's ongoing refusal to comply with any of the discovery requests despite court orders to do so. Pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 37(B)(2)(c), KAG sought dismissal with prejudice of Bennett's counterclaim, entry of default judgment against her on KAG's claim, and an award of attorney fees. And pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 36, KAG asked the court to order that Bennett had admitted the eight unanswered requests for admission.

[11] Bennett filed an objection to the motion for sanctions, noting that she had previously requested a hearing to clarify discovery, which the trial court never ruled upon. She also claimed that she had provided KAG's attorney with a flash drive of information in September 2023 and that “as a pro se litigate [sic] it is a financial burden ․ to continuously make copies, purchase more flash drives [and] to produce copies as I can't afford to keep up with a law firm.” Appellee's Appendix Vol. III at 85.

[12] On October 25, 2024, the trial court denied Bennett's request for a hearing on discovery and granted KAG's motion for sanctions. The trial court imposed each sanction requested by KAG and set an evidentiary hearing on damages. The evidentiary hearing on damages, as well as sanctions, was held on December 18, 2024, and January 30, 2025. At this hearing, the trial court apparently explained to Bennett that it had denied her motion for a hearing on discovery because she was improperly seeking legal advice from the court.¹

[13] On March 4, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment in favor of KAG in the amount of $4279 ($2779 in damages and $1500 in attorney fees) plus court costs of $104. Bennett filed a motion to correct error, which was summarily denied by the trial court the same day it was filed.

[14] Bennett now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[15] At all stages of this litigation Bennett has proceeded pro se, which is her right. But as a pro se litigant, she is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is “afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)); see also Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Kelley, 166 N.E.3d at 937 (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[16] The required contents of an appellant's brief are set out in detail in App. R. 46(A) and were ignored by Bennett at nearly every turn.² She failed to set forth a concise statement of the issue(s) presented on appeal, to include any citations to the record in her statement of the case, statement of facts, or anywhere else in her brief, or to provide us with a standard of review. Her statement of the case section contains argument – irrelevant argument at that – and provides no details regarding “the course of the proceedings relevant to the issues presented for review” or “the disposition of these issues by the trial court.” App. R. 46(A)(5). And her two-sentence facts section is similarly unhelpful, pure argument. See App. R. 46(A)(6) (requiring the section to “describe the facts relevant to the issues” supported by page references to the record and stated in accordance with the applicable standard of review); Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (observing that “the statement of facts must also be devoid of argument”); cf. Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“With the ‘facts’ that Ramsey has presented, we could not intelligently consider each question presented without reading the entire record to determine the true facts.”).

[17] Further detrimental to our review is Bennett's failure to provide an adequate argument section. She does not provide even one citation to the record or to legal authority in support of her argument, and her argument is untethered to any standard of review.³ App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) provides: “The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.” Further, App. R. 46(A)(8)(b) requires an appellant to “include for each issue a concise statement of the applicable standard of review[.]”

[18] “In Indiana, appellate law is fortified by its established procedural rules: a litigant who fails to support his arguments with appropriate citations to legal authority and record evidence waives those arguments for our review.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (cleaned up and internal quotations omitted); see also Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 366 (“A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide[ ] adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”). Such is the case here, and we will not brief Bennett's case for her or advocate on her behalf. See Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (“ ‘The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research,’ but instead are tasked with solving disputes ‘as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.’ ”) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.)) (emphasis added in Miller).

[19] In addition to finding the appellate issue(s) waived, we agree with KAG that Bennett should be sanctioned for procedural bad faith. Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E) provides: “The Court may assess damages if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith. Damages shall be in the Court's discretion and may include attorneys’ fees. The Court shall remand the case for execution.”

[20] When exercising our discretion to impose damages under this rule, we use restraint to avoid the potential chilling effect on the exercise of the right to appeal. Wenner v. Hensley, 224 N.E.3d 339, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

A strong showing is required to justify an award of appellate damages, and the sanction is not imposed to punish mere lack of merit, but something more egregious. Just as pro se litigants are required to follow all of the rules of appellate procedure, they are also liable for attorney fees when they disregard the rules in bad faith.

Id. (quoting Estate of Carnes, 866 N.E.2d 260, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[21] As relevant here, attorney's fees may be awarded for procedural bad faith “when a party flagrantly disregards the form and content requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, omits and misstates relevant facts appearing in the record, and files briefs written in a manner calculated to require the maximum expenditure of time both by the opposing party and the reviewing court.” Id. Even where the conduct falls short of being deliberate or by design, we may find procedural bad faith. Id.

[22] KAG notes that to respond to Bennett's contentions on appeal, it “first had to determine what arguments of alleged error, if any, were being made and then essentially make those arguments for Bennett.” Appellee's Brief at 11-12. We would add that KAG also had to compile a complete appendix and wholesale craft a statement of the case and statement of the facts, which sections were woefully lacking in Bennett's brief.

[23] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Bennett's procedural bad faith rises to the level of egregiousness for which appellate attorney's fees are warranted. Accordingly, we remand for determination of appellate attorney's fees to be awarded to KAG.

[24] Judgment affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We say apparently because we do not have a transcript of the hearing, as Bennett did not request one. However, certain filings by Bennett below reference statements made by the trial court at the hearing.

2.   Bennett also ignored Ind. Appellate Rule 43(E)’s requirement to double space text in her brief. Further, she failed to include in her appendix several pleadings and at least one order that were necessary for the resolution of this appeal and required by Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(2). We appreciate KAG's filing of a complete appendix for our review.

3.   The gist of Bennett's short, two-paragraph argument is reflected in the following statement from her argument section:How can it be fair to dismiss the case scheduled for jury trial, over discovery exchange when the case management plan clearly outlined that discovery had to be completed by 60 days before trial, so what was the purpose of having a case management plan if the presiding judge can ignore it and take away my right to a trial by jury.Appellant's Brief at 4.

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.