II v. April T. Haymond, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Larry M. Haymond II (“Husband”) appeals, pro se, following the dissolution of his marriage to April T. Haymond (“Wife”) and the denial of post-judgment motions related to personal jurisdiction and the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct. Husband presents four issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues:

I. Whether the trial court erred in declining to set aside the dissolution decree due to alleged improper service; and

II. Whether the magistrate erred in declining to recuse under Rule 2.11 of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 17, 2023, Wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage and moved for a provisional order regarding possession of the marital residence and child custody, support, and parenting time. Husband appeared through counsel on August 3, 2023. On August 7, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Wife's motion for a provisional order. Husband personally attended the hearing, where he was represented by counsel. The next day, the trial court entered an order directing Husband's counsel to submit a proposed provisional order within fourteen days. The trial court signed the provisional order on August 23, 2023. Three weeks later, on September 13, 2023, Husband's counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The court granted the motion on September 18, 2023.

[4] On September 27, 2023, a different attorney appeared on behalf of Husband. After a series of status conferences, on June 11, 2024, Husband's counsel filed a motion requesting a final hearing. On September 6, 2024, Husband's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the trial court granted on September 9, 2024. Husband filed an appearance reflecting that he was representing himself.

[5] The court scheduled a hearing for September 30, 2024. Ahead of the hearing, Husband filed a motion for contempt, which included allegations that he was not properly served. Husband alleged that Wife “intercepted several mailings and services addressed to [him]” and “services ․ were intentionally delivered to an incorrect address, and via incorrect methods.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 63. After the hearing on September 30, 2024, the court issued a written order finding Husband in contempt of the provisional order for failing to make timely mortgage payments on the marital residence.¹ In November 2024, the court held a final hearing on the dissolution petition. On February 25, 2025, the trial court issued a decree dissolving the marriage, distributing marital assets, and resolving the remaining issues of child custody, support, and parenting time.

[6] On March 18, 2025—within thirty days of entry of the dissolution decree—Husband filed (1) a “Motion to Vacate Judgment for Due Process Violation and Improper Service” (“the Motion to Vacate Judgment”) and (2) a “Motion to Authenticate Video Evidence in Support of [the Motion to Vacate Judgment].” Id. at 50–54, 56–57. In the Motion to Vacate Judgment, Husband alleged there was improper service of process resulting in a lack of jurisdiction and that, as a result, the dissolution decree was void and the judgment had been entered in violation of principles of due process. Husband cited Trial Rule 60(B) as procedural authority for vacating the dissolution decree. In the other motion, Husband moved to authenticate video evidence from a doorbell camera purportedly establishing that Wife intercepted his mail in July 2023, and therefore, Husband was not properly served. The court scheduled a hearing.

[7] Meanwhile, Husband filed several additional motions, among them, a Motion for Disqualification under Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 (“the Motion to Disqualify”). Husband claimed the magistrate should have recused because in July 2023—around the time Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage—the magistrate issued an ex parte protective order, finding that Husband was a credible threat to Wife's safety. Husband argued that “the impression made during that initial proceeding may have remained with the magistrate, consciously or unconsciously, throughout the years” and that “[t]his longstanding impression likely shaped the court's view of [his] credibility and character and may explain certain rulings made against him.” Id. at 47–48.

[8] On May 22, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on Husband's pending motions. Husband testified about the allegedly defective service and presented two exhibits that were admitted without objection: video footage from a doorbell camera purportedly showing Wife receiving the certified mail, and the certified mail return receipt with Wife's name on the signature line designated for the recipient. Husband acknowledged on cross-examination that he raised the service issue in a motion filed in the fall of 2024.² Husband also acknowledged that he personally attended the provisional hearing in August 2023 where he was represented by counsel, and he did not raise the service of process issue at the hearing. Husband testified that he “didn't get service so [he] couldn't raise it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. The trial court orally explained that “a court may acquire personal jurisdiction over a party through the part[y's] consent” and that Husband “basically waived even filing something in September of 2024” because he “availed [him]self” to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. at 14.

[9] On June 3, 2025, the trial court entered a written order denying the motions. As to the Motion to Vacate Judgment, the court found that Husband waived his challenge to personal jurisdiction, which was premised on allegedly improper service, because he “availed himself to this Court by appearing in person and participating in various hearings[,] including ․ the hearing on provisional orders held on August 7, 2023, various status hearings[,] and the final hearing.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24. As to the Motion to Disqualify, the court stated that Husband's “disagreement with the Court's Orders does not constitute grounds for disqualification of a judge.” Id. at 25. Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] We begin by noting that Husband represents himself on appeal. “[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). We also note that Wife did not file an appellate brief defending the trial court's rulings. Under the circumstances, “we do not undertake to develop an argument on the appellee's behalf, but rather[,] may reverse upon an appellant's prima facie showing of reversible error.” Morton v. Ivacic, 898 N.E.2d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2008). “Prima facie error in this context is defined as, ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)).

I. Service of Process

[11] Husband challenges the denial of his Motion to Vacate Judgment. Husband maintains that service was deficient, resulting in a lack of personal jurisdiction and the violation of his right to due process. Notably, “a judgment entered where there has been no service of process is void for want of personal jurisdiction.” Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1155 n.3 (Ind. 1998). However, under certain circumstances discussed herein, “[a] defendant can waive the lack of personal jurisdiction and submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court ․” Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 626, 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[12] In the Motion to Vacate Judgment, Husband cited Trial Rule 60(B) as grounds for relief. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 53. However, the motion was filed within thirty days of the final judgment, which was within the timeframe for a motion to correct error. See Ind. Trial Rule 59(C). Under the circumstances, we regard Husband's motion as a Trial Rule 59 motion to correct error. See Roberts v. Watson, 359 N.E.2d 615, 619 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that, when timely filed, “a motion which states a [Trial Rule] 60 ground [for relief] should be considered a motion to correct error[ ], regardless of its denomination”).

[13] In general, we review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion, reversing only “where the trial court's judgment is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or where the trial court errs on a matter of law.” Berg v. Berg, 170 N.E.3d 224, 227 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013)). However, “where a ruling turns on a question of law, our review is de novo.” Id. “A court's jurisdiction either exists or does not, and the question of a court's jurisdiction is therefore a question of law that is not entrusted to the trial court's discretion but rather is reviewed de novo.” Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “To the extent that the existence of jurisdiction must be determined on the basis of disputed facts, the trial court's determination of jurisdictional facts is reviewed for clear error.” Id.

[14] Under Trial Rule 4(A), “[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who ․ commences or joins in the action, is served with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected to the power of the court under any other law.” A party believing personal jurisdiction is lacking has the “option ․ to ignore a pending proceeding and take the risk that a subsequent challenge to personal jurisdiction will prevail.” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1156. Of course, doing so “is a bold move.” Id. There is a more circumspect option, which is to appear in the case and challenge jurisdiction at the earliest opportunity. See Kondamuri, 799 N.E.2d at 1158–59. Critically, however, these are the only viable options to preserve a jurisdiction challenge in that a defendant “submit[s] himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Harris, 922 N.E.2d at 632; see T.R. 4(A). Put differently, the trial court “has no power over [the] person[ ] ․ unless and until there is a response or an appearance and the lack of personal jurisdiction is not protested.” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155. If a defendant participates in the action without challenging personal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction requirement is satisfied. See T.R. 4(A); Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1155. This type of “ ‘waiver’ must be by the person holding the rights,” e.g., “a defendant with a right not to be sued in a court with no jurisdiction ․” Stidham, 698 N.E.2d at 1156.

[15] In this case, Wife petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage on July 17, 2023. On August 3, 2023, Husband appeared through counsel, who represented him at a hearing on Wife's motion for a provisional order. Husband personally attended that hearing, where there was no challenge to the adequacy of service of process. After Husband's initial counsel withdrew, Husband was represented by a different attorney. That attorney requested a final hearing and did not challenge service of process. Husband's counsel withdrew on September 9, 2024, more than one year after the proceedings began. Husband then appeared on his own behalf and represented himself at a hearing on September 30, 2024. Around that date, Husband raised the service of process issue for the first time.

[16] Based on the timeline involved and Husband's active participation in the case through counsel, the trial court determined that Husband submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and, therefore, waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction. On appeal, Husband argues that a party can only waive this challenge if the record “establish[es] that some form of constitutionally adequate notice was attempted.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. He claims “[t]he court cannot apply waiver doctrine to cure a complete absence of valid service” and that the waiver analysis “is premature.” Id. For support, Husband directs us to Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988). But Peralta involved a default judgment entered when there was improper service and the defendant did not appear or participate in the action—not circumstances where the defendant participated in the action before the trial court entered its judgment. See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 82–87. Husband also relies on K.S. v. State, but that case supports the waiver finding here; indeed, K.S. recognized that a court acquires personal jurisdiction when a person submits to its authority, which is precisely what Husband did by appearing through counsel and litigating for over a year without challenging personal jurisdiction. 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006).³

[17] Husband has not identified error in the determination that he waived any challenge to proper service by submitting himself to the court's authority.⁴ Because Husband appeared through counsel within weeks of the allegedly defective service, attended hearings, participated through his attorneys, and raised no challenge for more than a year, the waiver finding is amply supported regardless of whether the underlying service was in fact defective. Moreover, Husband's due process argument fails because it turns on his contention that the judgment was void due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. We, therefore, conclude the trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment.

II. Motion to Disqualify

[18] Husband claims the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Disqualify under Indiana Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1), which provides as follows:

A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality[ ] might reasonably be questioned, including ․ [when] [t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge[ ] of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

[19] As a threshold matter, we observe that Rule 2.11(A) is a professional rule informing a judge when recusal is mandatory—this rule “does not create a freestanding right of enforcement by a private party.” Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Instead, the ethical obligations contained in Rule 2.11(A) “are enforced by the individual judge against himself” and through “disciplinary actions of our [S]upreme [C]ourt.” Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. Thus, when a party cites Rule 2.11(A) and asks a judge to recuse, “we do not independently review a trial judge's recusal decision” in light of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Hamilton, 233 N.E.3d at 474. Nonetheless, in prior cases, this court has “engaged in that independent review anyway” out of “an abundance of caution ․” Id. In line with that caselaw, we address the merits here.

[20] “We begin with the presumption that a trial judge is unbiased.” State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024). “To overcome that presumption, the party seeking disqualification must identify facts reflecting the judge's actual bias or prejudice.” Id. Here, Husband cited Rule 2.11(A)(1), which requires recusal if a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge[ ] of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.” Critically, “[t]he personal knowledge that requires recusal is knowledge acquired from extrajudicial sources”—not knowledge gained through service as a sitting judge. Lee v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ind. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Jones v. State, 416 N.E.2d 880, 881–82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (collecting cases).⁵ Moreover, “[o]ur law is well settled that ‘[p]rejudice is not inferred from adverse judicial rulings.’ ” State ex rel. Allen, 226 N.E.3d at 217 (second alteration in original) (quoting Zavodnik, 17 N.E.3d at 269).

[21] In this case, Husband's disqualification argument rests on the magistrate's issuance of an ex parte protective order in a related proceeding on July 26, 2023, where the magistrate found Husband to be a credible threat to Wife's safety. That protective order was dismissed at Wife's request on August 7, 2023, the same day the parties appeared with counsel for the provisional hearing in the instant case. Husband argues that the magistrate's involvement in the ex parte case—and the alleged failure to disclose that involvement—created an appearance of bias requiring disqualification. We note, however, that Husband has not identified any extrajudicial source of knowledge; rather, the magistrate's exposure to the facts underlying the protective order came entirely through judicial proceedings. Knowledge so acquired is not personal knowledge within the meaning of Rule 2.11(A)(1). See Lee, 735 N.E.2d at 1172

[22] Husband directs us to Bloomington Magazine, Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), claiming the case held that “a judge's failure to disclose prior involvement with the same parties created grounds for disqualification, even where the prior case had been resolved.” Appellant's Br. p. 32. However, that case involved a close professional relationship between the judge and an attorney appearing before the judge, where the attorney recently served as chairman of the judge's election committee. Bloomington Magazine, Inc., 961 N.E.2d at 66–67. Here, there is no allegation of a personal or professional relationship between Wife and the magistrate; rather, Husband exclusively focuses his argument on the magistrate's role in the ex parte proceeding that led to an adverse ruling and the magistrate's alleged failure to disclose that role.

[23] To the extent Husband's argument reduces to a complaint about any ruling that followed in the dissolution proceedings—including the provisional order, the contempt finding, and the dissolution decree—adverse rulings, which reflect a judge's assessment of the evidence and law, do not establish actual bias or prejudice. See State ex rel. Allen, 226 N.E.3d at 217. Finally, as to Husband's contention that the magistrate improperly failed to disclose involvement in the ex parte proceedings, we conclude that, because there are no grounds for recusal based on the magistrate's involvement, any failure to disclose that involvement cannot independently establish grounds for recusal. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Disqualify.

Conclusion

[24] Because Husband submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction, the trial court did not err in denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment. Further, the trial court did not err in denying Husband's Motion to Disqualify under Rule 2.11(A)(1).

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The written order did not address Husband's arguments challenging service of process.

2.   The parties disputed whether the trial court addressed Husband's claim of improper service at the hearing on September 30, 2024. Wife asserted that there was “testimony on it” and the trial court “ruled from the bench.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 13. However, Husband told the trial court: “I don't think you ruled on it. I think it was forgot [sic] about.” Id. In any case, the parties agreed that the court “could decide it today.” Id.

3.   Husband also refers to “Beidel v. Bracken, 745 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).” Appellant's Br. p. 22 (italicization added). The cited portion of the reporter refers to multiple memorandum decisions that do not correspond to the cited case name, and we were otherwise unable to find a case with the name provided.

4.   At one point, Husband asserts that the trial court erred by failing to enter adequate findings “on the jurisdictional question,” claiming this court is unable to “conduct meaningful appellate review of whether the trial court properly established its authority to proceed.” Appellant's Br. p. 35. Husband does not cite authority requiring specific findings under the circumstances, nor are we aware of any. Furthermore, we note that the trial court's detailed written order facilitated our review of Husband's jurisdictional claim.

5.   Husband asserts that “prior involvement”—even as a presiding judge—“mandates disqualification.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. For this proposition, Husband cites Parker v. State, 773 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, and provides the following language in a citation parenthetical: “recusal required where judge's prior rulings created personal knowledge of facts in dispute.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. The cited case is a criminal case with a confrontation clause issue and a sentencing challenge, with no discussion whatsoever of recusal or the parameters of Rule 2.11(A)(1). This is not the only citation defect in Husband's brief. We admonish Husband to review citations for compliance with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and remain mindful that noncompliance risks forfeiture of the issue and may lead to sanctions. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring “cogent reasoning” supporting each contention with “citations to the authorities ․ relied on, in accordance with Rule 22”); Wilcox v. Gingrich, No. 25A-PL-1157, 2026 WL 249093, at *2–8 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2026) (addressing circumstances where similar citation issues impeded review).

Foley, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.