IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.R. II (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.R., II (“Father”) and K.B. (“Mother”) (together, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's order terminating their parental rights to W.B. (“Child”). Parents raise the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings; and

II. Whether the trial court's judgment that Parents’ parental rights should be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Parents are the biological parents of Child, who was born on July 24, 2023. Prior to Child's birth, Mother was involved with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) concerning Child's older sibling (“Sibling”) when a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) case was initiated in June 2021. Sibling was only the biological child of Mother and not Father. In September 2021, the State charged Mother with Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury with the victim being Sibling. In that case, Mother requested competency and mental health evaluations, and after completing them, she was found to be incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, the trial court received a report that Mother had attained the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in her defense. After a second set of evaluations, Mother was found competent to stand trial for those criminal proceedings.

[4] Due to Sibling's pending CHINS case, DCS became involved with Parents in the present case when Child was born in July 2023. DCS went to the hospital to assess Child, and at some point during the assessment, Father admitted to using marijuana. DCS had Father submit to a drug screen, which came back positive for marijuana and fentanyl. Child was not sent home from the hospital with Mother due to Mother already having an open CHINS case and concerns about her being able to care for Child. On August 18, 2023, DCS removed Child from Parents’ care on an emergency basis based on Father's substance abuse and Mother's inability to ensure she and Child were safe when in the home or the car with Father. Child was placed in foster care. On August 21, 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS, which alleged that Parents had “failed to provide him with a safe and stable home free of substance use.” Mother's App. Vol. II p. 55.

[5] On November 6, 2023, in a mediated agreement, Father admitted that Child was a CHINS because Father needed “assistance providing an appropriate home, free from substance abuse[,] and thus the coercive intervention of the court is required.” Ex. Vol. I p. 13. In the mediated agreement, Father agreed to, among other things, submit to random drug screens; successfully complete Fatherhood Engagement and comply with all reasonable recommendations; complete a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations; consistently engage in parenting time; establish paternity of Child; obey the law; obtain and maintain safe, stable, and appropriate housing; and obtain and maintain a legal and stable source of income. On November 14, 2023, Mother entered into an agreement that Child was a CHINS “due to substance use in the home” and agreed that “the coercive intervention of the [c]ourt is necessary.” Id. at 20. Under the agreement, Mother agreed to, among other things, participate in home-based casework, participate in individual therapy, attend visitation with Child, complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations, maintain suitable housing, meet Child's basic needs, and maintain a legal and stable source of income. The agreements were approved by the trial court, and the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS on November 27, 2023, and ordered Parents to participate in the services contained in the agreements.

[6] Subsequently, Father filed a motion to establish paternity of Child, and paternity was established on February 2, 2024. A periodic review hearing was held on February 21, 2024. In the order issued after the hearing, the trial court found that Mother had partially complied with the case plan. She completed a parenting assessment in January 2024, which recommended that Mother receive ongoing parenting education. Mother began home-based casework but struggled to meet all the requirements. Mother was participating in individual therapy and was “somewhat consistent in attending supervised visits” with Child. Id. at 27. The trial court found that Father had been inconsistent in submitting to drug screens. He had completed a mental health evaluation in December 2023 that resulted in a referral for wraparound services. At the time of the February 2024 hearing, Father was not participating in Fatherhood Engagement and was inconsistent in attending supervised visits with Child. The trial court found that Parents had not enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations. The trial court also ordered Father to “be respectful and compliant with everyone in th[e] case.” Id. at 28.

[7] A permanency hearing was held on August 21, 2024, and the trial court found that Parents had partially complied with the case plan at that time. Mother had missed many home-based casework appointments and parenting education meetings but was maintaining consistent visits with Child. Father had partially complied with drug screens and had only recently started Fatherhood Engagement services. Although Father had attended a family team meeting that was held in July 2024, Mother did not attend. After this hearing, Parents were ordered to engage in domestic violence related services due to a domestic violence incident involving Mother and Father in February 2024 that resulted in a no contact order and criminal charges against Father. Further, the trial court admonished Father for “his behavior” during the permanency hearing. Id. at 30. At the conclusion of the August 2024 hearing, the trial court changed Child's permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.

[8] On September 10, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to Child. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on December 9, 2024, and February 18, 2025. At the time of the hearing, Child had been under the supervision of DCS for over one year.

[9] At the hearing, Nydia Harris (“Harris”) testified. In February 2024, she had been assigned as the home-based casework provider for Mother. Harris testified that, when she was initially assigned, Mother was not compliant with the home-based casework. Harris later transitioned to becoming Mother's parenting education provider in July 2024 and testified that, from July to November 2024, she and Mother completed the “Nurturing Parenting” curriculum. Tr. Vol I p. 140. When working on that curriculum, Mother took a pre-test and a post-test. She scored “medium to high risk” on the pre-test and almost entirely “high risk” on the post-test, which reflected that Mother had regressed instead of progressed. Id. at 140–41. Mother had disclosed to Harris that Mother had a “cognitive delay” and that she had “testing [ ] adjustments” in high school. Id. at 142. Because of this cognitive delay, Harris did more review over the topics with Mother. After the Nurturing Parenting curriculum, Mother and Harris worked on the 1, 2, 3 Magic curriculum, and Harris assisted Mother by reading the text from the books aloud, reading the overview questions aloud, and re-wording the questions for Mother to make them more understandable. Harris testified that, despite these accommodations, Mother did not retain as much information from the curriculum as an average person would. Harris recommended that Mother's parenting time be supervised until she could retain the majority of the parenting information.

[10] Kelli Cave (“Cave”), who provided home-based casework services to Mother, testified at the hearing. Cave began providing services to Mother in November 2024, and at the time of the hearing, Cave was working with Mother on getting her driver's license. However, Mother had not yet passed the written test to obtain a learner's permit at that time. Cave also supervised visitations with Child and had done so since July 2024. The supervised visitations took place at the home of Mother's parents (“Grandparents”), which was where Mother was living at the time of the hearing. Cave testified that Mother was consistent in her visitation with Child, and Cave had no safety concerns during the visits. Cave stated that she believed that Mother was ready to move to pop-in visits where Cave would leave but do unannounced pop-ins. However, Cave noted that Mother still would not be totally alone with Child as Grandparents were always present in the home during visits. Cave could also not give an opinion on whether she would recommend unsupervised visits if Grandparents were not in the home as she had never observed Mother's visitations when Grandparents were not there.

[11] Mother had moved back in with Grandparents in November 2024 and her long-term plan was to live with them. Both Grandparents have significant health challenges. Grandfather is disabled as a result of a stroke about four years prior. Grandmother suffers from multiple myeloma, which had been in remission for less than a year and for which she is tested every three months. Grandmother testified that she and Grandfather had never left Mother totally alone in their house.

[12] There was also evidence presented as to Sibling's CHINS case. In August 2024, Mother consented to the adoption of Sibling; at that time, the CHINS case had been pending for over three years. As to Mother's criminal case concerning Sibling, after being found competent to stand trial in March 2024, she eventually pleaded guilty to Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury in October 2024. She was sentenced to six years with two years executed on home detention and four years suspended to probation.

[13] At the time of the hearing, Father was participating in the Fatherhood Engagement program. Tom Douthit (“Douthit”) worked with Father in this program and testified that the program worked on behavioral, life, parenting, and social skills and financial stability. Douthit stated that he began working with Father in May or June 2024 and that Father was engaging in the program and had progressed but had not yet completed the program. Douthit believed that Father needed mental health treatment concerning certain events from Father's childhood and due to time Father spent incarcerated. However, Douthit was not equipped to provide that treatment. Douthit also testified that Father had progressed in his ability to respond to authority figures but that he also believed that Father has some sort of intellectual disability.

[14] Father had not yet begun the batterer's intervention program that he was referred to complete due to the February 2024 domestic violence incident. At the time of the hearing, Father's domestic battery charge from the February 2024 incident remained pending. Father testified that he had completed a mental health evaluation but had not yet completed the recommended mental health services.

[15] Father had not progressed past fully supervised visits. Father did not have independent housing. Because of the no contact order restricting his contact with Mother, he had moved into a two-bedroom apartment with his sister. Neither Father nor his sister were on a lease for the apartment, and his sister paid rent month-to-month. Although DCS and the court appointed special advocate (“the CASA”) had not been to the apartment, Douthit had opined that there was not room for Child to live there. Father stated that he did not intend to live with his sister permanently but was waiting on housing assistance at the time of the hearing.

[16] Over the course of the case, Father did not maintain a stable source of income sufficient to provide for both him and Child. At the December hearing date, Father stated he was employed part-time with a landscaping company with an income that fluctuated from week to week. Douthit testified that Father had an “under the table job” where he did odd jobs for the company but that the job was not “consistent.” Id. at 123, 124. At the February 2025 hearing, Father was averaging about $440 as a monthly income between his “odds and ends” job and donating plasma. Id. at 125.

[17] Evidence was presented regarding Father's criminal history. He was convicted of drug-related offenses in 2015 for which he was given a suspended sentence but later violated the terms of his probation. In 2018, he pleaded guilty to theft and burglary in two separate cause numbers, and his sentences were stayed pending successful completion of mental health court. However, Father failed to successfully complete the requirements of the mental health court, and he was ordered to serve his sentences. He was released from incarceration in 2021.

[18] Father appeared late for both dates of the hearing, appearing about an hour and forty-five minutes late on the date of the February hearing. Father also exhibited “odd behaviors” during the February hearing. Mother's App. Vol II p. 10. He “put his head down and closed his eyes several times[,]” “was often slow to speak,” had speech that “was slightly slurred,” and “moved a lot in his chair.” Id. The trial court noted that these behaviors were different than those Father demonstrated at the December hearing. Grandmother testified that she did not believe it was in Child's best interests to be in Father's care due to Father's inconsistent involvement in Child's life. She stated that, at the time of the hearing, Father had not seen Child in months and that Father has “quite a few anger problems[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 177.

[19] DCS testified that it recommended termination of the parental rights of Parents because there was concern about Parents’ ability to care for Child and neither Mother nor Father has “displayed an ability to safely parent” Child. Id. at 35. Despite Mother's love and desire to parent Child, DCS did not believe that she was able to safely parent Child, and there was concern for Child's safety if he were “unobserved in [Mother's] care[.]” Id. at 36. DCS's plan for Child if termination was granted was adoption.

[20] The CASA testified that she had been assigned to the case since it began in August 2023. She also opined that it would not be safe for Mother to have full care of Child despite her best intentions, and she would have concerns with Child being alone in the home with Mother. The CASA also expressed concern regarding Father's anger due to his argumentative interactions with DCS and other providers. She also believed that Father lacked stability because of his inconsistent employment and living arrangements. The CASA recommended termination of Parents’ parental rights because, despite Parents’ desire to parent Child, it was not in Child's best interests to be in their care.

[21] At the time of the hearing, Child had been removed from Parents’ care for over a year and was eighteen months old. Child was in foster placement (“Foster Mother”) and been consistently with the same placement since he was six weeks old. Child was doing well in placement with Foster Mother. Foster Mother had known Mother for twenty years since Mother was a child. Foster Mother believed that Mother was unable to care for Child by herself without the assistance of Grandparents. Foster Mother also testified that she believed that Mother did not “cognitively” make “good choices” and was unsure that Mother could safely take care of Child “without direction.” Id. at 100. Foster Mother knew Father only from his relationship with Mother, but she did not believe that he would be able to care for Child because of “anger issues” and inconsistent visitation with Child. Id. at 101. Foster Mother testified that she and her husband planned to adopt Child if termination was granted and that they were open to Parent still having contact with Child.

[22] On June 20, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’ parental right to Child. In the order, the trial court concluded that termination was in the best interests of Child; that there was a satisfactory plan for Child, which was adoption; and that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of Parents will not be remedied. Parents now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[23] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in resolving a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[24] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

I. Findings Supported by the Evidence

[25] Initially, Father asserts that several of the trial court's findings were not supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which support it. Stewart v. Randolph Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 804 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Even erroneous findings are not reversible error if they are harmless. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“We may reverse a trial court's judgment ․ only if its findings constitute prejudicial error ․ A finding of fact is not prejudicial to a party unless it directly supports a conclusion.”), trans. denied. An erroneous finding is “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion.” Id.

[26] Father asserts that Finding 29 was not supported by the record. Finding 29 stated, “Father is now participating in, but has not yet completed, the Fatherhood Engagement program. Father is not compliant with random drug screens and is working on but has not completed recommendations from the mental health assessment. Father has not yet started the batterer's intervention program (BIP).” Father's App. Vol. II p. 7. Pointing to testimony by the DCS family case manager, Father contends that the evidence demonstrated that he had “participated in drug screens[,]” had done the “mental health assessment and was doing all the recommendations[,]” and had not been contacted by the batterer's intervention program. Father's Br. p. 11.

[27] Although Father cites to the family case manager's testimony to demonstrate that this finding was not supported by any evidence, evidence was also presented that after both the February 2024 CHINS review hearing and the August 2024 permanency hearing, the trial court found that Father was not consistently, and was only partially, participating in random drug screens. Ex. Vol. I pp. 27, 30. Evidence was also presented that, although Father had completed a mental health evaluation, he had not completed all of the recommendations from the evaluation. Tr. Vol. I p. 192. Further, the evidence supported that he had not yet started the batterer's intervention program. Id. at 47–48. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to support the challenged aspects of Finding 29.

[28] Father also argues that Findings 30 and 52 were not supported by the record. Finding 30 stated, “Father is inconsistent in his visits with the Child and has never progressed beyond supervised visitation.” Father's App. Vol. II p. 8. Finding 52 stated, “Father has begun participating in Fatherhood Engagement, but he is inconsistent with other services such as visitation.” Id. at 9. In reference to these findings, Father contends that the evidence established that he had attended visits with Child and Mother until a no contact order prevented him from being around Mother and that, at the time of the hearing, he had been having one three-hour visit weekly with Child and had recently begun having multiple visits per week.

[29] The evidence presented at the termination hearing demonstrated that, although Father did attend some visits with Child, he was not consistent in his attendance, and his visitation never proceeded past being fully supervised. At the February 2024 review hearing, the trial court found that Father was not consistent in attending his supervised visits with Child. At the termination hearing, Foster Mother testified that Father was “very ․ dicey with whether or not” he visits and that he had not engaged in all of his visits offered to him. Tr. Vol. I p. 101. Maternal Grandmother also testified that Father was “very inconsistent” and “kind of in an[d] out of [Child's] life.” Id. at 177. This was sufficient evidence to support the challenged aspects of Findings 30 and 52.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Judgment

[30] Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating their parental rights to Child. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent alleged circumstance was:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

A. Conditions Not Remedied

[31] Parents argue that there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of Child and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[32] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent- Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the trial court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[33] Here, Child was removed from Parents’ care on August 18, 2023, on an emergency basis due to Father's substance abuse and Mother's inability to ensure she and Child were safe when in the home or the car with Father. The CHINS petition additionally alleged that Parents had “failed to provide [Child] with a safe and stable home free of substance use.” Mother's App. Vol. II p. 55. At the time Child was removed, DCS was already involved with Mother and Sibling through a separate CHINS case, and Mother had been charged with Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury where Sibling was the victim.

1. Father

[34] Father contends that evidence presented at the termination hearing failed to establish it “was highly probable that the basis relied on for the termination of parental rights existed.” Father's Br. p. 14. He specifically takes issue with four bases cited by the trial court in its order: his controlled substance abuse; his housing; his low income; and his criminal history. He argues that substance abuse per se does is not a justification for terminating parental rights and that his isolated use fails to support termination. He additionally asserts that neither the fact that he is living with his sister and would have to share a bedroom with Child nor his economic condition were sufficient to support termination because there was no evidence either posed a threat to Child. Father further contends that the trial court's reliance on his criminal history was misplaced as such reliance focused on past deeds and not the progress he has made.

[35] The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that Child was removed from Father's care because he admitted to marijuana use at the time Child was born and then tested positive for both marijuana and fentanyl. Evidence established that Father had not consistently participated in court-ordered services over the course of the case and had not yet completed any of the services deemed necessary for him to safely and independently care for and parent Child. After the dispositional order was issued, Father did not consistently submit to court-ordered drug screens, and although he completed a mental health evaluation, at the time of the termination hearing, he had not yet completed the recommended wraparound services. Father did not begin to participate in the court-ordered Fatherhood Engagement program until May or June 2024, approximately ten months after the CHINS petition was filed. Although he was progressing through the program at the time of the termination hearing, he had not yet completed it. Further, Father's domestic violence charges from the February 2024 incident involving Mother remained pending, and Father had not yet begun the batterer's intervention program that the trial court ordered him to engage in after the August 2024 permanency hearing.

[36] Over the course of the case, Father never progressed past fully supervised visits. At the time of the hearing, Father did not have stable and independent housing and was living with his sister in her two-bedroom apartment, where he was not on the lease, and his sister did not have a lease and only paid rent month-to-month. During the case, Father never maintained a stable source of income sufficient to provide for both himself and Child. Evidence was presented that he was employed “under the table” with a landscaping company on a part-time basis with an income that fluctuated from week to week and that he also donated plasma to supplement his income. Tr. Vol. I p. 123. Additionally, there was testimony that Father had not consistently been involved in Child's life and, at the time of the hearing, had not seen Child in months.

[37] There was also concern about Father's anger issues. At both the February and August 2024 review hearings, the trial court made findings that Father was admonished for his behavior and ordered to be respectful to those involved in the case. Grandmother testified that Father has “quite a few anger problems[,]” and Foster Mother did not believe that Father would be able to care for Child because of his “anger issues.” Id. at 101, 177. The CASA also expressed concern regarding Father's anger due to his argumentative interactions with DCS and other providers. Father and Mother had also been involved in a domestic violence incident while the case was pending, and there were pending criminal charges against Father at the time of the hearing. Douthit, Father's Fatherhood Engagement service provider, testified that he believed that Father needed mental health treatment concerning certain events from Father's life.

[38] The evidence presented at the termination hearing established that, over the course of the case, Father was unable to demonstrate that he was able to safely parent Child and meet Child's needs. He was never able to complete any of the court-ordered services or progress past fully supervised visitation, and he was not able to maintain safe and stable housing or a stable and consistent source of income such that he could prove his ability to parent Child. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that Father would not remedy the conditions which resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home.

2. Mother

[39] Mother argues that the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for continued placement outside the home will not be remedied was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. She asserts that, although she has intellectual disabilities, she has the support of Grandparents to assist her and that she planned to remain in their home. Mother therefore contends that DCS failed to prove that she was unable to safely parent Child with these supports in place. She further maintains that, because the evidence shows that she and Child share a strong bond, that there were no safety concerns, and that services were progressing toward reunification, DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied.¹

[40] Child was removed from Mother's care due to her inability to ensure Child, who was only a few weeks old at the time, was safe and her failure to provide him with a safe and stable home free of substance use. Over the approximately sixteen months that this case was pending, Mother was not compliant with all of her court-ordered services. Although Mother completed some parenting education curriculum, she actually regressed in her understanding and retention of the material. Because of Mother's cognitive delay, her service provider implemented accommodations to assist Mother with understanding the material, but Mother still struggled to retain the information. As a result, her service provider recommended that Mother's parenting time be supervised until she could retain the majority of the parenting information.

[41] Mother did not have her driver's license, and although her home-based casework provider was working with her to obtain it, at the time of the hearing, Mother had not yet passed the written test to obtain a learner's permit. Over the course of the case, Mother never progressed past fully supervised visitation with Child. The visits took place at Grandparents’ home, and Mother was consistent in attending these visits. Although there were no safety concerns during the visits, Mother was never totally alone with Child, and Grandparents were always present in addition to the service provider. During the visits, Grandmother often provided guidance to Mother in caring for Child.

[42] Mother was living with Grandparents at the time of the hearing and planned to live there in the future. Although this was stable housing at the time of the hearing, Grandparents had significant health challenges. Grandfather was disabled because of a stroke, and Grandmother suffered from multiple myeloma, which was in remission for less than a year at the time of the hearing. Grandmother also testified that Mother was never left totally alone in their house. Foster Mother, who had known Mother for twenty years, testified that she did not believe that Mother would be able to parent Child without the guidance of Grandparents. Further, although Mother's criminal case concerning Sibling had been resolved at the time of the hearing, the circumstances of the case involved a conviction for Level 3 felony neglect of Sibling resulting in serious bodily injury.

[43] All in all, the evidence established that, over the course of the case, Mother was unable to demonstrate that she had resolved the reason for Child's removal, which was her inability to provide him with a safe and stable home. Mother has a cognitive delay that made it difficult for her to retain the parenting education information and that caused concern for her to be left alone with Child. The evidence revealed that Mother was not able to complete the requirements of the dispositional decree and could not safely parent Child without assistance. Mother is correct that “[m]ental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is not a proper ground for terminating parental rights.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1147 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992)). “[H]owever, [where] the parents are incapable of or unwilling to fulfill their legal obligations in caring for their children, then mental [disability] may be considered.” Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234. As our Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” Id. Here, the evidence established that, at the time of the hearing, Child was only eighteen months old, and Mother had not shown that she was able to safely parent him without relying on third parties. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in Child's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

B. Best Interests

[44] Only Mother additionally argues that DCS also failed to present clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests.² In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[45] Our review of the totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child was eighteen months old and had been removed from Mother's care since he was only weeks old and for nearly all of his life. Over that period of time, Mother had not been able to prove her ability to safely care for Child independently. She did not make significant progress over the duration of the case that started in August 2023, and she remained unable to safely parent Child by herself instead, relying on Grandparents, who never left her completely alone with Child at their home. This reliance on Grandparents was concerning because each of them has significant health challenges.

[46] As discussed above, DCS presented sufficient evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the reasons for Child's removal and continued placement out of her care. Additionally, both DCS and the CASA testified that they believed that termination was in the best interests of Child. The CASA recommended termination of Parents’ parental rights because it would not be safe for Mother to have full care of Child despite her best intentions due to the CASA's concerns about Child being alone in the home with Mother. DCS also believed that termination was in the best interests of Child because there were ongoing concerns about Mother's ability to care for Child unobserved and there had not been a demonstrated ability on Mother's behalf to safely parent Child.

[47] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting In re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Looking at the totality of the evidence, the trial court's conclusion that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

[48] We, therefore, conclude that the challenged findings were supported by sufficient evidence, and the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child.

[49] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Mother argues that the trial court “applied an incorrect rule of law” when it included the statement “[t]he question before the Court is whether Mother or Father is now [able to] or in the immediate future will have the ability to successfully parent the Child without third party supervision[,]” we do not find any error. Mother's Br. p. 9 (quoting Mother's App. Vol. II p. 11). Although this statement was included in the order, it is clear that the trial court applied the correct law when it concluded that “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in [Child's] removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied” by Parents. Mother's App. Vol. II p. 11.

2.   Father does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests and has, therefore, waived any argument the conclusion was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

Foley, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.