Cristina Lee Clark, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After being charged with murder and two counts of kidnapping, Cristina Clark entered into a plea agreement by which she agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony kidnapping and a firearm sentence enhancement. At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court found her guilty of kidnapping and of using a firearm to commit the offense and then entered judgment on the chronological case summary (CCS). The State later moved to withdraw from the plea agreement alleging Clark had breached its terms, and the court granted that motion the next day without holding a hearing. Clark was later tried and found guilty of murder, the kidnapping charges, and the firearm enhancement. She now appeals, arguing the court committed fundamental error when it granted the State's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement. Because we find that Clark was not denied fundamental due process under the circumstances of the withdrawal, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 7, 2022, Clark and four others held Corbin Rogers captive at gunpoint, then they sought a ransom from his relative in exchange for his release. Ultimately, one of the others shot and killed Rogers.¹ Two weeks later, Clark was charged with Count I: Murder, a felony;² Count II: Kidnapping, as a Level 2 felony;³ and Count 3: Kidnapping, as a Level 3 felony.⁴

[3] In March 2024, Clark entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead guilty to Count 2 as well as a firearm enhancement, and the State agreed to dismiss Counts 1 and 3. The agreement required Clark to cooperate with the prosecutions of her co-defendant-accomplices and to testify truthfully in the proceedings against them:

5. At the time of the taking of the guilty plea and again at the time of the Defendant's sentencing, the State reserves the right to question witnesses and comment on any evidence presented upon which the Court may rely to determine the sentence to be imposed; to present testimony or statements from the victim(s) or victim representative(s), and the State of Indiana and the Defendant agrees that the Court shall impose the following sentence:

a.The Defendant is to cooperate with the State of Indiana in the Prosecution of Josselyn Johnson, 49D27-2212-MR-033993, Jaheim Miller 49D27-2212-MR-033994, Daniel Jackson 49D27-2301-MR-000512 and D'sean Bigbee-Cummings, 49D27-2301-MR-000515.

b.The Defendant must appear at all future dales for Josselyn Johnson, 49D27-2212-MR-033993, Jaheim Miller 49D27-2212-MR-033994, Daniel Jackson 49D27-2301-MR-000512 and D'sean Bigbee-Cummings, 49D27-2301-MR-000515 relevant to her testimony, including depostions, taped statements, evidentiary hearings and trials. The Defendant must testify truthfully in a manner consistent with previou statements given under oath. Failure to testify in a truthful manner shall be deemed an aggravator at seentencing by the parties.

a. The presiding judge of Marion County Superior Court 27 Criminal Division shall determine if the Defendant's testimony is truthful in that regard.

Figure 1: Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 103.

[4] In April, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information to add a firearm sentence enhancement as Part 2 of Count 2.⁵ The trial court granted the motion to amend. At a guilty plea hearing on May 13, 2024, the trial court confirmed that Clark understood the details of the plea agreement, and Clark agreed to the factual basis laid by the State. Based on her admission, the court found her “guilty of Kidnapping as a Level [ ] (2) Felony and Count [ ] (4) Use of a Firearm Enhancement ․” Supplemental Transcript at 11. Although the court considered ordering a Presentence Investigation Report, it postponed entering that order to allow time for Clark to testify against her co-defendants in relevant proceedings. After the hearing, the court made the following entry on the CCS:

05/13/2024 Judgment (Judicial Officer: Davis, Angela Dow) 2. Firearm used in commission of an offense Plea by Agreement

Figure 2: Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 17.

[5] On November 13, 2024, the State filed a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement alleging Clark had breached the agreement:

Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, [Clark] was required to cooperate in the prosecution of other charged co-defendants and testify truthfully in all matters so related. [Clark] failed to abide by this condition of the plea and did not testify truthfully in a proceeding relating to the prosecution of co-defendants[.]

Id. at 112. About twenty minutes after filing that motion, the State filed an “Unopposed Motion to Continue” the co-defendants’ trial, which was scheduled to begin the next week. Id. at 114. In the motion to continue, the State informed the court that it was “in the process of obtaining and executing an agreement with a charged party or charged parties ․” Id. The State further advised that it “had previously entered into an agreement with a different charged party, who subsequently was untruthful under oath during a deposition.” Id. at 115. The State represented that it had told the defense attorneys the identity of the individual who had provided untruthful testimony and that “[t]he defendants, by counsel, do not object to this motion ․”⁶ Id. (emphasis in original). The court granted both motions the next day without holding a hearing, and Clark proceeded to trial without raising any issue or objection related to the withdrawn plea agreement.

[6] Clark was tried by a jury in June 2025 and found guilty of murder and both kidnapping counts. She waived her right to a jury on the firearm enhancement, and the court found her guilty of using a firearm to commit the offense. After the court vacated the kidnapping convictions to avoid any double jeopardy violation, it sentenced Clark to sixty-three years for murder and fifteen years on the firearm enhancement, for a total sentence of seventy-eight years executed in the Department of Correction. Clark appealed.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Clark argues that the trial court erred by “allow[ing] the State to withdraw from the plea agreement when the trial court had already accepted the plea and entered judgment of conviction.” Appellant's Brief at 8. Generally, we review a trial court's decision to grant the State's request to withdraw from a plea agreement for an abuse of discretion. Messersmith v. State, 70 N.E.3d 861, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). However, to preserve review of an alleged error for appeal, “the specific objection relied upon on appeal must have been stated in the trial court ․” Hale v. State, 976 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh'g denied, trans. denied). When a defendant fails to do so, the issue is waived unless we determine that fundamental error occurred. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied.

[8] Here, Clark acknowledges that at no point in the underlying proceedings did she object to the State's motion to withdraw or otherwise contest the trial court's withdrawal order. And, because she disputes the trial court's decision for the first time on appeal, we agree with Clark that the proper standard of review is fundamental error. See State v. Daniels, 680 N.E.2d 829, 834-35 (Ind. 1997) (reviewing defendant's request for post-conviction relief for fundamental error when the trial court rejected his previously accepted guilty plea, but the defendant did not raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal). “The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207 (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). “The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207). The error must be so plain that it is one the trial court should have raised sua sponte. Harris v. State, 76 N.E.3d 137, 140 (Ind. 2017).

[9] The parties dispute whether the trial court “accepted” the plea agreement and whether it was properly withdrawn. See Appellant's Br. at 13 (“[T]here was neither evidence of nor a determination that Clark breached the plea agreement.”). According to Clark, the court accepted the agreement, thereby binding it and the parties to its terms unless a limited exception existed to permit the State's withdrawal. See Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e) (“If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.”); Benson v. State, 780 N.E.2d 413, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (considering what constitutes acceptance of a plea agreement), reh'g denied, trans. denied; Messersmith, 70 N.E.3d at 865 (stating a court may revoke its acceptance of a plea agreement when the defendant breaches its terms because “principles of fairness do not demand the State's adherence to a plea agreement that the defendant himself has breached”). The State, in contrast, contends “the agreement was not yet binding on the court because no [formal] entry of judgment had yet been entered,” so “the trial court retained broad authority to allow withdrawal of the plea agreement.” Appellee's Br. at 10, 11.

[10] Clark also argues the State was not permitted to withdraw upon her breach because the plea agreement provided a specific “contractual consequence of her failure to perform: it w[ould] act as an aggravator at sentencing.” Appellant's Br. at 14. The State disputes this logic, contending plea agreements are generally interpreted according to contract law principles and a non-breaching party may pursue remedies provided by law unless the contract expressly restricts the parties to a specific remedy. See Mountain Trace Dev., LLC v. Spillman, 142 N.E.3d 477, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Given the circumstances of the withdrawal, we do not address whether the trial court accepted the parties’ plea agreement, if the State could withdraw from the agreement upon Clark's failure to provide truthful testimony, or whether the court properly revoked the agreement. Instead, we find these disputes are all resolved by the following fundamental error analysis.

[11] Any error that occurred in the withdrawal procedure was not fundamental. The uncontested representations the State made in its “Unopposed Motion to Continue,” which it filed contemporaneously with its motion to withdraw from the plea agreement, are particularly illuminating. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 114. In the motion to continue, the State reasoned that it needed additional time to bring the defendants to trial because it was seeking the cooperation of a charged party after a different charged party had entered into a plea agreement but testified “untruthful[ly] under oath during a deposition[.]” Id. at 115. The State advised that counsel had been notified of the identity of that individual and none of the defendants objected to the motion to continue.

[12] It is reasonable to infer that Clark was the “different charged party” mentioned in the motion to continue who provided untruthful testimony. Because the motion specifically indicated Clark had been made aware of the allegations against her and did not object to a continuance premised on the delay she caused by her breach, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Clark was not contesting or had acquiesced to the withdrawal of the plea agreement. Moreover, Clark never gave the trial court reason to believe otherwise as she stayed silent on the issue from the date the two motions were filed, through the days leading up to her jury trial, during her trial, after the verdict, and throughout her sentencing hearing. It wasn't until she was convicted of murder and the firearm enhancement and sentenced to seventy-eight years that she finally challenged the State's withdrawal from her plea agreement. Under these circumstances, Clark has failed to demonstrate how the withdrawal of the plea agreement made “a fair trial impossible” or constituted a “clearly blatant violation[ ] of basic and elementary principles of due process.” Bush v. State, 208 N.E.3d 605, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Wells v. State, 176 N.E.3d 977, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), trans. denied. Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by promptly granting the State's motion to withdraw without holding a hearing.

Conclusion

[13] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's order granting the State's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement.

[14] Affirmed.

[15] I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court did not commit fundamental error when it granted the State's motion to withdraw from the plea agreement.

[16] Clark pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to kidnapping as a level 2 felony and a use of firearm enhancement. The plea agreement required Clark to cooperate in the prosecution of the other charged co-defendants and to “testify truthfully in a manner consistent with previous statements given under oath.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 103. The plea agreement further provided: “Failure to testify in a truthful manner shall be deemed an aggravator at sentencing by the parties .......... The presiding judge of Marion County Superior Court 27 Criminal Division shall determine if the Defendant's testimony is truthful in that regard.”⁷ Id.

[17] Plea agreements are contractual in nature, binding the defendant, the State, and the trial court. Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 38 (Ind. 2004). Ind. Code § 35-35-3-3(e) provides, “If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms.” Here, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and entered judgment on the kidnapping conviction and the use of firearm enhancement.⁸ Thus, the terms of the agreement became binding on the parties and the court. Six months later, on November 13, 2024, the State filed its motion to withdraw the plea agreement. The State's motion was unverified and asserted, without supporting facts or affidavits, that Clark “did not testify truthfully in a proceeding relating to the prosecution of co-defendants.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 112. The court granted the State's motion the following day, without holding a hearing.

[18] Although the plea agreement specifically provided that the trial court “shall determine if the Defendant's testimony is truthful,” id. at 103, the court did not hold a hearing to determine whether the State's allegations were true. Moreover, even if the court had held a hearing and found that Clark did not testify truthfully, the plea agreement provided for the specific consequence—namely, that her “[f]ailure to testify in a truthful manner shall be deemed an aggravator at sentencing.” Id. The provisions of the plea agreement were negotiated and agreed upon by the parties, the parties struck a specific bargain regarding the consequence of untruthful testimony, and the court accepted the agreement.

[19] Fundamental error occurs “when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied. I would find that the trial court's acts of granting the State's motion to withdraw the plea agreement based on an unverified motion, without holding a hearing, and contrary to the specific remedy negotiated by the parties constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles and a denial of fundamental due process. Further, the harm to Clark was substantial. The maximum sentence Clark could have received under the plea agreement was thirty years for kidnapping as a level 2 felony plus twenty years for the use of a firearm enhancement. Following the withdrawal of the plea agreement and the subsequent trial, Clark was sentenced to seventy-eight years. I would find that the trial court committed fundamental error.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As reflected below in Figure 1, D'Sean Bigbee-Cummings, Daniel Jackson, Jaheim Miller, and Josselyn Johnson were the other four individuals involved in this incident.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(4)(A).

4.   I.C. § 34-42-3-2(a), (b)(3)(A).

5.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11(d).

6.   From the “Unopposed Motion to Continue” we can reasonably infer Clark's attorney was amongst those notified and represented Clark had no objection to the motion premised on the delay caused by her breach of the plea agreement. The caption of the motion contained all five co-defendants, the motion was filed in Clark's case, and the certificate of service affirmed the motion was served on her counsel of record.

7.   The plea agreement also stated:The Defendant acknowledges that the State's recommendation, or agreement to make no recommendation, is based on the Defendant's criminal history known to the Deputy Prosecutor representing the State at the time this agreement is executed and who entered into the agreement. In the event that such information is incomplete, that a further or more accurate criminal history is discovered prior to the entry of judgment or the Defendant is charged with the commission of another offense prior to sentencing, the State reserves the right to unilaterally withdraw from this agreement at any time prior to the entry of judgment.Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 104. Clark's failure to testify truthfully was not included among the reasons the State may withdraw from the plea agreement prior to the entry of judgment.

8.   An entry in the trial court's chronological case summary (“CCS”) on May 13, 2024, states “Order Granting Motion to Enter Plea of Guilty Pursuant to Plea Agreement.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 17. Another entry on that date in the CCS states, “Judgment,” “2. Firearm used in commission of an offense,” and “Plea by Agreement.” Id. Because the firearm enhancement operates only in conjunction with an underlying felony, the court's entry of judgment on the enhancement necessarily means that it also entered judgment on the underlying kidnapping conviction.

DeBoer, Judge.

Judge Altice concurs. Judge Brown dissents with separate opinion. Altice, J., concurs. Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion.