Debra Goins, Appellant-Respondent v. R.W., Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] For months after R.W. moved into the home next door to Debra Goins's residence, Goins sat outside on her porch making loud remarks—audible in R.W.’s yard—about R.W.’s parenting, finances, and family's alleged drug use. When police responded to R.W.’s complaint, Goins stated that she had been documenting R.W.’s household to build a case for reporting the family to police—and that if she couldn't get the photographs she needed from her own yard, she would enter a neighbor's home to take them. After police left, Goins grew louder. Days later, R.W.’s young daughter stepped outside and heard Goins yelling that the family was “trailer park trash.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 16.

[2] R.W. sought an order of protection, which the trial court granted. Goins appeals, claiming R.W. failed to present sufficient evidence that Goins either harassed or posed a credible threat to R.W. We affirm.

Facts

[3] Goins and R.W. are neighbors in Bedford, Indiana, living in adjacent properties with a shared driveway. A one-car carport on R.W.’s property at the end of the driveway abuts the property line, dividing the driveway approximately in half at that point. The carport covers R.W.’s portion of the driveway. Immediately to the side of the carport is Goins's portion of the driveway, which is slightly wider than a single vehicle. Each of the two homes has a very small front yard and is positioned close to the other.

[4] In late March 2025, while R.W. was finalizing the purchase of her property, the two women met for the first time. R.W. informed Goins that she planned to tear down the carport after her purchase. R.W. thought the conversation was friendly.

[5] The next day Goins approached R.W., R.W.’s fiancé, and the seller's realtor as they stood on what soon would be R.W.’s side of the driveway. This interaction was not friendly. Goins insisted that R.W. retain the carport, telling her that R.W. “was not going to move in and make changes next door to [Goins]” and “was not going to affect [Goins's] life.” Id. at 6. Goins also claimed that R.W. had been “disrespectful” the prior day, apparently due to R.W.’s decision to remove the carport without conferring with Goins. Id. at 6. Goins refused demands to leave the property and continued calling R.W. names and yelling until R.W. refused to continue the discussion.

[6] R.W. moved into the home with her fiancé and children around April 18, 2025. R.W. chose not to proceed immediately with the carport removal so as to avoid further conflict with Goins. However, Goins was not pacified.

[7] Beginning in May, Goins began walking around R.W.’s house and looking into R.W.’s property. Goins also began making loud comments, including expletives, outside Goins's home—audible in R.W.’s yard—about R.W.’s parenting, her finances, and her family's alleged drug use. Goins, who may have been speaking on her phone, stated that R.W. was not feeding R.W.’s youngest child and that R.W. “should have [her] kids taken away.” Id. at 8. Goins also stated that R.W. and her family were “going to see what happens if [they] mess with her, that she's the wrong person to mess with.” Id.

[8] In late May, Goins stated that R.W. and her family “have to be getting [their] money from somewhere” and that she knew the family was “dirty”—a term that she repeatedly used when describing the family. Id. Goins threatened to “call[ ] it in” as soon as she discovered what the family was doing and that she was “pretty sure that it's illegal activity.” Id.

[9] On June 4, R.W.’s fiancé stepped out of his vehicle at R.W.’s home and immediately heard Goins outside. She was speaking loudly about him playing video games all day within R.W.’s home. Goins also referred to R.W. as “that stupid b**ch next door.” Id. at 9. R.W.’s fiancé went to the police station and filed a report because R.W. and he were concerned about Goins observing activities within their home.

[10] On June 8, R.W. called police to report that Goins had trespassed onto her property. Officers responded and took R.W.’s complaint. Goins told the responding officer that she had been watching R.W.’s household and recording R.W.’s fiancé so she could report him to the disability office—where Goins's friend worked—for alleged benefits fraud. Goins believed R.W.’s fiancé was not working, although the record does not reveal her basis for believing that he was receiving or seeking any sort of public benefits or whether, in fact, he was doing so. Goins also stated that she had collected substantial home security camera footage and intended to report the family to the Indiana State Police once she compiled it.

[11] Goins also revealed that she, while standing on her portion of the driveway, had leaned across the property line to photograph the interior of R.W.’s carport. Goins claimed that she could not be arrested for that act, but if she could, she would just take photographs of R.W.’s home from another neighbor's property. Goins then alleged that R.W. was engaged in illegal activities. R.W. responded by telling Goins that R.W.’s children could hear Goins's inappropriate comments made on Goins's property. Goins grew louder throughout the exchange with R.W.

[12] Two days later, on June 10, Goins stood outside R.W.’s home calling R.W.’s fiancé a “junkie” and saying R.W. and her fiancé were “on drugs.” Id. at 16. The next day, as R.W.’s fiancé and R.W.’s young daughter stepped out the back door of their home, they heard Goins yelling about the family and calling them “trailer park trash.” Id.

[13] The next day R.W. petitioned for an order of protection in the Lawrence Circuit Court. She alleged that Goins had “placed [her] in fear of physical harm” and had committed repeated acts of harassment against [her].” Petition for an Order of Protection and Request for a Hearing, pp. 3-4 (filed June 12, 2025). After that filing, home security cameras showed Goins walking past R.W.’s home on the public thoroughfare and looking toward R.W.’s yard and other areas of the property.

[14] At the hearing on R.W.’s protective order petition, R.W. and her fiancé testified to a pattern of aggressive, abusive statements, and threats that Goins had made to them. R.W. testified that she and her family responded to Goins's harassment and threats by placing privacy coverings on their windows, staying inside their home, parking their car in a different location than the carport, and primarily using their secluded back door to enter and leave the home.

[15] In response, Goins testified that she knew from the start that she would have difficulties with R.W. based on R.W.’s failure to consult with Goins before deciding to remove the carport. Although R.W. believed the carport was entirely on her property, Goins described R.W.’s unilateral decision to remove it as “shocking” disrespect. Id. at 62. Goins also testified that during her first meeting with R.W., she determined that she “couldn't associate with” R.W. Id. Goins denied ever directing any comments to R.W. after their first meeting but admitted to taking photos of R.W.’s property on multiple occasions, in part to provide photos to her attorneys.

[16] The trial court found Goins had committed repeated acts of harassment and represented a credible threat to the safety of R.W. or a member of her household. The protective order enjoined Goins from contacting, harassing, or communicating with R.W. and directed her to stay away from R.W.’s residence, school, and place of employment. Goins appeals.¹

Discussion and Decision

[17] Goins contends the evidence is insufficient to support the protective order. She specifically challenges the trial court's findings that she harassed R.W. and that she presents a credible threat to R.W. Entry of these findings is a prerequisite to the issuance of a protective order under the Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (the Act), Indiana Code § 34-26-5 et seq., for three reasons. First, “[p]rotective orders are similar to injunctions, and therefore in granting an order[,] the trial court must make special findings of fact and conclusions thereon.” R.H. v. S.W., 142 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Second, the Act authorizes a protective order when a petitioner has “been subjected to harassment” by the respondent. Ind. Code § 34-26-5-2(b). Third, the trial court's finding that a petitioner has “been subjected to harassment” is sufficient to justify issuance of a protective order under the Act only when the respondent “represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of the petitioner's household.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h).

[18] When considering the propriety of a protective order, “[w]e apply a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then we determine whether the findings support the order.” R.H. v. S.W., 142 N.E.3d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “ ‘Findings are clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting C.S. v. T.K., 118 N.E.3d 78, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). We do not defer to the trial court's conclusions of law, however, and instead, evaluate them de novo. Id.

I. The Evidence Supports the Finding of Repeated Acts of Harassment

[19] For purposes of the Act, “harassment” is “conduct directed toward a victim” that includes “repeated or continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Id. at 1016 (citing Ind. Code § 35-45-10-2). Impermissible contact includes following or pursuing the victim or communicating with the victim. Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3(a). That list is expressly nonexclusive. Ind. Code § 35-45-10-3(b).

[20] Goins argues that her conduct did not satisfy this standard because she remained on her own property or on public streets at all relevant times and did not directly address R.W. after their initial meeting in March 2025. She relies primarily on L.R. b/n/f H.R. v. M.H. b/n/f N.H., 223 N.E.3d 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), in which this Court reversed a protective order based on only four alleged contacts between middle school students over four months. Id. at 683. But this case is different.

[21] Unlike the sparse, ambient contacts in L.R., Goins's actions were sustained, targeted, and deliberate. For months, Goins made loud remarks about R.W.’s private matters—her parenting, her household finances, and her family's alleged drug use—that were audible from R.W.’s own yard. Goins ominously warned that R.W. had chosen “the wrong person to mess with” and that she was “going to see what happens if [they] mess with her.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 8. The evidence showed that Goins's comments in May and June were about R.W., directed at R.W.’s household, and loud enough to ensure R.W. or any nearby household members would hear them.

[22] Police intervention did not stop Goins's behavior. Even after Goins learned that R.W. could hear the comments, she only grew louder. She called R.W.’s fiancé a “junkie” and accused the family of obtaining money from unspecified criminal endeavors. Id. at 16. Two days after that, R.W.’s daughter stepped out the back door and heard Goins call the family “trailer park trash.” Id. The continuation, even intensification, of Goins's conduct after both police intervention and notice that her inappropriate comments were heard by R.W.’s family supports the inference that it was intentional, not inadvertent, behavior. See Andrews v. Ivie, 956 N.E.2d 720, 723-25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming protective order where respondent continued contact despite petitioner's clear indications to stop).

[23] Goins argues that she made the comments during private telephone conversations not directed at R.W. To qualify as harassment, the conduct must be directed toward the victim. Ind. Code § 35-45-10-2. After Goins was told that R.W. could hear her abusive comments, Goins continued to engage in that behavior, raising the reasonable inference that she intended R.W. and R.W.’s nearby household members to hear. After all, at least some of the telephone conversations occurred as Goins was sitting on her front porch a short distance from R.W.’s property.

[24] Further supporting the finding that Goins's behavior constituted harassment are the security video recordings, R.W.’s fiancé’s corroborating account of the June 4 incident when police were called, and Goins's own admissions. For instance, she admitted she had photographed R.W.’s property multiple times, and the evidence showed that she reported leaning over the property line to photograph the inside of R.W.’s carport/garage area.

[25] Ultimately, Goins is asking us to reweigh the evidence and reevaluate her credibility and that of the other witnesses. For instance, Goins denied ever directing comments to R.W. after their first congenial discussion, and R.W. and her fiancé testified otherwise. On appeal, we do not disturb such determinations by the trial court, which was entitled to credit the testimony of R.W. and her fiancé. Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 994 N.E.2d 753, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that the appellate court reviewing a protective order will not judge witness credibility). The evidence supports the trial court's finding that Goins subjected R.W. or a member of her household to repeated acts of harassment.

II. The Evidence Supports the Finding of a Present Credible Threat

[26] A finding of repeated harassment supports the issuance of a protective order only if the respondent also “represents a credible threat to the safety of a petitioner or a member of a petitioner's household.” Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h). The threat must exist in the present tense—at the time relief is sought. S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 220-21 (Ind. 2020); L.R., 223 N.E.3d at 681. It must be credible, meaning “plausible or believable,” and there must be “reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent presently intends to harm the petitioner or the petitioner's family.” L.R., 223 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting P.D. v. D.V., 172 N.E.3d 306, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

[27] Goins contends no credible threat was shown, claiming that she never physically threatened R.W., allegedly never set foot on R.W.’s property, and took steps to limit her interaction with R.W. Goins relies on H.W. v. M.R., 266 N.E.3d 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), in which this Court reversed a protective order because the record contained no evidence that the respondent ever harmed or threatened to harm the petitioner.

[28] In H.W., however, the concerning conduct—accessing private messages, sharing sensitive images, and contacting others to locate the petitioner—was intrusive but untethered from any stated intent to harm. Id. at 739-741, 743. Here, Goins specifically stated that R.W. had chosen “the wrong person to mess with” and that R.W. and her family were “going to see what happens.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 8. Those are not expressions of frustration. They are warnings. And Goins backed them up with action.

[29] When police were called, Goins described within R.W.’s hearing what amounted to an active, ongoing campaign against R.W. and her family. Goins was watching R.W.’s household even when they erected various barriers (privacy film on windows, a back yard privacy fence, etc.). She even purported to document activities of R.W.’s fiancé within R.W.’s home. Goins also threatened to enter a neighbor's property to take more pictures of R.W.’s home before later admitting at the protective order hearing to repeatedly photographing R.W.’s property. Most importantly, Goins made threatening comments within earshot of R.W.’s family and did not de-escalate even when others (the realtor and police) intervened. Taken together, Goins's aggressive words and her increasingly intrusive conduct tell the same story: that she intended to see her threats through.

[30] The credible threat inquiry asks about present intent—not past behavior in isolation. See R.H., 142 N.E.3d at 1015 (“[T]he respondent must pose a threat to a protected person's safety when the petitioner seeks relief.”). Goins did not de-escalate after police intervened. In fact, she grew louder after the police contact. Even after the protective order petition was filed, she continued walking past and surveilling R.W.’s property, as documented by R.W.’s home security videos admitted into evidence at the hearing. Goins's failure to cease these activities after law enforcement's involvement adds to their threatening nature.

[31] R.W. alleged in her petition that she feared physical harm from Goins, and a reasonable person would share that view under the same circumstances, given the troubling combination of Goins's verbal threats and invasive conduct. See K.B. v. B.B., 168 N.E.3d 1048, 1051-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (finding petitioner presented a viable claim for a protective order and deserved a hearing based on her allegations that the respondent had become “visibly angry and aggressive” toward her at a meeting, entered petitioner's property without permission to seek information from a contractor about petitioner, sarcastically yelled at petitioner as she exited her car, and “intentionally blocked” petitioner's driveway). R.W. also testified to her concerns about Goins's conduct and documented the steps her family took to ensure Goins would have no access to them.

[32] The trial court did not err in finding that R.W. had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Goins represented a credible threat to R.W. or a member of her household. See S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 495 (Ind. 2023) (stating, even “in close cases ․ when the evidence could lead a court to grant or deny a petition ․ the trial court is the one to make that call”) (internal quotation omitted).

Conclusion

[33] The evidence supports the trial court's findings that Goins committed repeated acts of harassment against R.W. and represents a present credible threat to the safety of R.W. or a member of her household. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After issuance of the protective order, Goins was charged with and convicted of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy for violating it. She was sentenced on March 10, 2026, to 365 days imprisonment, with 305 days suspended to supervised probation.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.