Jeramie L. Jennings, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jeramie Jennings appeals from the sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury and Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury upon a person fourteen years or less. He contends that his sixteen-year aggregate sentence executed in the Department of Correction (DOC) is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Concluding that he has not met his burden of persuading us that his sentence warrants downward revision under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] J.W. was born on August 17, 2019. After he was born, he resided in a home in Kokomo with his mother and several other adults and their children. J.W. and his mother stayed in a bedroom in the middle of the home. J.W. was described as a “happy baby, very happy.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 166. J.W.’s mother, and other adults in the home, shared daycare responsibilities and supervised each other's children.

[3] In October of 2019, Jennings moved into the house with J.W. and J.W.’s mother. The three relocated to a different bedroom, which was in an addition at the rear of the house and had its own entrance. After Jennings moved in, J.W. was no longer brought out into the house for babysitting or other activities. Instead, he was kept almost entirely in the rear bedroom. Jennings and J.W.’s mother argued frequently. And on one occasion when the couple was arguing, J.W.’s mother could be heard screaming, “he's beating me, he's beating me,” and a back window was shattered. Id. at 175. J.W. was in the back bedroom at the time.

[4] Jennings and J.W.’s mother worked different hours for different employers. Jennings was responsible for J.W.’s care when J.W.’s mother was at work. Until November of 2019, on around ten different occasions, Jennings would bring J.W. out of the rear bedroom so that J.W.’s maternal grandmother could help get J.W. to sleep. J.W.’s maternal grandmother recalled that J.W. was “screaming like the hardcore cry ․ when [Jennings] would bring him to the room ․ he was almost inconsolable to that point.” Id. at 199. And on another occasion, a different adult, who was doing laundry, heard J.W. crying. She asked Jennings, “Do you do you need help with the baby[?]” Id. at 170. Jennings responded, “let the little bastard cry.” Id. The woman reported the incident to J.W.’s maternal grandmother, who went into the bedroom, retrieved J.W., and calmed him down.

[5] Because J.W. was a newborn, he was regularly seen by a pediatrician who monitored his growth, including the size of his head. In December 2019, the pediatrician noted that J.W.’s head was abnormally large. The pediatrician ordered a CT scan and examination by a neurosurgeon.

[6] On February 28, 2020, J.W. was seen at Peyton Manning Hospital by healthcare professionals, including Dr. Cortney Demitrius, a physician who is board-certified in both pediatrics and child-abuse pediatrics. Dr. Demetrius noted that J.W. had suffered bilateral mixed-density subdural hematomas, a phenomenon where blood vessels break and bleeding penetrates the dura.¹ These hematomas were bilateral, indicating they were on both sides of J.W.’s brain, and they had differences in density, which could mean they were inflicted at different times or in different manners. Dr. Demetrius diagnosed J.W. with abusive head trauma, which had been caused by some sort of shaking. Doctors also found that J.W. had five healing rib fractures, three on his right side and two on his left. He also had a healing fracture of his right distal radius near his wrist. Dr. Demetrius concluded that J.W.’s injuries, including his enlarged head, indicated abusive trauma inflicted by another person. Furthermore, the macrocephaly ² noted by J.W.’s pediatrician was likely caused by abusive head trauma.

[7] Christina Diouf, J.W.’s other grandmother, visited J.W.’s mother and J.W. at the hospital. Diouf was sitting with J.W. and his mother on the hospital bed when Jennings called J.W.’s mother. Diouf could hear their conversation because Jennings’ voice was loud, sounded angry, and he was cussing. Diouf heard Jennings call J.W.’s mother a derogatory name and say something to her along the lines of “why'd you take him there[,] you knew they're going to x-ray him.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 147. J.W.’s mother told Jennings that Diouf was there, and he said he was sorry.

[8] Later that day, J.W.’s mother and Jennings exchanged text messages. Jennings texted, “Don't have to wonder or worry about me anymore! I'll be in jail before the end of the day!” Ex. Vol. 4, p. 22 (State's Ex. 7). After several more texts, Jennings texted, “What's going on with our son? Did they find out anything when they did the CT scan?” Id. at 24. J.W.’s mother replied, “call me asap.” Id.

[9] The State charged Jennings with Level 3 felony aggravated battery and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury. The State later amended the charges and added a count of Level 5 felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury to a person fourteen years old or younger. Jennings’ jury trial began on April 22, 2025. The jury acquitted Jennings of aggravated battery and found him guilty of Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to a person fourteen years old or younger, and Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury. The trial court vacated the conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury out of double jeopardy concerns.

[10] The court then heard evidence as to sentencing, which included the presentence investigation report (PSI report), the victim impact statements, the sworn testimony of witnesses, unsworn statement submitted by the defendant and arguments of counsel. The following is some of the evidence the court considered.

[11] J.W. has seizures because of the abuse. His foster mother noted that J.W. “has horrific side effects from the seizure medication” he is required to take, resulting in him becoming enraged and combative and experiencing problems sleeping. Tr. Vol. III, p. 18. The side effects are particularly concerning because his frequent seizures result in dosage adjustments to his anti-seizure medication that trigger these symptoms. J.W. developed ataxic cerebral palsy, which, as an injury to the brain, causes mobility and walking issues. He participates in T-Ball; while he “can't run the bases ․ they put them in a wheelchair and push [him] around the bases after he hits the ball.” Id. at 15.

[12] J.W. is mute and deaf in both ears. The cochlear implants he has are not helpful because the injuries to his brain cause him to experience significant pain when the implants are activated. He attends the Indiana School for the Deaf part-time and is learning rudimentary sign language. And doctors have diagnosed cognitive delay. J.W. is six years old, but he functions like a three-year-old child. It is unlikely that J.W. will ever be able to live independently.

[13] Jennings was thirty-nine years old when he abused J.W. He reported using marijuana on a monthly basis from his eighteenth birthday until 2022, which includes the period of time during which his abuse of J.W. occurred. His criminal history includes a 2003 conviction of misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury, for which he was placed on probation and ordered to make restitution to the victim. He was charged with failure to stop after an accident resulting in non-vehicle damage in 2007. He was placed on pretrial diversion but failed to appear for a compliance hearing. That case was dismissed in 2020. Jennings also had a 2010 conviction for misdemeanor driving while suspended and a 2017 conviction for misdemeanor possession of marijuana.

[14] He told the probation officer preparing the PSI report that J.W.’s injuries were inflicted by J.W.’s maternal grandmother “and it was not brought to our attention.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3, p. 49. Jennings claimed that he was “guilty of leaving my son with someone I thought would care for him ․ I never thought that anything would happen to our son under the care and supervision of his grandmother.” Id. His IRAS evaluation placed him in the “HIGH” risk category for continued offending. Id. at 51-52.

[15] J.W.’s adoptive father testified that his son “has over twenty-three diagnoses that continue to cause him to be a very disabled child ․ [i]ncluding the diagnosis of cerebral palsy.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 114. He also testified that the cochlear implants were given to him in the hope that they would alleviate some of J.W.’s deafness, but that he is completely deaf. J.W. will suffer seizures for the rest of his life and will not be able to live independently. His father further testified and described J.W. as follows:

A little boy who asks every day if today is a doctor day. A little boy who can't make friends. A little boy who can barely form sentences using more than two to three words. A little boy who will turn into a disabled adult. A little boy, who has never been invited over to play at a friend's house or to a birthday party. He's five years old and he's still in diapers, and there's no expectation he will be potty trained soon. He will grow into a disabled adult. And independent living seems unlikely and subsequent so does marriage, work, kids or anything norm [sic] any of the things normally deemed important for a successful and happy life.

Id. at 118.

[16] The trial court found that Jennings’ criminal history was aggravating. However, the court further observed that while the age of Jennings’ prior convictions meant that the aggravator was “not a very strong aggravator[,]” it did include a battery, a violent crime. Tr. Vol. III, p. 133; Appellant's App. Vol. 3, p. 150. The court also considered the fact that J.W. was less than a year old as an aggravating factor along with Jennings’ violation of a position of trust with respect to J.W. as a caregiver. Additionally, the trial court found J.W.’s injuries were more severe and life-altering than required to prove guilt of the offenses of neglect and battery. And J.W.’s injuries were inflicted over a period of time.

[17] For mitigating factors, the trial court noted Jennings’ report of a heart condition and a diagnosis of adjustment disorder, anxiety, and insomnia, but found they were not strong mitigators.

[18] The court sentenced Jennings to sixteen years executed in the DOC for his Level 3 felony conviction. And the court sentenced Jennings to a concurrent term of six years for his Level 5 felony conviction. Thus, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of sixteen years in the DOC. Jennings now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[19] Jennings contends that his sixteen-year aggregate sentence executed in the DOC is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. He asks this court to revise his sentence to that which is recommended in the PSI report: a twelve-year sentence with eight years executed in the DOC with four years of supervised probation and anger management. Appellant's Br. p. 18.

[20] The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of sentences imposed by a trial court. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6). This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), enables this Court to “revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Deference to the trial court's sentence should prevail unless “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense and the defendant's character.” Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). A defendant, however, need not show that both the nature of the offense and his or her character warrant revision; however, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127 (citing Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)).

[21] Additionally, in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are not limited to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found by the trial court. Oberhansley, 208 N.E.3d at 1271. “Our role is primarily to leaven the outliers and identify guiding principles for sentencers, rather than to achieve the perceived correct result in each case.” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 122 (internal quotations omitted). “Ultimately, we rely on our collective judgment as to the balance of all the relevant considerations involved, which include the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[22] “In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 805 (Ind. 2025), cert. denied. In the present case, Jennings was convicted of a Level 3 felony and a Level 5 felony. The advisory sentence for a Level 3 felony is nine years, from which three years can be subtracted or seven years added due to particular circumstances of the defendant and the crime. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). The advisory sentence for a Level 5 felony is three years, from which two years may be subtracted or three years added due to the circumstances of the case. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Jennings’ aggregate sentence is six years less than the maximum sentence which could have been imposed.

[23] Our analysis of the “nature of the offense” requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)). A trial court's sentencing decision will “generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as [being] accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) ․’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[24] Jennings argues that “[t]he sentence imposed on [him] was out of retribution, not rehabilitation.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. He says, “[t]he injuries to J.W. are horrific and [Jennings] is not minimizing the challenges J.W. has ahead in life. However, Jennings was not convicted of inflicting those injuries on J.W.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. As to the argument that the sentence was imposed out of retribution, it suggests an abuse of discretion, an argument which is not relevant to an appropriateness analysis. See Westlake v. State, 987 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (abuse of discretion claim distinct from Appellate Rule 7(B) review). And Jennings’ argument that he was not convicted of inflicting the injuries on J.W. disregards the fact that a jury convicted him of Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury upon a person fourteen years or less of age.

[25] At trial, Jennings blamed J.W.’s grandmother for his life-altering injuries. And on appeal, he blames J.W.’s mother for those same injuries. However, as we said in Muehe v. State,

A parent's failure to take appropriate steps to protect his or her child from the abuse of the other parent is tantamount to neglect of that child, not to mention moral complicity with the base crime being perpetrated upon the child by the other parent. In a situation where it is the other parent perpetuating the abuse upon the child, the nonabusing parent is under an even greater duty to takes steps necessary to prevent the abuse. First, the parent has a higher probability of knowing about the abuse because she lives with both the victim and the abuser. Second, the relationship of the child-victim to the parent-abuser presents additional problems that do not arise when the abuser is a stranger. Due to the added problems inherent in a parent-child abuse situation, the nonabusing parent, as the only advocate for the child, has a greater responsibility to prevent such abuse when it becomes or should have become evident to that parent.

646 N.E.2d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied. Jennings was not J.W.’s biological parent, but he occupied a position similar to that of a father. The nature of J.W.’s injuries, their life-altering consequences, and the duration of the abuse were described above and in full at the sentencing hearing. His culpability for the Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent charge is not lessened by his argument that he did not physically strike or mistreat J.W.

[26] Jennings has failed to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense.

[27] Our analysis of the character of the offender involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021); McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020). A trial court's sentencing decision will “generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light ․ the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence vary based on the “gravity, nature and number of prior offenses as they relate to the current offense.” McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 112 (Ind. 2016). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[28] Jennings’ criminal history includes one conviction of misdemeanor battery, a crime of violence. And it includes a conviction of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in non-vehicle damage, an offense which reflects a neglect of lawful responsibility. Furthermore, Jennings admittedly used marijuana throughout adulthood, including during the time when he abused J.W. Jennings attempted to incriminate J.W.’s grandmother during his interview for the preparation of the PSI report and at trial. Additionally, Jennings expressed an indifference to J.W.’s well-being by expressing to another, “let the little bastard cry.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 170.

[29] Jennings has failed to demonstrate substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character such that his character warrants a downward revision of his sentence.

Conclusion

[30] Jennings has not demonstrated that his sentence warrants revision under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's sentencing order.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The dura is “a relatively thick membrane” that covers the fluid which covers the brain. Tr. Vol. II, p. 216.

2.   Macrocephaly is an enlarged head. Tr. Vol. II, p. 227.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.