IN RE: I.C.-B. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] I.C.-B. (“Child”) witnessed a domestic violence incident between Y.B.-M. (“Mother”) and S.C.-D. (“Father”) wherein Father grabbed Mother by the neck and Mother attempted to flee the home. Despite completing a domestic violence education program, Mother minimized the incident. The juvenile court adjudicated Child a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and ordered Mother to complete a new domestic violence assessment along with additional services. Mother appeals ¹ and raises two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the juvenile court clearly erred by adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1; and

2. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering Mother to participate in services.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2022, Child was born to Mother and Father. On November 15, 2024, Father “grabbed Mother by the neck” during an argument, causing Mother to lock herself and Child in a bedroom. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 83. While Mother and Child were in the bedroom, Father “banged on the door to try and gain access.” Id. Once Father was asleep, Mother tried to escape with Child and run to a neighbor's home, but Father saw her, “grabbed her hair to pull her back into the house,” id, and took her phone. Child witnessed the “entire incident.” Id.

[4] The neighbor contacted law enforcement, who arrested Father. Father was charged with strangulation, domestic battery in the presence of a child, and battery. Mother later reported to the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) that Father was arrested for a similar domestic violence incident involving Mother approximately one year prior in October 2023.

[5] To prevent Father from having contact with Mother and Child, a no-contact order was issued in Father's criminal case the day after the November 2024 domestic violence incident. Despite the no-contact order, Mother “repeatedly contacted” Father. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 84. On December 2, Mother requested that the trial court terminate the no-contact order, which the trial court did. Mother thereafter failed to appear for depositions in Father's criminal case, leading to the exclusion of her testimony and the State's dismissal of the case.

[6] On December 5, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS based on Child's exposure to domestic violence. Mother participated in services, including domestic violence education through her home-based therapy. Mother's communication with DCS directly was “poor,” and “the majority of the information that DCS ․ learned throughout the case” was provided by Mother's home-based case worker. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85. For example, Mother did not inform DCS that, after the November 2024 domestic violence incident, four new individuals began living with Mother and Child in the home. Additionally, Child was attending daycare with a babysitter who “refuse[d] to give any of her information to DCS for a background check.” Id. This concerned DCS because DCS did not “know who this person is or what they have done in the past.” Tr. Vol. II at 117.

[7] The juvenile court held a bifurcated factfinding hearing.² During the first hearing, Mother's testimony “minimize[d] the domestic violence incidents and the effects on her and Child.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85. Mother's description of the November 2024 domestic violence incident was “inconsistent with what she previously reported to DCS and police.” Id. at 84. After that hearing, although Mother had completed her initial domestic violence education program, Mother began “going over the material again,” which her therapy provider reported before the second hearing. Tr. Vol. II at 129. During the second hearing, Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Yesenia Secundino-Banuelos expressed concern that Mother was not “taking” the domestic violence incident “seriously.” Id. at 131. The FCM further noted that DCS could help provide Mother with “other options for daycare” than Mother's current babysitter. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85.

[8] On July 21, 2025, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating Child a CHINS. The juvenile court found that “Mother's testimony demonstrates that the minimal domestic violence education provided by the home-based therapist has been insufficient and ineffective” and “Mother would benefit from more extensive and more formal domestic violence education provided by a different source.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85. The juvenile court further found that “[t]here are other options for daycare for the child that DCS can assist with that Mother does not utilize.” Id. The juvenile court concluded Child was a CHINS due to his exposure to domestic violence and that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary because “Mother minimizes the domestic violence that has occurred and fails to understand the harmful effects of exposing her child to domestic violence.”³ Id. at 86.

[9] Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court issued a Parental Participation Order requiring Mother to participate in an “Intensive Family Preservation program” to include home-based case management, “Family Home Aide,” and a “new domestic violence assessment.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 113. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Clearly Err by Adjudicating Child a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1

[10] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's conclusion that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that in order to adjudicate a child a CHINS under that section, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. Although there is “a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010).

[11] We will reverse a CHINS determination only if the juvenile court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re R.L., 144 N.E.3d 686, 689 (Ind. 2020) (citing In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017)). “A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if [the juvenile court] applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id. (quoting D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 578). “[W]e neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (citing D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 577–78). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings that Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)).

[12] We first address Mother's challenge to three of the juvenile court's findings of fact. We then address Mother's challenge to the CHINS adjudication, specifically, the coercive intervention element.

a. Findings of Fact

[13] Mother specifically challenges the juvenile court's Findings 23, 24, and 34. Finding 23 states that in December 2025, Mother requested that the no contact order be dismissed. Finding 24 states that in November 2025, Mother reported to DCS that Father was arrested for domestic violence against Mother in October 2023.

[14] Mother argues that these two findings “contain typos in the years, where the year 2025 is indicated instead of 2024.” Appellant's Br. at 29. Mother is correct; the evidence presented at the factfinding hearings shows Mother's request to dismiss the no contact order and her report regarding the previous domestic violence incident both occurred in 2024. An error, however, is not “ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” App. R. 66(A). Here, the juvenile court's “typographical” errors do not render the substance of the juvenile court's findings clearly erroneous. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[15] As for Finding 34, the juvenile court found, “There are other options for daycare for the child that DCS can assist with that Mother does not utilize.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85. Mother argues this finding is “not supported by the evidence” because “Mother obtained her own childcare and DCS was not able to assist her with securing childcare due to a waitlist that Mother had no control over.” Appellant's Br. at 29.

[16] At trial, Mother acknowledged that DCS could help her find “more appropriate daycare,” but Mother testified that she was “on a waiting list.” Tr. Vol. II at 51. FCM Secundino-Banuelos testified that DCS could “help provide” Mother with “another place for [Child] to do daycare.” Id. at 116. Neither the FCM nor any other witness was asked about or testified regarding a waitlist. As Mother was the only witness who testified regarding a waitlist at the factfinding hearings,⁴ we cannot say Finding 34 is clearly erroneous.

[17] Moreover, even if the finding is incorrect, the error would be harmless. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's remaining findings, including that (1) Mother's testimony at the factfinding hearing was “untruthful and unworthy of credit,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 84; (2) Mother had “poor communication” with DCS, id. at 85; (3) Child's babysitter refused to provide information to allow DCS to run a background check to ensure Child's safety; (4) Mother “minimizes” the effects of domestic violence on her and Child, id.; and (5) Mother would benefit from additional domestic violence education. These unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the CHINS adjudication, and we cannot say the juvenile court's findings are clearly erroneous so as to warrant reversal. See In re D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 561 (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting Kanach v. Rogers, 742 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)), trans. denied, 221 N.E.3d 1209 (Ind. 2023); see also App. R. 66(A).

b. Coercive Intervention

[18] Mother also challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. The coercive intervention element “guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that intrusion for families where parents lack the ability to provide for their children, not merely where they encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” D.J., 68 N.E.3d at 580 (quoting S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287) (emphases in original). In determining whether the coercive intervention of the court is necessary, we “consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.” Id. (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290.)

[19] Here, the juvenile court concluded that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary because Mother “minimizes the domestic violence that has occurred and fails to understand the harmful effects of exposing her child to domestic violence.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 86. This conclusion was largely based on Mother's testimony regarding the November 2024 domestic violence incident, which the juvenile court found was “inconsistent with what [Mother] previously reported to DCS and police.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 84.

[20] We find it helpful to illustrate the inconsistency the juvenile court found. Mother originally reported to DCS and law enforcement that Father was “drinking ․ all night” and became “aggressive with her.” Tr. Vol. II at 64. Father “grabbed [Mother] by the neck and was choking her.” Id. at 83. Mother locked herself and Child in a bedroom, and Father “bang[ed] and knock[ed] on the door, trying to get her out.” Id. at 65. Mother stayed in the bedroom “for a while” and only came out once she thought Father was asleep. Id. Mother went to a neighbor's house to contact law enforcement, but Father “grabbed her hair through the window,” and she “couldn't get out.” Id. at 67. Mother reported that she was “scared” of Father and “was willing to go to a domestic violence shelter.” Id.

[21] When Mother testified at the factfinding hearing, however, she claimed that Father was “[n]ot completely aggressive,” Tr. Vol. II at 13; he was not “intoxicated,” “just upset,” id. at 15; and he did not grab her by the neck. Mother remained in the bathroom for only “about 15 minutes,” id. at 15, and Father's knocking on the door was “normal” knocking, id. at 16. Mother admitted that Father touched her, but she testified Father was “not ․ meaning to hurt” her. Id. at 17. When asked if Father “pull[ed]” her hair, Mother tepidly admitted Father “maybe at some point ․ touched” her hair, and she explained, “you can interpret ․ that he wanted to hurt me, but ․ I cannot say that.” Id. at 19.

[22] Mother concedes that her testimony “did appear to minimize” the domestic violence incident. Appellant's Br. at 30. Mother argues, however, that “[w]hen this fact was made known to her, she voluntarily asked providers to repeat the domestic violence services,” which Mother completed before the second factfinding hearing. Id.

[23] First, Mother did not testify regarding her review of the domestic violence material, so the juvenile court was unable to determine whether Mother's review of the material had been effective. Mother's argument is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do. See In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). Accepting Mother's argument would require us to place more weight on Mother's review of the domestic violence material than the juvenile court did.

[24] Moreover, Mother does not challenge the juvenile court's finding that “Mother would benefit from more extensive and more formal domestic violence education provided by a different source.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 85. Nor does Mother challenge the juvenile court's findings that (1) she was dishonest in her testimony; (2) she had poor communication with DCS; and (3) given that Child's babysitter refused to provide information to allow DCS to run a background check to ensure Child's safety, DCS could assist Mother in finding alternative childcare.

[25] Considering only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the juvenile court's decision, we cannot say that the juvenile court clearly erred in concluding that the coercive intervention of the court was necessary. We affirm the juvenile court's adjudication of Child as a CHINS.

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Ordering Mother to Participate in Services

[26] Mother next challenges the juvenile court's Parental Participation Order, which recited the services ordered in the Dispositional Order. After a child is adjudicated a CHINS, the juvenile court holds a dispositional hearing to consider “placement of the child ․ [and t]he necessity, nature, and extent of the participation by a parent ․ in the program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child.” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 750–51 (Ind. Ct. App.) (alterations in original) (quoting I.C. § 31-34-19-1), trans. denied, 270 N.E.3d 958 (Ind. 2025). A juvenile court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012)).

[27] We review a juvenile court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion. B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 751 (citing In re R.G., 130 N.E.3d 1171, 1180–81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's action is “against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. (quoting A.C. v. State, 144 N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020)).

[28] Here, the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate and successfully complete “an Intensive Family Preservation program ․, which is to include homebased case management, Family Home Aide, and a new domestic violence assessment.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 113. Regarding the domestic violence assessment, the juvenile court found that Mother minimizes Father's domestic violence and that Mother's domestic violence programming had not been effective. The juvenile court thus did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mother to obtain a new domestic violence assessment.

[29] As for the remaining services the juvenile court ordered, Mother argues that she already completed these services. The juvenile court determined that continuation of these services would assist Mother and Child. Mother's services would assist Mother in obtaining alternative childcare options that could be more thoroughly vetted than Child's current babysitter. Additionally, due to Mother's poor communication with DCS, DCS relied on providers for information regarding Mother's and Child's status. DCS argued that continuation of services would ensure that DCS was kept in the loop regarding “safety checks” and Mother's progress in the case. Tr. Vol. II at 175. The services ordered by the juvenile court relate to Mother's “behavior” and the “circumstances ․ revealed by the evidence.” B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 751 (quoting K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258). The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in so ordering.

Conclusion

[30] The juvenile court did not clearly err by adjudicating Child a CHINS, and it did not abuse its discretion by ordering Mother to participate in services. We affirm the juvenile court on all issues raised.

[31] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Father entered a “deny and submit agreement,” wherein he denied the allegations in the CHINS petition and requested a ruling “based upon the papers that [were] filed thus far in the case.” Tr. Vol. II at 7. The juvenile court took the agreement under advisement and accepted the agreement at the conclusion of the factfinding hearing.

3.   The CHINS adjudication was also based on the juvenile court's conclusion that “Father has neither taken responsibility for his problems with violence and substance abuse nor taken any steps to remedy them.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 86.

4.   We note that, at the dispositional hearing, the Guardian ad Litem testified that Mother was “working with the Home-Based Case Manager to try to get [childcare] assistance through [childcare and development funds], but at this time that is on hold and it's not because of Mother.” Tr. Vol. II at 172. This testimony appears to support Mother's contention that she was working with DCS to find alternative childcare. The testimony, however, was provided after the factfinding hearings occurred and thus could not be incorporated into the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication order.

Felix, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.