Lori Lynn Carpenter, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lori L. Carpenter pled guilty to Level 5 felony criminal recklessness and Level 5 felony intimidation pursuant to a written plea agreement, and the trial court imposed two consecutive three and one-half year sentences, ordering the aggregate seven-year sentence to be fully executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (the DOC). Carpenter appeals and contends her sentence is inappropriate because incarceration “predictably interferes with necessary medical care.” Appellant's Brief at 4.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] About 9:45 p.m. on August 30, 2023, Carpenter's neighbor called 911 to report hearing the sound of gunfire nearby. Several Sellersburg Police Department officers responded to the area and heard shots fired in Carpenter's home. By this time, Carpenter's seventeen-year-old daughter A.K. (Daughter), who had been in the home, had already fled on foot to her boyfriend's (Boyfriend) home located nearby, and Boyfriend's mother called police to report that Daughter was safe at their house. Additional officers arrived and surrounded the residence, and an Indiana State Police (ISP) detective was called to the location as a crisis negotiator. Daughter reported to police that Carpenter was intoxicated and shooting guns and told Daughter that she “was next,” causing Daughter to “truly believe [she] was going to die.” Transcript at 28. A SWAT team was summoned to the scene.

[4] Around midnight, Carpenter briefly exited through a back door, waved a gun, refused officers commands, and returned inside. Police tried negotiating with Carpenter intermittently for about two hours to get her to exit her home without a weapon, but their efforts were unsuccessful. At 12:23 a.m., officers breached the front door, and Carpenter hung up the phone with the negotiator. Minutes later, three SWAT team officers began to breach the locked interior door from the garage. As a ram slammed the door, Carpenter fired a shot through it, missing the SWAT officers. The ram immediately hit the door a second time, and the door swung open, revealing Carpenter pointing a pistol at the officers. SWAT Officer Sean O'Sullivan engaged and fired three shots, striking Carpenter. Officers rendered aid until emergency medical personnel arrived and transported Carpenter to the hospital.

[5] On August 31, 2023, the State charged Carpenter with three counts of Level 1 felony attempted murder, stemming from Carpenter's act of shooting through the door at the SWAT officers, and the State subsequently added a count of Level 6 felony intimidation regarding Carpenter's threats to Daughter.

[6] During the incident, Carpenter suffered gunshot wounds to her chest, abdomen, and left leg. Her injuries required multiple surgeries and hospitalization for about a month. Upon discharge from the hospital in early October 2023, Carpenter was transferred to a rehabilitation facility for inpatient physical, occupational, and speech therapies. In late November 2023, she was transported to the Clark County Jail. Because this affected her ability to attend appointments and receive medical care, in December 2023, Carpenter sought transfer to the DOC “where she can receive proper medical care,” and the court granted the request. Appendix Vol. 2 at 71, 75. Once there, she required and received ongoing medical treatment and, on various occasions, was transported to medical facilities for appointments or procedures.

[7] On May 13, 2025, Carpenter pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to two Level 5 felonies: criminal recklessness and intimidation.¹ The State dismissed the remaining charges. The agreement provided that the sentences on the two counts would be served consecutively, with sentencing otherwise left open to the trial court's discretion. The trial court accepted Carpenter's guilty plea, entered judgment of conviction, and set the matter for sentencing.

[8] At the August 5, 2025 sentencing hearing, the State presented the testimony of Daughter. She described that, when she arrived home on the night in question, she found Carpenter intoxicated, “firing her weapon” off the back porch, and “making threats” to Daughter's life. Transcript at 25. Daughter recounted that, when Carpenter came back in the house for more ammunition, she told Daughter, “you better be f*cking scared.” Id. at 26. At that point, Daughter fled the home and ran to Boyfriend's house.

[9] Daughter also read her written victim impact statement, which stated in part that she was “a survivor of a lifetime of abuse” by Carpenter, that what occurred that night “was not an isolated incident, but the result of years of psychological and emotional abuse.” Id. at 28, 29. Daughter expressed that Carpenter “has not taken true accountability or expressed true remorse [and] continues to manipulate everyone around her” and that, despite a no contact order in place, Carpenter “still continues to communicate through family members making extremely harsh comments about me, putting me down, and seeking to derail my hard work and success.” Id. at 29, 31. Daughter urged that Carpenter's “pattern of destruction” would only stop if Carpenter is “given the space to truly face her wrongs.” Id. at 31-32.

[10] The presentence investigation report (PSI), considered by the trial court, included a written victim impact statement by Carpenter's other daughter, M.B. Her letter, similar to Daughter's, expressed that, for as long as she could remember, Carpenter “has used manipulation, emotional cruelty, and psychological control” with those around her, especially her children, and manipulated others “to avoid consequences and garner sympathy” and “to shift blame elsewhere.” Appendix Vol. 3 at 125. M.B. asked the court, in sentencing Carpenter, to “see past the mask [Carpenter] wears and recognize the pattern of manipulation and harm that has followed her for decades.” Id. The PSI also reflected that Carpenter had one prior operating while intoxicated (OWI) misdemeanor conviction; the State advised that, although omitted from the PSI, Carpenter was out on bond in two OWI cases – one in Floyd County and the other in Clark County – at the time of this incident.²

[11] Carpenter made a statement to the court, discussing her military career, explaining that at the time of the incident she was using alcohol to cope with a family death and other issues, and expressing remorse for the incident. To her daughters, Carpenter offered, “Please know with [ ] assurance of emotional support and tenderness, that I will be there for you in whatever capacity that I can” and although “I was not perfect in every situation [ ] my love for you is perfect[.]” Transcript at 94.

[12] Carpenter argued that mitigating circumstances existed, including that imprisonment would result in undue hardship “because it denies or delays her medical care.” Id. at 81. Carpenter submitted extensive documentary evidence concerning Carpenter's medical condition and treatment, which showed that Carpenter had and has ongoing medical needs and that at times she has required additional procedures for complications or additional repairs. Carpenter argued that incarceration placed barriers on her access to medical care. In support, Carpenter referred the court to several instances in the medical records that, she argued, illustrated the DOC impeded necessary care. She also pointed to the testimony of a doctor who, at the bond reduction hearing, had expressed some concern about whether the DOC's healthcare system had the funds, staff, and expertise to handle Carpenter's complex medical needs.

[13] Carpenter asserted other mitigators existed as well, including her acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty, her academic achievements of having a bachelor's and a master's degree, military service from which she was honorably discharged, and being considered by probation a low risk to reoffend. Carpenter urged that less restrictive alternatives to incarceration were available and presented a community corrections evaluation reflecting that Carpenter was eligible for probationary supervision or placement in a community corrections program, including home detention.

[14] The trial court identified aggravators and mitigators and sentenced Carpenter to consecutive terms of three and one-half years on each Level 5 felony, for an aggregate sentence of seven years. The court ordered the entire sentence to be executed at the DOC. Carpenter now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[15] Carpenter asserts that her fully executed seven-year sentence at the DOC is inappropriate under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). Carpenter “does not challenge the length of the sentence imposed, only the appropriateness of the mode of execution of her sentence[.]” Appellant's Brief at 5. She asks us to revise the manner in which her sentence is executed and remand with instructions to order placement on probation or in a community corrections program, “without disturbing the length of the sentence imposed.” Id. at 8.

[16] Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) allows us to revise a sentence if “after due consideration of the trial court's decision” we find that “the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our principal task in this regard is “ ‘to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ not to achieve a ‘correct’ result in every case.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1248 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). “Whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate ‘turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.’ ” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224). We generally defer to the sentence imposed “unless a defendant presents ‘compelling evidence’ portraying the nature of the offense and their character in a positive light.” Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248 (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The defendant bears the responsibility of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. See Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018).

[17] Rule 7(B) authorizes this court to revise not only the number of years imposed, but also “how [a sentence] is to be served.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. That is, “[t]he location where a sentence is to be served is an appropriate focus for application of our review and revise authority.” Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In that regard, we have observed:

[I]t will be quite difficult for a defendant to prevail on a claim that the placement of his or her sentence is inappropriate. As a practical matter, trial courts know the feasibility of alternative placements in particular counties or communities․ Additionally, the question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.

Id. at 343-44 (italics in original).

[18] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Here, the trial court sentenced Carpenter to three and one-half years on each of her two convictions, to be served consecutively and in the DOC. Carpenter asserts that execution of her sentence in the DOC is inappropriate because incarceration “predictably interferes with Carpenter's necessary medical care, exacerbates her injuries, and undermines rehabilitation” and “converts a seven-year term into something qualitatively harsher.” Appellant's Brief at 8, 14. She urges that “when less restrictive ․ alternatives are available, [her] sentence becomes an inappropriate outlier” that should be revised under Rule 7(B). Id. at 9.

[19] As to the nature of the offense, Carpenter urges this was an “isolated and rapidly unfolding encounter resulting in no injuries” and the threat she made to Daughter occurred “during the same chaotic episode,” such that the nature of the offense does not justify the seven-year sentence imposed. Reply Brief at 7. We disagree. Carpenter, while intoxicated, shot a firearm off her porch and inside her home, threatened Daughter's life, and refused to peacefully exit her home after hours of attempted police negotiations. Although well aware of the presence of the many law enforcement officers outside her home, Carpenter shot through the door as the SWAT team started to breach the door from the garage into the home. Given these serious and dangerous circumstances, we cannot say that the nature of the offense warrants revision of Carpenter's sentence.

[20] Pointing to her educational, military, and professional accomplishments, Carpenter argues that her character supports sentence revision, maintaining that the current offenses “represent a profound deviation from an otherwise productive and stable life.” Reply Brief at 12. It is well settled that, when considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history. Eisert v. State, 102 N.E.3d 330, 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. At the time of sentencing, Carpenter had OWI charges pending in two cases, which as the State points out reflects “a history of committing offenses while intoxicated and endangering the lives of others.” Appellee's Brief at 11. Further, violations of pretrial release reflect negatively on a defendant's character. See, e.g., Eisert, 102 N.E.3d at 335 (finding that repeated violations of pretrial release “does not suggest [defendant] is a person who respects the law or the court's authority”). And while Carpenter's criminal history may not be a particularly extensive one, we have recognized that even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character. Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[21] Further, both Daughter and her sister described Carpenter as manipulative. They stated that Carpenter had inflicted psychological and emotional abuse on them for many years and that Carpenter manipulated not only them but “everyone around her” to avoid consequences and garner sympathy. Appendix Vol. 3 at 123. They recounted that Carpenter “uses people” for her own gain and “shifts her demeanor the moment authority enters the room[.]” Id. at 123, 125. Carpenter has not established that her sentence is inappropriate based on her character.

[22] In arguing that her sentence is inappropriate, Carpenter asserts that the trial court “fail[ed] to adequately account for” her medical needs. Reply Brief at 4. To the extent that Carpenter is asserting that the trial court failed to properly consider this as a mitigating factor, we have explained appellate review under Rule 7(B) “is not a review of the trial court's consideration of aggravators and mitigators, but rather, ․ an examination of the appellant's sentence based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 786 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. That said, it is clear that the trial court was aware of Carpenter's likely need for ongoing medical care and treatment, expressly recognizing as a mitigator that, due to Carpenter's medical condition, “a prison sentence ․ would potentially result in und[ue] hardship.” Transcript at 96. We are confident that the trial court meaningfully considered Carpenter's condition and needs when sentencing her.

[23] Again, the question under Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Fonner, 876 N.E.2d at 344 (italics in original). Carpenter has not persuaded us that her seven-year sentence executed in the DOC is inappropriate.

[24] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Carpenter also pled guilty under the same agreement to Class C misdemeanor operating while intoxicated in a different case.

2.   A few days after this case was fully briefed on appeal, Carpenter filed an Amended Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Appendices, which the State did not oppose. We hereby grant Carpenter's motion by separate order. Carpenter's motion and the supplemental appendices reflect that, while this appeal was pending, the State moved on February 13, 2026, to dismiss the Floyd County charges, Cause No. 22D02-2307-CM-1204. On February 24, 2026, the Floyd County Superior Court ordered the expungement of all records related to the criminal charges in that case.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.