Michael W. Wright, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] In 1977, the State charged Michael W. Wright with four counts of first-degree murder. The same year, the parties entered into a plea agreement that provided, in relevant part:

1. That Michael W. Wright will withdraw his plea of Not Guilty to the four counts of first degree murder above, and will enter a plea of Guilty of Murder in the First Degree of Reeve Spencer, the same being Cause No. CR-77-31-V, guilty of the second degree murder of Raymond Spencer, Cause No. CR-77-29-V, guilty to the second degree murder of Ralph Spencer, under Cause No. CR-77-28-V, and guilty to the second degree murder of Gregory Brooks, under Cause No. CR-77-30-V.

2. That the Court will impose a sentence carrying life imprisonment for the first degree murder of Reeve Spencer, a sentence carrying life for the second degree murder of Raymond Spencer, an indeterminate term from 15 to 25 years for the second degree murder of Ralph Spencer, and an indeterminate sentence of 15 to 25 years for the second degree murder of Gregory Brooks, all of which sentences shall run concurrently.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 175-76. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Wright to life in prison.

[2] In 2025, Wright filed a “Verified Petition for Specific Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreement.” Id. at 136-80. He claimed that his plea agreement made him eligible to be considered for parole notwithstanding his life sentence and that the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) refuses to refer him to the Indiana Parole Board for such consideration. He asked the trial court to order the DOC to do so. The State objected, and the trial court denied the petition.

[3] Wright now appeals, but we affirm. Wright concedes that his plea agreement doesn't say anything about parole but argues that it wouldn't have made sense for him to agree to a life sentence without a chance of parole (the maximum possible sentence, since Indiana didn't have the death penalty at the time) and therefore we should treat the agreement as though it calls for parole eligibility. We decline to do so. “The grant of specific performance directs the performance of a contract according to the precise terms agreed upon, or substantially in accordance therewith.” Metro Holdings One, LLC v. Flynn Creek Partner, LLC, 25 N.E.3d 141, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Wright's plea agreement doesn't include any terms about parole, let alone “precise terms.” If Wright is to receive judicial relief as to parole eligibility, it will not come through an order for specific performance of the plea agreement. The trial court didn't err by denying Wright's petition.

[4] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.