O.W. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On March 29, 2023, M.W. and J.W. (collectively, “the Children”) were adjudicated to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that the Children were victims of neglect. The reports indicated that M.C. (“Mother”) had been arrested for theft and possession of methamphetamine and had left the Children in an Uber when she had gone into a store with the intent to commit theft within. The report further indicated that Mother and O.W. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) had a significant history of domestic abuse. After the Children were adjudicated CHINS, Father was ordered to complete certain services, which he failed to complete. On June 16, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. Following a fact-finding hearing, on October 8, 2025, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children.¹ Father contends, for the first time on appeal, that his due-process rights were violated and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the termination of his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Between 2009 and October of 2022, Father was arrested and charged with criminal acts, involving drug use and weapons possession, on at least four separate occasions. M.W. was born to Parents on January 17, 2020. J.W. was born to Parents on February 27, 2021.

[3] In the fall of 2022, Mother and the Children were residing with Father in Kentucky. In October of 2022, Father was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses in Kentucky, including “Assault 4th Degree – Child Abuse, Resisting Arrest, Terroristic Threatening, 3rd Degree, and two counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance, 1st Degree.”² Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29 (footnote omitted). Mother also disclosed “allegations of domestic violence between herself and Father.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 29 (footnote omitted).

[4] The Children were removed from Mother's care on February 27, 2023, when she “was arrested at Walmart, and the kids were left alone in the Uber while she was arrested for theft” and possession of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. II p. 123. At the time of Mother's arrest, the Children could not be placed with Father “because he had a criminal matter pending against him in Kentucky[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 123. DCS subsequently alleged that the Children were CHINS. Father denied that the Children were CHINS but waived his right to a fact-finding hearing. On March 6, 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children to be CHINS, finding that

2. Father lives out of state and is unable or unwilling to ensure the safety and well-being of the children.

3. Mother and Father have a history of significant domestic violence and Father has a criminal history related to violent behavior.

4. Children are seriously endangered and/or seriously impaired by Mother's instability, criminal activity, and involvement with illicit substances as well as Father's inability, neglect, or unwillingness to provide them with the appropriate care free from an environment with domestic violence.

5. Children and Parents need services that will not be received or participated in without the coercive intervention of the Court.

Ex. Vol. IV p. 33.

[5] On May 9, 2023, following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court ordered Father, inter alia, to maintain contact with the family case manager (“FCM”) and notify the FCM of any changes in address within five days; complete any program recommended by the FCM or other service provider; keep all appointments with the FCM and service providers; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income, refrain from using any illegal controlled substances or alcohol; complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; complete a substance-abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations; submit to random drug screens; refrain from committing any acts of domestic violence and actively participate in, cooperate with, and successfully complete all recommendations of a completed domestic-violence assessment; attend all scheduled visitations with the Children; and provide the Children with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect. Father, however, never submitted to a DCS-approved parenting assessment, completed domestic-violence classes, or submitted to mental-health or substance-abuse evaluations. He failed to participate in services “for a couple of years.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152. Once he had re-established contact with the FCM, Father tested positive for THC on March 25, 2025, and for THC and oxycodone on June 16, 2025.

[6] At some point, Father requested that the Children be placed with paternal grandmother. Mother objected to this placement, and DCS ultimately determined that placement with paternal grandmother was not appropriate. Father failed to appear for various hearings during the CHINS proceedings, including the hearing on his request to place the Children with paternal grandmother.

[7] On June 16, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing on August 1, 2025, during which Father, FCM Brittany Lindsey, and court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Breann Jones testified. On October 8, 2025, the juvenile court terminated Father's parental rights to the Children.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the children. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Due Process

[9] Father contends that he was denied due process, claiming that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to provide him with necessary services towards reunification. Father, however, did not raise this argument below, and has therefore waived it for appellate review. “[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016).

At a minimum, a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. The policy reasons behind this requirement—preservation of judicial resources, opportunity for full development of the record, utilization of trial court fact-finding expertise, and assurance of a claim being tested by the adversary process—apply with particular force where, as here, the claim is a constitutional one.

Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004).

[10] Father did not request additional services during either the CHINS or termination proceedings. “ ‘[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.’ ” In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)) (brackets in J.W.), trans. denied. Because Father did not request additional services or give the juvenile court a bona fide opportunity to address his due-process claims below, we conclude that he has waived appellate review of this contention.³

[11] Furthermore, to the extent that Father contends that the juvenile court denied him due process by failing to place the Children with paternal grandmother, we note that even if DCS had violated Indiana's preference for relative placement when possible in certain child-related cases, violation of a state law alone does not establish a due-process violation. See Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), aff'd in relevant part 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017). The record establishes that DCS had considered Father's and paternal grandmother's requests to place the Children with paternal grandmother. Despite having petitioned to have the Children's placement modified to place the Children with paternal grandmother, Father failed to appear for the placement hearing, suggesting an ambivalence towards the Children's placement. See A.F., 762 N.E.2d at 1252.

[12] The juvenile court conducted a hearing on Father's placement request in Father's absence, at which paternal grandmother appeared. While DCS had investigated the appropriateness of the Children's potential placement with paternal grandmother, Mother had objected to this placement, and DCS had ultimately determined that placement with paternal grandmother was not in the Children's best interests. Father was given the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, which satisfies due-process requirements. See In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012) (providing that due process requires the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner). Father has not established that he was denied due process.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rts. of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[14] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[15] Father contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of his parental rights to the Children. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).⁴ Of relevance to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

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(6) That:

(A) at least ninety (90) days have passed since the filing of the petition alleging that the child is a child in need of services; and

(B) the identity or location of the parent is unknown despite reasonable efforts having been made to identify or locate the parent.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Father does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the Children, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of his parental rights to the Children, Father argues only that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[16] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Father's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), (d)(4), and (d)(6). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[17] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[18] With respect to the reasonable probability that the conditions for the Children's continued placement outside Father's care would not be remedied, the juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Father's failure to make progress towards reunification or remedy the factors leading to the Children's continued removal from his care. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's order terminating Father's parental rights to the Children, we address Father's challenges to some of the juvenile court's factual findings.

1. Findings C.3 & C.4

[19] Father contends that Findings C.3 and C.4 are not supported by the evidence. These findings read

3. FCM Lindsey testified that Father never engaged in a parenting assessment or in a domestic violence awareness program, Father tested positive for THC on a screen from March 25, 2025 and THC and Oxycodone on June 16, 2025.

4. Father testified at the termination trial that he thought that the classes he took in Kentucky, coupled with the dismissal of the child neglect charge meant he did not have to engage in any additional services in Indiana. FCM Lindsey testified that she discussed with Father that the curriculum from the Kentucky classes Father attended for his criminal case were not in line with what was expected for the CHINS case in Indiana and that he did need to engage in the services outlined in his disposition.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 31, 62 (footnote omitted on each page). In arguing that these findings are not supported by the evidence, Father asserts that “[t]hese findings ignore that DCS failed to provide services to Father[,]” pointing to the fact that FCM Lindsey was unable to find acceptable services for Father in Michigan. Appellant's Br. p. 17.

[20] While FCM Lindsey testified that she had been unable to find service providers in Michigan who “would cooperate[,]” she also testified that services remained open to Father in Indiana but that Father had failed to participate in the offered services. Tr. Vol. II p. 140. FCM Lindsey testified that Father had not been active in services “for a couple of years.” Tr. Vol. II p. 152. FCM Lindsey's testimony demonstrated that Father had never completed a DCS-approved parenting assessment, mental-health screening, or domestic-violence class. FCM Lindsey further testified that Father had tested positive for THC on March 25, 2025, and THC and oxycodone on June 16, 2025. Father had not provided a valid prescription for oxycodone at the time of the positive result. FCM Lindsey further testified that she had explained to Father that the classes that he had completed in relation to his criminal case in Kentucky were not the equivalent of and did not satisfy the services ordered in the underlying CHINS case. FCM Lindsey's testimony supports the juvenile court's findings in C.3 and C.4. Father's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

2. Finding C.6

[21] Father also claims that finding C.6 is not supported by the evidence. Finding C.6 provides that

6. During the pendency of the CHINS case, Father changed addresses, more than once. FCM Lindsey testified that she attempted to get Father's address, but all he would tell her is that he lived in “Ashland, Kenutcky” [(sic)]. FCM Lindsey was not informed Father had returned to Detroit, Michigan, where he lived prior to going to Kentucky.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 32, 63. Father challenges this finding, asserting that FCM Lindsey did not mention Ashland, Kentucky, at any point during her testimony.

[22] While FCM's Lindsey's testimony did not refer to Ashland, Kentucky, other evidence did. For instance, in its progress report dated May 9, 2024, DCS stated that Father had contacted FCM Mikaela Robertson on April 25, 2024, but “would not confirm his address further than Ashland[,] Kentucky.” Ex. Vol. III p. 241. In an order dated May 8, 2024, the juvenile court noted that Father “has not complied with the children's case plan. Father's exact whereabouts are unknown. Father contacted DCS on or about April 25, 2024 but would not confirm his address, stating only that he was in Ashland Kentucky.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 57. While the juvenile court's finding wrongly attributes Father's refusal to verify his address to his discussion with FCM Lindsey rather than FCM Robertson, the evidence nevertheless supports the juvenile court's finding that Father had refused to confirm or verify his then-current address. Father's challenge to this factual finding essentially amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

3. Finding C.8

[23] Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support finding C.8, which stated

8. As for employment and income, Father testified that he had been working for his father, in Detroit, for approximately six (6) months, on houses. He was unable to testify to what income he received. Father further testified that prior to working for his father, he “did tattoos”, doing most of them for free. Father stated he also gets money for “doing my music” and sometimes makes $200 per week and sometimes performs for free. Despite being unable to account for regular income, Father testified he pays paternal grandmother rent and provides for his other five (5) children (not involved in these matters) through using Cash-App.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 32, 63. Father challenges this finding by claiming that he had been “able to testify to his income, stating that he was paid per project, and that the pay varied depending on the project that he completed.” Appellant's Br. p. 17.

[24] While Father did testify that his pay was dependent upon the job, the juvenile court explicitly found that “Father's testimony lacks credibility.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. In making this finding, the juvenile court noted that

Father denied any criminal record, but then admitted to being arrested several times for gun charges and being convicted and sentenced to a federal institution for a gun charge. Most recently, in 2022, Father was charged with Assault 4th Degree – Child Abuse, Resisting Arrest, Terroristic Threatening 3rd Degree, and 2 counts of Possession of Controlled Substance 1st Degree (Methamphetamine) and negotiated a plea agreement for Resisting Arrest and Terroristic Threatening. Father denied ever having any mental health conditions or diagnosis, but DCS Exhibit A evidenced Father's claim including PTSD, paranoia and anxiety. Father testified he financially supported his five (5) other children, but would not state what his income was and claimed he didn't have regular income from working on houses for his father or doing his other side jobs. Father told CASA he was living outside Detroit with his girlfriend, but at trial testified he was living with his mother in Detroit (paternal grandmother) and paying rent, had just moved to another house, which address he didn't know, and had yet a third house for his children, which he did not know the address.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. Father does not challenge the accuracy of this finding, which we accept as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct). Moreover, FCM Lindsey's testimony demonstrates that Father had indicated that he had “informal employment” with his father but did not provide any proof of income. Tr. Vol. II p. 133. Father's challenge to this finding again amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[25] Father contends that the juvenile court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from his care would not be remedied is not supported by the evidence. We disagree. In addition to the challenged findings discussed above, the juvenile court made a number of unchallenged findings supporting its conclusion, which we accept as true. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687. The unchallenged findings establish that although Father initially had been required to appear at the CHINS proceedings electronically due to the bond conditions relating to his then-pending criminal charges in Kentucky, of the hearings he appeared for, Father had failed to attend the hearings in person once his criminal case had been resolved. Father failed to engage in services in Indiana. Father claimed to have stable housing for the Children in Detroit but could not provide the juvenile court with the address of the home in which he planned to reside with the Children, should they be returned to his care. Father had also been arrested and charged with criminal offenses four times between 2009 and 2022. Father did not ask about the Children beyond attempting to gain information for a potential lawsuit against DCS that he claimed he was planning to file.

[26] We agree with the juvenile court that “Father's history is a predictor of future behavior and substantial probability of future neglect.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 35, 66. Father has established a historical pattern of being unable to care for the Children. Father's historical pattern of instability, coupled with failure to make progress towards reunification, despite completing the court-ordered services aimed at reunification, sufficiently establishes a reasonable probability that the conditions that have resulted in the Children's continued placement outside of Father's care will not be remedied.⁵ Father's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do.⁶ See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[27] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[28] In challenging the juvenile court's determination that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests, Father claims that he “should be given additional time to complete services.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. We disagree. The evidence establishes that the Children have “been in either kinship or foster care since the beginning of the CHINS case, February 27, 2023.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 33, 64. Foster parents have “provided support, care, a stable home and supervision in the absence of parents since” the Children were placed in their home. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 33, 64. The Children have

made great strides while in the care of the current foster parents and their commitment and consistency in working with the [Children] to aid in [their] growth is commendable. The Court doubts such improvement would be possible under Father's care in light of his failure to engage in the case in any meaningful manner during the course of the CHINS proceedings.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 65.⁷

[29] The evidence established that DCS's plan for the Children is that they be adopted and that they are currently placed together in “a pre-adoptive placement and [are] happy and bonded to caregivers, who have expressed a desire to adopt [the Children] should [they] become available for adoption.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. The Children refer “to foster parents as mom and dad.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. The juvenile court determined that “[p]ermanency is critical for the” Children. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. “[A] child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child[.]” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. The juvenile court also found that “Father's testimony lacks credibility.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. The juvenile court further found that

7. Father's failure to attend court hearings, unwillingness to notify DCS when he moved or of his address, and failure to actively participate in the CHINS case, except for requesting either he or paternal grandmother to have placement, demonstrates a lack of insight into how his actions and behaviors affect [the Children].

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10. Both DCS and CASA believe that adoption is in the [Children's] best interest[s]. The Court finds that adoption is in the [Children's] best interest.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 34, 65. Father does not challenge any of these findings, which again we accept as true. See Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687.

[30] In addition, we have previously concluded that the testimony of a case worker and CASA can support a best-interests finding. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). FCM Lindsey testified that the Children are “[v]ery much” bonded with their foster parents and feel happy and secure in foster parents’ home. Tr. Vol. II p. 130. FCM Lindsey opined that it is the Children's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights given concerns for his pattern of criminal behavior and domestic violence and abuse and also “[b]ecause [the Children] don't know him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 131. Father indicated that he planned to continue to smoke marijuana, claiming that “[i]t's legal where he resides.” Tr. Vol. II p. 131.

[31] Likewise, CASA Jones testified that she had been assigned to the Children's cases in October of 2023 but had not met Father until June of 2025. CASA Jones testified that Father had not asked her “about how the children were doing[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 159. She described the Children as “very happy boys” who are “doing very well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 159. CASA Jones opined that termination of Father's parental rights to the Children is in the Children's best interests, noting Father's history of violence and drug use and that the Children “do not have any recollection of [Father] being their father.” Tr. Vol. II p. 160. CASA Jones noted that the Children had “been through a lot of trauma” and had “been involved in therapy to address” their issues. Tr. Vol. II p. 162.

[32] Given the testimony of FCM Lindsey and CASA Jones and the juvenile court's unchallenged findings, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that termination of Father's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. Once again, Father's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[33] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to the Children's adoption and does not participate in the instant appeal.

2.   Father eventually pled guilty to resisting arrest and terroristic threatening, in exchange for dismissal of the other charges.

3.   In any event, even if Father had not waived his due-process claims, Father's due-process claims are without merit. Again, Father did not request any additional services beyond those that had been offered by DCS. While he completed some classes in Kentucky as an attempt to lower his potential criminal exposure in his then-pending criminal case, the evidence most favorable to the juvenile court's judgment indicates that these classes did not match the services ordered by the juvenile court. Father repeatedly refused to appear in Indiana, to participate in the services offered, or to visit with the Children. Father's failure to appear at hearings related to the CHINS and termination proceedings demonstrates his ambivalence and his refusal to participate in services reflects an unwillingness to change existing conditions. See A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“A parent's failure to appear for assessments and court hearings reflects ambivalence, and the failure to attend parenting classes reflects an unwillingness to change existing conditions.”), trans. denied.

4.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children on June 16, 2025. Although Father cites to a prior version of the statute in his appellate brief, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights.

5.   To the extent that Father claims that he had made a similar level of progress as the parent in In re Ma.J., 972 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), we disagree and conclude that the evidence does not demonstrate that Father had made any progress towards reunification. Father has failed to complete any of the court-ordered services, failed to remain drug free, and failed to exercise his visitation rights with the Children.

6.   Having concluded that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the juvenile court's conclusion that the reasons for the Children's removal from Father's care were not likely to be remedied, we need not consider Father's argument as it relates to whether the evidence also supports the juvenile court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children.

7.   The juvenile court's order relating to M.W. includes the following additional sentence after the word “commendable[:] Records evidence that foster parents are involved in Child's therapy.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 34 (footnote omitted).

Bradford, Judge.

Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.