N.M., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a factfinding hearing, the trial court adjudicated N.M. a delinquent for an act which, if committed by an adult, would be Level 6 felony strangulation.¹ N.M. raises one issue for appellate review, which we restate as: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting police bodycam footage in which Victim stated N.M. choked her? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] N.M. and Victim were in a dating relationship. On October 16, 2024, Victim phoned her mother, Candy Wright, from N.M.’s house where she was living. Victim called Wright because “she needed help.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. Victim and N.M. were arguing, and the disagreement turned physical.² Wright heard crying and yelling over the phone, so she drove to N.M.’s house. Wright entered the property and went upstairs; there she witnessed N.M. with his hands around Victim's neck “choking her.” Id. at 10. Wright “grabbed a hold of [N.M.], and ․ pulled him off.” Id. Wright kept watch as Victim gathered her things to leave. When N.M. tried to attack Victim a second time, Wright had to pull him back “with all [her] weight[.]” Id. at 11. At some point, N.M. left the house on his own. Victim and Wright also left the property and headed to where Wright was staying. Victim was “very upset” and remarked N.M. “could have killed [her].” Id. at 12. After “a few minutes” at Wright's place, Wright drove Victim to the hospital. Id. at 13.

[3] A forensic nurse with specialized strangulation training treated Victim at the hospital. Victim continued to be “very upset” and was “tearful” during her examination. Id. at 35. She had “very significant injuries ․ visible” on her neck and chest. Id. Victim described her symptoms and complained of pain in multiple areas of her body. Victim recounted what she experienced during N.M.’s attack.

[4] Officer Wally Deerfield of the Plymouth Police Department responded to a call about the incident. He interviewed Victim at the hospital, and his bodycam recorded their conversation. Victim told the officer N.M. had choked and hit her.

[5] On December 13, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging N.M. committed acts that, if he were charged as an adult, would be the following: Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine; Level 6 felony strangulation; and Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate bodily injury.³ The trial court held a factfinding hearing on May 19, 2025. Wright, the nurse, Officer Deerfield, and N.M. testified. Victim did not. During Officer Deerfield's direct examination, the State moved to admit a portion of the bodycam footage of his conversation with Victim at the hospital. N.M. objected. He argued the recording contained inadmissible hearsay statements by Victim. The State countered the footage was admissible under the present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay. Without explanation, the trial court overruled N.M.’s objection and admitted the bodycam recording. At the end of the hearing, the trial court made a true finding solely for Level 6 felony strangulation. The court subsequently entered an order adjudicating N.M. a delinquent.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bodycam footage.

[6] N.M. argues admission of Officer Deerfield's bodycam footage “was a violation of the Indiana Rules of Evidence[.]” Appellant's Br. at 9. The State maintains the footage was admissible under multiple exceptions to the general hearsay prohibition, including the excited utterance exception.

[7] We review a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 452 (Ind. 2026). This Court will “reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)), trans. denied. “On review of a claim challenging the admissibility of evidence,” we will “uphold a correct legal ruling even where based on incorrect, or absent, legal reasoning below.” Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1267 (Ind. 2008), cert. denied.

The excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay applies.

[8] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Evid. R. 801(c). “Generally, hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls into one of the well-delineated exceptions.” Gillespie v. State, 244 N.E.3d 423, 434–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Evid. R. 802). In this case, the State offered Victim's out-of-court statements as found in the bodycam footage—that N.M. choked her—to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that N.M. committed strangulation. N.M. objected to admission of the recording as hearsay. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 22–24. Without providing an explanation, the trial court overruled N.M.’s objection and admitted the bodycam footage.

[9] Evidence Rule 803(2) describes an excited utterance as: “A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Under this exception to the hearsay rule, a statement is admissible when “the declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event when the statement was made.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 459 (quoting Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000)). The statement must be “trustworthy under the facts of the particular case.” Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (Ind. 1996). “The logic behind admitting excited utterances is that the startling event and absence of opportunity for cool reflection make statements more reliable and reduce the likelihood of fabrication.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 459.

[10] Here, Victim believed N.M. “could have killed [her.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 12. She was crying and upset when her mother drove her away from N.M.’s house. Not long after, Victim sought treatment at the hospital. There Victim remained visibly distressed. She then told Officer Deerfield N.M. had choked her. Under these circumstances, Victim's statements were clearly “made while ․ under the influence of the excitement engendered by” N.M.’s aggression. Yamobi, 672 N.E.2d at 1346; see also Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 459 (considering the declarant's physical and emotional condition; the nature of the startling event; and whether the declarant had the opportunity to cool down). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bodycam footage.

Any error in the admission of bodycam footage was harmless.

[11] Even if the trial court erroneously admitted Victim's statements to the officer, any error was harmless. An error is harmless if its “probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Carr, 274 N.E.3d at 460 (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)). “Ultimately, the error's probable impact is sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023).

[12] Under Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-9(c)(1), a person commits strangulation when they “in a rude, angry, or insolent manner, knowingly or intentionally” apply “pressure to the throat or neck of another person[.]” There was ample evidence outside the footage at issue to prove N.M. strangled Victim. Wright testified she saw N.M. with “his hands around [Victim's] neck ․ choking her[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 10. Wright stated she had to pull N.M. away from Victim twice to keep him from choking her. The emergency room nurse testified Victim arrived at the hospital with “significant injuries that were visible” around her neck. Id. at 35; see also Ex. Vol. 3 at 4–6 (images of Victim's neck taken at hospital). In her professional assessment, the nurse concluded Victim had symptoms typical of those who suffer strangulation-related injuries: vision changes, difficulty breathing, and difficulty swallowing. Victim informed the nurse that during N.M.’s attack, she was “feeling dizzy, lightheaded, disoriented, and had a headache[.]” Tr. Vol. 2. at 43.⁴ At the factfinding hearing, the nurse explained these were tell-tale signs Victim experienced strangulation. And N.M. himself admitted to “holding [Victim] down” at some point during the incident, testifying he held Victim down “by her throat ․ not throat, shoulders.” Id. at 50. As we remain confident in the trial court's findings, any alleged error in the admission of the bodycam footage was harmless. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492.⁵

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the officer's bodycam evidence.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c)(1) (2020).

2.   The record does not precisely explain why the two began arguing. It appears the conflict started because N.M. “didn't say good morning, and stuff got hectic after that.” Id. at 48.

3.   The State later filed a motion to dismiss the possession of methamphetamine allegation, which the court granted. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 76, 78.

4.   N.M. does not challenge on appeal the admissibility of the nurse's testimony.

5.   N.M. further argues admission of the recording constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine Victim. See Appellant's Br. at 9. But at the factfinding hearing, N.M. only objected to admission of the recording on the basis it was inadmissible hearsay, not a violation of his constitutional right to conduct cross-examination. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 22–24. Therefore, N.M. has waived this claim on appeal. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000) (holding waiver of confrontation issue where objection at trial was based solely on other grounds). N.M. does not allege fundamental error.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.