Mario Nathaniel Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Mario Smith's 11-year-old relative told the jury that Smith had molested her repeatedly over a period of months. Smith had also admitted the same to police. A jury found him guilty of four counts of child molesting, and the trial court imposed a 42-year sentence. Smith appeals, arguing the trial court erred by publishing the victim's videotaped forensic interview to the jury under the recorded-recollection exception to the hearsay rule in Indiana Evidence Rule 803(5). But even if the trial court erred in admitting the videotaped interview, we conclude that any error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. We therefore affirm.

Facts

[2] In April 2025, Smith was 21 years old and living with his family in the basement of a duplex in South Bend. Smith's close relative, 11-year-old K.L., lived there, too. K.L. disclosed to a friend at school that she was being sexually abused by Smith. That same day, K.L. was taken to the Casie Center in South Bend, where she was questioned by a trained forensic interviewer. The interview was recorded on videotape.

[3] Afterwards, K.L. and her mother went to St. Joseph Hospital, where K.L. was physically examined by forensic nurse Christina Shuttleworth. K.L. told Nurse Shuttleworth that she had been sexually assaulted by her 21-year-old relative, Mario Smith. K.L. then tested positive for bacterial vaginosis, a condition whose primary cause is sexual intercourse and which, according to Nurse Shuttleworth, is uncommon in an 11-year-old child.

[4] Meanwhile, law enforcement officers went to Smith's place of employment and asked to speak with him. Smith agreed, and a detective thereafter conducted a recorded interview of Smith. This recording later was admitted without objection during Smith's trial as State's Exhibit 5.

[5] Smith initially denied any sexual contact with K.L. but subsequently confessed. He told the detective that K.L. had “come onto” him, that she had performed oral sex on him at least twice, and that she had given him “hand jobs” and rubbed his penis against her vagina. St. Ex. 5 at 21:45-22:15, 30:45-31:20, 34:20-30. He acknowledged his penis “might've” slipped inside her vagina. Id. at 33:15-50, 38:00-20. He explained he was “sexually frustrated” because his girlfriend lived out of town. Id. at 26:05-20.

[6] The State charged Smith with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting and two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting. At Smith's jury trial, K.L. testified with the help of anatomical diagrams to identify the relevant body parts that she could not identify by name. Her testimony showed that Smith's penis had touched her mouth, breasts, and genitals and that his hands had touched her breasts and genitals. She testified that she was eleven years old and living in the duplex with Smith at the time the sexual contact occurred.

[7] While testifying, K.L. remembered some details of the sexual encounters but not others. She could not recall where within the home the first assault occurred, how the encounters would end, or what she had told her friend. She acknowledged that her memory had been better at the time of her Casie Center interview. Based on these gaps in K.L.’s memory, the State moved to publish the recording of K.L.’s Casie Center interview to the jury as a recorded recollection under Evidence Rule 803(5). Smith objected, claiming the recording was hearsay and that K.L.’s memory was not insufficient enough to trigger application of the recorded recollection exception in Evidence Rule 803(5).

[8] The court found that K.L. was “very sparse on details” and that her memory was insufficient enough to satisfy the rule's requirements for playing the videotaped interview to the jury. Tr. Vol. II, p. 64. However, the court did not permit the video to be treated as a trial exhibit that could be brought into the jury room during deliberations. The jury then watched the videotaped interview.

[9] The jury found Smith guilty on all four counts. The trial court sentenced him to a total of 42 years imprisonment, with five years suspended to probation, for the four offenses. Smith appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Smith raises one issue on appeal. He contends the trial court abused its discretion by publishing K.L.’s Casie Center interview under Evidence Rule 803(5), which provides:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: ․

(5) ․ A record that:

(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately;

(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory; and

(C) accurately reflects the witness's knowledge.

If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

[11] Under that rule, K.L.’s videotaped forensic interview could be read into evidence as a recorded recollection—but not admitted as an exhibit—if three requirements were met: (1) the recording concerns a matter K.L. once knew about but now could not recall well enough to testify fully and accurately about; (2) the recording was made or adopted by K.L. when the matter was fresh in her memory; and (3) the recording accurately reflects her knowledge. See id. Smith concedes the second and third requirements were satisfied. He argues only that K.L.’s memory was sufficient for her to testify fully and accurately and, therefore, publishing the videotaped interview was needlessly duplicative.

[12] Though we are not convinced the trial court erred in admitting the recording, even if there was error, it was harmless. “Generally, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.” Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1238 (Ind. 2012). “In viewing the effect of the evidentiary ruling on a defendant's substantial rights, we look to the probable impact on the fact finder.” Id. An error is harmless if the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. Id.

[13] Smith contends any error in admission of the recording was not harmless because K.L.’s credibility was paramount. Playing K.L.’s interview ensured that the jury heard her story twice. Smith alleges this amounted to drumbeat repetition that gave the jury an impermissible reason to believe K.L. and substantially swayed its verdict. But this argument ignores that the State's case also rested on three evidentiary pillars independent of the videotaped forensic interview: (1) Smith's own confession; (2) K.L.’s live trial testimony; and (3) the evidence arising from Nurse Shuttleworth's examination and trial testimony. We address each in turn.

[14] First, and foremost, Smith confessed. His videotaped police interview—admitted without objection—captured him acknowledging his repeated sexual contact with his 11-year-old relative. He admitted that she performed oral sex on him at least twice, including the day before her disclosure. He also admitted she gave him “hand jobs” and rubbed his penis against her vagina. St. Ex. 5 at 30:45-31:20. He acknowledged his penis may have penetrated her vagina. He knew she was a child, given his close familiar relationship to her and his own statements that she was childish and not mature. Smith also told the detective that he was aware the contact was inappropriate. Thus, the Casie Center interview added little to what Smith already had revealed.

[15] Second, K.L. testified at trial to every essential element of each charged offense. She told the jury that Smith's penis had touched her mouth. She also testified that his penis and hands had touched her breasts and vagina. She identified the body parts on anatomical diagrams. She confirmed that she was eleven years old, that these acts occurred at a particular home where they lived, and that it happened more than twice. The uncorroborated testimony of the child victim alone is sufficient to support convictions for child molesting. Bean v. State, 15 N.E.3d 12, 23 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[16] Third, K.L.’s disclosure to Nurse Shuttleworth—admitted without objection as State's Exhibit 7—provided an independent account of the same conduct. K.L. told the nurse she had been sexually assaulted by her 21-year-old relative, Mario Smith. The nurse's chart documented K.L.’s disclosure that Smith had been “touching her, having her perform oral sex on him, and penile to vaginal penetration.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 91. And Nurse Shuttleworth's examination confirmed K.L. had tested positive for bacterial vaginosis, a diagnosis consistent with repeated sexual intercourse and uncommon in an 11-year-old patient. That medical corroboration of Smith's guilt was independent of the Casie Center interview.

[17] Against this mountain of properly admitted evidence, Smith argues the error was not harmless because K.L.’s Casie Center interview caused her to “effectively vouch for herself.” Appellant's Br., p. 11. He suggests that the jury's exposure to K.L.’s repeated and consistent statements bolstered her credibility in the jury's eyes beyond what her live testimony alone would have accomplished. Smith draws on this Court's observation that repetitious hearsay testimony on the same topic risks inundating the jury and lending extra credibility to the declarant. See Kress v. State, 133 N.E.3d 742, 747 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[18] We are not persuaded. The underlying concern in Kress is that a jury's assessment of guilt might turn primarily on whether it believes the complaining witness, making repetitive hearsay dangerously prejudicial. Id. That concern carries little weight here because Smith's own admissions—made in a recorded police interview independent of K.L.’s account—established each element of each offense with which he was charged and convicted. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3 (setting forth the elements of child molesting). Because K.L.’s account was duplicative of the admissions already made by K.L., the concerns from Kress are not present here.

[19] A jury that watches a defendant admit to repeated oral sex and genital contact with his 11-year-old relative does not necessarily need to credit the victim's testimony to convict. It may rely on the words of the person who is the least likely in a criminal jury trial to implicate himself: the defendant. Moreover, the Casie Center interview simply filled in some of the gaps in K.L.’s memory so that her account more closely matched Smith's own recitation of the crimes. On this record, we are confident that the Casie Center interview could not have substantially swayed the verdict. See Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023) (ruling that a trial court's evidentiary error does not require reversal if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence, is sufficiently minor that it does not undermine confidence in the outcome).

[20] Even if the trial court erred in admitting the Casie Center interview, that error was harmless. As Smith raises no other error on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.