Lacy D. Patton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Lacy D. Patton claims that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony and that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay costs and a fine without holding an indigency hearing. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 11, 2023, Pulaski County Sheriff's Deputy Cody Foust initiated a stop of a vehicle driven by Patton due to an expired license plate. A woman, A., who previously had been in a relationship with Patton, and her six-year-old child, were in the back seat of the vehicle. Deputy Foust asked Patton for his license and registration, which Patton provided, and Deputy Foust confirmed that his license plate was expired, learned that his driver's license was also expired, and issued a citation for the expired plate and license. Deputy Foust conducted an inventory search of Patton's vehicle for impoundment and, when he entered it, he smelled the odor of marijuana. In the center console area, Deputy Foust found a plastic bag containing a leafy plant-like substance consistent with marijuana, a plastic bag containing a crystal-like substance, and “a sniffer,” which is “a device commonly used to snort substances.” Transcript Volume III at 179. Patton stated that A. had “nothing to do with whatever's in his vehicle.” Id. at 190. Deputy Foust searched Patton and found “[a] small glass vile [sic] [ ] containing a crystal-like substance inside of it.” Id. at 180. He found the vial in Patton's “right cargo pocket. Not his upper pocket, but the side.” Id. Subsequent testing showed that the vial contained methamphetamine with a net weight of less than 0.01 gram.

[3] The State charged Patton with: Count I, possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony; Count II, possession of marijuana as a class A misdemeanor; and Count III, possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor.¹ In December 2024, the court held a jury trial, and the jury found Patton guilty of possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor under Count II and did not reach a decision on Counts I and III. Patton admitted that he had a prior conviction supporting the elevation of his conviction under Count II to a class A misdemeanor.

[4] In September 2025, the court held a second jury trial on Counts I and III. Deputy Foust testified that he was familiar with the appearance of methamphetamine and had seen methamphetamine hundreds of times. He indicated that he spoke to Patton “about the things that [he] found,” and when asked about Patton's answers, Deputy Foust testified, “They changed.” Id. at 189. Deputy Foust testified, “[h]e went from saying that there was nothing in the vehicle to saying he owns up to what's in the vehicle,” “I asked him about what he was owning up to that was located in the vehicle, and he said he didn't know,” and “[t]hen he started mentioning items that were in the vehicle, and then I specified methamphetamine, and he said yes.” Id. When asked, “at some point, did he accuse you of planting it,” Deputy Foust responded affirmatively. Id. at 190. When asked, “did you [ ] plant that evidence,” he replied, “No,” and when asked, “[w]here did you find it,” he answered, “In his pocket.” Id. Deputy Foust testified that Patton “mentioned that [A.] has nothing to do with whatever's in his vehicle, something to that nature.” Id. On cross-examination, when asked, “[w]hat did [the methamphetamine] look like when you seized it,” Deputy Foust replied, “Uh residual amount is how I'd describe it. It's not enough that I removed it from that container, weigh it on our scale, uh but it's, it's obvious, it's very obvious and present.” Id. at 201. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked, “looking at [the vial,] [b]ased on your training, your experience, do people typically buy this much methamphetamine,” Deputy Foust answered “No,” the prosecutor asked, “what would this ․ be typical of,” and he replied, “[t]hat is typical, you would see that after someone used uh, a bigger amount of methamphetamine.” Id. at 204-205. The jury found Patton guilty of possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony under Count I ² and not guilty of possession of paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor under Count III.

[5] The court held a sentencing hearing. When asked “how do you support yourself now,” Patton stated, “Social Security SSA and now wounded, Wounded Soldier Program.” Transcript Volume IV at 29. When asked why he received benefits from the Wounded Soldier Program, he replied, “I guess because of my hernia.” Id. Patton testified that he cares for his brother who cannot walk. Michelle Griffith testified that she lived with Patton and his brother, that Patton's brother is unable to work, that she received food stamps and did not have money to buy supplies, and that Patton provided money. In closing argument, Patton's counsel stated, “I would ask that the Court permit him to do home detention. Um, he is able to pay the fees with home detention.” Id. at 40. His counsel also stated, “on Count 2, [ ] I would ask that it be just time served with whatever fine the Court deems appropriate.” Id. The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) stated that Patton “reported he receives $1,500.00 in SSA retirement benefits and $844.00 in Wounded Soldier benefits” and that he “reported the following monthly expenses: rent - $500.00 gas - $1,700.00 electric - $200.00 food - $500.00.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 226. The court sentenced Patton to concurrent terms of three years with one year suspended to probation on Count I and one year on Count II. The court ordered, with respect to Count I, that Patton pay a fine of $1.00 and court costs.³ It stated that it would require a $100 probation administrative fee and that he would be required to pay for any drug screens that may be requested by any law enforcement, probation officer, or service provider. The court also stated that Patton would be required to pay fees for a drug and alcohol abuse evaluation. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court asked, “I'm going to go ahead and assume, based upon your indication today that you are not financially able to employ [ ] an attorney ․ for purposes of an appeal,” Patton agreed, and the court stated that it was “going to go ahead [ ] and show that ․ an attorney should be appointed to you for purposes of determining [ ] whether an appeal should be filed, and so we will do that through the public defenders counsel for you and have counsel appointed for the purposes of that appeal.” Transcript Volume IV at 44-45.

Discussion

I.

[6] Patton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Specifically, he asserts the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the methamphetamine knowingly.

[7] When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[8] To obtain a conviction for possession of methamphetamine, the State was required to prove that Patton “knowingly or intentionally possesse[d] methamphetamine (pure or adulterated).” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b) provides, “[a] person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” The State in general must only prove that the defendant possessed an identifiable amount of contraband. See Beeler v. State, 807 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

[9] The record reveals that Deputy Foust searched Patton and found a glass vial containing methamphetamine in a pocket of his pants. When asked, “[w]hat did [the methamphetamine] look like when you seized it,” Deputy Foust replied, “Uh residual amount is how I'd describe it. It's not enough that I removed it from that container, weigh it on our scale, uh but it's, it's obvious, it's very obvious and present.” Transcript Volume III at 201. When asked, “looking at [the vial,] ․ what would this ․ be typical of,” Deputy Foust answered, “That is typical, you would see that after someone used uh, a bigger amount of methamphetamine.” Id. at 204-205. Further, at one point, Patton admitted to Deputy Foust that the items found in the vehicle were his, and he stated that A. had “nothing to do with whatever's in his vehicle.” Id. at 190. Deputy Foust also discovered “a sniffer,” “a device commonly used to [ ] snort substances,” in the center console area of Patton's vehicle. Id. at 179. The State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the vial was used for storing contraband and that Patton knowingly possessed the methamphetamine in the vial. We affirm Patton's conviction for possession of methamphetamine.

II.

[10] Patton argues “the record shows no inquiry into [his] financial circumstances, no indigency hearing, and no determination regarding his ability to pay before imposing financial obligations.” Appellant's Brief at 13. He also argues that the court did not specify the amount of court costs imposed. The State argues the trial court engaged in a sufficient inquiry into Patton's ability to pay. With respect to court costs, it asserts that the chronological case summary (“CCS”) shows a balance due of $405.⁴

[11] An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a trial court's sentencing decisions and to the imposition of costs and fees. Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024). This standard allows reversal only when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.

[12] A trial court is required to conduct a hearing to determine whether a person is indigent before imposing costs or a fine. See Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 (“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent․ (b) A court may impose costs and suspend payment of all or part of the costs until the convicted person has completed all or part of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the costs, the court shall conduct a hearing at the time the costs are due to determine whether the convicted person is indigent.”); Ind. Code § 35-38-1-18 (“(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whenever the court imposes a fine, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent․ (b) A court may impose a fine and suspend payment of all or part of the fine until the convicted person has completed all or part of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the fine, the court shall conduct a hearing at the time the fine is due to determine whether the convicted person is indigent.”).

[13] Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(a) requires a trial court to consider a person's “assets,” “income,” and “necessary expenses” in determining whether the person is indigent. Eversole v. State, 260 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). In Spells, the Indiana Supreme Court held that “the record of an indigency determination must disclose evidence” of those three factors to satisfy the indigency hearing requirement. 225 N.E.3d at 780. The Court noted that the trial court “may consider” a defendant's eligibility for SNAP, TANF, or “another need based public assistance program” as sufficient evidence of indigency, id. at 778 (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(b)), the court may “prorate” fines, fees, and costs to what a defendant “can reasonably afford,” id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(d)),⁵ and a defendant “may be deemed unable to pay one cost, yet able to pay another.” Id. (citation omitted). “Other relevant factors may also need to be examined in an individual case, once brought to the court's attention, such as the defendant's living situation, employment history, potential earnings, social security benefits, state of health, and dependents.” Id. at 779. In Spells, the Court found the indigency determination requirement unsatisfied where the record showed the following:

The trial court first questioned Spells about her means at a pretrial hearing in December 2021. At that time, Spells was working thirty to forty hours a week in daycare, earning $800 gross biweekly, living with her sister, and had no children. We note that the court did not inquire further into Spells's necessary expenses or request dollar amounts for them. The court nonetheless appointed counsel, implicitly finding Spells indigent, and imposed the $100 supplemental public-defender fee.

The trial court next heard evidence of Spells's circumstances at the sentencing hearing in July 2022. Responding to questions from defense counsel, Spells explained that she was employed in full-time elder care. However, she was now living alone and expecting a child for whom she would be the primary financial provider. It was apparent that Spells's circumstances had changed since the pretrial hearing. Yet, no further evidence of her assets, income, or necessary expenses emerged at sentencing. The court found Spells indigent as to probation fees but imposed a fine, costs, and other fees.

Id.

[14] As mentioned above, under Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 and Ind. Code § 35-38-1-18, a court may impose court costs or a fine or may suspend payment until a defendant has served his sentence. Here, the court neither fixed the amount of Patton's court costs nor suspended payment of those costs.

[15] As for the indigency determination requirement by Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(a), while Patton indicated that he received a benefit from Social Security and a benefit from the Wounded Soldier Program, and the PSI indicated those benefits were $1,500 and $844 per month, respectively, and included certain reported expenses, the court did not hear testimony regarding Patton's assets, total income, and necessary expenses. It also did not inquire about his eligibility for a need based public assistance program. Patton indicated that he cares for his brother, and Griffith indicated that Patton's brother was unable to work and that Patton provided money. The record is insufficient to satisfy the indigency determination requirement in Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(a). See Eversole, 260 N.E.3d at 1005 (“The evidence of Eversole's finances was far less revealing than that deemed inadequate in Spells․ Eversole disclosed that he had a dependent child with special needs․ At none of these hearings did the trial court hear evidence of Eversole's assets, potential income, or necessary expenses. The record is therefore insufficient to satisfy the indigency hearing requirement.”); Maze v. State, 262 N.E.3d 190, 193-194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“As our Supreme Court recently explained, now that our legislature ‘firmed up the requirements for determining indigency,’ trial courts ‘must consider three distinct items—assets, income, and necessary expenses—that the legislature deems essential in calculating a defendant's ability to pay. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 778 (citing I.C. § 35-33-7-6.5(a))․ Here, the trial court elicited evidence about Maze's assets and income, learning that Maze initially had access to around $3,000.00 in savings, was unemployed and currently without income, and might be able to re-enter the workforce. Yet, there was inadequate inquiry into Maze's necessary expenses, particularly in light of evidence he needed the money to support himself and a dependent.”); Howard v. State, 236 N.E.3d 735, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“Pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Spells, ․ the trial court erred by assessing the fine, costs, and most of the fees without properly determining whether Howard was indigent.”).

[16] Based on this record, we reverse the trial court's order that Patton pay a fine, costs, and fees. On remand, the court may (1) hold an indigency hearing and enter an amended sentencing order which specifies the amount of costs, any fine, and any fees for which Patton is fully or partially responsible, or (2) suspend payment of any costs, fine, or fees until Patton has served his sentence and conduct an indigency hearing at that time. See Eversole, 260 N.E.3d at 1006 (“We remand for the trial court to conduct or schedule an indigency hearing in conjunction with its imposition on Eversole of any other fine, costs, and fees. That is, the court may either: (1) consider Eversole's ability to pay when imposing the expenses, as prescribed by Indiana Code § 35-38-1-18(a) and Indiana Code § 33-37-2-3(a); or (2) impose the expenses, suspend their payment, and consider Eversole's ability to pay when their payment is due, as prescribed by Indiana Code § 35-38-1-18(b) and Indiana Code § 33-37-2-3(b). We note our Supreme Court's recommendation that, generally, ‘a defendant's financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration.’ Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind. 2002).”). See also Peterson, 2025 WL 2383920 at *4 (“We remand with instructions to the trial court to correct the sentencing order to include the amount of court costs imposed on Peterson. And if the trial court does not suspend payment of those costs, the court shall hold an indigency hearing.”).

[17] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Count I alleged that Patton “did knowingly possess methamphetamine, pure or adulterated the said methamphetamine weighing less than 5 grams while [Patton] was in the physical presence of a child less than eighteen (18) years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 39.

2.   Patton states in his appellant's brief, and the State does not disagree, that “[t]he State made clear throughout the trial and in closing arguments that [he] was charged with Count 1, possession of methamphetamine, as it pertained to the residue found in the glass container Officer Foust stated he found in [his] pocket.” Appellant's Brief at 10 (citing Transcript Volume III at 234-236) (prosecutor arguing “Count 1 is [Patton] knowingly possessed methamphetamine. It is in his pocket․ Checking his pocket, now he's going to check the cargo part․ See, that's not the cargo, because you see the flap. Now you see him open the flap. He has to unbutton it, and then he pulls it out․ That's the case. That's possession of methamphetamine.”)).

3.   The court did not specify the amount of court costs.

4.   We decline the State's invitation to determine court costs based on the CCS. See Peterson v. State, No. 25ACR-635, 2025 WL 2383920 at *3 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2025) (“We decline the State's invitation to discern the amount of court costs by visiting the certified CCS, which the State found on mycase.in.gov.”).

5.   Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(d), as it existed at the time Spells was issued, is now found at Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6.5(e). See Pub. Law No. 111-2024, § 17 (eff. Jul. 1, 2024).

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.