IN RE: The Paternity of D.A.; (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Leroy Alexander (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order that denied his petition to modify custody of his seven-year-old son, D.A. (“D.A.”). Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his petition. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father's petition to modify custody of D.A.

Facts

[3] Father and Olliya Schoos-Combs (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) are the parents of D.A., who was born in May 2018. Parents never married, and in May 2022, Father filed a petition to establish D.A.’s paternity. In July 2022, following a virtual hearing, the trial court issued an order finding that Father had established D.A.’s paternity by affidavit and by Parents’ stipulation on the record. Thereafter, in October 2022, following a virtual hearing, the trial court issued an order awarding Mother sole legal custody and Parents joint physical custody of D.A. In addition, the trial court ordered Parents to “continue to work together to arrange a schedule of equal physical custody and parenting time with [D.A.].” (App. Vol. 2 at 28).

[4] On July 29, 2023, DCS received a report that Mother and her partner, Jaylen Leach (“Leach”), were physically abusing D.A. The report specifically alleged that Leach had given D.A. “wedgies.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 42). According to the report, D.A. had stated that “ ‘wedgies’ mean[t] that [Leach] w[ould] come up behind him and pull his underwear in a motion that it w[ould] then go up the cheeks of his buttocks.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 42). The report also alleged that D.A. had stated that Leach had made him hold cans of food as punishment. In addition, the report alleged that D.A. had stated that he had been “hit with a belt when in trouble.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 42). One week later, on August 7, 2023, a DCS family case manager completed an investigation and determined that the abuse was unsubstantiated. It appears that Mother and Leach entered into a safety plan wherein they agreed to no longer spank D.A.

[5] On August 16, 2023, Father, acting pro se, filed a petition to modify custody of D.A. In this petition, Father alleged, in relevant part, that there was a substantial change in the following circumstances:

Shortly after the final ruling Mother and [Leach] have began residing under the same roof with [D.A.]․ Mother has allowed [Leach] to punish [D.A.] in manners justified by her and [Leach]․ [D.A.] has alleged that [Leach] abuses, neglects and harasses [D.A.] when in Mother's care. Father has attempted to address [D.A.]’s concerns to both Mother & [Leach] on multiple occasions which resulted in ․ Father's fury․

(App. Vol. 2 at 33) (grammatical errors in the original). Father also filed a motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, which the trial court denied that same day.

[6] Later in August 2023, Father obtained counsel. Also, late in August 2023, Mother obtained a two-year order of protection enjoining Father from threatening to commit or committing acts of harassment against Mother and Leach.

[7] In February 2024, DCS received a report that Mother and Leach had neglected D.A. by “making [D.A.] wear pulls ups” and “not taking him to the doctor for his accidents.” (Ex. Vol. 1 at 45). A DCS family case manager investigated the report and determined that the alleged neglect was unsubstantiated.

[8] Later in February 2024, Father filed another motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, which the trial court granted. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem (“the GAL”) in April 2024, and the GAL accepted her appointment in September 2024. During the pendency of the proceedings, the trial court held regular virtual status conferences.

[9] On May 16, 2025, the GAL issued her report, wherein she recommended that Father be awarded primary physical custody of D.A. According to her report, the GAL was “concerned about the punishments used in Mother's home.” (App. Vol. 2 at 75). Specifically, the GAL believed that DCS had instructed Mother to stop using wall sits as a disciplinary technique and to stop allowing Leach to punish D.A. The GAL alleged that Mother was still using wall sits as a disciplinary technique and was still allowing Leach to punish D.A.

[10] One week later, Mother filed an objection to the GAL's report. Specifically, Mother alleged that the GAL's recommendation had “rel[ied] almost entirely on allegations made by [Father],” who was “the subject of a current protective order[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 137). According to Mother, “[t]he GAL's failure to fully address or incorporate this [protective] order into her recommendations constitute[d] a serious oversight.” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 137). Further, in her objection, Mother stated that DCS had not instructed her to stop using wall sits as a form of discipline. Rather, according to Mother, DCS had only instructed her and Leach to stop spanking D.A., and she and Leach had followed those instructions. Mother further stated that the only evidence that the GAL had that she and Leach were still spanking D.A. had come from Father's “unverified statements.” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 138).

[11] The trial court held a virtual hearing on Father's petition to modify custody on June 2, 2025. At the beginning of the hearing, the trial court admitted the GAL's report into evidence over Mother's objection. The GAL, Father, and Mother testified at the hearing. The gravamen of Father's testimony was that the disciplinary techniques used by Mother and Leach constituted a substantial change of circumstances that merited a modification of D.A.’s custody. According to Father, who became very emotional during his testimony, it “ha[d] not been made clear to [him] that [D.A.] [was] safe” with Mother and Leach. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65). Father also testified that D.A. had “not talk[ed] about” the treatment that he had received in Mother's home. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 65).

[12] Mother, who appeared pro se at the hearing, testified that during DCS’ investigation of the alleged abuse, the family case manager had instructed her and Leach to stop spanking D.A. but had not instructed them to stop using wall sits as a disciplinary technique. According to Mother, she and Leach had complied with DCS’ instructions to stop spanking D.A. Mother further testified that Leach had never punished D.A. with wedgies. In addition, Mother testified that Leach and D.A. had stopped horseplaying following DCS’ first investigation because her job as a DCS family visitation facilitator had been impacted by DCS’ investigation. Mother further testified that D.A. had “always been happy and cared for” and that D.A. loved Leach. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 93). During Mother's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence several family photographs of Mother, Leach, their young daughter, and D.A.

[13] In August 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Father's petition to modify custody of D.A. That order provides, in relevant part, as follows:

8. Father alleges Mother has allowed her boyfriend, Jaylen Leach to punish [D.A.] in manners justified by Mother. Specifically, Father states that Jaylen Leach abuses, neglects and harasses [D.A.] when in Mother's care. [D.A.] has known [Leach] since 2022. While Mother does admit that Jaylen Leach has punished [D.A.], she denies that it has risen to the level of abuse, neglect or harassment.

9. Two reports were made to DCS and have been unsubstantiated. Mother testified Jaylen Leach no longer “spanks” [D.A.] following the DCS reports.

10. The GAL was concerned about Mother's boyfriend, Jaylen Leach providing corporal punishment for [D.A.] specifically giving a wedgie to [D.A.] the week of his birthday. Mother states she was present and denies that [D.A.] was given a wedgie as punishment, but rather as horseplay.

* * * * *

12. The Court finds that Father is overstating incidents between Jaylen Leach and [D.A.] as a means to an end of changing custody.

13. The Court does not find credible the allegations that Jaylen Leach is abusing, neglecting, or harassing [D.A.].

(App. Vol. 2 at 19-20).

[14] Father now appeals.

Decision

[15] At the outset, we note that Mother did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee does not submit a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for that party. Easterday v. Everhart, 201 N.E.3d 264, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Instead, we apply a less strict standard of review and may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Id. Prima facie error is “error at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (cleaned up). “Still, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[16] Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to modify custody of D.A. We disagree.

[17] Due to Indiana's preference for deferring to the trial court in family law matters, we review the trial court's custody modification decision for an abuse of discretion. Matter of Paternity of A.R.S., 198 N.E.3d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We recognize that “[a]ppellate courts are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record[ ] and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony ․, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we neither reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility. In re Paternity of C.S., 964 N.E.2d 879, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Rather, we reverse only if the trial court's custody determination is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id.

[18] Indiana Code § 31-14-13-6 provides that a trial court may not modify an existing child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the child; and (2) there has been a substantial change in one or more of the statutory factors that the trial court may consider under Indiana Code § 31-14-13-2. These factors include:

(1) The age and sex of the child.

(2) The wishes of the child's parents.

(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.

(4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:

(A) the child's parents;

(B) the child's siblings; and

(C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest.

(5) The child's adjustment to home, school, and community.

(6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

(7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent.

(8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian[.]

Ind. Code § 31-14-13-2. As the party seeking a custody modification, Father had the burden to prove these elements. See In re Paternity of B.D.D., 779 N.E.2d 9, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[19] Here, Father contends that “[t]he trial court erred in finding there had not been a substantial change in circumstances to justify a change of custody from Mother to Father, ignoring the allegations of abuse by Mother's partner.” (Father's Br. 11). However, the trial court was under no obligation to credit any of Father's testimony regarding these allegations and apparently did not. Indeed, after hearing Parents and the GAL testify at the custody modification hearing, the trial court specifically found that Father's allegations that Leach was abusing, neglecting, or harassing D.A. were not credible. Father's argument is simply a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See C.S., 964 N.E.2d at 883.¹

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father also argues that “[t]he trial court erred in conducting a child custody hearing virtually without any finding that it was a necessity and issued an Order that should be vacated.” (Father's Br. 16). However, Father did not object, either before or during the final hearing, to the trial court holding the hearing virtually. This Court has previously explained that “[a] party cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.” C.S., 964 N.E.2d at 886. Therefore, Father has waived appellate review of this issue. See id. We further note that most, if not all, of the hearings in this matter were held virtually, and Father did not object to any of the virtual hearings.Father also argues that “[t]he trial court's delay in bringing this matter to trial deprived Father of his opportunity to be awarded primary physical custody by allowing Mother to attempt to remedy her behavior in the care of [D.A.].” (Father's Br. 19). We note that Father filed his petition to modify in August 2023, and the trial court held the final hearing in June 2025. However, our review of the record reveals that Father did not object, during the pendency of the proceedings, to any delay in the final hearing. Therefore, he has waived appellate review of this issue. See C.S., 964 N.E.2d at 886. We further note that any delay in the final hearing appears to have been attributable to the GAL completing her final report. Specifically, as soon as the GAL filed her final report in May 2025, the trial court held the final hearing. We also note that Father was the party who had requested the appointment of the GAL.

Pyle, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.