Timmy Taylor, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Timmy Taylor appeals his conviction for Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the afternoon of January 19, 2024, Taylor drove his friend, Dereka Daniels, to pick up her daughter from school. Before arriving at the school, Taylor smoked marijuana in his car and then sprayed air freshener to cover up the smell. He and Daniels picked up her daughter, and then Taylor began driving them home. At the time, Lawrence Police Department Officer Andrew Thorup was on patrol with Officer Roberto Santiago in his car. Officer Thorup saw Taylor change lanes without signaling and initiated a traffic stop. Taylor continued driving for about a block and then pulled over around 46th Street and Brookhaven Drive.

[3] Officer Thorup approached the passenger side of Taylor's car, and Officer Santiago approached the driver's side. Officer Thorup noticed a “designer marijuana bag” with “weed symbols on it,” which is “commonly associated with possession of marijuana,” in the center console. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 111. He also smelled the odor of “blunt blaster,” which is a spray used to “mask the odor of marijuana.” Id. From the driver's side, Officer Santiago could smell the odor of marijuana coming from inside the car. Officer Thorup called a K-9 officer to the scene. In the meantime, Officer Thorup ran Taylor's license and registration and learned that Taylor has prior convictions for burglary and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

[4] The K-9 officer arrived and conducted an open-air sniff, and the K-9 alerted to the odor of narcotics on both the driver and passenger sides of the car. Officer Thorup began searching the car and noticed the butt of a handgun under the steering column. Based on his training and experience, Officer Thorup knew that “this is a common area [to] find items that are of concern” and that “people put things there ․ to hide them from plain view.” Id. at 115. After discovering the handgun, Officer Thorup called Officer Cody Anderson, a firearms liaison, to the scene to recover it. Officer Anderson retrieved the gun, a black Taurus 9-millimeter, from underneath the steering column and transported it to the Lawrence Police Department for processing. Taylor was arrested and also taken to the police department by another officer.

[5] At the station, Officer Anderson asked Taylor if his DNA would be on the gun, and Taylor said no because the gun was his father's. Officer Anderson took the gun to the processing room and collected three swabs from different parts of the gun. In the meantime, Officer Thorup applied for a search warrant to obtain a buccal swab from Taylor for comparison to any DNA recovered from the gun. The search-warrant affidavit stated that there was an investigation at 46th Street and Brookhaven Drive for “Possession of firearm by Serious Violent Felon.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 158. The body of the affidavit consisted of a four-paragraph narrative titled, “The Investigation.” Id. (capitalization omitted). Officer Thorup detailed the date, time, location, and purpose of the traffic stop and that Taylor was identified as the driver of the car. He then described the open-air sniff and the K-9's alert. The affidavit further stated:

Officer Thorup began a probable cause search of the [vehicle] and immediately located a Taurus G3 S/N ********* underneath the steering column within immediate reach of Timmy Taylor.

Officer Thorup knows from his training and experience as a police officer and numerous firearms investigations that it is possible to compare potential DNA recovered from items of evidence to known DNA standards from individuals.

Id. at 159. But the affidavit didn't specify why Taylor qualifies as a serious violent felon and is therefore prohibited from possessing a firearm. A magistrate issued the warrant, and Officer Thorup collected a buccal swab from Taylor.

[6] The crime lab tested the buccal swab and the swabs from the gun. The third swab from the gun, which was taken from the bullet headstamps and the magazine, contained DNA from three individuals. (The results from the first two swabs were inconclusive.) The DNA profile from the third swab was “130 billion times more likely if it originated from Timmy Taylor and two unknown individuals than if it had originated from three unknown, unrelated individuals,” which “provides very strong support for the inclusion of Timmy Taylor.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 187.

[7] The State charged Taylor with Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (based on a 2015 conviction for Class B felony burglary with a deadly weapon) and alleged that he is a habitual offender.¹ Taylor moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his car, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court denied the motion. The day before trial, Taylor filed another motion to suppress, this time seeking suppression of the DNA evidence obtained from his buccal swab. He argued that the warrant authorizing the buccal swab wasn't supported by probable cause because the search-warrant affidavit didn't explicitly state that Taylor was prohibited from possessing a firearm (beyond the general statement that there was an investigation into possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon). After holding a hearing, the trial court denied Taylor's motion.

[8] At trial, the court admitted the buccal swab and the DNA evidence recovered from the gun over Taylor's objection. Taylor's father, Timmy Taylor, Sr., testified that he occasionally used Taylor's car when his own car wasn't working. He recalled borrowing Taylor's car one evening five days before Taylor's arrest. Timmy Sr. believed he'd taken his gun, a black Taurus 9-millimeter, with him that evening and put it in the glove box of Taylor's car, but he forgot to take it out after he finished using the car.

[9] The jury found Taylor guilty of Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon but couldn't reach a verdict on the habitual-offender enhancement, so the trial court declared a mistrial as to that allegation. Taylor was retried on the habitual-offender allegation in March 2025, and the jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced Taylor to a total term of 16 years, with 8 years executed in the Department of Correction and 8 years suspended.

[10] Taylor now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Taylor contends that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence obtained from his buccal swab. While we generally review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, when a challenge to such a ruling is based on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, our review is de novo. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2007).

I. Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated

A. Probable Cause

[12] Taylor first argues that the search warrant authorizing the buccal swab was invalid because it wasn't supported by probable cause. The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” In determining whether a police officer's affidavit sets forth probable cause to issue a search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “Put differently, the central question in a probable cause determination is whether the affidavit presents facts, together with reasonable inferences, demonstrating a sufficient nexus between the suspected criminal activity and the specific place to be searched.” Id. at 1128. “[T]he duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 1128 n.7.

[13] Taylor claims that the warrant authorizing the buccal swab wasn't supported by probable cause because the search-warrant affidavit didn't allege that he is a serious violent felon prohibited from possessing a firearm. He relies on Herron v. State, 44 N.E.3d 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. There, a police officer applied for and was granted a warrant to draw Herron's blood to determine whether she was operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The search-warrant affidavit contained no written narrative; it was a form affidavit consisting of boilerplate language for an operating-a-vehicle-while-intoxicated investigation, and the officer merely checked boxes and filled in blanks on the form. The boilerplate language included the following statements: “Blood in such person, which is evidence of the crime of operating a vehicle/motor vehicle while intoxicated ․ and tends to show that said person committed such offense,” and “In the course of my duties, I had occasion to investigate ․ the scene of an operating a vehicle while intoxicated.” Id. at 834. The officer also left some material sections of the affidavit blank. Herron moved to exclude the evidence obtained from the blood draw on the ground that the warrant lacked probable cause, and the trial court denied her motion.

[14] In an interlocutory appeal, we reversed, holding that the affidavit failed to set forth probable cause to issue a warrant—although the affidavit alleged that Herron was intoxicated, it didn't allege that she operated a motor vehicle, which “is crucial to whether there was probable cause that the crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated was committed.” Id. at 835. We found that the boilerplate language referencing the crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, without facts particular to Herron, was insufficient to establish probable cause. We noted that a magistrate reading the affidavit “would clearly have a substantial basis to believe that [the affiant-officer] meant to allege that Herron operated a vehicle while intoxicated, but would not have a substantial basis to find probable cause that Herron actually did commit that offense.” Id. at 837.

[15] Here, Officer Thorup began his affidavit by stating that there was an investigation into “Possession of firearm by Serious Violent Felon.” He described the traffic stop, K-9 sniff, and his subsequent probable-cause search of Taylor's car. Officer Thorup explained that he found a handgun underneath the steering column within immediate reach of Taylor, and that he knew “from his training and experience as a police officer and numerous firearms investigations that it is possible to compare potential DNA recovered from items of evidence to known DNA standards from individuals.” Taylor contends that because these facts don't include any allegation that he is a serious violent felon, which is an element of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, the affidavit failed to set forth probable cause that evidence of this crime would be uncovered from the buccal swab. We must agree.

[16] Although Officer Thorup stated that he was investigating possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and that a firearm was found within Taylor's reach, the affidavit contained no allegations of Taylor's prior convictions, that he is a serious violent felon, or that he is otherwise prohibited from possessing a firearm. Without such allegations, the affidavit fails to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between obtaining a buccal swab from Taylor and the suspected crime of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The State argues that Officer Thorup's statement about DNA comparison “leads to the reasonable conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that obtaining Taylor's buccal swab and comparing it to the gun would lead to evidence that the crime had occurred.” Appellee's Br. p. 13. But as we remarked in Herron, while a magistrate would certainly have a substantial basis to conclude that Officer Thorup meant to allege that Thomas was a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm, the facts as alleged don't provide a substantial basis to find probable cause that Thomas committed that crime such that evidence of the crime would be uncovered by a buccal swab.

[17] The search warrant authorizing the buccal swab was not supported by probable cause and was therefore invalid.

B. Good-Faith Exception

[18] Notwithstanding the invalidity of the warrant, the State contends that exclusion of the buccal swab wasn't required under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. “Suppression of illegally obtained evidence is not required if the police relied on the warrant in objective good faith,” Heuring v. State, 140 N.E.3d 270, 277 (Ind. 2020) (quotation omitted), meaning they “acted in objectively reasonable reliance on what they thought was a valid warrant,” Wright v. State, 108 N.E.3d 307, 314 (Ind. 2018) (quotation omitted). Belief in a warrant's validity is not reasonable if the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Heuring, 140 N.E.3d at 277. Our inquiry is not into what the affiant-officer subjectively believed—it is one of “objective reasonableness,” i.e., whether a “reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.” Id. Because “a primary objective of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct,” our Supreme Court has cautioned against construing this exception “so broadly ․ as to obliterate the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 277-78.

[19] Taylor argues that, like in Herron, the good-faith exception doesn't apply here. In Herron, we noted the “public policy of incentivizing better police behavior” and held that the good-faith exception didn't apply because the affidavit lacked indicia of probable cause. 44 N.E.3d at 838. As explained above, the affidavit there was a “prefabricated form” for an operating-a-vehicle-while-intoxicated investigation. Id. at 836. The affiant-officer left several sections of the form blank, including the prompts stating, “[I] observed erratic and/or unlawful motor vehicle operation as follows․” and “I believe that above-named individual was the operator of the motor vehicle in question because․” Id. at 834-35. We explained that although the use of boilerplate language alone doesn't call the validity of a warrant into question, upholding a warrant based on “pure boilerplate without any facts specific to the search at issue ․ would be to turn magistrates into the kind of rubber stamp they cannot and should not be.” Id. at 836 (quotation omitted). We concluded that affirming the affidavit “would come much too close to the obliteration of the exclusionary rule that our Supreme Court has cautioned against.” Id. at 838.

[20] Unlike the affidavit in Herron, Officer Thorup's affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in the validity of the resulting search warrant would be entirely unreasonable. Officer Thorup didn't use a form affidavit or boilerplate language; he provided a four-paragraph narrative detailing his investigation into Taylor. He stated that there was an investigation at 46th Street and Brookhaven Drive for possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and described the traffic stop and K-9 sniff leading up to the search of Taylor's car. Officer Thorup explained that he found a gun within Taylor's reach and gave context for why he was seeking to obtain Taylor's DNA. Given all of these facts specific to the search at issue, we cannot say a reasonably well-trained officer reading the affidavit would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. Unlike Herron, applying the good-faith exception here doesn't turn the magistrate into a “rubber stamp” or risk obliteration of the exclusionary rule.

[21] Because reliance on the search warrant to obtain a buccal swab from Taylor was in objective good faith, Taylor's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The trial court therefore did not err in admitting the DNA evidence from the swab.

II. Taylor's rights under Article 1, Section 11 were not violated

[22] Taylor also argues that the buccal swab constituted an unreasonable search under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Taylor acknowledges that he didn't object on Indiana constitutional grounds in the trial court.² See Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Ind. 2011) (“[A] defendant may not argue one ground for an objection to the admission of evidence at trial and then raise new grounds on appeal.”). Failure to raise an objection at trial normally results in waiver and precludes appellate review unless the admission of evidence constitutes fundamental error. Id. Thus, Taylor must establish fundamental error on appeal.

[23] Although Article 1, Section 11 is worded similarly to the Fourth Amendment, we interpret it independently and “ask whether the State has shown that a particular search or seizure was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 191 (Ind. 2021). As just explained, in obtaining the buccal swab from Taylor, Officer Thorup acted in objectively reasonable reliance on what he thought was a valid warrant. For the same reasons described above, collecting the buccal swab was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial court therefore did not err, much less commit fundamental error, in admitting the DNA evidence.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also charged Taylor with Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana but dismissed that charge before trial.

2.   Taylor claims that although he “did not object specifically on Indiana constitutional grounds” in the trial court, he nonetheless “preserve[d] the issue for this Court to review” because he cited to Heuring in his motion to suppress, and “Heuring specifically employed the Indiana Constitution in its analysis.” Appellant's Br. pp. 23-24. We find this argument unpersuasive.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.