IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.S.J. (Minor Child); M.J.P. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.P. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to C.J. (“Child”). Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights because she had remedied the conditions that led to Child's removal. We disagree, and accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court clearly erred by terminating Mother's parental rights.

Facts

[3] Child was born in January 2023, to Mother and S.J. (“Father”).¹ At the time of Child's birth, Mother was under a dispositional order with the Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Mother's three older children had been removed from her care and placed in DCS wardship due to concerns about Mother's alcohol abuse and unsanitary home conditions.² DCS did not receive reports from the hospital at the time of Child's birth regarding neglect or abuse, and Child remained with Mother.

[4] On August 2, 2023, while working with Mother's three older children, a DCS family case manager observed that the conditions in Mother's home were deplorable. Child was approximately six months old at that time. DCS removed Child from Mother's care and filed a verified petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 on August 3, 2023. Karla Polley was assigned as Child's family case manager (“FCM Polley”) for the duration of Child's case. Mother is not fluent in English, speaks only the Chuj language, and did not attend school in her native or home country Guatemala. DCS provided Chuj interpreters to Mother for most of her visitations and services.

[5] On October 19, 2023, Mother, with counsel, entered into an agreed stipulation regarding the CHINS petition and an agreed dispositional order. The dispositional order reflected the case manager's observations that Mother's home was “cluttered, littered with trash, moldy food, and dirty diapers scattered throughout the home” and that “[c]ockroaches and evidence of other pests were also observed.” Ex. Vol. III p. 6. Pursuant to the dispositional order, DCS maintained wardship of Child, Child's out-of-home placement continued, and orders consistent with a permanency plan of reunification were entered.

[6] The dispositional order also required Mother to, among other things, allow DCS to make announced or unannounced visits to her home and to submit to random drug screens. Mother was referred for home-based case management to address housing, parenting skills, and maintenance of a clean and sanitary home; supervised visitation; a substance-use assessment; and individual therapy. Mother had regularly scheduled supervised visits with Child every Monday at the DCS office. FCM Polley picked Mother up at her apartment, drove her to the DCS office for her visit with Child, and drove her home following the visits. Mother had “excellent attendance” with the court-ordered services and was consistent with her visitations. Tr. Vol. II pp. 31, 70. Mother, however, struggled to understand the “big picture” and retain the skills she learned from the services. Id. at 31. And Mother did not progress beyond supervised visitation.

[7] During the pendency of the case, Mother had one positive drug screen for methamphetamine on August 3, 2023, and four positive alcohol screens on August 10, 2023, August 21, 2023, February 6, 2024, and March 7, 2024. Mother took scheduled drug tests during her regularly scheduled Monday supervised visits, and she did not test positive for substances after March 7, 2024, through the date of the fact-finding hearing. FCM Polley attempted to conduct unannounced visits at Mother's home and administer random drug screens, but Mother was unavailable when FCM Polley visited.

[8] On June 24, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. DCS alleged, in part, that “there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 12. The fact-finding hearing was held on April 9, 2025, and July 23, 2025. At the hearing, Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) Deena Personett, FCM Laurie Dakuras,³ FCM Polley, supervised visitation provider Andrea Heide, and a maintenance employee at Mother's apartment complex, Farron Dyer, testified regarding the conditions of Mother's apartment and Mother's progress during the pendency of the CHINS proceeding.

[9] CASA Personett testified that there had been ongoing concerns about Mother's alcohol abuse, which was one of the reasons Mother's three older children were removed from her care. Personett also had concerns about “the unidentified people who were in and out of [Mother's] apartment at all times.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Personett described her observation of Mother's apartment and stated: “there is dirt on the floors ․ dangerous cleaners on the floors. The food in the refrigerator appears not to all be good.” Id. at 8. Personett further testified that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interests.

[10] FCM Polley expressed concerns about Mother's substance abuse, financial situation, home sanitation, and participation in court-ordered services. Polley testified that Mother had one positive screen for methamphetamine on August 3, 2023, when Child was removed from Mother's care, and four positive alcohol screens thereafter. The most recent positive alcohol screen was on March 7, 2024, during a visit with Child. Mother did not have any positive screens after March 7, 2024.

[11] It became increasingly difficult to gain access to Mother's home for “unannounced” and “unscheduled” visits to “administer random drug screens.” Id. at 40-41. Polley recalled that “[t]here have been times that unidentified men that were in the home answered the door and told me that [Mother] was not home.” Id. at 63. On or around April 12, 2025, when Polley attempted to make an unannounced visit, she heard loud music in the building, and the music became “louder” as she approached Mother's apartment door. Id. No one in the apartment answered the door when Polley knocked, and the “loud music, laughing, [and] giggling” continued. Id. After Polley knocked a few more times, the music was “turned off,” and she heard “a shh shh shh” before the noises went silent. Id. at 64. No one answered the door. “Since April, [Polley] [ ] had one time where [she] was able to visit [Mother] unannounced in the home outside of a Monday.”⁴ Id. at 63.

[12] Polley testified that Mother was at risk of having her electricity shut off and that “her rent was behind” due to financial strains. Tr. Vol. II p. 26. Mother admitted, however, that she had been “sending money back to Guatemala to her family” and to men who “bring others to the United States for large sums of money.” Id. at 27. Mother's improvement in the conditions of her home was inconsistent and unsustainable. Although the bathroom was clean, other areas of the apartment were unsuitable and not at or above “minimum standards” for home conditions for a child of Child's age. Id. at 25. Despite Mother's “excellent attendance” and genuine effort across services, Mother struggled to translate that effort into meaningful and sustained progress. Id. at 31. At the time of the hearing, Polley opined that Mother was no closer to “developing the parenting skills needed than she was prior to [Child's] birth.” Id. at 32. Polley also testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[13] At the April 9, 2025 hearing, Andrea Heide, the supervised visitation provider from January 2024 to February 2024, also testified. Heide testified that Mother showed that “she loved her daughter.” Tr. Vol. II p. 44. On one occasion, Mother allowed Child to play with Legos, which were not age-appropriate for Child, and, within minutes, Child began “putting Legos into her mouth,” creating a choking hazard. Id. On another occasion, Mother attempted to give Child an Oreo cookie, but “[Child] didn't have teeth at the time.” Id. Mother also provided “fruit loops” and other age-inappropriate food. Id.

[14] Farron Dyer, a maintenance employee at Mother's apartment complex, also testified regarding the condition of Mother's apartment and issues related to Mother's rent. Dyer testified that Mother had disconnected the drain underneath her kitchen sink and allowed water to pool throughout her apartment, damaging the apartment beneath hers. Dyer received complaints about “loud parties” in Mother's apartment and that, when he went to the apartment to address the complaints, he did not see a party but observed “a bunch of alcoholic beverages,” consisting of about “20 or 30” drinks. Id. at 57 Mother had also accumulated “three violations” against the policy of apartment management, which placed her at risk of eviction. Id. at 57-58.

[15] On August 5, 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court found, among other things, that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the dispositional orders, that no progress toward reunification was being made, that the current status quo was not likely to change in any reasonable timeframe, and that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied, even if Mother were given more time. The trial court concluded that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child's best interests and that DCS had a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment—that plan being adoption. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[17] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.⁵ Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[18] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).⁶

[19] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

A. The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[20] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”⁷ Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[21] Here, the CHINS proceeding was initiated due to the conditions of Mother's apartment and Mother's abuse of alcohol. Child was removed from Mother's residence after a family case manager observed deplorable conditions in Mother's apartment while the FCM was working with Mother and her three older children. Mother's apartment was cluttered with trash and dirty diapers on the floor, and the FCM also observed evidence of cockroaches and other pests. The photographs taken on August 2, 2023, show that the apartment was in an unsanitary condition and not suitable for Child. The photographs also show what appears to be uncleaned blood stains on the floor and spoiled food in the kitchen and refrigerator.

[22] Over the approximately two-year period that the CHINS case remained open, the conditions in Mother's apartment improved at times but did not consistently meet minimum standards for a young child. Photographs taken on June 30, 2025, and July 14, 2025, show that Mother's apartment remained messy, with items on the floor throughout the apartment, what appears to be uncleaned blood stains on the wall, and bagged trash stacked in the kitchen. Despite Mother's efforts to clean the apartment, its conditions did not significantly improve to a sanitary standard.

[23] Mother argues that she “tried very hard” to change the conditions, enrolled in the requested DCS services, and that “she love[s] [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 44. DCS does not dispute that Mother loves her Child or that she has made genuine efforts to improve. Mother's good intentions, however, did not translate into sufficient progress toward reunification. Although DCS acknowledged that Mother had “excellent attendance” at services, Mother struggled to retain the skills and concepts she learned and often defaulted to prior habits. Id. at 31. The record also reflects that the most substantial change Mother made to the condition of the apartment occurred shortly before the termination hearing, when she repainted the apartment and submitted limited photographs depicting its condition.

[24] Next, Mother argues that she had thirteen months of clean drug and alcohol screening results, demonstrating that she had remedied her alcohol abuse. Mother did not test positive for alcohol after March 7, 2024, which was approximately thirteen months before the first hearing date. This record, however, is tempered by evidence that most of Mother's screens, particularly those closer in time to the fact-finding hearing, were not randomly administered. FCM Polley testified that she attempted to make “unannounced” and “unscheduled” visits to Mother's home to administer random screens, but the majority of those attempts were unsuccessful. Tr. Vol. II pp. 40-41, 63-64. Additionally, multiple witnesses observed empty beer cans and other alcohol containers in Mother's apartment on multiple occasions. Although the witnesses could not confirm whether Mother consumed the alcohol, the evidence supports the trial court's concern that Mother's sobriety could not be reliably assessed without random screening.

[25] Furthermore, multiple witnesses testified that unidentified men regularly came in and out of Mother's apartment. Mother sometimes identified the men as family members or friends but did not provide identifying information to DCS. The presence of unidentified adults in the home supported concerns about the safety and stability of the home for a young child.

[26] The trial court acted within its discretion to consider Mother's overall pattern of conduct during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings rather than any “efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding that the conditions resulting in Child's removal would not be remedied is not clearly erroneous. Mother's arguments to the contrary are, in substance, requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

B. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[27] Mother next challenges the trial court's determination that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests.⁸ In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[28] Both the FCM and CASA testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Although Mother had “excellent attendance” at services and showed love toward Child, Mother struggled to retain and maintain the skills she learned through services designed to provide foundational parenting skills. Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Mother also failed to demonstrate that she could effectively and consistently manage her alcohol abuse. In foster care, Child was placed with her three biological siblings and received services to address her developmental and health needs. Further, at the time of the hearing, Mother was at risk of eviction and having her electricity shut off, and the condition of her apartment remained uncertain as to whether it met minimum standards of sanitation and safety. Given these circumstances, the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[29] The trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights in October 2023, and is, therefore, not a party to this appeal.

2.   Mother's parental rights to those three children were involuntarily terminated on August 24, 2024.

3.   FCM Dakuras participated in the court-ordered removal of Child on August 2, and her observations regarding the conditions of the apartment were reflected in the CHINS order. FCM Dakuras did not testify regarding anything after that date.

4.   It is unclear from the record whether a random drug screen was administered at that time.

5.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

6.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024. DCS filed its petition in June 2024, under the new version of the statute. The statute was also later amended effective July 1, 2025, but we apply the version in effect at the time DCS filed the petition.

7.   Mother argues that she “was not provided with notice” of three alleged circumstances under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(2) and was denied procedural due process. Appellant's Br. p. 15. Mother, however, later conceded that she “confines her argument” to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(3). Id. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) provides that “[a] petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, DCS was required to prove only one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). Here, the trial court found a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and sufficient evidence supports that conclusion. We, therefore, do not address whether Mother had notice under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)(2).

8.   Mother concedes in her appellate brief that DCS's plan for Child to be adopted by the current foster family is “legally sufficient.” Appellant's Br. p. 13.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur