IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.G. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to A.E. and B.E. (together, “the Children”). Mother raises the following restated issues for our review:

I. Whether there was sufficient evidence supporting certain findings of fact;

II. Whether the trial court's judgment that Mother's parental rights should be terminated was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[2] Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother is the biological mother of the Children, B.E. born in September 2010 and A.E. born in February 2014.¹ Prior to the present proceedings, the family had a history of contact with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). On April 29, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) due to domestic violence between Mother and the Children's biological father (“Father”) (together, “the Parents”). See Ex. Vol. IV pp. 39–41; 57–60. In July 2016, the Children were adjudicated CHINS based on the Parents’ admissions, and in April 2017—almost one year later—the trial court granted DCS's request to terminate its wardship of the Children.

[4] In January 2019, DCS again became involved with the family after receiving a report of domestic violence in the home. See Ex. Vol. III p. 221. In March 2019, the trial court approved a program of informal adjustment (“IA”). In May 2019, DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care and filed a CHINS petition alleging the Children were CHINS due to domestic violence between the Parents and the Parents’ substance abuse. In June 2019, the Parents admitted to the to allegations in the petition, and the trial court adjudicated the Children CHINS. The trial court subsequently issued an order discharging the Parents’ IA as unsuccessful in July 2019. In January 2022, the trial court granted DCS's request for Wardship Termination, and the Children were returned to Mother's care due to her maintaining sobriety, completion of addiction treatment, participating in Mental Health Court, and keeping the no contact order in place with Father.

[5] However, in June 2022, after receiving a report of neglect and allegations of domestic violence between Mother and her then-boyfriend, T.L. (“Boyfriend”), DCS again became involved with the family. See id. at 134. In July 2022, the trial court approved an IA for Mother and Boyfriend, but in March 2023, the IA was discharged because Mother had not successfully completed the required services. Later that month, on March 24, 2023, DCS received a report that there was “on-going domestic violence” between Mother and Boyfriend. Tr. Vol. II p. 52. After investigation, DCS removed the Children from the home and filed a CHINS petition (“the Petition”). See id.; Ex. Vol. III pp. 33–36, 91–94. In the Petition, DCS alleged that the case was opened due to domestic violence between Mother and Boyfriend in the presence of the Children and substance abuse.

[6] On May 4, 2023, the trial court accepted Mother's stipulation and agreed dispositional order with DCS, admitting the Children were CHINS “due to allegations of domestic violence in the home.” Id. at 43, 101. As a part of the agreed dispositional order, Mother agreed to the following requirements: maintain safe and suitable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income; complete a substance abuse assessment and follow necessary treatment; submit to random drug screening; meet with psychiatric personnel and take prescribed medication; not commit new acts of domestic violence; “successfully complete all recommendations as a result of any domestic violence assessment or program[;]” and attend scheduled visitations. Id. at 44–47, 102–05.

[7] Initially, Mother was compliant with services, but as of February 2024, the trial court found that Mother denied the existence of domestic violence in the home and was no longer compliant with the dispositional order. Mother failed to complete the required domestic violence services and continued to be in a relationship with Boyfriend, “who was the perpetrator of domestic violence in the presence of the [C]hildren.” Id. at 61, 119. As a result, the trial court added a concurrent permanency plan of adoption.

[8] In January 2024, Family Case Manager Constance Kimball (“FCM Kimball”) began managing the family's case and in April 2024, FCM Kimball organized Child and Family Team Meetings (“CFTM”) with Mother every two weeks in an attempt to “get things done.” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Despite FCM Kimball's efforts, Mother failed to comply with the requirements of the dispositional order, and eventually, the CFTMs decreased to once every three weeks, then to once every month.

[9] On July 22, 2024, DCS filed its Verified Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights (“the termination petition”). See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 17, 24. The fact-finding hearing was held on March 17, 2025, and at the time of the hearing, A.E was eleven years old, B.E. was fourteen years old, and they had been removed from Mother's care for almost two years. At the termination hearing, DCS presented testimony from the following witnesses: FCM Kimball, FCM Supervisor Mary Coulston (“FCM Coulston”); Theodore Hull (“Hull”), a home-based case manager through Firefly Family and Children Alliance who has been involved with Mother since April 2023; Adriene Higgins (“Higgins”), a Care Manager through the Hamilton Center who had been working with Mother since June 2022; and Laurie Weaver (“Therapist”), a therapist that worked with the Children through Raintree Consulting. At the hearing, DCS presented evidence regarding Mother's compliance with services pursuant to the dispositional order: (1) mental health services; (2) domestic violence services; (3) substance abuse; (4) enrolling in services recommended by service providers (parenting skills); and (5) securing and maintaining stable housing and income. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 43–47, 101–05.

[10] Mother was previously diagnosed with Bipolar II disorder. Mother received therapy services through the Hamilton Center for her diagnosis, but FCM Kimball noted that Mother had been “very inconsistent with therapy services” and that she was “not compliant with taking ․ medications.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 32–33. Moreover, FCM Kimball testified that, on the date of the hearing, she received notice from Mother's mental health service provider that her services were being cancelled for noncompliance. See id. at 67. However, Mother testified that she was taking her mental health medications nightly. See id. at 143.

[11] Hull provided housing, domestic violence prevention, transportation, and parenting skills services to Mother. He stated that there “has been no progression, [Mother] refuses to acknowledge that there has been any domestic violence, in this case, and she has told [Hull] she doesn't need any assistance with that.” Id. at 109. Over the course of the CHINS case, Mother was provided four separate referrals to domestic violence service providers, but each referral was closed unsuccessfully. In February 2024, Mother began services with Abuse, Awareness, and Accountability, which required Mother to “log on, be attentive, be awake, [and] engage in services virtually[.]” Id. at 33. From February through September 2024, Mother attended only thirteen of the forty sessions. See id. Due to her lack of attendance, Mother's referral for services through Abuse, Awareness, and Accountability was closed out in September 2024.

[12] Mother was also referred to another domestic violence service provider, the Rose Project. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact Mother, this referral was closed after approximately one month. See id. at 82. During the hearing, Mother stated that she does not need domestic violence counseling because her “case wasn't domestic violence[,] that was in the past.” Id. at 130. Mother emphasized that she has not been in a relationship with Boyfriend for some time and does not communicate with Father. Mother also claimed that she only received two referrals for domestic violence service providers: (1) Abuse, Awareness, and Accountability; and (2) Counseling Pathways. Mother later admitted that she had not completed either program but indicated that she would reengage in services if she knew that the Children were coming home to her.

[13] As far as services related to Mother's substance abuse, FCM Kimball noted that when she took over the case in January 2024, Mother was required to submit to random drug screening. After a three-month period of negative testing, Mother was not required to participate in further drug screening.

[14] Hull testified that he was working with Mother on parenting skills through the 1-2-3 Magic Curriculum. Hull stated that—after approximately one week—Mother “became frustrated with some portion of [the curriculum]” and stated, “no one is going to tell me how to parent my kids[.]” Id. at 110. Not long thereafter, Mother stopped participating in these parenting skills services.

[15] Mother was provided supervised visitation with the Children. FCM Coulston stated that the supervised visitation providers raised concerns about Mother's ability to manage the Children's behavior during the visits and often had to step in, manage, and redirect the Children. See id. at 57. Further, FCM Coulston explained that Mother “wanted that time to be more positive time, and didn't want to have that time to be responsible for discipline or redirection[.]” Id. at 58. Mother responded that she did not think that DCS should be telling her how to parent the Children but did acknowledge that her parenting “could be worked on[,]” and that there were “things that [she could] change about [her] parenting[.]” Id. at 136.

[16] At the time of the hearing, Mother was living at Counsel on Domestic Abuse (“CODA”), which is a domestic violence shelter, where she had resided since August 2023. Mother did not have to pay to reside there, and CODA permits children to reside at the shelter. While residing at CODA, Mother was able to work with Hull and budget to save approximately $400 a month. At the time of the hearing, Mother had accumulated approximately $3,600 in savings but testified that she did not feel the need to continue saving her money. Mother owed a local housing authority approximately $4,400 in past due rental payments. See id. at 78. Despite being encouraged to apply her savings against the housing authority debt, Mother refused and still owed the obligation as of the date of the hearing.

[17] Hull assisted Mother with the task of securing permanent housing. Despite Hull's assistance, Mother failed to follow up with the FCM when asked to do so and failed to take responsibility for obtaining the necessary documentation to secure housing. See id. at 109. Hull stated that “progression has only happened in the last month and a half, to get the Social Security cards and birth certificates for her and the kids. So, we are really at square [one.]” Id. When Mother was asked about CODA's conditions or requirements for Mother to remain living there, she stated that “they know my situation. They know that it wasn't the domestic violence, but it is a domestic violence shelter, but they know my situation and they gave me a place to stay[.]” Id. at 135. Mother acknowledged that CODA was not a forever home and that she would be looking for housing elsewhere for just herself and the Children.

[18] Mother did not have a driver's license and had to rely upon public transportation or rides from others. Hull stated that Mother has expressed interest in moving outside Terre Haute and living in a rural environment that lacked public transportation. Nonetheless, Mother has previously stated that “she can get where she needs to go, and does not need any assistance getting to where she needs to get.” Id. at 110.

[19] With respect to the Children's mental health, FCM Kimball explained that A.E. “struggles with stability, she does have some behaviors, even in current placement․ [that include] yelling and screaming ․ [and] hitting[.]” Id. at 73. In October 2024, A.E. was taken to the hospital by FCM Kimball due to an incident that occurred at her foster placement. During the incident, A.E. was expressing suicidal ideations, homicidal ideations, threatening the other foster children in the home, and threatening to jump out of a window. See Ex. Vo1. I Supp. p. 10. FCM Kimball explained that A.E. is on psychotropic medication and was admitted to a behavioral health center due to suicidal ideation. While at the behavioral health center, A.E. was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and intermittent explosive disorder. See id. at 10, 15. Further, FCM Kimball testified that A.E. does not do well with “being told no,” and “screaming, biting, hitting [occurs] towards anyone who is trying to direct her[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 88.

[20] Therapist worked with A.E. until she was hospitalized in October 2024, and then “engaged in case conferences for her transition of care,” and closed out services in December. Id. at 100. Therapist testified that A.E. “did not have boundaries with others, had difficulty following directives, ․ [and] threaten[ed] [ ]harm towards [her]self and also towards others.” Id. at 96. FCM Kimball noted that Mother was “in complete denial that [A.E.] has challenges that need to be addressed or medicated for. She doesn't believe in medication for herself or [A.E.].” Id. at 75.

[21] Therapist stated in order for Mother to successfully parent the Children, Mother would need to understand “trauma informed parenting” and “the cycle of domestic violence and how that impacts children” in order to meet A.E.’s emotional needs. Id. at 97. Therapist also indicated that Mother would need a stable home environment, to understand the trauma the Children have been through and to be able to communicate “effectively and reflectively.” Id. Mother's denial of the need for domestic violence services was a concern because “there isn't accountability and learned benefits from going through the education, and applying the skills.” See id. Moreover, Therapist stated that if Mother was not managing her own mental health needs that she “may not be as well equipped to manage the mental health of [the Children].” Id. at 98.

[22] At the time of the hearing the Children were placed in two separate foster homes. FCM Kimball noted that A.E. had only been in her current placement for a “couple of weeks now” and was struggling in her placement. Id. at 75. FCM Kimball said that B.E. was doing “very well” in his placement and noted that his “behaviors have diminished at this point [in] time.” Id. Since the Children's removal from Mother, A.E. had a total of twenty-four different placements, and B.E. had nineteen different placements.² Therapist noted that A.E. “threatens self-harm ․[and] has a very low self-esteem and self-worth[.]” Id. at 99. Therapist ultimately concluded that it would be best for A.E. to be placed in an adoptive home and “be stable in one (1) home.” Id. at 104.

[23] FCM Kimball testified that she believed it was in the best interests of the Children to terminate the parent-child relationship. See id. at 76. CASA Ron Hocking (“CASA Hocking”) also concluded that the Children would be better provided for if they were adopted or remained in a foster placement. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 107–12. CASA Hocking reasoned that adoption or a foster placement was best for the Children because Mother had not been compliant with services and would not be able to adequately support herself or the Children, and because the Children copied Mother's inappropriate behavior at the foster placements. Specifically, he felt that Mother does not have “the capability of providing ․ services that those children need.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27.

[24] Higgins was Mother's care manager through the Hamilton Center and had been working with Mother since June 2022. Higgins worked with Mother on her independence, which included connecting her to food pantries, assisting her with budgeting, helping her attend doctor's appointments, and getting her transportation. Higgins stated that her role “would change depending on where [Mother] was at in her current life.” Id. at 116–17. Higgins concluded that since she became involved in Mother's case, nothing had been resolved. See id. at 117. Higgins further stated that without her “physically directing [Mother]” to do things, there was just an overall “lack of motivation[,]” and that Mother “seem[ed] to struggle without someone physically taking her to and from places, guiding her, telling her what to say, what to do, in order to get the things that she needs done.” Id. at 120, 121. Hull also noted that Mother had not made significant progress in any of the services provided and none of the concerns had been resolved. Based on Mother's “lack of progress” in the prior twenty-three months, Hull had “concerns with [Mother's] ability to provide any kind of stability for the kids.” Id. at 111.

[25] DCS's plan for the Children was adoption and both of the Children's foster placements expressed interest in adopting the child in their care. B.E. has been with his current placement since August 2023; his placement had an attorney and was prepared to start the adoption process with DCS. As to A.E., her placement also expressed interest in adopting her if the termination proceeds despite only having A.E. placed in the home for approximately two weeks.

[26] At the end of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement and gave each party the opportunity to submit proposed findings and conclusions. On April 14, 2025, the trial court issued its written findings and conclusions and judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children (“the Order”). The trial court specifically found that Mother had “display[ed] a lack of accountability and motivation” in addressing issues with housing, domestic violence, mental health, and parenting skills as identified by DCS. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 122. The trial court noted that Mother remained unemployed, failed to “obtain suitable housing[,]” “refuse[d] to acknowledge having issues with domestic violence[,]” and remained inconsistent in her mental health treatment. Id. at 122–23. Although Mother's substance abuse issues were no longer a concern for DCS and she had “fairly consistent” attendance with her home-based caseworker, the trial court found that Mother still “needed oversight and was unable to manage the [C]hildren's behavior.” Id. at 123.

[27] The trial court concluded that the Children have been adjudicated CHINS on three separate occasions, have spent fifteen of the last twenty-two months removed from the Parents and under the supervision of DCS, “[d]espite DCS's reasonable efforts ․ the [P]arents have been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [Children] being placed in care outside the [P]arent's home[,]” and “the conditions that resulted in the [C]hildren's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the [P]arents will not be remedied[.]” Id. at 122. In terminating Mother's parental rights, the trial court also determined that Mother did not have the ability to care for herself nor the Children; that termination was in the best interests of the Children; that there is a satisfactory plan for the care of the Children, which is adoption; that the Children need stability and permanency; and the CASA had recommended termination. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[28] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to the Children, claiming the trial court erred in entering certain findings and that there was insufficient evidence supporting the termination decision. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). However, “parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” Id. (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.). We note that “[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” Id.

[29] “Decisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). “We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 642 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). Our review is confined to two steps: “whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229–30 (Ind. 2013)). “[W]e will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996)).

I. Challenged Findings of Fact

[30] Mother first contends that the record fails to support the trial court's findings set forth in Finding 9.d. of the Order, which stated:

Despite being involved in multiple domestic violence cases, including Child In Need of Services cases, as well as being the victim in at least one criminal case resulting in a domestic battery conviction, Mother refuses to acknowledge having issues with domestic violence and does not believe she needs domestic violence counseling. Mother has been referred to four different domestic violence service providers and has been closed out by each provider due to non-compliance. One of such providers included an Abuse[,] Awareness[, a]nd Accountability course. Mother only completed 13 of 40 sessions. Mother has not engaged in domestic violence services since September of 2024.

Appellant's App. Vol. II. p. 122. Mother argues that “[t]he record does not support the court's finding that Mother refuses to acknowledge the existence of domestic violence[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 18. Mother does not contest the other facts set forth in Finding 9.d. and readily admits that she does not believe she needs domestic violence counseling. Mother claims the court's use of the present tense is not accurate, arguing that there is no evidence of current domestic violence, only past occurrences, and that because she no longer resides with Father or Boyfriend, she does not have present issues with domestic violence. Further, Mother argues that her parental rights cannot be terminated for failure to participate in unnecessary services. See id. at 20.

[31] We address Mother's latter argument first. Mother cites to In re A.C. in support of her contention that her parental rights cannot be terminated for failure to participate in unnecessary services. 905 N.E.2d 456, 464–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). However, In re A.C. is readily distinguishable. Id. In that case, a parent timely challenged the terms of a CHINS dispositional order requiring participation in certain substance abuse services. Our Court reversed, concluding that they were “unable to find any allegation or even an indication that Mother has a substance abuse problem” and that the “evidence does not support the juvenile court's participation decree[.]” Id. at 464. However, in the present case, Mother not only failed to challenge the CHINS dispositional order, but she specifically agreed to participate in domestic violence related services under the terms of the agreed dispositional order. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 43–48, 101–106. To the extent Mother argues that domestic violence services were not necessary, she raises this issue for the first time on appeal. It is well settled that a party on appeal waives a claim by raising it for the first time on appeal. See e.g., In re S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (stating “a parent may waive a due-process claim in a CHINS or termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal.”). There is no indication in the record that Mother challenged the services offered to her by DCS during the CHINS or termination proceedings. Any argument that services ordered in the dispositional order are not necessary is therefore waived.

[32] It is undisputed that there has been a long history of domestic violence issues in Mother's household. Mother's first two CHINS cases (2016 and 2019) involved domestic violence issues, and the underlying CHINS case (2023) likewise involved domestic violence issues. It is also undisputed that Mother does not believe that she needs domestic violence services based upon her mistaken belief that her “case wasn't domestic violence[,] that was in the past.” Tr. Vol. II p. 130. Hull, Mother's home-based services provider, noted that Mother “refuses to acknowledge that there has been any domestic violence[.]” Id. at 109. The trial court's finding does not state that Mother is currently suffering from occurrences of domestic violence but rather expresses Mother's lack of insight into her need for domestic violence services. As a result, we conclude that the trial court's findings set forth in Finding 9.d. of the Order were supported by the evidence presented at the hearing.

II. Sufficient Evidence

[33] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (“the Termination Statute”). With respect to subsection (d) of the Termination Statute, DCS alleged the following circumstances:

(2) That: (A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and (B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2),(3),(5). “DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.” In re R.S., 158 N.E.3d 432, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). “Due to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) being written in the disjunctive, the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d 481, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025).

A. DCS's Allegations Under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d)

[34] In the termination petition, DCS alleged circumstances under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2), (3), and (5) existed. The trial court concluded in its order that DCS proved each of these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Since Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court need only find that one requirement of subsection (d) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re A.L., 273 N.E.3d at 489. Here, Mother does not challenge the trial court's finding under subsection (d)(5) that the Children had previously been adjudicated as CHINS on two separate occasions. This finding was supported by the record. Indeed, at the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from FCM Coulston that DCS filed its first CHINS petition in April 2016, then filed another CHINS petition in May 2019, and filed its third petition in March 2023. Tr. Vol. II pp. 45, 47, 52; Ex. Vol. IV pp. 26–62; Ex. Vol. III pp. 6–122, 153–215. In all three cases (April 2016, May 2019, and March 2023), the Children were adjudicated CHINS. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 121. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court's finding under subsection (d)(5) was supported by clear and convincing evidence.³

B. Best Interests

[35] Mother contends that DCS failed to prove termination of the parent-child relationship was in the Children's best interest. To determine if termination is in the best interests of a child, the trial court “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citing In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.). A central interest is a child's need for permanency. Id. (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009)). “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648).

[36] The underlying CHINS petition was the third occasion where the Children had been adjudicated CHINS based on domestic violence in Mother's household. In addition to these CHINS petitions, Mother had two IAs, both of which were discharged as unsuccessful. Less than a month after being discharged unsuccessfully from the second IA, DCS received a report of neglect based on allegations that domestic violence was again occurring in the home. See Ex. Vol. III pp. 34, 92. After an investigation, DCS removed the Children from the home. Mother eventually entered into an agreement with DCS, stipulating that domestic violence was a contributing factor for DCS's involvement and admitting the Children were CHINS.

[37] Throughout the case, Mother was non-compliant with court-ordered domestic violence related services. One service provider, Hull, noted that there had “been no progression, [Mother] refuses to acknowledge that there has been any domestic violence, in this case, and she has told [Hull] she doesn't need any assistance with that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 109. After the dispositional order was issued, Mother was provided with multiple referrals to domestic violence service providers which she did not complete. For example, Mother only attended thirteen out of forty sessions of the virtual Abuse, Awareness, and Accountability program before her referral was closed. Rather than address her failure to complete the services, Mother instead maintained that she does not need domestic violence counseling because her “case wasn't domestic violence[,] that was in the past[,]” and that she is no longer in a relationship with Boyfriend nor does she communicate with Father. Id. at 130.

[38] FCM Kimball, CASA Hocking, and Higgins all had concerns as to Mother's ability to adequately care for the Children. FCM Kimball explained that it was in the best interest of the Children to terminate the parent-child relationship.⁴ See id. at 76. FCM Kimball testified that it would be difficult for Mother to maintain stability due to being unemployed, residing at the domestic violence shelter, lacking transportation, and her failure to comply with domestic violence counseling and services. See id. at 91–92. Higgins noted that because of Mother's lack of progress in the last twenty-three months, she had concerns for her “ability to provide any kind of stability for the kids.” Id. at 111. Further, Higgins explained that Mother struggled without someone assisting her, guiding her, or telling her what to do in order to accomplish daily tasks. See id. at 120. Additionally, CASA Hocking recommended termination of Mother's parental rights and believed that it was in the Children's best interests to be adopted or remain in foster placement. See Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 107–12. He noted that the Children copy Mother's inappropriate behavior in their foster placements, and he did not believe that Mother had “the capability of providing ․ services that those children need.” Tr. Vol. II p. 27.

[39] Mother argues that her noncompliance with domestic violence services is immaterial and DCS should excuse Mother from complying with the dispositional order as it did her requirement to receive substance abuse services. Because Mother provided consistent, clean drug screens, DCS did not require Mother to complete further substance abuse services, as required by the dispositional order. Mother's argument represents an invitation to reweigh the evidence, we decline to do so. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Irrespective of whether Mother was in need of continued substance abuse services, it is clear that Mother was in need of domestic violences services in order to ensure that Mother had the ability to provide the Children with a home that was free from domestic violence.

[40] At the time of the hearing, B.E. and A.E. were placed in separate foster homes. B.E. had been with his current placement since August 2023, and FCM Kimball noted that B.E. was doing “very well” in his placement and that his “behaviors have diminished at this point [in] time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75. Although A.E. had only been in her placement for approximately two weeks and had displayed some emotional issues, her placement noted that A.E. “is really, really sweet and you can see a lot of potential in her ․ she struggles to understand that she is wanted, and she's loved[.]” Id. at 122.

[41] Therapist emphasized that to be successful in parenting the Children, Mother would need to understand “trauma informed parenting,” and “the cycle of domestic violence and how that impacts children.” Id. at 97. Additionally, Therapist noted the importance of Mother managing her own mental health needs and ultimately questioned Mother's ability to manage the Children's mental health needs if she was not managing her own. Therapist also emphasized the importance of having a stable home environment, being able to communicate efficiently and effectively, and understanding the trauma that the Children had been through. Mother failed to demonstrate an ability to provide for the Children's emotional needs, a point further demonstrated by Mother's refusal to acknowledge the benefits of domestic violence services.

[42] In support of her claim that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's best interests finding, Mother argues that she has a stable residence and sufficient financial resources to secure housing for her and the Children. Mother also argues that since the CHINS filing, she is no longer in a relationship with Father nor Boyfriend and therefore, has remedied any concern for domestic violence in the future. As stated above, Mother's history demonstrates a long pattern of domestic abuse, with Mother both as the victim and the perpetrator. Mother's lack of insight into her need of domestic violence services places the Children and Mother at great risk of repeating the same cycle of violence and trauma. In this instance, Mother had nearly two years to engage in services and comply with the terms of the dispositional order but failed to do so. The trial court's conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the Children was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

C. Satisfactory Plan

[43] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan of care and treatment for the Children. Our court has previously explained for a “plan to be satisfactory, for the purposes of the termination statute, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied. “A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children.” Id. (citing Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375).

[44] DCS's plan was for the Children to be adopted, and each child's foster placement testified that they had a desire to adopt the child placed with them. B.E. had been in his current placement since August 2023, and his foster placement had secured an attorney to begin the adoption process. Although A.E. had only been in her foster placement for approximately two weeks, her placement expressed interest in adopting her. Even if either adoption did not ultimately occur, DCS's plan was satisfactory. Our Court has previously concluded that “a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not identified a specific family to adopt the children.” Id. Rather, “it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007.

[45] Mother argues that the numerous placements of the Children, the Children's placement in separate foster homes, and A.E.’s stay at a behavioral health center demonstrate that DCS did not have a satisfactory plan for the placement of the Children. While the number of placements for each of the Children is concerning, Mother's arguments amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say the trial court erred in concluding DCS had a satisfactory plan for the treatment and care of the Children.

Conclusion

[46] Based on the above, we conclude that the findings challenged by Mother were supported by the record, and the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[47] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The biological father of the Children also had his parental rights terminated in the same proceedings as Mother but does not participate in the present appeal. See Appellee's Br. p. 5.

2.   The record does not disclose why the Children were subjected to so many separate placements. Nonetheless, the number of placements is alarming, particularly in light of A.E.’s mental health diagnoses and the Children's exposure to trauma.

3.   Since Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, and we have found that sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that the Children had been adjudicated as CHINS on two separate occasions, we need not address Mother's other arguments under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d).

4.   Mother asks this court to reconsider our well-established precedent that the recommendation of a family case manager is sufficient to show that a termination is in a child's best interest. See Appellant's Reply. Br. pp. 4–5. However, Mother raises this issue for the first time in her reply brief, and it is therefore waived. See Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Magwerks Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 977 (Ind. 2005) (stating, “The law is well settled that grounds for error may only be framed in an appellant's initial brief and if addressed for the first time in the reply brief, they are waived.”).

Foley, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.