IN RE: A.H. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.L. (“Mother”) and J.H. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court's determination that one of their children is a child in need of services (CHINS) and the resulting dispositional decree. Parents argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the CHINS adjudication and the requirements in the dispositional decree. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents have two children together: B.H., born in August 2012, and A.H. (“Child”), born in March 2016.

[3] In the fall of 2022, Child was living with Mother while B.H. was living with Father. In September, police searched Mother's home as part of a criminal investigation and found methamphetamine and paraphernalia, including “items of paraphernalia and methamphetamine residue ․ in close proximity to [C]hild's toys.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 42. Mother was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent, Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance, Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.¹ The trial court there issued a no-contact order prohibiting Mother from having contact with Child, then six years old, so Child began living with Father and B.H. In November 2022, the court modified the no-contact order to allow Mother to have visitation with Child up to four days a week, supervised by Father and for no more than four hours at a time.

[4] In May 2025, while Mother's criminal case was still pending, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that Mother had violated the no-contact order by attending an awards ceremony at Child's school and that she “appeared to be under the influence of illegal substances” at the ceremony. Id. at 41. DCS spoke to Child, then nine, and she reported that she'd been living with Mother and that Father and B.H. “come and visit sometimes.” Id. at 42. As a result, Parents were both charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy—Mother for violating the no-contact order in her criminal case and Father for aiding or inducing Mother to violate the order by allowing Child to live with her.

[5] On June 3, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child is a CHINS. The initial and detention hearings were held together, at which Father waived his right to counsel. The trial court ordered that Child be removed from Father's care and placed with his parents (“Paternal Grandparents”). (B.H. remained in Father's care at that time.) The court scheduled mediation for July 21 via Zoom and a fact-finding hearing for July 29. Mother participated in mediation with counsel, but Father didn't attend, purportedly because his phone broke the night before. In the mediated agreed entry, Mother admitted that Child is a CHINS and agreed to participate in certain services. The court took Mother's agreement under advisement pending the fact-finding hearing for Father.

[6] On July 27, two days before the fact-finding hearing, DCS received a report that Father was “observed to be impaired” at B.H.’s. baseball game and that he'd driven with B.H. in the car. Tr. p. 42. Assessment Family Case Manager (FCM) Jaylyn Coleman went to Father's house with a police officer to investigate the report, but Father refused to cooperate and told them to “f*** off.” Id. at 43. Father was “very erratic and agitated,” and both FCM Coleman and the officer believed him to be under the influence. Id. FCM Coleman asked Father to submit to a drug screen, but he refused. Due to the lack of a sober caregiver for B.H., DCS filed a petition alleging that he is a CHINS.² B.H. was also placed with Paternal Grandparents.

[7] The day of the fact-finding hearing in Child's case, Father called the court and said he wouldn't be attending because he was at work and didn't have a ride. The hearing proceeded in Father's absence. Permanency FCM Alycia Hacker testified that DCS still had concerns about Mother using drugs and that although drug use wasn't an issue for Father, there were concerns about his alcohol use. FCM Hacker noted that Parents refused to submit to drug screens for DCS. FCM Coleman testified that when she went to Father's house on July 27 to investigate the report that he was impaired while caring for B.H., his eyes were glassy, his speech was slurred, and “he had to hold onto the door frame to hold him up.” Id. at 43. After the close of evidence, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS.

[8] DCS submitted its predispositional report in August, recommending (among other things) that Father complete a substance-abuse assessment, submit to random drug and alcohol screens, attend supervised visitation, and participate in individual therapy, family therapy, and fatherhood engagement. Later that month, Parents hired new counsel to represent them both, and counsel moved to set aside Mother's mediated agreement and the CHINS adjudication. The trial court denied the motion.

[9] The court held a dispositional hearing as to Father in September. FCM Hacker testified that DCS recommended a substance-abuse assessment and random screening because Father “appeared to be under the influence” during his interaction with FCM Coleman and refused to submit to any screens for DCS. Id. at 54. Although Father had submitted to one screen on his own, DCS was concerned because Father “was not observed at the time” of collection. Id. at 73. FCM Hacker opined that individual therapy would help Father with his anger and verbal aggression and “not only to have a better relationship with [M]other [and] his children but with himself.” Id. at 62. She further explained that both individual therapy and fatherhood engagement would help Father better communicate with his family. FCM Hacker also noted that, at a child-and-family team meeting (CFTM), Mother had requested that the family participate in family therapy due to communication issues between her and Father. Before Mother made this request, Father had been asked to leave the CFTM because he was “getting ․ loud.” Id. at 52. FCM Hacker testified that Father “made clear” to DCS that “he doesn't believe that the department needs to be involved in his life.” Id.

[10] At the end of the hearing, the court accepted DCS's dispositional recommendations but added that it would only “require the drug and alcohol abuse evaluation if a screen comes back failed.” Id. at 80. The court also noted that if Father produced clean screens until the periodic review hearing in December, it would “entertain” returning Child to his care.³ Id. That same day, the court accepted Mother's mediated agreement and issued dispositional decrees for Parents.

[11] Parents now jointly appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Parents contend that both the CHINS adjudication and the requirements in the dispositional decree are not supported by the evidence.⁴ When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a CHINS determination or CHINS disposition, we grant deference to the trial court and give due regard to its ability to assess the credibility of witnesses. In re A.C., 198 N.E.3d 1, 9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's decision.” Id. at 10.

I. The trial court's CHINS adjudication was not clearly erroneous

[13] Parents first argue that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that Child is a CHINS. We will reverse a CHINS adjudication only upon a showing that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012).

[14] Here, DCS alleged that Child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. A child is a CHINS under this statute if, before the child turns 18,

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. An adjudication under this statute “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied.

[15] We first note that Mother admitted that Child is a CHINS in her mediated agreement, that the trial court denied Parents’ motion to set aside the agreement, and that Parents don't challenge this denial on appeal. But even beyond Mother's admission, DCS presented sufficient evidence that Parents’ actions and inactions have seriously endangered Child. DCS's involvement here began when it received a report that Mother appeared to be under the influence at an awards ceremony at Child's school. At the time, Child was supposed to be living with Father due to the no-contact order in Mother's 2022 criminal case, which stemmed from police finding methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Mother's home and near Child's toys. But instead, Child had been living with Mother with Father's knowledge. As a result, Parents were both charged with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, and Child was placed with Paternal Grandparents. Two days before the fact-finding hearing, Father was “observed to be impaired” at B.H.’s. baseball game and reportedly drove with B.H. in the car. When FCM Coleman and police went to Father's house that day, they noticed that his eyes were glassy, his speech was slurred, and “he had to hold onto the door frame to hold him up.” Although Child wasn't in Father's care at that time, he was the only reunification option due to Mother's no-contact order, but he was unable to be a sober caregiver for Child.

[16] The evidence also establishes that Child's needs are unmet and are unlikely to be met without State coercion. FCM Hacker testified at the fact-finding hearing (for which Father failed to appear) that DCS still had concerns about Mother's drug use and Father's alcohol use. Despite reports that Parents had each been visibly under the influence at events for their children, they hadn't submitted to any random drug screens for DCS. Although Father submitted to one screen on his own, he “was not observed at the time” of collection. In addition to his refusal to screen, Father has been generally uncooperative with DCS. When FCM Coleman and police tried to investigate the report that he was impaired while caring for B.H., he told them to “f*** off.” He was verbally aggressive with FCM Hacker, and he was asked to leave a CFTM because he was “getting ․ loud.” As FCM Hacker testified, Father has “made clear” that “he doesn't believe that the department needs to be involved in his life.”

[17] Parents have not shown that the CHINS adjudication was clearly erroneous.

II. The requirements of Father in the dispositional decree are supported by the evidence

[18] Parents also argue that the trial court erred in ordering Father to participate in services as part of the dispositional decree. “Although the juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate, the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was revealed by the evidence.” K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1258.

[19] Parents contend that the evidence doesn't support the trial court ordering Father to participate in fatherhood engagement, individual or family therapy, a substance-abuse assessment, random drug screens, or supervised visitation. We disagree. At the dispositional hearing, FCM Hacker testified that individual therapy would help Father with his anger and verbal aggression and “not only to have a better relationship with [M]other [and] his children but with himself.” She opined that both individual therapy and fatherhood engagement would help Father better communicate with his family. Indeed, Mother had requested at a CFTM (after Father had been asked to leave) that the family participate in family therapy due to communication issues between her and Father.

[20] As for the substance-abuse assessment and random drug screens, as explained above, Father was observed to be under the influence but refused to submit to any screens for DCS. Because Child can't be returned to Mother's care due to the no-contact order, DCS must ensure that Father can be a sober caregiver for Child. The inability to confirm Father's sobriety also supports the requirement that his visitation be supervised. And supervised visitation is further warranted given that, while Child was supposed to be living with Father and Father was supposed to be supervising Mother's visitation, Father allowed Child to live with Mother in violation of the no-contact order. Notably, the trial court limited these requirements based on the evidence—it noted that it would require Father to complete a substance-abuse assessment only “if a screen comes back failed” and that if he produced clean screens until the next review hearing, it would “entertain” returning Child to his care.

[21] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to participate in services as part of the dispositional decree.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This case is still pending.

2.   B.H. was adjudicated a CHINS in October 2025.

3.   As of the review hearing on December 3, 2025, Father had submitted to one drug screen, which was positive only for a prescribed medication. See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 p. 24.

4.   Parents purport to allege due-process violations as a third issue (which, as DCS points out, they didn't raise in the trial court), but this “issue” is merely a restatement of Parents’ sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.