Sheldon K. Haycraft, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A confidential informant called Sheldon Haycraft and arranged to buy from him two “8-balls” of methamphetamine for $160. When the confidential informant arrived at Haycraft's trailer, Haycraft seemingly weighed the methamphetamine on a small scale, packaged it in a blue plastic bag, and sold it at the going street rate. During Haycraft's later trial for dealing in methamphetamine arising from this transaction, the trial court refused his request for a jury instruction on entrapment because the State presented evidence of his predisposition to deal methamphetamine. Haycraft appeals, claiming the trial court erred in refusing the entrapment instruction. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In March 2023, Ashley Whitehouse began working as a confidential informant for the Harrison County Sheriff's Department. Whitehouse told the officers that she knew Haycraft, a social acquaintance, would be willing to sell drugs to her.

[3] Whitehouse thereafter contacted Haycraft by phone and arranged to purchase two “8-balls” of methamphetamine—approximately seven grams—for $160. Whitehouse met law enforcement officers immediately before the scheduled drug buy. The officers searched her person and vehicle to ensure she had no illegal contraband, equipped her with audio and video recording devices, and followed her as she drove to Haycraft's trailer.

[4] Once inside Haycraft's trailer, Whitehouse purchased 3.6 grams of methamphetamine from him for $80. During the transaction, which was captured on the recording device, Haycraft weighed the methamphetamine on a small scale and delivered it to Whitehouse in a small, blue plastic bag. Law enforcement officers later testified that such scales and plastic bags are commonly used in the sale of narcotics. Haycraft told Whitehouse that he only had enough methamphetamine for one 8-ball, rather than the two that she sought. He handed back $80 of the $160 she had given him. Whitehouse left and returned to the officers, to whom she gave the methamphetamine she had just purchased.

[5] The State charged Haycraft with Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. At his jury trial, at which the recording of the drug buy was admitted, Haycraft requested an entrapment instruction. The trial court found the instruction was not merited because the State had presented evidence of Haycraft's predisposition—including his knowledge of “drug price, weight, [and] drug terminology”—and because Haycraft had “not met his burden to show [that he] was not predisposed to commit the offense.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 72. The jury found Haycraft guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 8 years imprisonment, with 3 years suspended to probation. Haycraft appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Haycraft raises a single issue: whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment. “A claim of error in instructing the jury is usually reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). When evaluating the propriety of an instruction, we consider whether: (1) the instruction correctly states the law; (2) there is evidence in the record supporting the instruction; and (3) the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 267 (Ind. 2023). We conclude the trial court correctly found that the evidence did not support the entrapment instruction.

I. The Entrapment Defense

[7] A criminal defendant may raise entrapment as a defense if the defendant's “prohibited conduct ․ was the product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent, using persuasion or other means likely to cause the person to engage in the conduct” and “the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(a) (Entrapment Statute). “Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit the offense does not constitute entrapment.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(b).

[8] “Once the defendant has indicated an intent to rely on the affirmative defense of entrapment and has established government participation, the burden shifts to the State to show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime[.]” Scott v. State, 772 N.E.2d 473, 474-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “Even in the context of undisputed police participation in criminal activity, if evidence of the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime is presented, the defendant is not entitled to an instruction on the entrapment defense unless he presents evidence showing a lack of predisposition.” Strong v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

[9] Indiana courts have long recognized the circumstances that bear on predisposition. These include knowledge of the going price of the drugs on the criminal market, familiarity with drug terminology, possession of drug-related apparatus, the manner of the sale itself, and the accused's readiness to participate. McKrill v. State, 452 N.E.2d 946, 949 (Ind. 1983) (quoting Sowers v. State, 416 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)).

II. The State Presented Substantial Evidence of Haycraft's Predisposition

[10] The parties do not dispute that Haycraft's proposed entrapment instruction correctly stated the law or that its substance was not covered by other instructions. Their disagreement centers on whether the trial court properly determined that the instruction was not supported by the evidence.

[11] The evidence showed police involvement in the drug deal. The burden therefore shifted to the State to prove Haycraft's predisposition to sell drugs. The evidence on that issue showed Whitehouse knew that Haycraft possessed methamphetamine. When Whitehouse called Haycraft and arranged to purchase two 8-balls for $160, Haycraft agreed. The record reflects no hesitation on his part, and he appeared relaxed and casual during the drug buy captured on the police recording equipment that Haycraft was wearing.

[12] Additionally, the term “8-ball” employed in the drug buy is specialized drug-trade terminology referring to 3.5 grams of methamphetamine. Haycraft appeared to weigh the methamphetamine on a small scale to ensure that it met the requirements of an 8-ball. Haycraft also informed Whitehouse that the plastic baggie he was handing her contained 3.6 grams of methamphetamine. Small scales and blue plastic bags are commonly associated with the drug dealing trade.

[13] When it turned out Haycraft could supply only one 8-ball, rather than the two to which Whitehouse and Haycraft had earlier agreed, Haycraft counted out $80 of the $160 she had given him and returned that $80 to her. His ability to seamlessly adjust the quantity, price, and payment—all consistent with the going street rate of $50 to $100 per 8-ball—demonstrated not only his understanding of drug-trade terminology but also his knowledge of market pricing, weights, and the mechanics of drug transactions. See Wallace v. State, 498 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind. 1986) (noting that knowledge of various routine elements of the drug trade including lingo, pricing, and drug quantities suggests predisposition to sell drugs); McKrill, 452 N.E.2d at 949 (finding “possession of apparatus” and “the manner of the sale itself” relevant to predisposition). Given this evidence, the State met its burden by producing evidence that Haycraft displayed multiple indicators of predisposition

III. Haycraft Failed to Counter the Evidence of His Predisposition

[14] Haycraft argues that he effectively counters the State's evidence of predisposition with evidence of his lack of predisposition. He notes that Whitehouse had never previously purchased drugs from him and that she did not know whether he had sold drugs to anyone else. Although Haycraft, who was 60 years old at sentencing, has an extensive criminal history, he notes that he had never been charged with dealing drugs.¹

[15] Haycraft's focus on Whitehouse's intent and knowledge is inapt. The pertinent question regarding predisposition is whether criminal intent was “deliberately implanted in the mind of an innocent person[.]” Cherry v. State, 254 N.E.3d 1100, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Clark v. State, 209 N.E.3d 444, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). Thus, it is Haycraft's intent that is at issue—not Whitehouse's.

[16] Whitehouse's lack of familiarity with Haycraft's drug-dealing activities is not evidence that Haycraft lacked a predisposition to sell drugs. It simply reflects Whitehouse's limited knowledge. That Whitehouse had never personally bought drugs from Haycraft does not mean Haycraft was unwilling or unable to sell them. To the contrary, Whitehouse testified that she knew Haycraft would be willing to sell her methamphetamine—which is itself some evidence of predisposition.

[17] Haycraft's focus on Whitehouse's motives for serving as a confidential informant and cooperating with police is similarly misplaced. Whitehouse's personal motivations bear on her credibility but not on the relevant inquiry: Haycraft's predisposition to sell methamphetamine. At most, Whitehouse's contact with Haycraft merely afforded him an opportunity to commit the offense, which “does not constitute entrapment.” Wallace, 498 N.E.2d at 964; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-9(b).

[18] The trial court carefully considered the arguments of both parties during an extensive colloquy before denying the instruction. On this record, the court's decision was well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that the evidence did not support the instruction.

Conclusion

[19] The record reveals ample evidence of Haycraft's predisposition to deal methamphetamine. Haycraft offered no probative evidence of his lack of predisposition. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment.

[20] We affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The jury did not hear any evidence of Haycraft's criminal history.

Weissmann, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Foley, J., concur.